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THE REVOLUTIONARY 
PERIOD IN EUROPE 



THE CENTURY HISTORICAL SERIES 

George Lincoln Burr, 
of Cornell University, General Editor 



THE VOLUMES 

I Introduction to the Study of History. George 
L. Burr of Cornell University. 

II The Ancient World. (To about 49 B. C.) 
William L. Westermann of the University of 
Wisconsin. 

III Rome. (To about 568 A. D.) 

IV The Middle Ages. (To about 1273.) Dana C. 

Munro of the University of Wisconsin. 

V The Ren.mssance and the Reformation. (To 
about 1598.) Earle W. Dow of the University 
of Michigan. 

VI The Period of the Absolute Monarchies. 
(1603 to 1763.) Wilbur C. Abbott of Yale 
University. 

VII The Revolutionary Period. (From 1763 to 
1815.) Henry E. Bourne of Western Reserve 
University. 

VIII The Nineteenth Century. (1815 ir 1900.) 
William E. Lingelbach of the Uni- ' y of 
Pennsylvania. 



THE CENTURY CO. 



NEW YORK 



THE REVOLUTIONARY 
PERIOD IN EUROPE 

(1763-1815) ()T^ffT 



BY 

HENRY ELDRIDGE BOURNE 

Professor of History in Western Reserve University 




T^^ 



NEW YORK 
THE CENTURY CO. 

1914 



Copyright, 191 4, by 
The Century Co. 



JAN -6 1915 



©CI.A:i91267 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PACT 

I -^HE PEOPLE AND THE OLD REGIME 3 

II GOVERNMENT IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 19 

III CURRENTS OF PUBLIC OPINION 33 

IV THE WORK OF THE BENEVOLENT DESPOTS 48 

• V THE FRENCH MONARCHY AS A BENEVOLENT DESPOTISM . 62 

VI THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 76 

VII THE FALL OF THE OLD REGIME IN FRANCE 88 

VIII REVOLUTIONARY REORGANIZATION I07 

IX THE FINANCES AND THE CHURCH I25 

X THE MENACE OF CIVIL WAR 137 

XI THE REVOLUTION AND EUROPE 150 y^- 

XII THE WAR AND THE MONARCHY l6g 

XIII THE REIGN OF FORCE I94 

XIV THE ATTEMPT TO ORGANIZE THE REPUBLIC 2l8 



XV IMPERIALISM AND BANKRUPTCY 



232 



XVI THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AS A GREAT POWER ..... 248 

XVII A BENEFICENT DICTATORSHIP 267 

XVIII BEGINNINGS OF REVOLUTION IN GERMANY 286 



XIX FROM CONSULATE TO EMPIRE 



XX THE NEW CHARLEMAGNE 



XXI THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM 



301 



317 



340 



XXII THE REORGANIZATION OF PRUSSIA 367 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



CHAPTER PAGE 

XXIII THE SCOPE OF REFORM IN EUROPE 383 

XXIV THE FRENCH EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT 400 

XXV THE LAST GREAT VENTURE 414 

XXVI THE COLLAPSE OF THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE 429 

O XXVII THE RESTORATION IN FRANCE AND IN EUROPE .... 446 

NOTES ON BOOKS 467 

INDEX aRc 



LIST OF MAPS 



FACING 

PAGE 



1 INEQUALITIES OF THE SALT TAX 8 

2 EUROPE IN 1763 24 

3 PARTITIONS OF POLAND 56 

4 PARIS AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE REVOLUTION 104 

5 NORTHERN ITALY AT THE PERIOD OF NAPOLEON'S FIRST 

CAMPAIGN 240 

6 GERMANY BEFORE THE REVOLUTION 296 

7 CENTR.A.L EUROPE IN 1803 312 

8 CENTRAL EUROPE AFTER 18 15 456 



THE REVOLUTIONARY 
PERIOD IN EUROPE 



f 



THE REVOLUTIONARY 
PERIOD IN EUROPE 

CHAPTER I 

THE PEOPLE AND THE OLD REGIME 

THE close of the Seven Years' War brought only a lull in chap. i 
the great conflicts of the eighteenth century, and yet for jy^^^irsg 
a time men seemed less influenced by dynastic quarrels, and 
their attention was centered upon questions of social and politi- Reform 
cal reconstruction. The policies of rulers were afifected by these iu4?in " 
newer interests. They tried to make an end of crying abuses, Europe 
or at least to simplify their administrative systems and to re- 
move troublesome obstacles to the exercise of their authority. 
In the last years of the century the timid plans of monarchical 
reform in France were thrust aside by a popular revolution 
which aimed to reorganize society according to the principle of 
equality. The same principle of reorganization was carried be- 
yond the ancient frontiers of France when war broke out and 
victorious French armies sought to enlarge the borders of the 
nation or to impose the national institutions upon dependent 
peoples. Before the period closed with the downfall of Na- 
poleon and the settlement of 1815, these two forces of mon- 
archical reform and revolutionary action had worked many 
changes in the structure of European society. 

No brief description of the characteristic features of the old 
regime can be made altogether satisfactory, because within the 
limits of a single country, or even of a province, there existed 
such baffling diversity. Although the proportions of truth are 
difficult to fix, the impression grows irresistible that the classi- 
fications of men in the eighteenth century were outworn, rigid, 
and unfair, and that those who labored on the farm or in the 
shop were seriously hampered by restrictions laid upon them by 
law and custom. When Rousseau declared in 1762 that " Man 
is born free and is everywhere in chains," the second part of 
his statement was sufficiently exact in the economic and the 
larger social sense. 

3 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



The population of Europe was still mainly rural and its prin- 
cipal occupation was agriculture. Nine-tenths of the French 
people lived in the country or in small towns. Lyons was the only 
city besides Paris which had over one hundred thousand inhabit- 
ants. In Germany Berlin had just passed the one hundred thou- 
sand mark. Birmingham and Manchester, the great manufactur- 
ing centers of England, which now have a population of over five 
hundred thousand, had about thirty thousand. The inventions 
which created the modern factory system and have filled the 
towns with throngs of artisans had not been made. Industry 
was carried on much as it had been for generations. 

In the country there were only two classes, lords and peas- 
ants. A middle class hardly existed except in England. In 
some parts of Europe the relations of lord and peasant were as 
primitive as on an English or French manor of the twelfth cen- 
tury. In Hungary the peasant could not even own land. He 
was in a sense the property of the noble and his rights were not 
recognized by law. Within the kingdom of Naples it is said 
that a thousand kinds of feudal dues might still be levied. Even 
where, as in France, a new social order had for centuries been 
displacing the feudal system, feudal survivals were apparent 
on every side in the structure of rural society. Nor was it a 
question merely of quitrents and other dues. The possession 
of a noble estate usually carried with it some governmental au- 
thority. The lord might be to all intents and purposes a petty 
sovereign or he might retain merely shreds of his former pow- 
ers. Absolute rulers did not always interfere with the local 
sovereignty of their nobles. The kings of Prussia, for example, 
did not venture to curtail the powers which the lords exercised 
ever their peasants. 

Many of the nobles in France could hardly be said to belong 
to the rural population, because they usually resided in Paris or 
Versailles. They found life far from the sunshine of royal 
favor unendurable, and many of them could not pay their ex- 
penses without the aid of gifts and pensions. The religious 
wars of the sixteenth century had uprooted them from the soil, 
and Louis XIV had sought to increase the splendor of his Court 
by insisting upon their presence. He also hoped in this way to 
cure them of the rebellious mood into which they had fallen 
during the regency of Marie de' Medici and during the Fronde. 

By the middle of the eighteenth century the court nobles 
formed a class of absentee landlords. Their estates were left 
in the hands of stewards, whose success was measured by the 
amount of dues they extracted from the peasantry. The ideal 



THE PEOPLE AND THE OLD REGIME 



of efficiency appealed to these stewards as to the other adminis- chap, i 
trative officials of the time. They examined the seigniorial 1750-89 
records containing statements of rights of lord or peasant in 
forests and common lands and of the dues which the peasant 
owed, in order that no part of their master's heritage might be 
lost by neglect or through patriarchal tenderness in enforcing 
collection. It seemed as if a feudal reaction were taking place. 

Still later in the century a fashion was adopted which prom- 
ised to correct the evil of absentee landlordism. The nobles 
imitated the English custom of spending several months every 
year in the country. Arthur Young, the English traveler, noted 
in his journal in September, 1787, that '*at this time of the year 
and for many weeks past, Paris is, comparatively speaking, 
empty. Everybody that have country-seats are at them; and 
those who have none visit others who have. This remarkable 
revolution in French manners is certainly one of the best cus- 
toms they have taken from England." The change, however, 
came too late to give the greater nobles any firm hold on the 
affections of the people or any large influence in local affairs. 

Among the lesser or provincial nobles there were many who 
lived habitually on their estates, absorbed by the cares of country 
gentlemen. The Marquis de Mirabeau, the father of the more 
famous Count de Mirabeau, was one. These nobles were not 
rich, but neither were they poor. They were on good terms 
with the peasants, and if their position in the community was not 
altogether satisfactory, it was through no fault of their own. 
There were also many nobles whose income raised them scarcely 
above the situation of the neighboring peasants. Arthur Young 
heard of nobles in southern France who were obliged to live on 
twenty-five louis a year. In 1789 several Poitevin nobles came 
to their electoral assembly dressed as peasants and without money 
enough to pay their bills at the inn. 

The noble's position was weak because his powers as seignior. The No- 
mere remnants of what he once possessed, made him the principal ^q^^^^^ 
creditor of his community, rather than its ruler, and, thereby, its 
natural leader and protector. The seigniorial court, where once 
the noble dispensed justice as a sovereign without appeal, pos- 
sessed only a shadow of its former authority. The cases brought 
before it were chiefly fiscal, disputes between the seignior and 
the peasants about rights and dues, the obligations of lord and 
tenant. Other services which the medieval noble had rendered 
to the community had suffered a similar transformation. He 
had caused a mill to be built, and had provided a wine-press and 
a bakery or public oven. He also maintained a market and was 



5 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

C HAP. I often responsible for the local roads and ferries. Now these 
1750-89 services had become privileges, giving him the sole right to let 
the contracts for grinding grain, pressing grapes, and baking 
bread. In his name tolls were charged on the roads and at the 
ferries and dues in the market-place. It was as seignior again, 
not as landlord in the narrow sense, that the noble could levy a 
cens or quitrent and other dues upon the peasant owners or rent- 
ers of land within his jurisdiction. All these rights he prized 
as the basis of his social superiority. He would not have con- 
sented to abandon them for a sum equal to the capitalized value 
of their annual revenue. As the royal government did not 
usually entrust him with local administrative duties, he had little 
or no opportunity to gain political leadership. His social position 
and his financial privileges, therefore, lacked the ordinary means 
of defense. 
^^^ If the position of the French noble was weak, that of the peas- 

ant was wretched. He has been called by Taine the " beast of 
burden " of the old regime. His miseries sprang from no single 
cause. They were due to the system of landholding, the weight 
of taxation, and to the backward state of agriculture. Only a 
million and a half peasants, and perhaps fewer, chiefly in the 
eastern and northeastern provinces, were serfs; the other nine- 
teen or twenty million were owners of their farms, or renters, 
or agricultural laborers. In France more than in any other coun- 
try of Europe the peasant was an owner of the soil. His owner- 
ship, however, was still burdened with charges, which were a 
heritage from the feudal system, for the country was covered by 
a network of noble or ecclesiastical seigniories. Nevertheless, 
the peasant who could sell, bequeath, or mortgage his prop- 
erty must be described as its owner. In this sense there were 
multitudes of peasant proprietors. They held nearly one-half of 
all the farm land. In some parts of the south they owned still 
more. In the north their share was smaller, falling as low as 
thirty-three per cent, in a few places.^ The nobles owned from 
fifteen to twenty per cent., the middle class of the towns about 
as much, and the clergy considerably less. Besides the peasant 
proprietors there were many other peasants who cultivated the 
land for a part, usually half, of the produce, and who were fur- 
nished with house, half of the stock, and seeds. There were 

' Exact knowledge of the extent of peasant property in France is due 
- mainly to the researches of M. Loutchisky. See his L'^tat des classes 
agricoles en France a la veille de la Revolution, or the review of his con- 
clusions in an article by M. S6e in the Revue d' Histoire Modeme et Con- 
temporaine, XVIII. 257-267. 



THE PEOPLE AND THE OLD REGIME 



also prosperous peasants who rented large farms, especially in chap.i 
the north and northwest. 1750-89 

The feudal or seigniorial charges were vexatious rather than Feudal 
heavy. In addition to the cens or ground rent, the peasant had to ^^^^ 
pay dues called the champart or terrage, which amounted to a 
small percentage of the produce of the farm. These dues varied 
greatly throughout the country in name and character. Other 
dues commonly called lods et ventes, which must be paid if the 
land was sold, sometimes took as much as a third of the selling 
price and decreased the market value of the land. The seignior 
could oflfer the price and take the land, a possibihty which also 
lessened its value. In one respect the situation of the peasants 
had distinctly improved. The right of the nobles to require per- 
sonal labor had either been exchanged for a small money payment 
or had fallen into disuse. Even the money payments were grow- 
ing less, because the value of money was steadily decreas- 
ing. 

The greatest curse of the countryside was the hunting privi- 
leges, which except in a few regions belonged exclusively to the 
nobles. Restrictions were placed by law and custom upon the 
methods of agriculture, in order that the game might not lack 
for food. The nobles could ride across the growing crops. In 
many places the lord's pigeons were a pest. These evils were 
greatest in about four hundred leagues of territory treated as 
royal hunting preserves and called capitaineries. D'Argenson, 
one of Louis XV's ministers, wrote in his diary in 1753 that 
the inhabitants of " Fontainebleau no longer sow their land, the 
fruits and grain being eaten by deer, stags, and other game." 
Arthur Young, after a ride through the forest of Chantilly, which 
belonged to the Prince of Conde, remarked : " They say the 
capitainerie, or paramountship, is above 100 miles in circumfer- 
ence. That is to say, all the inhabitants for that extent are pes- 
tered with game without permission to destroy it, in order to give 
one man diversion." Seeing another princely estate he said: 
" Great lords love too much an environ of forest, boars, and 
huntsmen, instead of marking their residence by the accompani- 
ment of neat and well-cultivated farms, clean cottages, and happy 
peasants." 

The tithe which the Church demanded of the peasants was The Tithe 
collected less rigorously than in England. It amounted to about 
a thirteenth of the produce. But as the things in which it should 
be paid were often specified, it restricted the freedom of the 
peasantry and was one of the causes of the backward state of 
agriculture. Moreover, the income often went to non-resident 



? THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

C HAP. I clergy or to nobles, while the parish priest was left to starve on 
1750-89 a few hundred livres a year. 

It was neither the feudal noble nor the Church, but the State 
raxation which was principally responsible for the peasant's heavy burden. 
His load of taxation was constantly increased, although privileges 
and exemptions were distributed with lavish hand to other classes. 
The evil was partly historical in its origin. The principal direct 
tax was the taille, which nominally fell upon non-noble persons 
in proportion to their ability to pay, whether their income was 
I from agriculture or industry. The nobles were exempt because 
I the tax originated in feudal times when they rendered military 
i service to the King. The clergy as ministers of the altar were 
also exempt. In a few regions the tax rested on the land, rather 
than on the occupiers, and there a lord who occupied land classi- 
fied as " peasant " was obliged to pay the tax. Peasants who 
rented land from the nobles were not exempt from the taille, al- 
though they were not taxed as high as peasant owners. The 
tax should have been paid by the townsmen as well as the peas- 
ants, but many of the towns were exempt, while others com- 
pounded for the tax by the payment of lump sums which they 
collected under the form of tolls or octrois. Thousands of in- 
dividuals who held office were also exempt as a matter of privi- 
lege. The exemption of most of those whose voices counted in 
the formation of public opinion made the task of reformers diffi- 
cult. When the government needed more money, the ministers 
instead of attempting to equalize the burdens of the tax, increased 
the amount the long-suffering peasants were forced to pay- 
Two other direct taxes, the capitation or poll tax and an in- 
come tax called the twentieths, or vingtiemes, also were collected 
chiefly from the peasants. The great majority of the peasants 
paid the capitation not as a separate tax, but as an addition to 
the taille, increasing it by about fifty per cent. In the case of 
nobles, magistrates, and townsmen the assessment was light. 
When the first vingtieme was established, the government in- 
tended that it should amount to five per cent, of the taxpayer's 
income, and that it should be paid by the privileged classes as 
well as by the common people. To render the levy more exact 
the sources of income were classified in separate schedules, and 
officials were appointed whose business it was to verify personal 
declarations of revenue. But the clergy, the nobles, and the 
judges sought on all occasions to defeat such attempts to equalize 
the burdens of taxation. The clergy purchased exemption both 
from this and the capitation by offering at the time of the first 
levy an unusually large " free gift." They made the " free gift " 



THE PEOPLE AND THE OLD REGIME 



every five years, which was equivalent to about four millions chap, i 
annually, while a single twentieth of their income would have 1750-89 
been over five millions. 

The question has often been asked, What part of the peasant's 
net income was absorbed by the three direct taxes? In Taine's 
opinion they took fifty-three per cent. This appears to be much 
exaggerated. The taille was supposedly levied on the net in- 
come of the peasant after the expenses of cultivation were paid, 
but as there were no statistics according to which such an estimate 
could be made the principle remained almost purely theoretical. 

The evils which sprang from the management of the levy were 
even more oppressive than the size of the burden. This was Taxes un- 
especially true of the taille. The total amount was arbitrarily f^iriy 
fixed each year by the King's council, and it was repeatedly in- 
creased until 1780, when Necker, director general of the finances, 
persuaded the King to declare that it should never be more than 
one hundred and six million livres.^ Until that time, great as the 
individual peasant's burden might be, he had no assurance that 
it would not be increased in a year or two. The method of as- 
sessment and collection vexed the peasant with dangers still closer 
at hand. ^ This task rested with the peasants themselves. All, 
the ignorant as well as the capable, were forced to take their turn 
at the ruinous duty, and obliged to obtain the amount assigned to 
the parish. In case of delay they were compelled to advance the 
money out of their own pockets. They were tempted to be 
lenient with their friends, harsh with their enemies, and timid 
toward the rich and influential. The only way in which a peas- 
ant could lighten the burden of taxation was by assuming the 
appearance of poverty or by making difficulties about paying. 

The system of the indirect taxes was equally vicious. In the 
collection of these the country was not treated as a single whole, 
but was broken up into regions, some of which had valuable privi- 
leges and exemptions. The method of collecting the salt tax, 
which was a government monopoly, illustrates the evils of the 
system. One-third of the country, the north central provinces, 
the region of the grandes gahelles, paid two-thirds of the tax. 
There was a region of the petites gahelles where the rate was 
smaller, and still other " redeemed " or " free " districts. As 
Brittany was '' free " and yet bordered on the region of the 
grandes gahelles, salt on the one side of the line cost from two 
to three livres a hundred pounds and on the other side from fifty- 
six to fifty-eight livres. The inevitable consequence was smug- 

2 This sum includes the capitation and accessories. It could be increased 
only by a law duly registered by the parlements. 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. I 
1750-89 



gling, for the venturesome trader could carry salt across the 
frontier, sell it for a third of the government price, and still 
make an enormous profit. The expense of guarding the borders 
increased the cost of collecting the tax. In certain regions the 
amount which each family must use was fixed at seven pounds 
for each person seven years of age, and this at a time when salt 
cost in the region of the grandes gabelles about twelve cents 
a pound, without allowing for the diflference in the value of 
money. ^ 

■ The peasants were required to work from eight to forty days 
upon the highways. This was called the royal corvee, and it was 
in effect a direct tax collected at a time and in a way which often 
interfered with the care of the crops. Arthur Young said the 
French roads would have filled him with admiration had he not 
known of the abominable corvees, which made him commiserate 
the " oppressed farmers, from whose extorted labour this mag- 
nificence has been wrung." 

( French agriculture, like all European agriculture before the 
latter part of the eighteenth century, clung to methods centuries 
old. The tools were almost as primitive as in the days of the 
Romans and the Egyptians. There was no attempt to improve 
the species of grains or vegetables or to fertilize the soil. The 
culture of the vine alone had reached a high degree of develop- 
ment. Most of the domestic animals were inferior in size and 
quality. Draught horses and driving horses were an exception. 
Horse-racing was introduced in 1756 in imitation of the English. 
As yet there was Httle demand for beef, the poor not being able 
to buy it and the rich preferring venison or fish. To save the 
soil from becoming exhausted the peasant left a third or even a 
half of it fallow every year. ' The sale of grain, which was the 
principal crop, was hampered by the restrictions which the gov- 
ernment threw about the grain trade. There were, nevertheless, 
reasons for hopefulness. Enlightened noblemen, like the Duke 
de Liancourt, a friend of Arthur Young, were intensely interested 
in making improvements. Many agricultural societies were 
formed, and a school of writers calfed the Physiocrats arose, 
which contended that real increase in wealth comes only from 
land. 

The peasant had one resource beyond his agriculture. Me- 
chanical industries were not rigidly restricted to the towns, but 
were carried on in the country, so that the peasant whose plot of 
ground would not support his family might become a spinner, a 
weaver, or a cutler, or pursue some trade connected with rural 
life. As he competed with other men working in their homes or 



THE PEOPLE AND THE OLD REGIME 



their shops in the cities, and not with a highly organized group c hap. i 
of employees as in modern factories, his trade might furnish his i750-89 
principal support while his farm or garden was secondary in 
importance. 

The burdens of the French peasant appear lighter when com- The 



German 
Peasantry 



pared with the load carried by many of the German peasants, 
especially by those living east of the Elbe. Here the rights of 
the nobles did not have the sanction of antiquity, as in France, 
for until money replaced barter and personal services were trans- 
formed into perpetual rent charges the German peasant had been 
usually a free man, cultivating his share of the village lands or 
occupying a farm, the rent of which he paid in produce or in 
labor. When the noble ceased to be a knight obliged to furnish 
military aid to his territorial prince, he found it to his advantage 
to transform his ancient prerogatives into the rights of a seign- 
iorial landed proprietor. Then, because he had the power, and 
because the territorial prince was more concerned with establish- 
ing his own position as a sovereign than with the condition of the 
peasants, he frequently added new rights to the old, until, by the 
eighteenth century, the peasant nearly everywhere in Germany 
had sunk into the condition of a dependent or subject of the 
noble, possessing few of the ordinary privileges of the free 
farmer. 

The situation of the German peasant varied in the different 
provinces or states. In the valleys of the Rhine and the Main, 
in central Germany, on the slopes of the Alps, and in the Austrian 
duchies, not much actual serfdom existed, although the peasants 
were subject to dues and services. In the Prussian provinces of 
Cleves and Mark most of the peasants were free, while in other 
Prussian provinces west of the Elbe they had lost their freedom, 
and were subject to burdensome dues such as the heriot, which, 
at the peasant's death, gave half his personal property to the lord. 
But it was east of the Elbe — in Prussia proper, in Pomerania, 
and in the duchies of Mecklenburg — that serfdom was most 
widely extended. When Stein traveled through Mecklenburg, 
as late as 1802, he found " the whole laboring class under the 
pressure of serfdom," and the abode of the nobleman seemed to 
him " as the lair of a wild beast, who desolates everything round 
him and surrounds himself with the silence of the grave." ^ 

Within the states of the King of Prussia the peasants on the peasant 
royal domains were better off than the others, for the King's pjy"'^^'^ 
right over his property would support him in an attempt to im- 

3 Quoted by J. R. Seeley, Life and Times of Stein, I. 132. 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. I prove their condition, even against the protest of lease-holders. 

1750-89 But the lords would invoke the same principle of property, if the 
King attempted to introduce changes in the condition of the 
peasants on their domains. The peasant could not be sure of 
being permitted to retain his farm nor did he possess the right 
to transmit his land to his heirs. The lord could select the son 
who should succeed to the farm. If the tenant was old or feeble, 
or incapable of cultivating his land, the lord might compel him 
to cede it to another more likely to fulfil the duties of a depend- 
ent. Without the lord's consent the peasant could not sell the 
land, nor put it in pledge, nor even borrow. There was danger 
also that the lords would use the power of eviction as a means 
of enlarging their own domains at the expense of the peasant. 
The result would be a reduction of the peasant population. 

At this point the Prussian monarchs asserted their right of 
protection, in order to be sure of having recruits for the army. 
Frederick William I issued a decree guaranteeing the peasants 
of Prussia and Pomerania a better tenant right, but he required 
from them the promise not to leave their farms nor send away 
their children, and he made no change in their customary obliga- 
tions. The decree was not carried out, even on the royal do- 
mains, for the local officials, many of whom belonged to the 
nobiUty, felt that it endangered their rights. Nevertheless, the 
monarchs were successful in preventing the nobles from adding 
much peasant land to their estates, insisting that if a peasant 
family was evicted, another should be found to take the vacant 
place. The peasant who was a soldier enjoyed in a special way 
the royal protection. Although he spent a large part of the year 
in time of peace on the lord's domain, he could not be treated 
tyrannically because he was in a sense the King's man. 

privUeges The German peasant was worse off than the French peasant in 

man'i.Md ^^^ amount of personal work he must perform for the lord or 
for renters of estates belonging to the royal domain. The situa- 
tion in the Prussian territories was not uniform, but it was fre- 
quently the case that the peasant was not protected even by cus- 
tom against an increase in the demands upon him. In addition, 
his children were liable to domestic service in the lord's manor 
house or castle at merely nominal wages. 

Except on the royal domain, the local lords were the real rulers, 
and controlled the courts, in which they could not be sued with- 
out their own consent. They also controlled the administration 
of the villages lying within their domains. Only in the collection 
of taxes and the recruiting of the army was this species of 
seigniorial sovereignty abridged. The royal government in its 



THE PEOPLE AND THE OLD REGIME 13 

work of centralization had not gone as far as had the royal gov- ohap^i 
ernment of France, and chiefly for the reason that it had begun 1750-89 
much later. 

The Prussian peasant did not suffer as much from the burden 
of taxation as the French peasant, although the Prussian noble 
succeeded in obtaining exemption from most of the taxes. The Taxation 
peculiarity of the Prussian system was the sharp distinction made ^ Prussia 
between the open country and the towns. The two principal 
taxes were the land tax levied mainly upon peasant farms and 
the excise or indirect taxes upon commodities brought into the 
cities or produced within them. In order to make the excise 
productive, the government permitted in the open country none 
but the most necessary industries such as brewing, carpentry, and 
building. In the western provinces the line between city and 
country was not so sharply drawn. The nobles in most of the 
provinces were exempt from the land tax. In many cases also 
they were free from the excise, their city residences being exempt 
as well as the industries practised on their estates. They paid 
a small tax in lieu of the feudal military service which they 
formerly rendered. 

The economic position of the Prussian peasant was also bad, 
for the line which the administration drew between town and 
country compelled him to purchase all except the simplest neces- 
saries in the town at a price enhanced by the excise. His cloths, 
tools, sugar, and tobacco paid high duties on entering the Prussian 
dominions in order to favor home manufactures or prevent coin 
from being exported. His own products had a limited market, 
for the exportation of wheat was generally forbidden ; and in 
some quarters the exportation of raw material like wool was 
also checked, in order to keep supplies from being sold to rival 
countries. 

In England the peasant farmer was apparently better off than 
in France. There serfdom had left no traces in the form of xhe 
feudal dues and compulsory labor. The nobles bore their share English 
of the burden of taxation. Many of the villagers earned a large ^^^^^ ^^ 
part of their income by spinning, weaving, and other trades, for 
the guild system had broken down more completely in England 
than on the Continent, and industries were carried on throughout 
the countryside. In agriculture, also, medieval methods had been 
abandoned in many districts, although in others the division of 
the arable land into three fields, which were then sub-divided 
among the villagers, still persisted. There were, however, forces 
at work which were to put the English farmer in a more dis- 
advantageous position than his French neighbor. Already in 



[4 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

C HAP. I the change from medieval modes of holding land the nobles had 
1750-89 greatly increased their share. The petty nobles or landed gentry 
used their influence in parliament to carry through laws which 
destroyed customary rights of tenure, such as the copyholder had 
possessed. The nobles also fenced off parts of the common 
lands of the villages, and the small farmers or yeomen did not 
have money enough to defend the village rights in the courts. 
Before the century was over the class of yeomen almost dis- 
appeared. 

French society was more complex in the towns than in the 
rhe country because of the existence of an important middle class. 

The richer part of the middle class, or bourgeoisie, included the 
ofifiicials engaged in the management of the finances, the magis- 
trates, and the wealthy merchants. Many of the magistrates, 
whose offices were their property and could pass from father 
to son, belonged to the " nobility of the robe," which was quite 
as proud of its position, and as jealous of its privileges, as the 
nobiUty of the sword. Wealthy bourgeois famihes lived in a 
style akin to that of the richer nobles. Below them was the 
petite bourgeoisie, made up of masters in the guilds and of or- 
dinary tradesmen. The artisans and the laborers were simply 
" people." The richer bourgeois occasionally purchased the 
estates of ruined noblemen and acquired patents of nobility. 

In Germany the divisions of society had been growing more 
rigid, and were even more complex than in France. The con- 
trol of the imperial cities was in the grasp of a set of families, 
which regarded themselves as fractional parts of the princely au- 
thority. This was especially true of Nuremberg, Augsburg, and 
Ulm. Hamburg and Frankfort seemed to possess a more liberal 
atmosphere, and yet in Frankfort, which was Goethe's birthplace, 
there existed at the " bottom of the scale a great mass almost 
without legal protection." Above were the guilds, next, doctors 
and merchants, and, at the top, the nobility. " Each class was 
subdivided into manifold grades," so that the social and political 
structure of the city resembled a " tower broad at the base and 
growing narrower as it rose, each separate story divided into 
numerous cages, through the gratings of which it was almost 
impossible to pass." * In the territories of Frederick the Great 
the duties of each class seemed appropriately arranged. The 
nobles commanded the army, the peasants furnished the recruits, 
the burghers enriched the State by trade, while the scholars and 
poets pursued their studies or dreamed their dreams undisturbed 
by the plainer cares of life. 
4 Bielschowsky, Albert, Life of Goethe, I. 8. 



THE PEOPLE AND THE OLD REGIME 15 

The restrictions which the old regime in France threw about chap^i 
the industries of the townspeople were fewer than those which 1750-89 
hindered the progress of agriculture. In most of the towns in- 
dustries were still under the control of guilds or corporations of Guilds 
masters, which aimed to regulate the methods of manufacture 
and to preserve to the members the advantages of a local mo- 
nopoly. The honor as well as the interest of the guild 
was involved in maintaining the reputation of the prod- 
uct. The masters naturally desired to lessen the numbers 
admitted to the guild, so that in some cases it was impos- 
sible for any except relatives of masters to become mem- 
bers, although they might have served their apprenticeship and 
their usual time as journeymen. This policy increased the value 
of the monopoly, but was likely to excite the indignation of the 
rest of the community. The government sometimes attempted 
to reduce the evil by offering royal letters of mastership, a prac- 
tice which also brought in a little revenue. In 1755 a decree 
threw open all towns except Paris, Lyons, Rouen, and Lille to 
men who had completed their apprenticeship and the usual term 
as journeymen, waiving the rule that they should first be received 
as masters. The guilds were still powerful enough to prevent 
their monopoly from being destroyed in this way, and the decree 
served chiefly to mark the increasing liberality of the government. 
The spread of industry into the country undermined the monop- 
oly of the guilds and was favored by the government, which after 
1762 assured to the rural inhabitants the right to purchase tools, 
machines, and raw materials. 

The selfish conservatism of the guilds was not the only ob- 
stacle to the progress of industry. Under the influence of Col- 
bert's ideas, a mass of regulative decrees determined the exact Regulation 
amount of raw material which each piece of stuff should con- l^^ 
tain, as well as the manner in which it should be put together. 
The aim of these regulations was the protection of the consumer 
against bad workmanship or fraud, but they threw difficulties in 
the way of inventors, for it was not always easy to persuade a 
government council of the usefulness or practicability of a new 
production. The regulations were enforced by the guilds and 
by royal inspectors, whose seals were affiixed to the goods. 
Offenders were prosecuted, their goods pilloded or destroyed, 
and their business ruined. Roland, the ill-fated minister of the 
interior in the Revolution, declared that when he was an inspector 
in Rouen he had seen as many as one hundred pieces of goods 
destroyed in one morning, solely because they were of an irregu- 
lar weave. From the middle of the century masters and officers 



of Indus- 



i6 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIQD IN EUROPE 

C HAP. I became less severe in the enforcement of the regulations. This 
1750-89 movement was specially due to the influence of the economist 
Gournay, who became intendant of commerce in 175 1. 

The word manufacture has a literal application to the methods 
of work under the old regime, for most of the machinery was 
run by hand and was of a type which had been used for cen- 
turies. A few large shops employed several hundred persons, 
but there was little division of labor. Most of the shops were 
small, with only the master, an apprentice or two, and a few 
journeymen. The goods were often sold by the master, who was 
a petty tradesman as well as a " manufacturer." 

The ordinary workmen, who had little prospect of ever becom- 
Empioyees ing masters, sought to improve their condition by uniting in secret 
organizations or brotherhoods. Towards the middle of the cen- 
tury so many strikes and boycotts occurred that the government 
issued a decree forbidding such organizations or any combinations 
of employees to bring pressure on the masters. The employees 
could not abandon the service of a master without a permit ; and 
if another master received them without this permit, he, as well 
as they, was liable to a heavy fine. 

In Germany and Austria the guilds had long been losing ground 
when the territorial princes vigorously undertook their reor- 
ganization. Labor troubles such as were the object of French 
legislation furnished the occasion. In the German states the 
situation was peculiar in that journeymen who got into conflict 
with their employers or with the administration had only to 
cross a near-by frontier in order to be welcomed with open arms. 
Each state was glad to swell its population of artisans at the 
expense of its rivals. In Germany, also, the journeymen had an 
organization of their own akin to the guilds. The state govern- 
ments found no way to meet the difficulty except by resort to 
the outworn method of imperial legislation. With unusual 
energy the diet undertook the task and in 1731 seriously modified 
and weakened the powers of the organizations of journeymen, 
leaving them hardly more than their functions as charitable and 
religious bodies. No journeyman could be employed without a 
pass from the head of the guild, endorsed by his previous em- 
ployer, even though this employer belonged to another state. 
The guilds were put under the control of the states, with the re- 
sult that in Germany industry, like religion, became an affair of 
the state. The main purpose of the legislation which followed 
was to deprive the guilds of their petty monopolies and make the 
conditions of admission easier. 

Trade as well as industry suffered from the restrictions thrown 



THE PEOPLE AND THE OLD REGIME 17 

about it in Europe. In France the process of destroying local chap^i 
barriers had been carried further than in Prussia or any part of 1750-89 
Germany, but the system of customs and other indirect taxes 
was so complicated that Necker said scarcely two men in a gen- Trade 
eration succeeded in mastering it. The consequence was loss of 
trade. A load of wine from Roussillon paid twenty-two differ- 
ent charges on its way to Paris. These included customs duties 
collected by the government, octrois of the towns, and dues of 
seigniors. Sometimes these charges favored the importer* of 
foreign products. For example, the cloths of Carcassonne be- 
fore they reached the northern markets paid fifteen per cent, of 
their value, whereas similar Enghsh cloths in the same markets 
paid only eight per cent. The situation in Prussia and in the 
German provinces of Austria was worse, because the process of 
unification was far less complete. On the Rhine tolls were col- 
lected thirty times from Strasbourg to Holland. Moreover, the 
separate states had no incentive to break down barriers, but on 
the contrary many to make them higher. 

No trade restrictions were fraught with greater future dan- 
gers than those which had grown up in France about the com- 
merce of grains. These restrictions were suggested by the fear 
of famine, which in the days of poor roads and of little general 
commerce was not a mere figment of the imagination. The pre- 
cariousness of the crop seemed to offer peculiar opportunities 
to the farmer or trader who wished to profit by the calamity of 
the community, and government officials and local magistrates 
were convinced that only through careful regulation could an 
adequate supply of grain be maintained in each province. The 
laws provided that all grain must be sold in the open market and 
that the farmers could retain only enough for their personal use. 
Merchants deaHng in grain were registered, and the place and 
amount of their purchases were recorded. The provincial par- 
lements or courts frequently forbade the transportation of grain 
beyond the borders of their own provinces. Its exportation from 
the country was also forbidden. Occasionally in time of famine 
the government or the courts fixed a maximum price. 

The restrictions placed upon the colonial trade are also sig- 
nificant. They have been summed up by the descriptive term colonial 
" colonial pact," which does not imply that the colonies ever "^^^^^ 
agreed to them. According to the colonial pact the mother coun- 
try gave protection and offered a market for the staple produc- 
tions of the colony, and in return enjoyed the monopoly of the 
colonial market and commerce. In its more rigorous form the 
system was applied to the Spanish colonies, which were treated 



i8 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

C HAP. I as a p^j.^ Qf tj^g King's domain. Trade with these colonies was 
1750-89 at first limited to a single port, emigration was hedged about with 
difficulties, and the foreigner was warned off on pain of death. 
At the opening of the eighteenth century England interfered 
with this monopoly, obtaining from Spain by treaty the right to 
import slaves into the Spanish colonies and to send two ships to 
the annual fair at Porto Bello. The English captains were not 
delicate in their observation of treaty limitations and they found 
smuggling too profitable to resist. Nor were the Spanish 
colonies the only ones to suffer from smugglers. The French 
could not keep the trade of their colonies altogether in their own 
hands. The English colonists in America were the most formid- 
able interlopers. They exported fish, lumber, and cereals, arti- 
cles which the French West Indians needed and for which they 
were anxious to give in exchange sugar, rum, and molasses. 
The English sugar islands complained that in this way French 
sugar was competing dangerously with English sugar, and 
parliament passed the Molasses Act, levying a prohibitive duty 
on these commodities ; but the act remained a dead letter. When 
the French lost Canada and Louisiana the preservation of the 
monopoly of their colonial trade became impossible, for they 
had no food-producing colonies from which the sugar islands 
might draw supplies. 

It is evident that many things characteristic of European 
social and industrial life in the eighteenth century needed the 
serious attention of reformers and statesmen. The only question 
is, Why were they unable to correct the evils in time to forestall 
revolution ? 



CHAPTER II 

GOVERNMENT IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 

IN the eighteenth century something more than the consent of c hap. ii 
a well-meaning ruler was needed to insure the success of 1750-89 
plans of reform. Even in France, the land of absolute mon- 
archy, the formula " As wishes the King, so wishes the law " was 
only a legal principle. The task of the reformer was merely 
begun when the King accepted his plans. Privileged classes and obstacles 
favored communities could often defend their advantages sue- to Reform 
cessfully by making a skilful use of the compHcated structure of 
the old governments. They could confuse public opinion, even 
when they did not delude themselves, by raising the cry of " lib- 
erty " and ''property." The institutions of the old regime were 
not the product of systematic minds, devising the articles of a 
paper constitution, but were the result of a long process of his- 
toric growth. They bore the marks of conflicts and compromises 
without number. Most of the European States had been pieced 
together at different times. When a prince annexed a province 
he was often obliged to promise to respect its ancient liberties, 
although they might injure, at least indirectly, other provinces 
under his rule. 

This is more surprising in the case of France than of Prussia 
or Austria. The Prussian monarch had but recently assumed the 
crown, and, strictly speaking, was King only in eastern Prussia. Make-up 
His other lands he held by other titles — elector, count, or duke. 
As these lands lay within the Holy Roman Empire, separated 
from one another often by the States of other princes, it was 
difficult, if not impossible, to treat them all as parts of an ab- 
solute monarchical system. It was certainly impossible in the 
case of Austria. The Hapsburg monarchy received its royal 
standing from the two kingdoms of Bohemia and Hungary, which 
Ferdinand, brother of Charles V, had gained by election in the 
sixteenth century. Upper and Lower Austria were only arch- 
duchies. The Hapsburgs possessed other lands in what is 
now the Austrian empire and in southern Germany. When the 
territories of Spain were divided in 171 3 and 17 14, they received 
Lombardy and the southern Netherlands. It would be difficult 

19 



of states 



20 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

CHAP. II to imagine a group more diverse in race, in language, and in his- 
1750-89 torical traditions. Two of the group, Lombardy and the Nether- 
lands, were distant from the rest. The common subjection to 
the Hapsburgs was incidental, if not accidental. To adopt a 
policy of assimilation would be to invite trouble, as the Emperor 
Joseph was to discover. 

The situation in France was apparently different. In certain 
Local respects, however, the differences were only apparent. Many 

prwiieges Qf ^j^g French provinces had been united under the crown for 
centuries, but others, especially Franche Comte, Alsace, and Lor- 
raine,! had been held only a short time. The older as well as the 
newer provinces clung jealously to the privileges which the King 
had originally guaranteed to them. The promise of Louis XIV 
to Franche Comte was typical. He agreed to respect its " privi- 
leges, franchises, and immunities and to conduct himself in all 
things as a prince and count palatine of Burgundy is held to do." 
The rights of Brittany were secured both by the marriage con- 
tract between Anne of Brittany and Louis XII in 1491 and by 
the act of union of 1532. So it was with other provinces. The 
local rights and liberties were not altogether harmful. They 
could be used to check the tendency to unreasonable centraliza- 
tion which already characterized the French government. 

In the oldest provinces most of the earlier local liberties had 
disappeared. The monarchs in their struggle with the feudal 
nobles did not distinguish clearly between powers which the cen- 
tral government should exercise and those which should be left 
to each community. These provinces formed the great central 
region of the country and were called Lands of Elections because 
the districts into which they were subdivided were called elec- 
ProTinciai tions. The border provinces. Burgundy, Artois, Brittany, Lan- 
AsaembUea gygdoc, and Others, formed the Lands of Estates, because they 
retained their provincial estates or assemblies. Even in the 
eighteenth century, when a reasonable development of local self- 
government would have been an advantage rather than a danger, 
the royal administration kept such assemblies under strict con- 
trol. No resolution of any importance, especially none touching 
the expenditure of money, could be carried into effect without 
the consent of the King's council. Nevertheless, the existence 
of the estates, the presence of the leading men of the province, 
representing the clergy, the nobles, and the official class of the 
towns, acted as a check upon administrative tyranny. Further- 

1 Lorraine was annexed in 1766, although it had been virtually a part 
of France since 1738, when Stanislas, ex-king of Poland, and father-in- 
law of Louis XV, became duke. 



GOVERNMENT IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 21 

more, in some cases the assemblies undertook enterprises which c hap, n 
the central government had no thought of attempting. 1750-89 

The provincial assembly of Languedoc was the most efficient 
of these bodies. It met every autumn at the call of the King and 
remained in session forty or fifty days. The deputies voted in- 
dividually in a single hall, although they were chosen separately 
by the clergy, the nobility, and by the third estate. The deputies 
of the third estate were not popularly elected, and represented 
their town because they held its offices, but they understood the 
local needs. Through the power which the assembly was per- 
mitted to exercise the taille was distributed more fairly and was 
collected without so many acts of petty oppression. The expendi- 
tures for local purposes, which were mainly under its control, 
often ran as high as two million livres. Arthur Young com- 
mented on the excellent roads of Languedoc, which the provincial 
assembly provided for without the use of the corvee. 

The provincial estates of Brittany were kept by their organiza- 
tion from accomplishing so useful a task. They were more 
suited to obstruction than progress. Every nobleman over 
twenty-five years of age had a right to a seat. Sometimes twelve 
hundred attended, while the third estate had only forty-two depu- 
ties. 

The inclination to resist measures of reform when they seemed 
to encroach upon ancient local privileges was, however, present Resistance 
in Languedoc as well as in Brittany. The provincial assemblies *°ciiange 
attempted to drive hard bargains with the King, when they did 
not refuse altogether to agree to changes. In 1749 the govern- 
ment introduced the vingtieme, or income tax, in order to equalize 
the burdens of taxation, and it was unwilling to permit provinces 
to offer a lump sum in lieu of the tax. Languedoc insisted upon 
its right to pay the tax only after formally giving its consent, ap- 
pealing to the terms of the will of the last Count of Toulouse by 
virtue of which Languedoc had passed to the Crown, and to early 
royal edicts which had confirmed its privileges. When the King 
would not listen, the assembly refused the customary " free gift,'' 
which was Languedoc's share of the taille. The government in 
a spasm of vigor dissolved the assembly and collected the tax, but 
four years later the minister who was responsible for the reform 
lost his influence and the government yielded to the protests of 
the privileged classes. In Brittany resistance was equally suc- 
cessful. The ministry considered the advisability of decreasing 
the number of nobles in the provincial assembly, but sought the 
same end by calling together a small " extraordinary " assembly. 
Although it consented to the royal demands, the regular estates 



22 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

C HAP, n which assembled soon afterwards clamored for the suppression 
1750-89 of the tax. The spirit of resistance was so widespread that the 
government officials could not make the appraisements upon 
which the tax should be based, and finally agreed to permit the 
province to offer a stated sum instead. A more curious instance 
of the manner in which ancient liberties served as a defense for 
existing abuses occurred in the last days of the old monarchy at 
the Assembly of the Notables, When the King's brother recom- 
mended the ministerial proposal to substitute a land tax resting 
upon all proprietors for the unfair system in force, a Provengal 
nobleman declared that one of the rights of Provence, guaranteed 
by the will of King Rene, at the time when his kingdom was an- 
nexed to France, was exemption from any land tax. 

In the levy of the indirect taxes many provinces possessed ad- 
vantages which obstructed the progress of reform. These privi- 
leges were historical in origin. For example, the provinces in 
which no salt tax was collected before they were annexed re- 
mained free from the tax. Other annexed provinces continued 
to pay for salt at the rate which they had been accustomed to pay 
before annexation. Still others had in the sixteenth century ad- 
vanced money to a needy King in return for a perpetual reduc- 
tion of the rate. 

The same evil affected the customs duties, which were not col- 

TariJBE Iccted at the frontiers of the kingdom, but at the boundaries of 

provinces or groups of provinces. Certain provinces, like Alsace 
and Lorraine, were treated as if they were foreign countries and 
were given a tariff system of their own. Other provinces, though 
simply " reputed foreign," also had a separate system, while 
seventeen provinces in the north central region were under a 
single tariff system. This was called the region of the " Five 
Great Farms," because the collection of the indirect taxes had 
once been let or farmed to five separate companies. In order 
to gain an idea of the obstacles to commercial progress during 
the old regime, it is necessary to add to these various tariffs 
the transit dues which the lords collected, Necker called the 
complicated tariff system " monstrous in the eyes of reason." 

Nobody under the old regime defended local or class privileges 
more stubbornly than the courts. They included the parlement 
of Paris, which had jurisdiction over most of the older France, 

The Courts and twclvc provincial parlements. Before a law became ef- 

Reform* fective it was customary to send it to the courts to be entered 
upon their records. This act made it valid within their juris- 
dictions. They had a right to withhold registration of the law 
as a protest against its provisions. The King could meet their 



Barriers 



GOVERNMENT IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 23 

protest by modifying the terms of the project or by holding what chap. 11 
was called a " bed of justice " and with great ceremony expressly 1750-89 
commanding them to register. It took Henry IV several years 
to procure the registration of the Edict of Nantes by all the 
provincial parlements. The courts, also, had a limited legislative — - 
capacity of their own, issuing regulations which they enforced 
within their jurisdiction unless these were annulled by the 
King. The judges in parlement, regarding themselves as the 
last barrier against the triumph of despotism, were in danger of 
over-emphasizing their political opportunity and forgetting that 
they were primarily courts of justice. As they represented the 
interests of a class, they were likely to obstruct the action of the 
royal government if it undertook measures seriously attacking the 
system of privilege. 

The judges based their right to oppose specific acts of royal 
legislation upon their duty as interpreters of the constitution and 
the laws of the kingdom. They held that even the supreme 
legislator, the King, could not add laws which were in manifest 
contradiction to the long-estabHshed principles of royal legisla- Theory of 
tion. If his ministers, acting in his name, attempted this, the tiie Judges 
courts must declare the edicts subversive of the constitution. 
Nor could their opposition be overcome by a bed of justice, which 
in such a case would be a vulgar act of violence. That France 
had no written constitution in which definite Hmitations were 
placed upon executive and legislative power, did not affect their 
attitude. The trouble with the theory lay in their idea of what 
the constitution was and what rights it protected. If its principal 
use was to safeguard the privileges and exemptions of the clergy, 
the nobility, and the office-holders on the ground that they could 
never be deprived of the advantages which they had inherited 
from their ancestors, the conclusion was inevitable that the way 
to adequate reform was closed. 

One or two illustrations will make clear the practice of the 
courts on questions touching the rights of the privileged classes. 
When the first vingtieme was created and the administration made 
a sincere effort to collect the information needed for a fair dis- 
tribution of the burden, the parlement of Paris refused to register 
the edict. As the War of the Austrian Succession, which had 
offered an excuse for extraordinary taxes, was over, the judges 
concluded that the government was intent upon the establishment 
of a permanent " tribute," to be levied upon all property, and 
not merely upon the property of peasants or townspeople. They 
saw in the edict an insidious attempt to destroy exemption from 
taxation, but at this time they did not carry their resistance very 



24 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

C HAP. II fa^j.. The administration held a bed of justice and the tax was 
1750-89 registered. 

At the close of the Seven Years' War the finances were in a still 
more desperate state and the ministry grimly resolved to put 
through an appraisement of all real estate in the kingdom, in or- 
der to make the two vingtiemes which then existed more pro- 
ductive. The parlement of Paris registered the edict only under 
compulsion. In the provinces resistance was more violent. The 
parlements of Toulouse and Grenoble attempted to arrest the 
governors who demanded the registration of the edict, and the 
governors were obliged to maintain a permanent guard to pro- 
tect themselves from the court bailiffs. At Rouen all the judges 
left the court-room when the governor demanded registration; 
only the attorney-general and the clerk remained. The parlement 
declared the registration which these officials made null and void. 
After months of wrangling the government yielded, and arranged 
with the courts that the vingtiemes should be collected on the 
basis of the existing appraisements, which were notoriously un- 
fair, and that individual assessments should not be raised. Such 
was the idea the judges held of defending the constitution and 
laws of France. 

The possibility of obstruction was not the only or even the 
Local principal evil from which the French government suffered. It 

Govern- contained positive defects. The organization of the towns is a 
notable example. Instead of using them as healthy organs of the 
spirit of local self-government, the administration kept them 
strictly under its tutelage. The municipal corporations were re- 
cruited from a few privileged families. Like the provincial as- 
semblies, they could not raise money or expend it without the 
approval of the royal council. The same thing was true of the 
parish administrations. The records of the council show re- 
quests from parishes for the right to spend twenty-five livres. 
Several times within a century the government had treated town 
offices as a means of raising money. Louis XIV at one time 
made them venal, permitting the provincial assemblies to maintain 
freedom of elections by purchasing the offices as a whole. The 
same plan was tried in the reign of Louis XV. The right of elec- 
tion was restored in 1764, but it was again taken away in 1771, 
except for those cities which offered a lump sum for their liber- 
ties. 

In structure the town governments were as a rule made up of a 
municipal body or corps de ville, the officers of which singly ad- 
ministered departments and together formed a council. There 
was also a general assembly, composed of the members of the 




Long East 5 of Greemvich 



GOVERNMENT IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 25 

notable families. Some of them had a right to seats, others were c hap, u 
chosen by the professional men, the trade guilds, the parishes, or 1750-89 
wards of the towns. 

The government of Paris was a curious intermingling of 
medieval guild institutions and later royal agencies. At the 
Hotel de Ville sat the provost of the merchants, four aldermen, 
and the other officers of the municipal bureau. There were also Paris 
twenty-four councilors, although no council in the proper sense 
of the word. The peculiar province of the Hotel de Ville was 
the river trade and everything that concerned it, including a part 
of the responsibility for the supply of food. The most important 
official of the city was the lieutenant-general of the poUce, who 
took his orders directly from the royal minister of the house- 
hold. He not only controlled the police, who were supported by 
the regiment of the French guards, but directed all parts of the 
administration not reserved to the Hotel de Ville. He also issued 
ordinances similar to those commonly within the power of an 
American city council. 

In fining the positions of provost and aldermen there was an 
elaborate semblance of election. The provost was actually 
nominated by the King, but each year two aldermen were chosen 
by a body partly composed of officials and partly of notable citi- 
zens. Almost the only valuable opportunity of gaining experi- 
ence was offered by the parish organizations or fabriques. Two 
general assemblies were held each year for the election of a 
responsible churchwarden, and to pass upon the accounts of the 
retiring churchwarden. In order to vote in these assemblies it 
was necessary to be rated on the tax list for at least six livres. 

The local agent of royal authority, whether in the Lands of intendants 
Estates or in the Lands of Elections, was the intendant. His 
jurisdiction extended over a district called a generalite, an ad- 
ministrative subdivision of the kingdom which was of more uni- 
form size than the province. Sometimes a province contained 
two or three generalities, while in one or two instances more 
than a single province was included in a generality. The in- 
tendant had charge of the levy and collection of the direct taxes 
and of the expenditure of money for improvements. Doubtful 
matters he referred to the King's council. He was also responsi- 
ble in a measure for the public order and watched important 
cases in the courts, occasionally carrying them up to the council. 
He was an effective instrument of centralization, fashioned by 
Richelieu and Colbert, the prototype of the modern prefect. 
Like the prefect he was often an able and conscientious adminis- 
trator. As he was brought into immediate contact with the suf- 



26 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. II 
1750-89 



The Eoyal 

Adminis- 

tratioQ 



The GOT- 
ernment 
of Prussia 



fering peasantry, he became anxious to remedy the evils of the 
tax system and promote the prosperity of his generality. Some 
of the most hopeful efforts for reform proceeded from these men, 
who, nevertheless, were complained of as the agents of royal or 
bureaucratic despotism. 

The administration of France centered in the King's council 
and its subsidiary councils or committees. Besides the high coun- 
cil to which only officials qualified with the title of " Ministers of 
State " were admitted, and which, like a royal cabinet, was en- 
trusted with questions of general policy, the important boards 
were the council of finances, in which the controller-general was 
the most influential member, the council of despatches, a ministry 
of the interior, and the council of parties, or privy council, which 
determined many questions of administrative jurisdiction. 
Through its councilors of State and masters of requests the 
council of parties investigated and prepared for discussion nearly 
all administrative questions brought before any one of the coun- 
cils. There was generally a principal minister, but he might not 
be the most influential officer of the administration. As the 
financial problem became more urgent it was inevitable that the 
controller-general's word would become decisive. In addition 
to the finances he had charge of public works, agriculture, and 
commerce, and might have been called minister of the interior. 
Affairs of local administration were, however, distributed among 
the four secretaries of State, — war, marine, foreign affairs, and 
royal household, — each secretary receiving several provinces. 
According to the plan, provinces on the coast should have been 
assigned to the minister of the marine and frontier provinces to 
the minister of war, but this was not always done. 

In the case of Prussia, where the process of territorial growth 
was of later date, and where no Alps or Pyrenees impelled to- 
wards unity, it is less surprising to discover how little the ad- 
ministrative system approached any ideal of formal organization. 
The King was bound to respect the privileges of his many terri- 
tories, although since the days of the Great Elector the Hohen- 
zollerns had been ready to attack privileges of estates or towns 
which stood in the way of the development of military power. 
The reformer of the royal administration had been Frederick 
William I, who, in 1723, organized the General Directory with 
the special aim of giving some unity to the management of the 
revenue. As in France, the work of the ministers was divided 
geographically rather then according to the character of the work 
itself. Frederick II had modified this plan by creating a minis- 
try of industry and commerce and what was equivalent to a de- 



GOVERNMENT IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 27 

partment of military affairs or a quartermaster general's office, c hap, ii 
When, however, Silesia was annexed, instead of subjecting its ad- 1750-89 
ministration to the General Directory, he entrusted it to a special 
minister. Neither he nor his father had a prime minister, but con- 
ducted affairs personally with the different ministers. Frederick 
attended to the most minute details and frequently rendered de- 
cisions which concerned a particular minister without even in- 
forming him of the matter. His ministers sometimes seemed to 
be degraded to the level of mere clerks, without initiative or 
responsibility. He used as his agents the councilors, who served 
as intermediaries and reporters, so that not infrequently a cabinet 
councilor had the King's confidence and was in a position to in- 
fluence the royal mind in a way impossible for the ordinary minis- 
ter. Under a weaker master than Frederick the Great such a 
practice might become fruitful of cabals and lead to backstairs 
intrigue. 

In local administration, as has been explained already, the 
nobility retained a large part of their feudal sovereignty, but the 
Landrath, head of the county or Kreis, had become a royal officer, 
chosen from a list of candidates named by the nobles. The towns 
were controlled by the tax commissioner known as the Steuerrath, 
for in almost all matters a financial question was involved, and 
the King desired to increase the revenues available for mihtary 
purposes. Through this officer he watched every possible channel 
of outflow. In the eastern portion of the Prussian territories the 
provincial estates had ceased to have more than a formal func- 
tion, but in the west they had important opportunities for advising 
the royal officers who formed the provincial chambers of war and 
domains. The towns had lost their old liberties, and were no 
longer centers of active political or administrative life. In this 
they resembled the French towns. 

The government of Great Britain differed from the European 
governments in one significant feature; that is, in the develop- TheEng- 
ment of rule through an elected assembly. In France the states ^^^j^°^^ 
general had not met since 1614. It had never succeeded in seri- 
ously limiting the powers of the King. Similar assemblies in 
other continental countries had played an even slighter role. But 
in England in the seventeenth century parliament had seized the 
reins of government, and a century later its supremacy was made 
effective by the development of the cabinet, or body of ministers, 
politically responsible to the majority of the members of the 
House of Commons. The leader of the cabinet was the prime 
minister. The King was supposed to accept as his official opin- 
ion the advice tendered him by his ministers. In this way the 



28 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



C HAP. II government of the country, its legislative as well as its adminis- 
1750-89 trative work, was controlled by public opinion which found ex- 
pression in parliament, and particularly in the House of Com- 
mons. The plan of responsible ministries was not completely 
worked out until the early part of the nineteenth century, but it 
was characteristic of England from the days of Sir Robert Wal- 
pole. 

The EngHsh system was, however, not free from defects. 
The Eng- Representation in the House of Commons was based on a medie- 
of Rep?e- val distribution of seats and took no account of the changes in 
sentation population. Too many seats were controlled by the great land- 
owners. It has been estimated that out of the total membership 
of six hundred and fifty-eight, the landowners, most of whom 
were nobles, had the power to nominate four hundred and eighty- 
seven. One family influential in the Lake district controlled the 
elections to eleven seats. According to another way of reckoning 
the proportions of the evil, one hundred and fifty-four persons, 
including the King and many peers, nominated three hundred and 
seven members, or nearly one-half, of the House of Commons. 
" It is certain that the King by the use of national funds and the 
gift of places and pensions was able to keep a sufficient band of 
followers in the House of Commons from 1767 to 1781 to enforce 
his personal rule." ^ Fortunately the nobles did not use their 
power to shift the weight of taxation to weaker shoulders or to 
create a system of special privileges, although they did multiply 
sinecures in order to provide for their younger sons. 

This method of choosing members for the House of Commons 
soon became a principal cause of quarrel between England and 
her colonies in America. In the course of a debate in 1793 upon 
a plan of reform, Mr. Grey, the Earl Grey of the Reform Bill of 
1832, declared that had the defects of the EngHsh system been 
removed in time the American colonies would have been saved. 
Whether this assertion was anything more than a strong argu- 
ment in favor of his scheme or not, it is true that the colonists 
were not hkely to be treated fairly by such a parliament, nor 
could they feel inclined to accept its decisions. The English sys- 
tem of colonial government was in other respects far more liberal 
than either that of France or that of Spain. The French and 
Spanish colonies were governed by officials sent from the mother 
country and were without power to tax themselves or adopt laws 
of local application, while the English colonies enjoyed a large 
measure of self-government. In most of the North American 

2 Edward Channing, History of the United States, III. 72. See also 
J. Holland Rose, William Pitt, I. 10. 



GOVERNMENT IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 29 

colonies, the governor was appointed by the Crown, but he was c hap, ii 
controlled by an assembly elected by the citizens or " freemen." 1750-89 
The controversies between the governors and the assemblies 
stimulated the feeling of independence. As the governor's salary 
depended upon the grant of the assembly, there was an effective 
way of bringing pressure to bear upon him. In matters of in- 
dustry and trade the colonies were subject to the decisions of 
parliament. The customs officials were officers of the Crown 
and paid by it, so that the colonial assemblies had no control over 
them. But the trade laws could not be enforced if colonial juries 
failed to convict offenders. From the point of view of the de- 
fense of the empire this local independence was a grave disad- 
vantage, for it was difficult to persuade a dozen colonial assem- 
blies to unite in any general scheme of defense or of taxation for 
imperial purposes, and an attempt of parliament to tax the people 
of the colonies directly might arouse resistance and even re- 
bellion. This problem was forced upon the attention of the 
British government by the cost of the struggle with France in 
America and by the permanent needs of colonial defense. 

The weakest spot in the French government was the financial 
system. The unjust distribution of the taxes by which the bur- French 
den was placed mainly upon the peasantry prevented the govern- Finances 
ment from raising money enough to meet its expenses unless it 
practised a severe economy and refraine<i from wars with its 
neighbors, two conditions unlikely to be fulfilled. The royal 
court was wasteful. MilHons were squandered in gifts and pen- 
sions. At the end of the old regime the pension list amounted 
to over fifty million livres, or about a tenth of the revenues. A 
part of this vast sum was paid for actual services rendered to 
the country, but most of it was given to favored officials or to 
court nobles who knew how to beg. One minister of war upon 
his retirement had arranged for twelve pensions for himself or 
members of his family. Nevertheless, a parsimony as severe as 
that of Frederick the Great would not have remedied the financial 
situation. Even if war debts were forgotten, the normal de- 
velopment of civil expenditure made necessary an increase in the 
revenues. More money could be found only by abandoning the 
antiquated system of taxation, which failed to reach important 
elements of the national wealth. 

In 1764 the French public debt amounted to two and a half 
billion livres, with an interest charge which took half the revenue. 
From time to time the King's ministers tried to balance accounts 
by suspending payments or by scaling down indebtedness. They 
had also fallen into the vicious habit of securing loans from 



30 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. II 
1750-89 



Financial 
Methods 
of Fred- 
erick the 
Great 



financiers under the form of " anticipations " of future receipts. 
For such loans the financiers charged a high rate. The practice 
also introduced another element of disorder into accounts already 
confused. There was no regular budget of receipts and ex- 
penses, although after a year was closed, occasionally many 
months afterwards, its accounts were made up in a formal state- 
ment called an etat au vrai. Even then the nature of a particular 
expenditure might be concealed because it had been withdrawn 
from audit by royal order or order of the chief finance minister. 
For these reasons it was difficult even for government officials 
to ascertain the exact condition of the finances. 

The method of collecting the indirect taxes, the salt and tobacco 
taxes, and the import and export duties, was unnecessarily ex- 
pensive. The government farmed its right of collection to sixty 
financiers, called farmers-general, who advanced a million and 
a half livres apiece, part of the sum as a loan to the government 
and part as payment for the ofBces, storehouses, and stocks of 
salt and tobacco. The contract ran for a term of six years and 
the profits of the enterprise, which were the sums in excess of 
the amount paid annually to the government, were divided among 
the farmers-general. As the government paid the financiers a 
high rate of interest on the loans, their profits were increased. 
In addition they received many thousands as allowances and fees. 
It was discovered that the contract which ran from 1744 to 1750 
produced for the farmers-general fifty-four million livres' profit, 
or nine million a year. According to Senac de Meilhan, who 
wrote in 1787, the financiers connected with the " farm " divided 
more than seventeen hundred million livres in the fifty years which 
closed in 1776, enough to have extinguished two-thirds of the 
French national debt. Two of these financiers had gained thirty 
million apiece. The average cost of this method of collection 
to the government was twenty per cent, of what the tax pro- 
duced. 

Prussia's financial resources were astonishingly small for a 
State which supported an army of between one and two hundred 
thousand men. Before the close of Frederick's reign they were 
doubled, but amounted at most to twenty-seven million thalers. 
Of this sum twelve million were expended on the army. Fred- 
erick also accumulated a treasure of over fifty million. He had 
emerged from the long struggle of the Seven Years' War almost 
without debt but by means of expedients which would have com- 
promised the honor of a less enlightened and powerful prince. 
He repeatedly debased the coinage and paid his creditors, in- 
cluding his officials, with promissory notes which he redeemed 



GOVERNMENT IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 31 

in debased coin. When peace was made, he restored the coinage c hap, n 
to its normal condition and took up the debased coin at one-fifth 1750-89 
of its face value. 

The income of Frederick's predecessors, the electors of Bran- 
denburg, was derived from their domains and from such sub- 
sidies as the local estates of their various dominions would grant 
them. When the electors inherited Cleves and Mark in the west, 
the duchy of Prussia in the east, and Pomerania in the north, 
they struggled victoriously with nobles and cities for a perma- 
nent, independent revenue. The fruits of their triumph were the 
land tax, levied mainly upon peasant lands, and the excise which 
was a system of indirect taxes upon commodities brought into 
the cities or produced within them. There was no single system 
of import and export duties for the whole group, but each prov- 
ince was treated by itself, and customs barriers existed even in 
the interior of the provinces. Specific duties were levied to pro- 
mote the export of one product or to prevent the importation of 
another. Frederick was influenced by the theories of the mer- 
cantile system, and wished to keep raw material from leaving his 
provinces and to hinder manufactured products from entering 
them. He wished to hoard his gold, partly that his state treasure 
might be large enough in case of sudden war. He treated the 
provinces west of the Weser as if they were foreign territory and 
would not permit their products to enter his other provinces. 
With these features Frederick's system of taxation could not pro- 
duce the maximum revenue and its results were unfavorable to 
the healthful growth of agriculture, manufactures, and trade. 
The management of the royal domains was more satisfactory. 
They comprised nearly one-third of all the landed property. By 
careful husbandry and a successful plan of rentals their revenue 
was constantly increased. 

Great Britain's financial system was far in advance of that of 
her neighbors. It enabled her not only to create an incomparable English 
naval defense, but also to subsidize her aUies on the Continent ^"^anciai 

1 1 • • • r r 1 Adminis- 

and hire mercenary armies. The most important feature of the tration 
system was the successful organization of credit, mainly through 
the Bank of England, which began its career in 1696 by lending 
its subscribed capital to the government. In return the govern- 
ment charged the interest to the " funds " due from the excise, 
and thus created the " funded " debt. The bank could issue notes 
redeemable in the coin which the government would pay as in- 
terest. By its loans it aided in the wise investment of capital 
and in the development of business. The growth of credit en- 
abled the government to negotiate the loans rendered necessary 



32 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

CHAP, u [)y enormous expenditures during the continental wars. The min- 
1760-89 istry learned early the necessity of providing scrupulously for 
the payment of the interest. As credit improved, the rate at 
which the government could borrow was gradually reduced from 
eight to three per cent. ; but the amount of the funded debt grew 
rapidly. At the close of the Seven Years' War it was £122,600,- 
000, with a floating debt of fourteen million more. 

The sources of the British income were the land tax, the ex- 
cise, and the customs. The inequalities of the land tax, which 
were complained of, were not due to any privileges belonging to 
the nobility, but to defects in the appraisement of property. The 
burden was increased by the general exemption of personal prop- 
erty. The system of customs, even after the improvements 
introduced by Sir Robert Walpole, was complex and clumsy, en- 
couraging smuggling and other frauds. By 1759 the general 
rate had risen to twenty-five per cent, and there was in addition 
a multitude of special duties. By its unity, however, Great Brit- 
ain was saved from the consequences of many diflferent customs 
areas, each with a special set of duties — an evil condition which 
weighed heavily upon the progress of trade in all continental 
countries. 

Within half a century each of these three countries, France, 
Prussia, and Great Britain, was to suflFer disaster, partly at least 
in consequence of the weakness of their governmental system. 
France was to prove herself incapable of carrying through re- 
forms in time to forestall revolution. Prussia's compUcated 
methods of administration led directly to embarrassment and 
defeat under the weak successors of Frederick the Great. The 
misfortune which befell the English was the loss of their prin- 
cipal colonies in America. 



CHAPTER III 

CURRENTS OF PUBLIC OPINION 

THE men whose writings influenced the tendencies of Eu- ohap^i 
ropean thought in the eighteenth century were not mainly 1750-8) 
interested in reform. The assistance which most of them gave 
to this movement was incidental. Some were students of 
philosophy or science or of political and social theories. Others 
were engaged in discrediting the doctrines imposed upon their 
fellow-men by Church and State. Never has the antagonism 
been keener between what was taught by authority and what 
was advocated by thoughtful scholars and by brilliant, or merely 
clever, controversialists. 

Churchmen, regarded throughout the Middle Ages, and even 
after the Protestant Reformation, as the special depositaries of 
truth, had lost prestige as intellectual leaders. This was the case Notable 
particularly in France. No new Bossuet, interpreter of the di- ^°°^'^ 
vine right of kings and bishops, appeared to defend the estab- 
lished order. If a person of priestly title wrote, it was usually 
to join in the attack upon the teachings of the Church or the 
theory of the monarchy. The Abbe de Condillac, his brother 
the Abbe Mably, and the Abbe Raynal, whom the Church had 
unfrocked, are notable examples. Condillac's Treatise on Sen- 
sations, published in 1754, was a serious contribution to philoso- 
phy, but it undermined traditional views. The Abbe Mably 's 
Principles of Legislation, which appeared twenty years later, criti- 
cised the rights of property, arguing for community of goods. 
Far more influential than either was the Abbe Raynal's Philo- 
sophical and Political History of the Indies, which appeared in 
1772, and which included not only valuable information upon 
European colonization in the west and in the east, but also pas- 
sionate denunciations of princes, ecclesiastics, and even employ- 
ers. He declared that rehgion was the invention of priestly 
charlatans. It has been said that his History of the Indies was 
for two decades the " bible of the oppressed and of dreamers." 

After the middle of the century many churchmen were notable 
for their sincere devotion to the welfare of their communities, 
but they were practical administrators rather than writers cap- 
able of correcting the prevalent tone of negation. The higher 

33 



THE REA'OLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



C HAP.n i clergy — bishops, abbots, and members of the cathedral chapters 
1750-89 — were drawn almost exclusively from the nobility. The last 
bishop belonging to a family of the third estate resigned in 1783. 
The leaders of the Church possessed the defects as well as the 
qualities of the nobility. Several were men of evangelical piety, 
although not controversialists. Others were influenced by the 
liberal tendencies of the time. Of some the remark would have 
been true which Louis XVI made when he was asked to nomi- 
nate Lomenie de Brienne as archbishop of Paris, " The arch- 
bishop of Paris must at least believe in God." 

The French Church had suffered in the controversy during 
the first half of the century over the enforcement of the papal 
bull Unigenitus, condemning the Jansenist doctrines of grace.^ 
This controversy became violent in 1752 after the clergy began 
to refuse the sacraments to those who did not adhere to the bull. 
The parlement of Paris intervened in behalf of the rights of the 
dying, and the King annulled the decrees of the judges. The 
conflict was not ended until Pope Benedict XIV ordered that 
the sacraments should not be refused except to persons notori- 
ously disobedient to the bull. Meanwhile the courts and the 
lawyers had been thrown into antagonism to the authorities of 
the Church. 

Another severe blow to the Church was the destruction of the 
Jesuit Order, composed of the most militant defenders of ec- 
clesiastical authority. The Jesuits were detested by the magis- 
tracy which was now thoroughly committed to opposition to 
extreme views of papal power. They had once possessed great 
influence through their control of education, for the larger num- 
ber of colleges or secondary schools was in their hands. But 
their method as teachers had begun to arouse criticism, on the 
ground that it produced only good Latin versifiers. The hatreds 
inherited from the Jansenist controversy were the cause of their 
ruin. They were compromised in the failure of a commercial 
company managed by P. Lavalette, formerly one of their offi- 
cials in Martinique. This incident was the signal for an attack 
upon them by the provincial parlements and the parlement of 
Paris which alleged that the statutes of the Society contained 
principles hostile to the royal authority. At first Louis XV tried 
to protect the Order, but its enemies were strong, and in 1764 

^Jansenism was a revival of Augustinian conceptions of Christian 
morals. The tendency of thought was named for Bishop Jansenius, of 
Ypres, who died in 1638. Pascal and the Port Royalists adopted it, and 
Quesnel embodied it in his Reflexions morales, one hundred and one 
propositions of which were condemned in the bull. 



CURRENTS OF PUBLIC OPINION 



35 



Intoler- 
ance 



he signed an edict annulling it, while permitting the members c hap, n i 
as individuals to reside in their dioceses and continue their work 1750-89 
as ecclesiastics under the control of the bishops. This attack 
in France had been preceded by one in Portugal, as a result of 
which the Jesuits were expelled as conspirators against the King. 
It was followed by their deportation from Spain. A few years 
later, upon the demand of the Kings of France and Spain, the 
Pope abohshed the Order everywhere. The Jesuits found pro- 
tectors only in the Protestant King of Prussia and in the Ortho- 
dox Empress of Russia. 

Although the French Church was fast losing its ascendancy, 
sinister outbursts of intolerance still occurred. In 1762 the par- 
lement of Toulouse condemned a Protestant merchant, Jean 
Calas, to be broken on the wheel upon the flimsy charge that he 
had murdered his son, who, rumor declared, was about to become 
a Catholic.^ Three years later a nobleman, still in his teens, the 
Chevalier de la Barre, was condemned to death by the parlement 
of Paris for an insulting attitude toward a religious procession, 
an offense which he had aggravated by reading forbidden books. 

In Germany, churchmen, whether CathoHc or Protestant, were 
on the defensive. Lutheranism had emerged from the contro- 
versies of the sixteenth century with a dogmatic system as rigid 
as that of the medieval scholastics. In the latter part of the 
seventeenth century the Pietists — Spener, Francke, and their 
followers — strove for a more personal religious experience. 
Men of similar disposition, under the patronage of Count Zin- 
zendorf, organized a new Church, that of the Moravian Brethren. 
But these movements, while exercising an important influence 
upon many communities, were not strong enough to counteract 
the force of the rationalistic attack on the Christian system. 

In the German CathoHc Church interest centered about the con- 
troversy over the limitations of papal power. Many of the Ger- 
man bishops and abbots were princes ruling over extensive ter- 
ritories, and were inclined to adopt an attitude of independence 
toward the papacy. In 1763 Hontheim. the coadjutor-bishop of 
the archbishop-elector of Treves, pubhshed a treatise upon the 
jurisdiction of the pope. The identity of the author was long con- 
cealed under the pseudonym Febronius. Hontheim acknowl- 
edged the primacy of the Holy See, but asserted that the papal 
claim of a right to confirm or depose bishops was drawn from 



Religious 
Controv- 
ersy in 
Germany 



2 The people of Toulouse approved the verdict. The Abbe Colbert, one 
of Hume's correspondents, wrote him, " In spite of all that has happened, 
they every man believe Calas to be guilty, and it is no use speaking to 
them on the subject." Quoted by John Rae, Life of Adam Smith. 186. 



36 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

CHAP. Ill the False Decretals. He also said that the decrees of the Pope 
1750-89 in regard to doctrine and conduct required confirmation by a 
general council. Nor were his conclusions merely historical and 
theoretical. He asked the popes to abandon their extreme claims 
and urged princes to compel them to do so if they refused. Three 
editions of the work were soon published. Hontheim was ap- 
pointed the head of a commission, which met at Coblentz, a city 
belonging to the Elector of Treves, in order to prepare a state- 
ment of the grievances of the bishops. Although he was after- 
wards led to make a partial retractation, his views had an im- 
portant influence upon legislation in Austria, where they were 
vigorously defended by the professor of canon law at the Uni- 
versity of Vienna. 

In England religion was becoming a positive force through 
The Be- the labors of George Whitefield and John Wesley. Both were 
ugious clergymen of the state Church, but they had abandoned the con- 
in°ESa^d ventional methods of ordinary churchmen. They were not con- 
cerned about the philosophical defense of Christianity; their 
task, as they understood it, was to preach repentance and salva- 
tion. The churches were too small to hold the throngs who were 
eager to hear them, even when the clergy did not refuse them ad- 
mission to the pulpit. They preached ordinarily in the fields or 
in the streets. Wesley never considered himself a separatist from 
the Church of England, although in 1767 he abandoned his earHer 
view that salvation was impossible outside it. Wherever he went 
he organized chapels and started charitable work, in effect laying 
the foundation of the Methodist Church in England and America. 
Such a revival of religious enthusiasm counteracted the destruc- 
tive influence of attacks on the established order far more than 
any formal arguments could have done. Wesley himself was a 
Tory in politics, although he freely criticised the abuses which 
he perceived in English Hfe. He described the slave trade, so 
profitable to the English merchants, as that " execrable sum of 
all villainies." 

To criticise the old regime in newspapers or books was beset 
ThePresB with difficulties. England and Holland were the only countries 
where liberty of the press existed. The German newspapers 
until the time of Frederick did not often venture to discuss public 
affairs. He gave more freedom to two Berlin papers, and this 
opened a new era. By 1784 there were two hundred journals of 
which the best were Moser's Osnabriick Intelligencer and Schu- 
bart's German Chronicle. The Leyden and Amsterdam Gazettes 
had a large sale outside of Holland, because of the freedom which 
they enjoyed. In France the number of newspapers increased 



CURRENTS OF PUBLIC OPINION 37 

rapidly in the latter part of the century, but editors were forced c hap, h i 
to be cautious, otherwise they were lodged in the Bastille " during 1750-89 
the King's pleasure." Many French books were printed in Am- 
sterdam or Geneva, and smuggled across the French border. 
From 1750 to 1763 the royal censorship was under the control 
of a liberal, Lamoignon de Malesherbes, but this did not alto- 
gether remove the shackles from the press. 

It happened that in France, where the defense of the estab- 
lished order was weakest, the attack upon it was strongest. The 
great names of the period are Montesquieu, Voltaire, Diderot, 
and Rousseau. Not all that they said, nor the most important 
part of it, was destructive in tendency, but the total volume of 
their criticisms was such that respect for ancient institutions was 
undermined. 

Montesquieu's influence was exerted mainly upon the course 
of political thought. In 1721 he had published the Persian Let- Montes- 
ters, which were full of biting satire masquerading as the naive *"^®" 
account of European society which two wealthy merchants sent 
home to their friends. In these letters the Pope was referred 
to as an old idol, who once deposed kings, but is no longer feared. 
The French King was represented as making money out of men's 
vanity by selling them titles, or as compelling them to receive 
promises to pay instead of coin. Montesquieu had visited Eng- 
land, residing there two years. He did not fail to note the cor- 
ruption in the public life of the English, and yet he regarded 
them as the freest people in the world. It was in 1748 that he 
published the Spirit of Lazvs, the work which brought him last- 
ing fame. What attracted immediate attention was his praise 
of the English constitution and his insistence upon the necessity 
of a separation of executive, legislative, and judicial functions. 
He thought this was characteristic of English institutions, al- 
though the cabinet system, by which the initiative in making law 
and the duty of enforcing it are entrusted to the same officials, 
was already partially developed. To him the chief requirement 
was an independent judiciary, which existed in England in the 
form of the ancient and undisputed sway of law. So far as 
his book increased the respect of Frenchmen for the English 
constitution, it acted as a solvent of reverence for absolute mon- 
archy. His doctrine of the separation of the powers was to be- 
come a fundamental dogma of the Revolutionists. 

This work eventually turned political thought away from ab- 
stractions to the study of actual conditions. Montesquieu taught 
that institutions are partly the result of physical environment and 
of the character of peoples. No single scheme of government is 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. Ill therefore applicable everywhere. He thus gave a natural setting 
1750-89 to government and " laicized the philosophy of history," under- 
mining the authority of Bossuet's great exposition of the provi- 
dential course of human events. 

Voltaire's influence was not due to any single work of great 
voiuire power, but to a succession of poems, essays, pamphlets, his- 
tories, and philosophical books, extending over a period of more 
than fifty years. These writings possessed a marvelous clearness 
of statement and pushed every inquiry which reason and common 
sense could suggest into the dark corners of authoritative tradi- 
tion and consecrated custom. He set forth in sentences sparkling 
with wit opinions which most educated men of his times were 
beginning to entertain. The strongest single impression which he 
sought to convey was that the Church was the enemy of progress 
and enlightenment, and that its power should be destroyed as an 
" infamous thing." He did not distinguish between the French 
Church and other Churches, but treated them all as the invention 
of self-seeking priests. He was not, however, an atheist. He 
held that God had implanted in mankind a sense of justice which 
would finally triumph over prejudice and vice. 

Voltaire was not a revolutionist in politics. He wished to re- 
move the abuses which he as well as other thoughtful men saw 
in European society, but he believed that a monarchy was the 
best form of government. The particular reforms which he de- 
sired were individual liberty, the equalization of the burdens of 
taxation, the abolition of serfdom, the suppression of feudal dues, 
and the organization of public education. In comparison with 
what France was to see within twenty years after his death this 
was a conservative program, 

Voltaire's intellectual development was profoundly influenced 
by his residence in England from 1726 to 1729, almost at the be- 
ginning of his career. He made the acquaintance of the leading 
English writers, learned the language thoroughly, and studied 
the masterpieces of English literature, especially Shakespeare's 
plays. Locke's Essay concerning the Human Understanding 
made him a disciple of that philosophy, and Locke's Letters on 
Toleration gave him a cause. He also became one of the most 
convinced advocates of Sir Isaac Newton's theories against their 
French assailants. A few years after his return he published a 
volume of Letters upon the English in which he contrasted 
French and English society. He remarked that the English peas- 
ants could improve their dwellings or their cattle without fear 
of having their taxes raised in consequence. He noted also that 
the clergy and the nobles were not exempt from taxation. In 



CURRENTS OF PUBLIC OPINION 39 



religion, he said that " An Englishman, like a free man, goes to c hap, i i: 
Heaven by the road that pleases him best." As a consequence 1750-89 
of this book he became the leader of a group of admirers of 
England. The authorities in his own country did not relish his 
criticisms, and the courts ordered his book to be pubUcly burned.^ 

For several years Voltaire seemed ambitious to be reckoned as 
a scientist. It was at this time that a French expedition to the 
Arctic Seas proved that the earth was flattened at the poles, as 
Newton had explained. Voltaire seized the occasion to pubHsh 
an excellent popular treatise on the Newtonian system. Never- 
theless, his proper field was not science but hterature. For a 
short time he was received into royal favor, was chosen to the 
French Academy, and was even employed upon diplomatic mis- 
sions; but Louis XV disliked the whole tribe of philosophers. 
Voltaire did not feel safe at Paris and ordinarily lived near the 
frontier. In 1749 Frederick the Great, with whom he had been 
long in correspondence, sent him an invitation to reside at the 
Prussian Court. He accepted the invitation, but his genius was 
too erratic to make him a good courtier, and three years later 
he returned to France. His fears still kept him away from Paris, 
and he finally purchased an estate at Ferney within convenient 
distance of the frontier of Switzerland. 

It was at this period that his most active propaganda against 
the Church began. In 1756 he published his Essay on General voitaire 
History, which was really a voluminous history of civilization ^^l^^ 
from the time of Charlemagne, the first work which presented 
that phase of history successfully. He filled it with thrusts at 
the ecclesiastical institutions which he detested. This was still 
more true of his Philosophical Dictionary. He was not content 
with the publication of books, but directed the attacking forces 
either through an agent whom he sent to stir the zeal of those 
who seemed to be lagging behind, or by means of letters and 
pamphlets. A clerk in the office of the controller-general of 
the finances forwarded them to all parts of the country. Voltaire 
finally concluded that the pamphlet was a better weapon than 
books, because it was read easily and was more likely to escape 
the attention of the police. The pamphlet also was more 
adapted to the style of attack which he thought effective. " It 
is," he said, " at once more sure and more agreeable to ridicule 
theological disputes and make people look upon them with dis- 
gust." His. energy seemed inexhaustible. Although over sixty 
years old, he worked eighteen or twenty hours a day. 

3 This account of Voltaire follows mainly that of M. Carre in Lavisse, 
Histoire de France, VIII, 2, i7of., 298f. 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



Voltaire did not venture to return to Paris until near the close 
of his life in 1778. Several times during the reign of Louis XV 
he was thrown into paroxysms of fear by the mere possibility 
that his ecclesiastical foes might yet take vengeance upon him. 
One occasion was when his Philosophical Dictionary was burned 
on the pyre upon which the body of La Barre was consumed. 
In 1769 " he pretended to be in a dying condition and confessed 
and received the communion, taking the precaution of having 
these pious acts certified by a notary."^ As the clergy could 
procure no retractation from him at the time of his death, they 
caused the printing or sale of his books to be forbidden. But 
times were changing, and the King's principal minister permitted 
the publication near Strasbourg of a complete edition of his 
works. 

For many years before his death Voltaire had been the most 
influential of a group of writers often called the Philosophers. 
To this group belonged the Abbe de Condillac, Buffon, author of 
the Natural History, D'Alembert, the great mathematician, D'Hol- 
bach, whose System of Nature taught materialistic atheism, and 
Diderot, a literary man almost as versatile as Voltaire. Diderot's 
special achievement was as editor of the Encyclopedia. In its 
large folios were brought together all that free inquiry had been 
able to learn about every imaginable topic. Its articles on the 
practical arts were of great value. It was outwardly respectful 
toward Church and State, because otherwise authorization to 
publish it would have been refused. Articles upon ecclesiastical 
matters were usually given to liberal churchmen, but references 
were added to other articles upon kindred subjects in which opin- 
ions altogether different were set forth. The fundamental phi- 
losophy of the work was hostile to supernatural religion. It was 
a formidable exhibit of the triumphs of human reason unhampered 
by the restraints of an orthodoxy which still revered the medi- 
eval theologians as authoritative teachers. The work was orig- 
inally planned as a translation and revision of Chambers's Ency- 
clopedia. The first volume appeared in 1751. Almost immedi- 
ately alarmed orthodoxy began to raise obstacles to its progress. 
It was twice suppressed, but Diderot and his coadjutors went on 
with their work and by 1765 the seventeen volumes were ready 
to be delivered. There were also supplementary volumes, eleven 
of them filled with plates. 
^ The principal weakness of the philosophical school was their 
simplified conception of man. They were misled by what Taine 
calls the classical spirit. They ignored the obscure and the un- 

* Carre, in Lavisse, Histoire de France, VIII, 2, 304. 



CURRENTS OF PUBLIC OPINION 41 

usual. Most of them used a vocabulary which was abstract, c hap, h i 
without a variety of words rich enough to describe the diversi- 1750-89 
ties of life, even if they had been capable of perceiving such 
things. They thought that to select the general and to name it 
exactly was the highest use of the reason and was truly scien- 
tific. But an adequate account of mankind cannot, be made in 
that way. It is not surprising that the man they saw was a fig- 
ment of their imaginations. If they observed an individual who 
was brutish and unreasonable, the inference was irresistible that 
his condition was the consequence of bad laws. Good legislation 
and good men, they contended, must go together. If the laws 
were improved they prophesied that men would become indefi- 
nitely perfectible. 

Rousseau was for a time counted as a member of the philo- Rousseau 
sophical party, although he was in reahty one of the creators of 
Romanticism, which before the century was over destroyed the 
ascendency of the rationalistic philosophers. His ideas of nature 
and of mankind were fundamentally opposed to their teachings. 
His most notable book. The Social Contract, was published in 
1762. Its significance is not so much in the theory of political 
society which it taught as in the contrast between the author's 
positive declarations and the legal principles of the French State 
at that time. He confronted an absolute monarchy with the 
proposition that the people are sovereign, and that this sover- 
eignty cannot be delegated. While the royal council drew up 
decrees on the theory that the King's will had the force of law, 
he declared that law is the expression of the common will. The 
government, be it monarchy or repubhc, is simply an intermediary 
body, possessed of a temporary commission, with the task of 
making the will of the sovereign people effective in relation to 
individual persons as subjects. Although he taught that the re- 
publican form of government Avas adapted only to the necessities 
of small states, he explained the evils of monarchical rule in such 
a way as to excite distrust of kings. He declared that it was for 
the interest of a prince that his people should be weak and 
wretched, for only thus was he safe from rebellion. 

Rousseau's teachings were not dangerous to monarchical gov- 
ernments alone. Although he intended to defend individual lib- 
erty, he affirmed the ominous sophism that the citizen needs no 
guarantee against the tyranny of the democratic State, because 
a whole cannot injure one of its members. His doctrines could 
be, and in the event were, used to silence minorities suffering 
under the tyranny of a majority authorized for the time to style 
itself the agent of the sovereign will. 



42 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

C HAP. I ll A more striking instance of dubious reasoning was his attitude 
1750-89 toward religious toleration. He would permit no intolerant re- 
ligion within his ideal commonwealth, and yet he insisted that 
there was a " profession of faith which is purely civil . . . and 
that its articles are social sentiments without which it is impos- 
sible to be a good citizen or a faithful subject." No one can be 
compelled to accept them, but those who do not should be ban- 
ished, and if any one who has accepted them should act as if he 
does not believe them, he should be put to death. The list of 
dogmas was short: God, providence, and immortality, the hap- 
piness of the just, and the punishment of the wicked. This idea 
of a civil religion enforced under pain of banishment or death 
was to play a sinister part in the coming Revolution. 

The year 1762 also saw the publication of Rousseau's Emile, 
The Re- which had a more lasting effect upon educational ideas and meth- 
Nature °^^ *^^^ ^^^ Social Contract had upon political thinking. Under 
the form of a story of the development of a boy whose father 
was rich enough to obtain for him a special tutor, Rousseau ex- 
pounded a plan of education according to nature, which took 
account of the spontaneous tendencies of the child and shielded 
the inner forces of his life from harmful contact with a cor- 
rupted and artificial social system. Until the boy was twelve 
his main business was to grow. He should be taught only what 
his senses and experience made him anxious to understand. 
When the time came for more formal instruction, its character 
should be determined by the stage of development which he had 
reached. At all times the nature of the child was to be the guide. 
This protest against submission to conventionality and appeal 
for a return to nature touched a chord which was ready to vi- 
brate. 

Rousseau had in the preceding decade written two Discourses 
in which he contrasted the artificialities of civilized society and 
the simplicity and virtues of primitive life. In the first he argued 
that the progress of the arts and sciences, in other words of civ- 
ilization, had actually corrupted the original sound nature of man- 
kind. In the second Discourse, which was upon the Origin of 
Inequality, he explained more at length " his legend concerning 
the primitive condition of mankind, in which man, strong, soli- 
tary, feeling in his heart a natural pity which is the germ of all 
the virtues, lived without quarrels and without passions." ^ He 
declared that the first one who enclosed a piece of ground and 
called it his own, and discovered people blind enough to beUeve 
^ Carre, ibid., 310. 



CURRENTS OF PUBLIC OPINION 43 

him, was the true founder of civilized society. Such ideas c hap, h i 
seemed repellent to the philosophers who regarded their century 1750-89 
as peculiarly enlightened and who looked forward to the speedy 
triumph of reason. Voltaire wrote to Rousseau that reading his 
book made one feel like walking on all fours, and added, " As 
it is more than sixty years since I have done this, it is impossible 
for me to resume the habit." 

Besides Rousseau and the philosophers, there were other men 
whose minds were of a more practical cast and whose opinions TheEcon- 
soon affected the policy of the government. They are sometimes omists 
grouped together as the Economists, and sometimes separated 
into two groups, one interested primarily in advocating freer 
trade, the other engaged in propagating the view that agriculture 
is the sole source of increase in a nation's wealth. This second 
group was occasionally referred to as the " sect of the Physio- 
crats." Its leader was Quesnay, physician in ordinary of the 
King. His principal work, the Tableau economique, was printed 
on the royal press at Versailles in 1758, and it is said that Louis 
XV took a personal interest in the enterprise. Quesnay divided 
society into three classes : the productive, or farming population ; 
the proprietary, or owners of the soil ; and the sterile, or artisans, 
traders, and professional men. He argued that industry did not 
add to the real wealth of the country, because it simply changed 
the forms of things which already existed. As land was the sole 
origin of riches, the net product of agriculture was the only thing 
properly taxable. Quesnay's chief disciple was the Marquis de 
Mirabeau. Another follower was a young man named Dupont 
de Nemours, who was to have a share in the reform movements 
of the next quarter century and of the Revolution. Quesnay 
said of him, " We must take care of this young man, for he will 
still speak after we are dead." The great service which this 
school of thinkers rendered was to call attention to the importance 
of agriculture as a source of national wealth. 

The most influential member of the other group of the 
Economists was the Marquis de Gournay, who purchased the 
office of intendant of commerce in 1751. He and his friends 
were opposed to the policy which Colbert, the great minister of 
Louis XIV, had carried out in regard to industry and commerce. 
Instead of minute regulation he advocated the policy of freedom. 
His maxim was " Laisser faire et laisser passer." He believed 
that competition was the most powerful spur to industrial activ- 
ity. One of his followers, and a disciple of Quesnay as well, 
was Turgot, who in 1761 became intendant at Limoges and thir- 
teen years later the first great reform minister of Louis XVI's 



44 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. Ill reign.^ Gournay's influence was also felt through Trudaine, who 
1750^9 was intendant of finances and had charge of the department of 
commerce. 

In neither Great Britain nor Germany was any such sustained 
Literary attack made upon the bulwarks of the old regime. The Revolu- 
Tenden- tion of 1688 and the successful defense of the Hanoverian kings 
Engund against the Stuart Pretenders and their Jacobite followers had 
taken away the principal excuse for pohtical agitation. Parlia- 
ment was now supreme. The political writers were usually on 
good terms with the parliamentary leaders, in whose gift were 
desirable offices, and they were rarely tempted to put forth rad- 
ical doctrines. The most significant tendencies in EngHsh 
thought, aside from the Wesleyan movement, were the new in- 
terest in nature and a clearer perception of human character. 
The one found its earliest expression in descriptive poetry, espe- 
cially Thomson's Seasons, the other in Richardson's novels of 
sentiment, Clarissa and Sir Charles Grandison. A different 
phase was illustrated in Macpherson's Ossian and in Percy's 
Reliques. The interest which these poems excited proved that 
men were eager to please their imagination by contemplating per- 
sons and scenes altogether foreign to the narrow vision of the or- 
dinary rationalistic philosopher of the century. 

The intellectual relations between Great Britain and France 
were close throughout the century. Rousseau's writings strength- 
ened the Romantic tendency in English literature. In economic 
thought the work of the Physiocrats was surpassed by Adam 
Smith, whose Wealth of Nations was published in 1776. Smith 
had resided in Paris for several months in 1765 and 1766. He 
was a frequent visitor at the apartments of Quesnay in the 
chateau of Versailles and he met Turgot often in the salon of 
Mile, de I'Espinasse in Paris. As his own central ideas on eco- 
nomic life were already formed, and as he had actually begun 
to write his Wealth of Nations, he was not merely an interested 
listener. Dupont de Nemours regarded him as a follower of 
Quesnay, but though Smith's admiration for Quesnay was sin- 
cere, he did his own thinking, and his argument for freedom, 
assuring producers a fair field and no favor, proved far more 
convincing than the arguments of the French economists.'^ 

The intellectual life of Germany showed the characteristics 
found everywhere in western Europe in the eighteenth century, 

6 In 1769-70 Turgot published Reflections sur la formation et la distribu- 
tion des richesses, which is regarded as a forerunner of Adam Smith's 
Wealth of Nations. 

7 John Rae, Life of Adam Smith, ch, xiv. 



CURRENTS OF PUBLIC OPINION 45 

and yet currents of thought and feeling were discernible which c hap, h i 
prophesied a more unique development. The country had been 1750-89 
slow to recover from the wounds of the Thirty Years' War. iheintei- 
Furthermore, the prestige which the brilliant age of Louis XIV ^?=^*°^J 
had given to French ideas long kept the Germans under their Germany 
spell. Many a German court was a diminutive, not to say piti- 
able, replica of Versailles. Slowly a spirit of revolt was aroused 
against imitation and conventionalism. Frederick's victory at 
Rossbach in 1757 over the French army gave to many Germans 
the feeling that they were a nation and had a future. Within 
his dominions this feeling could not take form in pohtical activ- 
ity, for Frederick was an autocrat. It did not express itself in 
factious opposition, because he convinced his people that he re- 
garded himself as the first servant of the State. Outside of 
Prussia in the smaller principalities there was still less oppor- 
tunity for the growth of political opinion. This did not pre- 
clude a vigorous intellectual development in other directions. 
The situation is illustrated in the work of Klopstock, the first 
great German poet of the eighteenth century. His poetry ex- 
pressed at once religious idealism, a high conception of national- 
ity, and a warm faith in the progress of mankind.^ His princi- 
pal poem was the Messias, an epic, which was suggested by Mil- 
ton's Paradise Lost. The first three cantos were published in 
1748 and won him hosts of admirers. His German patriotism 
prompted him to attempt to revive the figures of German an- 
tiquity, striking the same note which appears in Ossian and in 
the Reliques. Meanwhile, Richardson's novels stirred German 
sentiment and Thomson's Seasons found imitators. In 1766 
Wieland completed his translation of twenty-two of Shakespeare's 
plays, and the influence of the English dramatist began to sup- 
plant the authority of the French classical drama. 

German thought was emancipated still further under the leader- 
ship of Lessing and Herder. Although as a rationalist Lessing 
rebuked the bigotry of the Lutheran theologians, he criticised 
with equal vigor the intolerance of the philosophers. He was one New ideas 
of the masters of the new Humanism, which decried the slavish °^^^^*^°if 
imitation of ancient writers characteristic of the older classical ization 
teachers. He argued for a real comprehension of the Greek 
spirit which would stimulate the Germans to a full expression 
of their own nature. Winckelmann had emphasized the same 
idea in his Thoughts upon Imitation of Greek Masterpieces. The 
new university at Gottingen became a center of this Humanism. 

*Kuno Francke, History of German Literature, 235. 



46 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

CHAP. Ill The Germans preferred to seek their classical ideals at the sources, 
1750.89 rather than take them second-hand from the French. At this 
time they turned with a fresh interest to Homer for his matchless 
pictures of primitive heroes. Herder extended the application 
of Lessing's principle to the whole history of mankind. He was 
the first to make clear the fact that history is concerned with the 
progress of development. According to this view a national lit- 
erature at each period is an expression of contemporary national 
life. He frankly took up the defense of the Middle Ages which 
the philosophers affected to despise as times of Gothic and Cim- 
merian darkness. They seemed to him ages of ferment, of en- 
ergy, and of action. He once exclaimed, " Give us back for 
many reasons your reverence and superstition, your darkness and 
ignorance, your disorder and rudeness of manners; and take in 
return our light and our unbelief, our nerveless coldness and re- 
finement, our philosophic flaccidity and human wretchedness ! " ^ 
Nor were revolutionary thoughts lacking in some of these writ- 
ings. In Lessing's Emilia Galotti the vices of princely courts 
were held up to scorn. Fortunately Frederick's influence made 
such vices less fashionable among the great. 

The newer tendencies of German thought were hostile to much 
that was of French origin, but not to Rousseau's teachings. His 
appeal for a return to nature found in their hearts a sympathetic 
response. " It is indeed impossible to conceive of the ' Sturm 
and Drang ' movement without Rousseau's Nouvelle Heloise and 
Emile." ^° In his system of ideas the emphasis was placed upon 
man. His second Discourse exerted a decisive influence upon 
the intellectual development of the great German philosopher 
Kant. To him Rousseau seemed the philosopher of the micro- 
cosm, who had '' replaced Newton, the philosopher of the 
macrocosm." Kant's mind was henceforth turned aside from 
finespun theories of the universe and his attention was concen- 
trated upon problems of conduct and human welfare.^^ 

Northern Italy was also awakening to new intellectual life 
Italian Under the influence of a group of men in Milan, the most notable 
Reformers q£ Y^hQ^ was the Marquis Cesare Beccaria. Lombardy since 
1714 had belonged to Austria and the mild rule of Maria Theresa 
gave the Lombards a period of unwonted prosperity. Beccaria 
and his friends for a short time published a newspaper which 
discussed the legislative, economic, and literary questions of the 
day in a spirit of frank intelligence. They avoided the obstacle 

» Calvin Thomas, German Literature, 261. 

10 Kuno Francke, 303, 

" Friedrich Paulsen's Kant, 39. 



CURRENTS OF PUBLIC OPINION 47 

of the censorship by having their paper printed in Brescia on c hap, h i 
Venetian soil. In 1761 Beccaria published a treatise on Crimes 1750-89 
and Punishments. He criticised the secret procedure of the 
courts and the cruelty of the penal law. At this time in Eng- 
land one hundred and sixty offenses were punishable by death. 
In France ordinary persons convicted of a capital offense were 
broken on the wheel, suffering horrible and prolonged agonies. 
Beccaria also protested against the use of torture to extract a 
confession from the suspected or evidence from the convicted 
criminal which might lead to the arrest of accomplices. 

The men of the eighteenth century were justified in regarding 
the age as full of promise. They were, however, destined to be 
cruelly disillusioned about the all-sufficiency of reason. The his- 
tory of Europe, and especially of France, from 1763 to 1789, was 
to reveal the formidable obstacles which the reform spirit would 
be obliged to remove before its ideals could become practical 
realities. 



CHAPTER IV 



CHAP. IV 

1763-89 



Enlight- 
ened 
Buleis 



Frederick 
the Great 



THE WORK OF THE BENEVOLENT DESPOTS 

THE Seven Years' War had involved every important coun- 
try of western Europe. In 1763 the first task was to 
restore what had been destroyed by the ravages of the struggle. 
The principal rulers were not content with this, but were anxious 
to carry out significant reforms. The most conspicuous of 
them, Frederick II of Prussia, Joseph II of Austria, and Charles 
III of Spain, have been called " Enlightened " or " Benevolent 
Despots." They were benevolent because anxious to promote 
the welfare of their peoples, and despots because they desired to 
destroy the institutions which hindered the efficiency of the royal 
administration and prevented them from making their will the 
rule of government. Their successes and failures have a still 
deeper interest on account of their relation to the great move- 
ment of revolutionary reform soon to begin in France. Their 
careers may ofifer a criticism or a justification, or at least an 
explanation, of the impatient zeal with which the French leaders 
appHed the policy of " thorough " to the institutions of the most 
ancient monarchy of Europe. 

The problems of each state were the consequence of the same 
general condition, and the work of their rulers displayed, there- 
fore, many similarities. All desired to improve the position of 
the peasants, and all sought to foster and regulate manufacturing. 
They were united in attacking local and corporate powers. A 
few entered into conflict with the Church over what they re- 
garded as her impossible pretensions. 

The most successful of the enlightened despots was Frederick 
II. He was but slightly influenced by idealistic schemes. The 
Silesian wars were not a school for visionaries. The hard neces- 
sities of a military State, realized by a mind exceptionally keen 
and penetrating, were his unvarying guide. He had a stern 
conception of duty and regarded himself as the first servant of 
the State. His industry was tireless. But he constructed a 
governmental machine which his less capable successors could 
not manage, and which, twenty years after his death, brought 
ruin upon the kingdom. It is significant of his attitude that the 

48 



THE WORK OF THE BENEVOLENT DESPOTS 49 

receipts of State were apportioned among three funds, one of c hap, i v 
which, called the Dispositionskasse, was made up of the surplus 1763-89 
from the other two as well as of the proceeds of special taxes. 
This fund was literally at his disposition, and none of the min- 
isters could meddle in its management, which was turned over to 
a cabinet councilor. Thus Frederick alone understood the exact 
condition of the Prussian treasury. His despotism was also 
patriarchal and intimate, and he intervened personally in matters 
of detailed administration, counting it not beneath his attention 
to prevent a nobleman from marrying the daughter of a simple 
magistrate or to hinder a middle-class burgher from buying the 
estate of a bankrupt nobleman. 

It is not surprising that Frederick, an admirer of Voltaire, 
should take a liberal attitude upon religious questions. He went 
beyond mere toleration and granted complete religious liberty. 
He even wished the Jesuits to continue as teachers in his Silesian 
schools after their Order had been aboUshed by the Pope. In 
criminal procedure he put an end to the use of torture to extract 
evidence. He caused the procedure in civil cases to be simpli- 
fied and his officers succeeded in clearing up dockets which had 
been encumbered for years with unfinished cases. During his 
reign rapid progress was also made towards the codification of 
the laws, and the work was completed a few years after his 
death. 

Frederick's enlightened despotism nowhere assumed a more 
patriarchal character than in his efforts to heal the wounds of HeaUng 
war. He was not obliged to accumulate a treasure before begin- ^^^^^g 
ning, for when peace was made he had twenty million thalers in of war 
his war fund and ample stores of grain which he had accumu- 
lated for a new campaign. These resources he immediately used 
to aid the communities which had suffered most, particularly in 
Silesia, the New Mark, and Pomerania. With his great ca- 
pacity for work and his insistence upon detail he studied the 
needs of each community. In one case houses must be built, 
in another seed must be furnished, in still another horses were 
required. So efficiently were his plans carried out that in a few 
years the memory of the wars was gone and a new and better 
prosperity prevailed. As many as thirteen thousand houses were 
erected with state help. The experience which Frederick's offi- 
cials acquired was again utilized when West Prussia was an- 
nexed, in order to raise that unprogressive province to the level 
of its neighbors. 

One method by which Frederick sought to strengthen his 
provinces was the encouragement of immigration. In this he 



50 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



Attempts 
to Abolish 
Serfdom 



was following the precedents set by his father, Frederick Wil- 
liam I, and his great grandfather, the Great Elector, who had 
welcomed the persecuted Protestants of France and of Salzburg 
to Brandenburg. Frederick hoped that the mercenaries who 
entered his army would settle in his dominions. To obtain other 
colonists his agents were especially active at Hamburg on the 
coast and at Frankfort in southern Germany. If any com- 
munity suffered from the ordinary ills — crop failure, floods, 
fire, or the oppression of tyrannical and stupid rulers — 
Frederick's agents hastened thither, offering a refuge within his 
domains, with the promise of land, freedom from service in the 
army or from serfdom, and money for traveling expenses and 
for home-building at the journey's end. He preferred Germans, 
and sought those who had a reputation for skill in industry or 
agriculture. For example, he wished to attract East Fries- 
landers for cattle-raising and Swabians for ordinary farming. 
The land he had to offer belonged to the vast royal domains, 
or to the districts which he had caused to be reclaimed in the 
marshy regions along the Oder, the Warthe, and the Vistula. 
By this reclamation he had added more than 1500 square miles; 
to the arable land of the country. Many times he was grossly 
deceived in his colonists, who took the state aid, but soon 
wearied of the hard work necessary and fled from the province. 
Nevertheless, the results of his colonizing enterprises were de- 
cisive. It is estimated that 900 villages were thus founded and 
that 300,000 persons were added to the population. 

A more certain method of increasing the population of the 
country would have been a thoroughgoing reform in the situa- 
tion of the peasants. The attempts which Frederick made in 
this direction were infrequent and without much positive result. 
He had greater freedom of action upon the royal domains than 
upon the domains of the nobles. Like his father he wished to 
strengthen the right of the peasants to the farms which they 
occupied, so that neither they nor their children should be in 
danger of being evicted. He also tried to prevent the work 
required of the peasants by the holder of the estate or manor 
from exceeding three days a week, which he did not regard as 
unreasonable. After 1763 he did not permit the leases of do- 
main lands in East Prussia to include the right to exact domestic 
service at the manor-house from the younger members of the 
peasant families. As this was commonly regarded as the spe- 
cial badge of serfdom, its disappearance seemed to mark the end 
of serfdom on the royal domains in East Prussia. 

Frederick's efforts in behalf of the peasants on the estates of 



THE WORK OF THE BENEVOLENT DESPOTS 51 

the lords were less successful. He had to contend not only with c hap, i v 
their insistence upon respect for the rights of property, but with 1763-89 
the unwillingness of his officials to act against the interests of 
their own class. The attempt to abolish serfdom in Pomerania 
revealed the course similar measures were likely to take. In 
1763 while Frederick was in this province he verbally ordered 
that all serfdom, whether on the royal domain, the domains of 
the cities, or those of the nobles, should be done away with, " and 
without the slightest reasoning." But the nobles in one part 
of the province denied that serfdom existed there, and assumed 
that the King could not have intended to abolish any services 
which, in their opinion, were necessary to the prosperity of the 
region, while those in another part declared in effect that they 
did not insist on the name and desired only that the services 
should continue. As the King had not explained what should 
take the place of serfdom, and as his officials sympathized with 
the Pomeranian nobles, his famous order remained without ef- 
fect. He insisted, however, that nothing should be done which 
would diminish the number of recruits for the army, and that, 
accordingly, the lords should not evict peasant families and seize 
their farms.^ 

Frederick's lack of success in relieving the burdens of the 
peasants was due in a measure to his desire not to weaken the 
position of the nobles, from whom he drew the officers of his 
army. If a noble family became impoverished and was on the 
point of selling its land, he intervened to keep the property from 
falling into the hands of the burgher class. In some cases he 
lent money at a very low rate of interest. After the close of 
the Seven Years' War, when the nobles were in debt, and were 
obliged to borrow from usurers at the rate of ten per cent., 
Frederick's minister devised, especially for Silesia, a species of 
land bank, formed by associations of nobles, who on the security 
of their combined property were able to borrow at four per cent., 
and to make loans to individual nobles at four and three- 
quarters. 

Joseph II, another benevolent despot, pushed the policy of 
reform still further, but so many of his projects failed that his 
career has been treated mainly as an illustration of ill-considered Joseph 11 
zeal. Joseph was the son of Maria Theresa and co-regent with 
her of the Hapsburg dominions from 1765 until 1780, when he 
became sole ruler. It was significant of his attitude that he 

1 About half of the soldiers were peasants, and were furnished by the 
cantonal system, which assigned to each regiment for recruiting purposes 
a district containing five or six thousand families. 



52 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. IV began his rule by destroying certain royal game-preserves, from 
1763-89 which the peasants had suffered, and by using his private wealth 
to effect a conversion of the public debt at a lower rate of in- 
terest. No prince was ever more sincerely devoted to the 
public welfare, and his unceasing labors, unrelieved by the joys 
of success, hastened his death. He did not perceive, as did his 
mother, the immense difficulties of his task. Where she was 
saved by vacillation, he seemed to run towards defeat. Fred- 
erick II said of him with cruel irony, " He always took the sec- 
ond step before taking the first." The problems presented by 
the grouping under one rule of many peoples, of lordships, prin- 
cipalities, and kingdoms with diverse privileges and institu- 
tions, were insoluble except under the teachings of another cen- 
tury of painful and tragic experience. To all this were added 
the chaos and injustice of class privilege in its myriad forms. 
Under the circumstances even his failures may have been an 
important humane manifestation. Some of his successes 
opened the way for the reforms of the nineteenth century in 
Austria. 

Most of Joseph's projects were a continuation, in more de- 
veloped and radical form, of policies adopted by his mother 
either before 1765 or during the co-regency. This is true of 
the attempt to improve the condition of the peasants of Bo- 
hemia and Moravia, who, unlike most of the peasants in the 
German duchies, were still serfs. Two months after Joseph 
became sole ruler he issued a decree abolishing serfdom in his 
Slavic lands. This freed the peasants from restrictions on mar- 
riage, permitted them to leave the estates on which they served, 
and gave them liberty to choose an occupation. If they were 
not to be turned into a landless proletariat, it was obviously nec- 
essary to improve their situation as peasant farmers, and there- 
fore the decree was followed by others giving them better 
tenant rights. Toward the end of his reign Joseph fixed the 
amount of the peasant's gross income which should go to the 
lord at a maximum of seventeen per cent. Had he gone one 
step further and permitted the peasants to pay off this charge, 
he would have accomplished a veritable revolution, but he re- 
peatedly said he did not wish to free the peasants from their 
position as dependents, or subjects, of the lords, although he 
carefully limited the judicial powers which were still left to the 
lords as local magistrates. The position of the peasants in his 
German provinces was improved by general provisions similar 
to those adopted for the peasants of the Slavic provinces. His 
early death in 1790 did not permit all of these reforms to be- 



Belief 
of the 
Peasants 



THE WORK OF THE BENEVOLENT DESPOTS 53 

come established; but they marked a definite advance and be- c hap. i v 
yond them the Hapsburgs did not go for over fifty years. His 1763-89 
attempt to aboHsh serfdom in Hungary failed, as did his other 
Hungarian reforms. 

Another reform which touched the peasants closely was the 
reorganization of the land tax. Here Joseph's aim was less the 
increase of the revenue than an equalization of the burden, tak- 
ing away the exemptions which the nobles and the clergy still 
enjoyed. He determined to have all the land carefully ap- 
praised and treated alike when this great task had been accom- 
plished. To him its importance was due to the opinion, which 
he had gained from the Physiocrats, that the only definite in- 
crease in the wealth of a country was the net gain from the 
cultivation of the soil, and that upon this increment the bur- 
den of taxation should be laid. The reform was naturally un- 
popular with the privileged classes. They regarded the ad- 
vantages they had previously enjoyed as belonging to their 
heritage and not to be taken away without violating their rights 
of property. The Hungarian nobles, of Magyar race, were 
outraged that they must share the burdens of taxation with the 
" miserable contributory commonalty," who were principally 
Slavs. The new appraisement was completed in 1789. It was 
the theory of the law that for the duchies and for Bohemia and 
Moravia, seventy per cent, of the peasant's gross income should 
be untouched, and that the State should ask for only a little over 
twelve per cent., leaving to the lord a little more than seven- 
teen per cent. The appraisement had been so hurried that many 
of the peasants were taxed too high and complaints of the law 
were heard on every side. Before it had actually become ef- 
fective Joseph died, and Leopold, his brother, abandoned the 
whole plan. 

Joseph's assertion of the rights of the State in all questions church 
involving the relations of Church and State was so uncompro- a^^d state 
mising as to give this attitude the name Josephism. In it he 
was supported by his councilors more heartily than in his other 
tasks, and much that was accomplished was due rather to their 
initiative than to his. The most notable acts were the grant 
of toleration to the Protestants and to the Jews and the reduc- 
tion of the number of monasteries, with the application of their 
income to the needs of education and religion. The edict of 
toleration permitted any group of one hundred famihes to have 
a chapel and a school of their own. Protestants were admitted 
freely to civil and military offices, and their rights were defined 
in the case of mixed marriages. Although this act fell short of 



54 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. IV full religious freedom, it placed Austria in advance of most of 
1763-89 the other German states as well as of England and France. 
The attack upon the monasteries had a more practical motive. 
Too much landed property was immobilized in the " dead hand " 
and too many persons were withdrawn from the productive life 
of the community. In 1781 there were over 60,000 monks and 
nuns. Joseph began by dissolving those orders which were not 
devoted to education or to the care of the poor and the sick. 
By 1786 over 700 monasteries had been closed and their prop- 
erty turned over to the " religion " fund, primarily to bear the 
expense of an increase in the number of parish priests and to 
provide for the better religious instruction of the people. As has 
generally been the case in such vast transfers of property, there 
were waste and complaint of fraud, but the agricultural life of 
the Hapsburg provinces was stimulated by bringing a large 
amount of new land into the market. The aim of Joseph's other 
religious reforms was to make his Church independent of foreign 
ecclesiastical jurisdictions, diminishing even the prerogatives of 
the papacy in Austrian affairs. He encountered no popular op- 
position until he interfered with the religious practices of the 
people and attempted to regulate even the methods of burial. 

His most signal failure was in an attempt to introduce into 
Hungary the administrative system of a bureaucratic state. He 
had already divided his other dominions into circles, with offi- 
Dondnions cials in whosc hands all business was placed. By this change 
the local estates, which had given Maria Theresa much trouble, 
lost their importance. He now divided Hungary into ten cir- 
cles. It seemed unlikely that the diet would be assembled again, 
and that the county assemblies of nobles would retain their an- 
cient powers. The judicial system was reorganized and the 
courts were made independent of the nobles. A census was 
taken, apparently with the aim of introducing the method of 
conscription into the system of obtaining recruits for the army. 
By the projected reform of the land tax the immunities of the 
nobles would be lessened, and at the same time it was announced 
that their serfs were freed. When Joseph ordered German to 
be used as the official language instead of Latin, the Hungarians 
suspected him of an intention to Germanize them. The country 
was being hurried too fast along the path of reform and fell 
into a state of turmoil. At this juncture Joseph became involved 
in a war with the Turks and desperately needed the assistance 
of the Hungarians. The price he was obliged to pay was the 
abandonment of nearly every reform which he had attempted 
in Hungary. 



Failure to 
Centralize 
Hapsburg 



THE WORK OF THE BENEVOLENT DESPOTS 55 

Joseph's attempts to introduce his reforms into the Austrian c hap, i v 
Netherlands were even less successful. The local constitutions 1763-89 
of the duchies, counties, and lordships, which made up the Neth- 
erlands, had remained almost unchanged since the sixteenth 
century. The inhabitants were jealous of their privileges. They 
also resented Joseph's interference with their religious institu- 
tions. When he tried to apply his plans of a centralized admin- 
istration, stubborn resistance grew into open rebellion. By a 
mixture of concession and severity he succeeded in restoring 
order in the spring of 1788. But the trouble was not at an end, 
and a year later, when France was in revolution, the Nether- 
lands again rose in revolt and proclaimed their independence of 
Austria. This revolt had not been subdued when Joseph died 
in 1790. 

Not all that Joseph accomplished disappeared with him. His 
reforming spirit had wrought permanent changes in the laws and 
in the procedure of the courts. In criminal procedure, for ex- 
ample, he made a definite break with the past. For the first 
time the protection of innocence became one of its objects and 
cruel penalties were abandoned. 

Charles HI of Spain was more fortunate than the Emperor 
Joseph. Tradition has given him credit for his excellent aims, charies 
and has not inquired too closely whether they were carried out. ¥^?^ 
He knew his subjects well enough to see what was possible. 
Only once did he make a serious blunder, and that was when he 
ordered the men of Madrid to give up their slouch hats and long 
cloaks. Furious riots forced him to rescind the order. He abol- 
ished certain antiquated forms of taxation, but made no serious 
efifort to remedy the evils which existed in the system of holding 
land. In Andalusia the estates were of immense size, and 
mainly devoted to cattle and sheep raising. The few peasants 
in the province led a miserable existence because of the Mesta, 
a privileged association of civil and ecclesiastical proprietors, 
who had the right to drive their flocks everywhere regardless of 
fences. The condition of the peasants on the plateaus of Cas- 
tille, where the feudal system still flourished, was equally bad. 
In the north the peasants were better off, for it was the practice 
to give long leases and the large estates were subdivided. Charles 
attempted to improve the methods of cultivation by encouraging 
the work of economic or agricultural associations and establishing 
model farms. Something was also done towards road-building, 
of which Spain was sadly in need ; but most of the roads never 
came into existence except on the engineers' plans. After the 
manner of Frederick the Great, an attempt was made to plant 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. IV model settlements, chiefly of Flemings or Germans, upon great 
1763.89 tracts of deserted land in the Sierra Morena. In them primary 
instruction was to be obligatory and no convents were to be per- 
mitted. Although the enterprise was not altogether a failure, 
the change of climate and habits was too sudden for many of 
the colonists, who sickened and died. Charles made a strenu- 
ous effort to put an end to public begging, sending sturdy beg- 
gars into the army and caring for the young and feeble in in- 
firmaries. He also sought to assist the poor by the establish- 
ment of state pawnshops. 

The attitude of King Charles upon questions of Church and 
State resembled that of other enlightened despots. His treat- 
ment of the Jesuits was an extraordinary instance. Regarding 
them as the principal agents of papal interference he secretly 
prepared their ruin. Early in April, 1767, they were all ar- 
rested. They were allowed only time enough to take their hats, 
cloaks, and breviaries, and then were expelled from the kingdom. 

In the Spanish colonial system the only changes Charles made 
were of minor importance. He was too much under the influ- 
ence of tradition to abandon the old system of government which 
lodged responsibility with the Council of the Indies. But he 
opened the principal ports of Spain to the commerce of her 
colonies, a reform which greatly increased the volume of trade 
between Spain and America. 

In Italy the states in which reforms were most energetically 
undertaken were Lombardy, then a part of the Austrian domin- 
itaiy ions, and the grand duchy of Tuscany. Leopold, the second son 

of Maria Theresa, became ruler of Tuscany in 1765. He was 
more cautious than his brother Joseph and sought to strengthen 
local institutions. This resulted in a revival of public spirit. 
He removed the restrictions on internal trade, and even per- 
mitted the exportation of grain when the crop was abundant. 
He freed industry by destroying the guilds. In Tuscany, as in 
other Italian states, there was a multitude of ecclesiastics who 
held a large part of the land. Leopold's ministers made a suc- 
cessful attempt to remedy the situation. The Inquisition was 
also abolished. In criminal procedure torture was no longer 
used and even the death penalty was given up. 

Charles Emmanuel HI of Sardinia accomplished a still more 
remarkable work in the duchy of Savoy, that part of his do- 
minions which lay on the French side of the Alps. He showed 
the way in which the remains of feudal land tenure could be de- 
stroyed without commotion or injustice. He had one advantage 
over his brother princes: there were no assemblies of clergy or 



Feudalism 
Abolished 
in Savoy 



THE WORK OF THE BENEVOLENT DESPOTS 57 

nobility in Savoy to place obstacles in his path. Serfdom ex- chap.iv 
isted in a form which impoverished the inhabitants and forced 1763.89 
many of them to emigrate. If a serf died childless, his property 
went to his lord. The only means of avoiding such a loss was 
to treat the property of the family as an undivided estate, for 
in this case the survivors continued to hold it. But the serf who 
was not a member of such an association could not rid himself 
of the inability to bequeath his property, even though he had 
entered trade or one of the professions and had prospered. It 
was this feature of serfdom which the King first attacked in 
1762. After a few years he and his advisers decided to destroy 
the system of which it was a part. The great decree abolishing 
the feudal system was issued December 19, 1771, and a delega- 
tion or commission was appointed to arrange the compensation 
which should be given to the lords in place of the services hith- 
erto rendered by the peasants. Each community was to declare 
whether it wished to purchase, enfranchisement and to show that 
it possessed the means to furnish the indemnities due the lords. 
The services were then appraised and the money was raised either 
by requiring each peasant to pay a sum equal to the value of the 
services from which he was released or by dividing the whole 
amount to be paid among the peasants in proportion to their land 
tax. The task was long and arduous, and it was not completed 
twenty years later when the French Revolutionary armies in- 
vaded Savoy. Nevertheless, by that time the agreements between 
the lords and the peasants had called for the payment of nearly 
eight million livres, a sum worth over thirty million francs at the 
present time. 

A monarch with a reputation as a refc -mer greater than her The 
career deserved was Catherine II, the German princess who, c^^erine 
after the murder of her husband, Peter III, in 1762, ruled over 11 
Russia for thirty- four years. Catherine was for several years 
a correspondent of Voltaire. She attracted Diderot to her court, 
and skilfully flattered other French literary men who had a pow- 
erful influence upon the public opinion of the time. She was 
therefore accepted as " enlightened " without a rigorous scrutiny 
of her deeds. The great curse of Russia was the system of 
serfdom, which degraded the peasants to a position little above 
that of cattle. This evil Catherine did not venture to attack, 
and she even increased it by presenting hundreds of " souls " to 
her favorites. She, however, introduced improvements into the 
administrative subdivisions of Russia and also secularized the 
property of the monasteries, using what remained after the 
monks were pensioned to provide for public instruction and nee- 



58 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



Imperial- 
ism in 
Great 
Britain 



essary charities. She granted toleration to the strange sects 
of heretics which troubled the peace of the empire, and even 
permitted the Jesuits to reside within her dominions after the 
Pope had abolished the order. But most of the reforms de- 
manded by the Representative Legislative Commission which she 
convened at the beginning of her reign were not undertaken. At 
one time discontent flamed up in the terrible revolt led by Pou- 
gatchef, but this was ended after a long struggle. 

George III was not a " benevolent despot," but the history of 
England after 1763 illustrates the general trend of the time to- 
wards reform and more efficient organization of government. 
There was enough that called for reform in the political institu- 
tions of the home country, but the more pressing tasks were 
imposed by the situation in India and America. The stock- 
holders and officers, high and low, of the East India Company 
were utilizing the victories of Clive to enrich themselves from 
the treasures of the native princes, and, when these were ex^ 
hausted, by plunder of the hapless inhabitants. This led parlia- 
ment to begin the substitution of direct action by the home gov- 
ernment for control through a chartered company in managing 
the affairs of the ceded districts and dependent states. In other 
words, a beginning was made of the British empire in India. 

The colonies in America taken from the French in 1763 were 
also organized. The government at first intended to give them 
institutions similar to those of the neighboring English-speaking 
colonies, but it soon became evident that this would subject the 
Catholic majority to the rule of a few hundred Protestant Eng- 
lishmen, many of whom were adventurers. Parliament met the 
situation by passing the Quebec Act of 1774, which provided for 
an appointed council, and left the French their civil laws, slightly 
modified, while introducing the more lenient English criminal 
law. All the territory north of the Ohio and west of the AUe- 
ghanies was included within the new colony. 

In dealing with the older colonies the British government 
blundered disastrously. This was not from the lack of a meas- 
ure of reason and justice in its demands, but from a lack of 
sympathetic statesmanship in handling a delicate situation. It 
attempted to enforce trade laws which had been adopted in the 
interest of English manufacturers, merchants, and shipowners, 
and which had been evaded notoriously for years. What aroused 
bitter resistance was the attempt to create an imperial revenue 
by taxing the colonists directly. Part of the money was to be 
used to support troops which should guard the colonies against 
the danger of sudden French attack, but a part would be used 



THE WORK OF THE BENEVOLENT DESPOTS 59 

to pay the salaries of colonial judges and governors, in order c haf. i v 
that they might be more independent of the colonial legislatures. 1763-89 
The presence of regular troops would also strengthen the colonial 
executives. The attempt of the English ministers to carry out 
such a policy led within ten years to the revolt of the colonies. 
A few more years and the most promising part of the British 
colonial empire was lost forever. 

Nothing in the principles of the Benevolent Despots deterred 
them from attempts to round out their territories at the expense pirst 
of their neighbors. Nor was the national spirit sufficiently de- ■^/'p^J^^^ 
veloped in the countries of western Europe for the policy of 
territorial aggrandizement to be looked upon with abhorrence. 
Frederick had not suffered in the eyes of his philosophical ad- 
mirers because of his success in taking Silesia from Maria 
Theresa. The most conspicuous illustration of the spoliation of 
the weak by the strong was the First Partition of Poland. It 
was conspicuous because Poland was one of the largest coun- 
tries in Europe. In the characteristics of a State, however, 
Poland was as lacking as the Holy Roman Empire, although 
in another way. It was not divided into principalities, but its 
central power was completely disorganized by the " liberties " 
of the nobles. The monarchy was elective, and the candidate as 
a condition of his election was obliged to sign away his prerogar 
tives. The King had almost no army and no financial resources. 
The diet was held frequently, but each delegate had the right to 
oppose his liberum veto to any decree, with the result that during 
the reign of the last King of the Saxon dynasty, Augustus III, 
no one of the fifteen diets was able to reach a single important 
conclusion. Another source of trouble was the attitude of the 
dominant Catholic Church toward the dissidents: first, the Or- 
thodox, who were of the same faith as the Russians, and were 
in fact Russian, belonging to lands taken from Russia by Poland ; 
and, second, the Lutherans, living on the borders of Frederick's 
provinces, a part of the German movement of colonization to 
which Prussia had owed its origin. As the Polish territory 
barred the road from the kingdom of Prussia to Brandenburg, 
and as Poland had nearly three times the population of Fred- 
erick's dominions, it is apparent that he had a deep interest in 
keeping Poland weak. The acquisition of West Prussia was one 
of his cherished hopes. 

At the time when the Polish throne became vacant in 1763 
both Frederick II and Catherine II were ready to utilize the 
dissident question as an opportunity for intervention, and both 
were agreed that the next King of Poland must be one of the 



6o THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

C HAP. I V native magnates. They signed a treaty in April of the follow- 
1763-89 ing year, and Frederick secretly accepted Catherine's proposal 
that the new King should be Stanislas Poniatowski, a nephew of 
the head of the Czartoryski family, which was nourishing the fu- 
tile hope of reforming the Polish constitution with Catherine's 
help. Before the election a Russian army entered Poland, and 
the diet docilely chose Prince Poniatowski. Two years later in 
another diet the Czartoryskis nearly succeeded in modifying the 
conditions under which the liberum veto should be used. This 
diet was in the form of a " Confederation," which permitted 
decisions to be reached by simple majority vote. But through 
the machinations and menaces of the Russian ambassador, de- 
termined to prevent the reorganization of the Polish monarchy, 
the question of the dissidents was forced to the front. He ac- 
complished his purpose, but overshot the mark, for the Catholics, 
with their fanatical loyalty to the Church thoroughly aroused, 
not only restored the liberum veto, but caused the rejection 
of the demands of both Russia and Prussia in behalf of the 
dissidents. The Russians compelled a later diet, from which a 
majority of the members had fled, to rescind the laws against 
the dissidents and to place the Polish constitution under the 
guarantee of Russia. The defeated party immediately formed 
the Confederation of Bar. Russian troops, which entered the 
country to crush the confederates, in the course of the struggle 
violated Turkish territory and brought on a formidable war with 
the Sultan. In this Catherine's armies' were finally successful, 
but peace was difficult to arrange, for Austria would not permit 
the frontiers of Russia to be pushed to the Danube. A general 
European war seemed imminent, a prospect which alarmed 
Frederick the Great, from whose memory the terrible impres- 
sions of the Seven Years' War had not disappeared. He saw 
in Polish annexations the means of reconciling all interests and 
bringing the Turkish war to a close. Joseph II was eager for 
the partition, but Catherine would have preferred to retain her 
hegemony over a united Poland. Her resistance was finally 
overcome and the scheme of partition carried through. By it 
Frederick received West Prussia,^ while Austria, with less ex- 
cuse, took a larger territory in what was called Galicia, and Rus- 
sia annexed the lands east of the Diina and Dnieper, which had 
formerly been hers. Poland lost nearly a third of her territory 
and five million inhabitants. 

Two years later Catherine signed the peace of Kainarji with 

2 Strictly speaking, West Prussia, Ermeland, Kulmerland, and the Netze 
District. 



THE WORK OF THE BENEVOLENT DESPOTS 6i 

the Turks, by which they acknowledged the independence of the chap^iv 

Khanate of the Crimea. The significance of this appeared when 1763-89 

in 1785 she annexed the Crimea to Russia, giving to Russia as other At- 

valuable a coast on the Black Sea as Peter the Great had ac- *Tp*!,*° 

1 1 T-. 1 • ^^ ' 1 Seize Ter- 

quired on the Baltic earlier in the century. ritory 

The land hunger of the Emperor Joseph was not satisfied 
with the territorial gains of Austria in the first partition of Po- 
land. Twice he attempted to obtain Bavaria. The first time the 
opportunity was offered by a dispute about the succession. Jo- 
seph seemed on the point of reaching the goal when Frederick 
n blocked his way. The matter was not settled until Frederick 
invaded Bohemia. Joseph, advised by Catherine H, gave way 
and accepted a corner of land between the Salzbach, the Inn, 
and the Danube, with 60,000 inhabitants. In his second attempt 
Joseph arranged an exchange, oflfering a large part of the Neth- 
erlands for Bavaria. By another exchange he hoped to add 
the archbishopric of Salzburg. Again the plan was defeated by 
the opposition of the King of Prussia. 

The French monarchy was not unafifected by the ideals which 
had moved a Frederick, a Joseph, and a Charles III. Louis XVI 
did not have the clearness of mind or the continuity of purpose 
which characterized these kings, but his intentions were as be- 
nevolent as theirs. Moreover, France did not await his advent 
before definite reforms were undertaken. The officers of Louis 
XV, if not the King himself, attempted the role of the benevolent 
despot. 



CHAPTER V 



THE FRENCH MONARCHY AS A BENEVOLENT DESPOTISM 



CHAP. V 

1754-88 



' ' King • • 
in France 



First 
Reforms 



BENEVOLENT despotism was followed by revolution only 
in France. The reasons were many, but the chief reason 
was that despotism in France was incompetent. The royal ad- 
visers began early enough to combat the ills of the old regim.e. 
Their views of the situation were clarified by the criticisms 
which filled the books of the time, from the publication of Mon- 
tesquieu's Spirit of Lazvs to Turgot's Distribution of Riches 
and Raynal's History of the Indies. Their failure to carry 
through adequate plans of reform was not due to lack of ideas. 
They failed because Louis XV had not the character and Louis 
XVI had not the ability to give them firm support. Nothing in- 
terested Louis XV long. If there were evils which were difii- 
cult to remove, he was wont to say, " Well, enough of that. 
Things will last as long as we do." His death in 1774 did not 
improve the outlook as much as the excellent intentions of his 
grandson, Louis XVI, led some persons to hope. The new King 
was only nineteen, and had neither the knowledge nor the apti- 
tude for government which would fit him to do more than heed 
good counsels. His over-conscientiousness made him unduly 
hesitant. Sustained thought was impossible to him. His ideas 
seemed to have so little cohesion that his brother compared them 
to oiled billiard balls. Therefore " the principal cause of the 
ruin of royalty in France was the lack of a King." ^ 

Several reforms which were attempted in the reign of Louis 
XV have already been mentioned. The most important was the 
eflfort to make the levy of the income tax, or vingtiemes, more 
just. Among other noteworthy reforms were the decrees free- 
ing the grain trade. In 1754 restrictions preventing the carriage 
of grain from province to province were removed. Ten years 
later edicts were issued in favor of freedom of export, subject to 
a slight duty. The preambles of these decrees prove that they 
were written by disciples of the economists. Public opinion re- 
mained uncertain, if not hostile. When one or two crop failures 

1 A remark of M. Lavisse in one of the concluding chapters of his 
monumental Histoire de France, IX (I), 402. 

62 



FRENCH MONARCHY A BENEVOLENT DESPOTISM 63 

occurred, and the price of bread rose steadily, popular suspicion c hap, v 
was increased, and the parlements demanded the reestablish- 1754-88 
ment of the old regulations, which, they alleged, would check 
the manoeuvers of the speculators. The government persisted 
in its policy. In 1769 the crop was better and prices fell, but the 
following year a scarcity occurred, and this time the attack of 
the parlements upon the new system was successful. The former 
restrictions reappeared. 

Meanwhile the administrative service in charge of stocking the 
government granaries, which was suspected of buying and selling 
for gain, was transformed by a contract with a merchant named 
Malisset. According to the contract Malisset should keep the 
stock of grain fresh by selling the old and buying new. He was 
also allowed to grind a part of the grain and sell the flour to 
the Paris bakers, free from many of the restrictions which ham- 
pered the trade of other dealers. As he dealt in the name of 
the King and seemed to be backed by the credit of the govern- ihe Facte 
ment, he was assuredly a formidable competitor. Le Prevost de Famine 
de Beaumont by chance came into possession of a part of the 
agreement with the government, and he drew up a memoir ac- 
cusing the Malisset company of being in a compact to create a 
famine; that is, an artificial scarcity, in order to be able to sell 
grain at high prices. Le Prevost was arrested before he could 
present his memoir and was kept in prison for twenty years be- 
cause he would not promise to refrain from circulating such un- 
founded charges. This was the origin of the famous legend 
known as the Facte de famine. 

The economists had evidently lost the first battle for the free- 
dom of the grain trade. They were more successful in their 
campaign against the restrictions of the colonial trade due to East India 
the privileged position of the Company of the Indies, the French company 
rival of the great British and Dutch trading companies. The 
attack was led by Gournay who presented a memorial to the 
controller-general of the finances. One of the objections to the 
company was the limitation of its shipping to the single port of 
Lorient. The two wars with England in the middle of the cen- 
tury had ruined the company's trade and consequently its finances. 
But it was reorganized in 1765 and rapidly increased the volume 
of its commerce, although its receipts did not equal its expendi- 
tures. Finally in 1769 the government decided to suppress the 
company and to throw open the trade. The result justified the 
arguments of the economists, because the commerce of the In- 
dies soon reached proportions never known before. 

The government of Louis XV tried to put an end to the fac- 



64 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

C HAP. V tious opposition of the parlements by thoroughly reorganizing 
1754-88 the courts. The occasion was a conflict over the registration of 
King and the royal edicts on taxation after the close of the Seven Years' 
mentV War. The parlements professed to believe that they were the 
successors of the medieval curia regis and that their consent was 
necessary when the King decided to tax his subjects. Popular 
opinion looked upon them as a safeguard against ministerial 
despotism, since the States General had not been summoned for 
a hundred and fifty years. The judges disputed even the pre- 
rogative of the King, empowering him to order in a lit de justice 
the registration of his decrees. In December, 1770, when Louis 
XV solemnly condemned their doctrines and affirmed the pleni- 
tude of the royal authority, the parlement of Paris suspended 
its sittings. The King, advised by his chancellor Maupeou, did 
not compromise the affair. By a series of measures running 
through the following months, the jurisdiction of the parlement 
of Paris was diminished by the creation of six other superior 
councils, or courts, in Arras, Blois, Chalons, Clermont-Ferrand, 
Lyons, and Poitiers, bringing tribunals of final resort closer to 
the subjects. The judges in these courts, and the newly ap- 
pointed judges in the parlement of Paris, were not to purchase 
their positions. This was a step toward the destruction of an 
hereditary, privileged magistracy. At the same time the sup- 
pression of the fees known as " spices " affirmed the principle of 
free administration of justice and removed one of the worst 
abuses of the old system. Similar reforms were made in the 
provincial parlements. The government promised to simplify 
judicial procedure and to prepare a single code of law to take 
the place of the many different local codes and customs. The 
opposition of the judges and lawyers did not move the King, 
and the Maupeou parlements, as the new courts were called, out- 
lasted his reign. 

The first two years of Louis XVI's reign may be described 
as the ministry of Turgot. Although Count de Maurepas was 
Ministry the principal minister, Turgot as controller-general of the finances 
of Turgot faced the hardest task and therefore held the most responsible 
position. He was well trained for his work. During, his ad- 
ministrative career as intendant at Limoges he had shown the 
qualities of an energetic and patient reformer, able to apply rem- 
edies suited to the ills of that backward region. But he lacked 
the temperament to conciliate his opponents and the sagacity to 
discover the moment at which compromise is necessary to secure 
the fruits of victory. Two things rendered the success of his 
plans doubtful ; first, the character of Maurepas, who was more 



FRENCH MONARCHY A BENEVOLENT DESPOTISM 65 



anxious to retain his influence than to support vigorously his re- char v 
forming colleague; and, second, the reestablishment of the old 1754-88 
parlements. The King undid the work of his grandfather with 
the mistaken idea that his act would usher in a period of recon- 
ciliation and good feeling. In reality he was restoring the chief 
obstacle to effective reform and thereby rendering revolution 
inevitable. 

At the opening of his ministry Turgot urged upon the King 
a policy of retrenchment, summing it up in the words, " No bank- 
ruptcies, no new taxes, and no loans." His predecessor in the 
ministry of the finances had injured the credit of the govern- 
ment by expedients of partial repudiation. To borrow, there- 
fore, was expensive. To place new taxes before the system of 
taxation was reorganized would be unjust to the already over- 
burdened peasants. In consequence, economy was the sole re- 
source. This policy was not only wise, but also its immediate 
results were encouraging. Within a year the deficit of forty- 
eight million livres was reduced to eighteen, while at the same 
time twenty-three million livres of floating indebtedness were 
paid. 

Turgot corrected many abuses in the management of the 
finances, but his fame as a reformer rests upon three achieve- 
ments, — the freeing of the grain trade, the abolition of the corvee, riour 
and the destruction of the guilds. His ordinance upon the grain ^^"^ 
trade was issued almost immediately after he took office. In the 
preamble he showed that a scarcity of grain could be only tempo- 
rary, for high prices would incite the farmers to plant more. 
The watchfulness of farmers and merchants eager for profit 
was, he argued, a greater safeguard than any care which might 
be exercised by officials. Once more, as ten years earlier, na- 
ture seemed to oppose this particular reform, for a partial crop 
failure ensued. Men interested in the old system stirred up the 
populace to clamor for government regulation of the trade. In 
April and May, 1775, there was a series of riots known as the 
"flour war." The rioters appeared in Versailles and Paris. 
Under cover of solicitude for the welfare of the people the 
parlement of Paris tried to persuade the King to abandon Tur- 
got's policy, but the members were summoned to Versailles and 
reprimanded. The lieutenant-general of the police at Paris, who 
made only half-hearted attempts to suppress disorder, was dis- 
missed, and troops were sent through the disturbed districts to 
restore quiet. Turgot proved that he was not merely a reformer 
but a ruler. 

The transformation of the corvee involved the principle of a 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP.v just distribution of the burdens of taxation. When a similar 
1754-88 reform had been proposed before, the expense was to be charged 
Attack on as an addition to the taille, but according to Turgot's plan it was 
priviiegea to be added to the twentieths, which were paid by the nobles as 
well as by the peasants. This was an assault upon the citadel of 
privilege, and it provoked a lively discussion in the King's coun- 
cil. The keeper of the seals declared that it was dangerous to 
attack the privileges of the nobility; upon which Turgot said, 
with more vehemence than exactness, that such inequalities were 
not defended even among the nobles themselves. He also pointed 
out that many nobles were merely rich men who had purchased 
titles, and added, bitterly, that while there would be some justifi- 
cation in respecting the exemptions of the ancient defenders of 
France, there was no reason why similar privileges should be 
conceded to rich financiers who had been pillaging the State. 
The ordinance in regard to the corvee was not presented to the 
parlements for registration by itself, but combined with measures 
revolutionizing the conditions of industry in France. 

Turgot held the view taught by the economists that the monopo- 
lies enjoyed by the guilds were a dangerous restriction of the 
liberty of industry and a serious hindrance to the development 
of trade. The consequences of the monopoly were higher prices 
for the purchaser and a narrower opportunity for the artisan. 
His plan was to preserve the guild organization only in a few 
cases, — notably those of the apothecaries and the printers — in 
order to secure government control of those trades. He ordered 
the property of the guilds to be sold, the debts paid, and the bal- 
ance distributed among the members. Henceforward it should 
only be necessary for a workman to record his name, profession, 
and domicile at the proper office and conform to the police regu- 
lations of his industry. 

The ordinances on the corvee and on the guilds, with four 
others of less importance, were laid before the parlement of 
Paris for registration in March, 1776. Upon the question of 
the corvee, the judges took the attitude adopted by the keeper of 
the seals, regarding the change as a violation of the rights of 
property. They also considered masterships as rights over pro- 
duction which it would be unjust to take away without indemnifi- 
cation. They were ready to concede certain changes, reducing 
the number of guilds and lowering the entrance fees, but Turgot 
would not listen to any compromise, and persuaded the King to 
command the registration in a solemn lit de justice. 
FaUof This was Turgot's last success. He had excited the enmity of 

Turgot many persons who could weary the King with their complaints. 



FRENCH MONARCHY A BENEVOLENT DESPOTISM 67 

The Queen disliked the air of economy for which he was re- c hap, v 
sponsible. She also attributed to him the recall of one of her 1754.88 
favorites from the embassy at London. Maurepas became 
alarmed lest Turgot's energy might compromise him, and did 
what he could to prejudice the mind of the King. The crisis 
came in April. Turgot warned Louis XVI against weakness, 
plainly intimating his fear that this was a defect in the King's 
character, and saying grimly, " Never forget, Sire, that it was 
weakness which brought the head of Charles I to the block." 
Within two weeks the great minister was dismissed. He with- 
drew to private life, expressing to Louis XVI the hope that he 
had interpreted the situation amiss and that the dangers he had 
pointed out were chimerical. 

Among the aims which Turgot had no opportunity to carry 
out was the organization of elective assemblies — municipal, dis- 
trict, provincial, and national. The local assemblies would assist 
the government in planning and carrying on public works and 
in deciding questions with regard to which the advice of local 
bodies would be valuable. Turgot's national assembly was not 
to encroach upon the powers of the Crown, which he, like all 
Physiocrats, felt should be unrestricted in order to be beneficent. 
Nor were these assemblies to be democratic, for the right of 
voting was restricted to holders of landed property. 

At the beginning of his ministry Turgot had declared that 
unless the finances were put in order the first outbreak of war 
would throw the government into bankruptcy. Before he was France 
dismissed, his colleagues had begun to send secret assistance to and the 
the Enghsh colonies in America which had risen in revolt against Bevoiution 
acts of the British government. The principal motive of the 
French was the desire to be avenged for the humiliations of the 
Seven Years' War, to cripple an ancient rival, and destroy the 
new British colonial empire. More generous sympathies moved 
Lafayette and a group of young officers to cross the Atlantic and 
offer their services to the Continental Congress. In February, 
1778, France signed a treaty of alliance with the colonists and 
entered upon a war more glorious for her than any struggle since 
the early years of Louis XIV. 

With the close of the Seven Years' War the ministry of the 
marine had set about the reconstruction of the French navy 
and was so successful that in 1779 it was almost equal in size to 
the British navy. Indeed, several times during the war the 
French appeared to have won the sea power. The first effect of 
the French alliance upon the campaign in America was the re- 
treat of the British from Philadelphia to the more secure posi- 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



tion of New York. After this, interest was transferred to the 
struggle in the West Indies and in continental waters. In the 
summer of 1779, when Spain had joined in the conflict, a descent 
upon the coast of England was attempted, but it failed for lack 
of resolute and skilful leadership. The next year England's po- 
sition became still more precarious on account of the Armed 
Neutrality, formed by the Baltic powers and the Dutch as a pro- 
test against an unjust extension by the English of the term " con- 
traband " and the right of search. This brought about war be- 
tween England and the United Provinces. The timely presence 
of the French fleet in Chesapeake Bay in 1781 rendered the in- 
vestment of Yorktown by Washington and Rochambeau effec- 
tive, and by forcing the surrender of Cornwallis secured the in- 
dependence of the colonists. England continued the struggle 
long enough to gain an honorable peace, which the victory of 
Rodney over De Grasse in the West Indies in April, 1782, made 
possible. The English had also successfully defended Gibraltar 
against the combined attack of the allies. From the war the 
French gained little except an increase of prestige. The cost 
added fifteen hundred million livres to their public debt. 

Turgot's fall was followed by a reaction against the policy of 
reform. The corvee was restored and many of the old abuses 
crept back into the management of the finances. The guilds were 
reestablished, although some changes were made which decreased 
the traditional abuses. Trades so closely connected that it was 
difficult to mark off their fields were now united, and the fees for 
mastership were reduced. The new guilds, six of merchants and 
forty-four of arts and trades, were introduced into Paris immedi- 
ately. The attempt at restoration was extended more gradually 
to other towns. Several provincial parlements took the attitude 
that as they had never registered Turgot's edicts the older guilds 
still existed within their jurisdiction. 

After several months the management of the finances was en- 
trusted to Necker, a wealthy banker, who had won a reputation 
as a publicist. He was a native of Geneva and a Protestant and 
could not be made a minister of state, but he received the powers 
of controller-general with the title of director-general. His 
greatest task was to provide the money for the war with the 
EngHsh, which was no slight matter in a state suffering from 
annual deficits. Convinced that it would be wrong to increase 
the burdens of the taxpayers, he resorted to a series of loans. 
His reputation as a banker served him in this, but in order to 
insure the success of the loans he made them profitable to the 
investor and expensive for the treasury. It is believed that of the 



FRENCH MONARCHY A BENEVOLENT DESPOTISM 69 

five hundred and thirty milHon livres which he borrowed during c hap, v 
his term of office nearly half was used to meet ordinary deficits. 1754-88 
His most dangerous blunder was his failure to provide for the 
service of the loans by increased taxation, and the payment of 
interest out of the proceeds of later loans. This policy enhanced 
the current opinion of his financial skill, for it seemed a prodi- 
gious feat to carry a state through three years of war without 
adding to the burden of taxation. The greater his glory the more 
certain the blame for any successor who, especially in time of 
peace, should resort to increase of taxation. Public opinion 
would ascribe such action to bad management and wastefulness 
and would make a merit of resistance. 

Necker made his fault more serious in 1781 by publishing a 
Compte Rendu au Roi, or account of the finances, in which he The 
pretended to draw aside the veil which had concealed the finances £''"*|'* 
as a secret of State. He did this because he believed that pub- 
licity was one of the foundations of British credit. His act 
amounted to an acknowledgment that the finances were an afifair 
of the nation. Had he ventured to tell the somber truth in his 
account, his popularity would not have gained by the revelation, 
because the expenditures of the year 1781 exceeded the receipts 
by eighty-nine million livres without counting one hundred and 
twenty-nine million in " anticipations," which were claims upon 
the year's revenue. Instead of explaining the existing situation 
Necker set forth the budget of a " normal " year, omitting all 
war expenditures as well as certain other charges which he re- 
garded as " extraordinary." On the same principle he omitted 
extraordinary receipts. The result was a favorable balance of 
ten million livres. He left the impression on the minds of his 
readers that this was the actual situation, and glorified France as 
financially stronger than England because during the struggle 
France had introduced no new taxes, while England had increased 
her burden by many million pounds sterHng. Only a few of the 
initiated understood that the picture was fanciful. Necker now 
felt that his position was so assured that he could request the 
King to admit him to the rank of a minister of state. His pop- 
ularity, however, had aroused the jealousy of the other minis- 
ters, and Louis, on the urgent demand of Maurepas, refused the 
request. The consequence was that Necker resigned. 

During this period, which is called his first ministry, Necker 
inaugurated several important reforms, abolished useless offices, 
checked the lavish grant of pensions, and made a better bargain 
with the farmers-general. He called into existence provincial 
assemblies in Berry and Haute-Guyenne, to accomplish tasks sim- 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

ilar to those performed by the assembly of Languedoc. These 
assemblies were filled with royal nominees, instead of being 
chosen, as Turgot wished, by the landed proprietors. The dis- 
tinction between the three estates was recognized, although the 
third estate was given as many deputies as the clergy and the 
nobility together. The two assemblies justified their existence 
and eagerly and efifectively worked for the betterment of their 
provinces. 

Necker's retirement left the government in a serious predica- 
ment. The war was still to go on for two years. The financiers 
who had assisted him were likely to look upon the projects of 
his successors coldly. By the Compte Rendu the public had been 
told that the government was in possession of a surplus. 
Necker's immediate successor had accepted his appointment on 
the supposition that a balance existed, and he was chagrined to 
learn from the records of his office that it was simply a brilliant 
financial dream. When he laid the matter before the King, the 
good-natured Louis was indignant and conceived a settled dis- 
trust for the popular idol. As the government could not borrow 
to advantage it was obliged to levy new taxes, including a third 
twentieth. In November, 1783, the position of the controller- 
general was given to Calonne, an experienced administrator, a 
man of extraordinary versatility, but not a real statesman nor 
moved by well-considered aims. During his ministry, which 
lasted a little more than three years, the situation became acute. 

Calonne was acquainted with the grave condition of the treas- 
ury, but acted upon his conviction that the resources of the 
country were unbounded. He won the favor of the Court by 
gifts and pensions. He gave the Count of Provence, the King's 
brother, twenty-five million livres, and the Count of Artois, his 
younger brother, fifty-six million livres, to pay princely debts. 
Calonne also paid for the chateau of Rambouillet, which the King 
had recently bought for sixteen millions, and persuaded the King 
to yield to the Queen's desire for the estate of St. Cloud, which 
was to cost six more. He afterwards defended this spendthrift 
policy by declaring that all "would have been lost if he had 
taken the attitude of penury at a time when it was necessary to 
hide the reality of it." By no means all the money was wasted. 
Some was used for desirable public improvements. Much was 
needed to meet war expenses, which did not end as soon as the 
last shot was fired. Calonne was not without able advisers — 
the economist Dupont de Nemours, Talleyrand, then known as 
the Abbe de Perigord, and the banker Claviere, who was to be- 
come minister of finances during the Revolution. For a time 



FRENCH MONARCHY A BENEVOLENT DESPOTISM 71 

his policy seemed successful. Confidence was restored. Loans chap, v 
were subscribed eagerly. The rate of discount fell and the 1754-88 
country appeared to be prosperous. By and by criticisms and 
protests began to be heard. The judges who were called upon 
to register the successive edicts authorizing loans seized the oc- 
casion to present remonstrances. In 1785 Necker published his 
Administration of the Finances, which lauded his own achieve- 
ments and decried those of his successors. Forty-four thousand 
copies were sold in one year. 

At this time the Court suffered serious discredit from the 
Diamond Necklace Affair, of which the Cardinal de Rohan was Diamond 
the guilty dupe and the Queen Marie Antoinette the innocent ^g^^J*''® 
victim. Rohan, Grand Almoner of France and bishop of Stras- 
bourg, was the most notorious of the loose livers who discredited 
the episcopate. He was also a patron of the " Count " of Cag- 
liostro, an unusually picturesque charlatan. In the affair Rohan 
was persuaded by a group of sordid intriguers that the Queen 
desired to receive him to favor and to avail herself of his as- 
sistance in obtaining a necklace worth sixteen hundred thousand 
livres. Rohan obtained the necklace and handed it to one of the 
conspirators who impersonated the Queen's valet de chamhre. 
Rohan also gave to the jewelers who sold the necklace a contract 
for payment bearing the Queen's endorsement, which had been 
forged by the same person. In August, 1785, the plot was dis- 
covered, and Rohan was sent to the Bastille. The King un- 
wisely permitted him to be tried by the parlement of Paris, in 
which he had many partizans, and which was eager to assert it- 
self against the Crown. The result was an acquittal, applauded 
by the populace, although minor personages were condemned. 

In 1786 Calonne realized that the policy of loans could not caionne's 
be pursued indefinitely. He had borrowed eight hundred mil- 1^,"°^ 
lion livres, while the annual deficits had risen to more than one 
hundred million. He now proposed a radical remedy. He 
would resume the projects of Turgot, and push them at once be- 
yond the point which Turgot had attempted to reach. The 
King, at first distrustful, promised him support. Caionne's 
financial plans were original, his other reforms — abolition of 
the corvee, removal of the restrictions on the grain trade, or- 
ganization of local assemblies — were taken practically unchanged 
from Turgot's program. The new land tax, on the principle 
of Turgot's transformation of the corvee, was to replace the 
vingtiemes, and no exemptions were to be granted on the score 
of rank or official position. The difficulty was that the country 
was in need of immediate resources and the details of the reform 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



could not be worked out quickly enough to bring relief. As 
Calonne felt certain that the parlements would resist stubbornly, 
when the edicts embodying the proposed changes should be pre- 
sented for registration, he was anxious to secure the support of 
public opinion, and persuaded the King that this could be gained 
by laying the projects before an assembly of royal nominees or 
notables. 

The Assembly of the Notables met in February, 1787. Ca- 
lonne did not show much discretion in selecting the one hundred 
and forty-seven members. Among them were several distin- 
guished prelates who were strongly opposed to him. There were 
also thirty-three judges and officers of the parlements, who would 
be able to prolong their opposition when the decrees were sub- 
mitted for registration. Calonne made the mistake of holding 
out hopes of relief from taxation before the assembly met, 
although he knew that he would be obliged to reveal the existence 
of a huge deficit. He was under the delusion that if he de- 
nounced abuses with sufficient vigor, he could persuade or com- 
pel the very men who profited by them to aid him in introducing 
radical reforms. Accordingly he attacked every characteristic 
feature of the existing financial system with all the fury of a 
pamphleteer. His words first provoked astonishment and then 
led to combined resistance. The notables began to discover 
objections to each of his more significant proposals. His pro- 
vincial assemblies, chosen by the landed proprietors, indiscrim- 
inately from the three estates, seemed to be a step toward break- 
ing down that hierarchy of orders which was a fundamental law 
of the monarchy. In dealing with the taxation of ecclesiastical 
lands and the debts of the clergy, he proposed to authorize the 
sale of their ground rents and feudal dues. The nobles feared 
that this might lead to the redemption of all feudal dues and the 
destruction of the basis of their social superiority. As the oppo- 
sition gained strength Calonne was driven to admit that the 
deficit amounted to one hundred and thirteen million livres, a 
sum larger than the estimated product of his new land tax. The 
notables demanded a statement of receipts and expenditures. In 
the midst of the controversy the King accepted Calonne's resigna- 
tion. 

It would have been wise if Louis XVI had recalled Necker, 
who had the confidence of the financiers and who might have 
guided the State through the crisis. After a few weeks Louis 
entrusted the direction of the government to Lomenie de Brienne, 
Archbishop of Toulouse and a distinguished member of the As- 
sembly of the Notables. Brienne had opposed Calonne, but he 



FRENCH MONARCHY A BENEVOLENT DESPOTISM 73 

now adopted Calonne's plan, adding to it a stamp tax. He had no c hap, v 
greater success with the Notables than had Calonne, and finally 1754-88 
dissolved the assembly. He then made a vain attempt to con- Failure of 
ciliate the judges in order that the decrees might be registered. 8^^°^^'^ 
The first decrees — on the grain trade, the corvee, and the pro- 
vincial assemblies — were registered without difficulty. To pro- 
cure the registration of the decrees on the stamp tax and the land 
tax the government was obliged to hold a lit de justice on August 
6. Even this did not close the controversy, for parlement met 
the following day and declared the act of registration void, and 
again, some days later, declared that the States General alone 
could consent to new taxation. For this revolutionary conduct 
the judges were exiled to Troyes. The provincial parlements 
took the same attitude of resistance and a spirit of revolt spread 
through the country. But by autumn both the government and 
the parlement of Paris were ready for a compromise. The gov- 
ernment abandoned its reforms of taxation and the parlement 
agreed to register a decree prolonging the collection of the two 
vingtiemes and abolishing exemptions. 

The quarrel broke out again more fiercely two months later 
when the government proposed a series of loans extending over 
five years and amounting to four hundred and twenty million 
livres. To render this project palatable the King promised to 
summon the States General before the five years were ended. Al- 
though the quarrel dragged on through the winter one signal re- 
form was accomplished — the restoration of civil rights to the 
Protestants. As spring approached, the struggle became more 
bitter, until in May the King attempted to reach the root of the 
difficulty by reorganizing the courts in a manner similar to that 
which his grandfather had found successful. He tried to com- 
mend the change by promising the codification and improvement 
of the laws, the abolition of torture, and the reduction of the 
costs of justice. But this time public opinion was hopelessly 
confused and the resistance of the parlements was looked upon 
as a desperate defense of liberty against absolutist practices in 
government. 

It proved to be more difficult for the government to overcome 
opposition in the provinces than in Paris. Some of the pro- 
vincial parlements would not register even the decrees which the 
parlement of Paris had accepted. The decrees of May, 1788, Bank- 
reorganizing the courts awakened more violent resistance, which '"Ptcy 
centered in Brittany, Beam, and Dauphine. In Grenoble the 
attempt of the government to coerce the judges led to a for- 
midable riot, which could only be quieted by the judges them- 



74 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



Influence 
Abroad 



selves. This was followed by a successful movement for the 
restoration of the ancient estates of Dauphine, reorganized to 
suit the public opinion of 1788. Meanwhile the financial situa- 
tion had become desperate. Already in March an account of 
receipts and expenditures had been published, which placed the 
deficit at one hundred and sixty million livres. It was impossi- 
ble to borrow, because the capitalists feared the loss of their 
money unless parlement sanctioned the issue of loans. The only 
means of averting ruin seemed to be a meeting of the States Gen- 
eral. The government yielded to the pressure of public opinion 
and announced that the promised session should be opened on 
May I, 1789. As there was almost no money in the treasury, 
payments were on August 16 deferred for six weeks. The notes 
of the Bank of Discount,^ intimately associated with the gov- 
ernment, were given legal tender value in Paris. Brienne could 
not survive the failure of his projects and this confession of in- 
ability to pay the debts of the government. He resigned August 

25- 

The financial disorders not only compromised the plans of re- 
form, but also deprived France of the position abroad won by the 
successes of the American war. This became apparent in 1787, 
when conflicts in the Dutch Netherlands between the Orange 
party and the republicans invited foreign intervention. The 
stadtholder, William V, was a cousin of the English King, and 
his wife, Wilhelmina, was the sister of the new Prussian mon- 
arch, Frederick William II. France had posed as the patron of 
the republicans of the province of Holland, the leaders in the 
opposition to William. The arrest of Wilhelmina by their party 
in June, 1787, provoked a demand for reparation from Frederick 
William, and when the answer of the Dutch was evasive, a Prus- 
sian army under the Duke of Brunswick marched in from the 
Prussian province of Cleves. The French, paralyzed by quar- 
rels of the ministry and the courts, and by approaching bank- 
ruptcy, did not stir. The result was that the hereditary stadt- 
holdership was made an essential feature of the constitution of 
the United Provinces. This was followed a year later by the 
formation of a Triple Alliance, in which the Dutch exchanged 
the support of France for dependence upon England and 
Prussia. 

2 Caisse d'.Escompte, founded with the aid of Turgot in 1776. During 
Calonne's administration its capital was increased to one hundred mil- 
lions, of which seventy were lent to the government. It was the first 
bank national in character since Law's time, and may be regarded as the 
predecessor of the Bank of France. In 1787 its note circulation amounted 
to eighty-eight million livres. 



FRENCH MONARCHY A BENEVOLENT DESPOTISM 75 

The turn of affairs in the East inflicted another humiliation chap, v 
upon France, which was the traditional defender of Turkish in- 1754-88 
terests. The Emperor Joseph, weary of the French alliance, had 
made a treaty with Catherine H, looking to the partition of Tur- 
key, and when, in 1787, the Turks attacked her for seizing the 
Crimea, he joined in the war. The Swedes thought the occasion 
good for the recovery of provinces which the Russians had 
taken from them earlier in the century, and they invaded Rus- 
sian Finland with a large army. The Count de Montmorin, 
French minister of foreign affairs, sought to learn the aims of 
Joseph and Catherine, but failed, and Louis XVI was obliged to 
content himself with feeble efforts at mediation. In interna- 
tional politics France was soon to be reckoned as a negligible 
quantity. 



CHAPTER VI 

THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 

C HAP. V I jN 1788 France was on the verge of revolution, if not of finan- 
1733-1800 A cial ruin. For a time the statesmen of rival nations con- 
import- gratulated themselves upon the diminished influence of this for- 
ance of _ midable power, but when the catastrophe came it proved to be 
Advance SO great that neighboring countries could not long escape its in- 
fluence. Meanwhile, an industrial revolution had begun in Great 
Britain, which, ushering in an age of machinery, was destined 
to affect profoundly not only the struggle in France, but also the 
wider conflict into which that was merged. The nation which 
first equipped itself with the new instruments of manufacture 
would inevitably outrun its rivals in industrial development and 
the accumulation of wealth. In case of war, its larger financial 
resources would vastly increase its military and naval power. 
This became especially clear in the first decade of the nineteenth 
century when the French Revolution armed itself for the conquest 
• of Europe and under the leadership of Napoleon undertook to 
humble Great Britain. 

Although the forces set in motion by these two revolutions 
seemed involved in a fatal conflict for mastery, their essential 
role was one of cooperation. The industrial revolution eventu- 
ally furnished an economic foundation upon which the political 
and social principles of the French Revolution might erect the 
institutions of a democratic society. The development of manu- 
facturing by machinery built up great cities, whose leaders gained 
an influence stronger than that of the old semi-feudal landlords 
or that of the more recent mercantile aristocracy. For a time 
society seemed simply to have exchanged masters, but in the end 
the new aristocracy and the old alike became responsive to the 
hopes and demands of the common people, who, crowded to- 
gether in the cities, were conscious of their strength as well as of 
their rights. 

It was the inventions in two great industries, and in the appli- 
Eeiation cation of power to render them effective, that gave to Great 
Britain at the close of the eighteenth century her extraordinary 
advantage over her neighbors and rivals. These industries were 

76 



of Inveii' 
tions 



THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION -jy 

the manufacture of cloth, especially of cotton cloth, and the c hap, v i 
manufacture of iron. As soon as the new machinery was ap- 1733-I800 
preaching completion, a steam engine capable of moving it was 
nearly perfected. James Watt, the inventor of the steam en- 
gine, took out his first patent the year Richard Arkwright pat- 
ented his spinning frame. This meant that the factories could 
be equipped with machinery in places where it was impossible 
to obtain water power. A few years earlier a blast furnace 
had been built which increased the production of cast iron sev- 
eral hundred per cent., and a few years later a method was dis- 
covered for transforming cast iron into malleable iron. The 
most significant inventions, therefore — the machinery, the mode 
of producing the material for its construction, and the motive 
power to propel it — were complementary. This accounts for 
the swift triumph of the industrial revolution in Great Britain. 
It profoundly modified the situation in the last twenty years of 
the century. The great wars began before other nations had an 
opportunity to appreciate the advantages of the change. From 
1792 to 181 5 the war-troubled continent was not a field for 
economic experiments, and when the wars were ended, Great 
Britain was a generation ahead of her rivals. 

Even before the middle of the eighteenth century there were 
isolated instances of the introduction of machinery. As early 
as 1598 William Lee had invented a stocking-frame, the success Early 
of which aroused such jealousy on the part of the knitters that ^'^^e^'"'** 
Lee was obliged to take refuge in Rouen under the protection 
of the enlightened Henry IV. After Lee's death his associates 
returned to England and settled in the neighborhood of Notting- 
ham, which soon became the center of a flourishing stocking in- 
dustry. The use of machinery in a trade so special could, how- 
ever, exercise little influence upon industry in general. 

In certain parts of Italy spinning machines had long been used 
in producing silk thread, but the secret was carefully guarded. 
An Englishman in the first part of the eighteenth century suc- 
ceeded in obtaining plans of the machines and built a silk mill. 
His enterprise was for a time profitable, but the supply of silk 
was uncertain, and his success was hardly more significant than 
the introduction of the stocking-frame. 

It seems to have been a mere chance that the most important 
invention in the manufacture of iron did not belong to the 
seventeenth rather than to the eighteenth century. The use of 
charcoal in iron furnaces was already menacing the forests of 
England with destruction. Moreover, the English furnaces 
could not supply the demand for pig iron and the manufacturers 



78 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

CHAP. VI of things into which iron entered as a part were obliged to im- 
1733-1800 port large quantities from Sweden and Russia. The only way 
to assure the future of the industry was to find a method by 
which " pit " coal could be used in smelting ore. In its natural 
state it could not be burned with the iron, for it made the cast iron 
brittle. The discoverer of the process by which coal could be 
turned into coke and used in this form was a son of Lord Dud- 
ley, who possessed furnaces on his estates. But before the 
process was perfected Charles I and parliament were involved 
in war, and Dudley fought on the side of the King. Although 
he survived the struggle, he never again secured the support 
necessary to make his invention a practical success. Dudley and 
other ingenious men were precursors rather than creators. The 
time was not ripe. 

The changes in the economic situation by the middle of the 
Expansion eighteenth century gave an extraordinary stimulus to the inven- 
of Trade tive energies of men acquainted with the needs of industry. The 
older methods were no longer adequate to the demands made 
upon them. Foreign trade was expanding with tremendous 
rapidity. The changes affected Great Britain and France es- 
pecially, for they had flourishing colonies in America and valu- 
able trading stations in India. Between 1715 and 1789 French 
foreign trade increased fivefold. At the close of the period more 
than half of this trade was with the colonies, especially the 
sugar-raising colonies of the West Indies. The progress of 
British trade was as rapid and more free from disastrous inter- 
ruptions. Commerce with the North American colonies alone 
had reached before the Seven Years' War an annual average of 
two million pounds sterling, nearly three times what it had been 
forty years earlier. The wars in the middle of the century did 
not check or disorganize British trade as they did the trade of 
France, because Great Britain maintained her supremacy upon 
the sea and was better able to protect her shipping. Another 
fact favored the development of English industry. The guild 
system had broken down more completely in England, and the 
government did not place obstacles in the way of invention by 
insisting upon minute regulation of the processes of manufac- 
ture. In England also capital, so necessary for industrial ex- 
periments on a large scale, had reached a higher stage of devel- 
opment, partly as a consequence of the success of the Bank of 
England founded at the close of the preceding century. 

The progress of industry in Germany was retarded by her 
petty state system, with its multitude of tariffs, transit dues, and 
tolls. The cities of the far interior, like Nuremberg and Augs- 



THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 79 

burg, so flourishing in the sixteenth century, had long been losing c hap, v i 
ground. The population of Nuremberg was only half what it 1733-I800 
had been two centuries earlier. Augsburg's cloth industry, 
which employed six thousand weavers in the sixteenth century, 
employed only five hundred in the latter part of the eighteenth. 
Cities situated on the coast, like Hamburg, which shared in the 
newer commercial activities, grew rapidly, but their prosperity 
had little apparent influence on the cities of upper Germany. 

The changes then taking place in England are illustrated by 
the growth of Liverpool. In the early part of the seventeenth 
century Liverpool was hardly more than a fishing village, and 
even a century later its population numbered only five thousand. 
The development of the colonial trade, including the slave trade, 
which followed the close of the War of the Spanish Succession, 
was profitable to Liverpool. The population of the city in- 
creased fivefold by 1750. But the relations between it and the 
inland towns were as yet undeveloped. England, unlike France, 
had no canals. The roads also were still in deplorable condi- 
tion. These obstacles were almost as great as the tolls and dues 
which hampered internal trade in continental countries. 

Not only did economic necessity act as a spur, but also any 
advance in one part of an industry stimulated men to improve TheFiying 
the processes in other parts. This is illustrated in the case of shuttle 
weaving. The weavers had long been hampered by the difficulty 
of throwing the shuttle from side to side, if the cloth was broad. 
In 1733 John Kay devised a flying shuttle, which enabled him 
to weave even broadcloth without the assistance of a helper. As 
his invention also increased the speed with which ordinary weav- 
ing was done, it destroyed the balance in the industry. The 
women of England were unequal to the task of supplying the 
thread which the weavers wanted. The need of machines for 
spinning was felt more keenly than before. 

In the textile industries the manufacture of cotton profited 
most by the invention of machinery. This industry had been of 
slow growth in England. It had been introduced in the six- 
teenth century by Flemish weavers who fled from their country 
during the religious wars. In the early part of the eighteenth 
century it was still of far less importance than the woolen in- 
dustry. The spinners were unable to produce a thread as strong 
and fine as that spun by the Hindus, and they commonly mixed 
linen with the cotton in order to increase the strength of the 
cloth. They owed their market partly to the fact that parlia- 
ment, influenced by the woolen merchants, had prohibited the 
importation of India prints. As soon as spinning and weaving 



8o THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. VI machinery were invented the cotton industry advanced by leaps 
1733-1800 until it became one of the most distinctive industries of Great 
Britain, and of greater importance than the woolen trade. Its 
peculiar home was Lancashire, where the climate was moist and 
equable, and where the port of Liverpool was close at hand. 
A machine for spinning cotton thread was invented the same 
The Spin- year as the flying shuttle, but the inventor did not have the capi- 
ning Jenny t^l to introduce his invention. A few years later it was pur- 
chased and a mill was built provided with the machines, but it 
was badly managed and the enterprise failed. The first suc- 
cessful machine was made by James Hargreaves, who was a car- 
penter as well as a weaver. The story is told that he entered 
the room where his wife was spinning so suddenly that she 
upset her spinning-wheel. He noticed that the wheel kept on 
turning as it lay on the floor, and this suggested to him the idea 
of making a wheel which would turn several spindles and spin 
several threads at once. He constructed a machine which spun 
eight threads, and named it a " spinning jenny " in honor of his 
wife. In 1767 he began to make machines to sell. As they were 
light they could be set up in cottages and did not interfere with 
the domestic system of manufacture. The thread which they 
produced was fine, although it lacked somewhat in strength. 
Richard Arkwright's machine, which was patented in 1769, 
Arkwright the year before Hargreaves obtained his patent, was constructed 
on a different principle. Its essential feature, like that of the 
unsuccessful spinning machine invented a generation earher, was 
a system of rollers, each revolving faster than the one before, 
and by this means drawing out the strands of cotton. The 
thread was strong, but not fine. Arkwright's machines differed 
from those of Hargreaves also in the fact that they were too 
heavy for a spinner's cottage. Special buildings were required. 
In 1 77 1 with the aid of certain capitalists Arkwright built a mill 
on the Derwent near Derby. As water power was used his 
machine was called the water-frame. Its introduction meant the 
partial abandonment of the domestic system, and the transfer of 
the spinner from the home to the factory, one of the most far- 
reaching consequences of the industrial revolution, and not 
peculiar to any single trade. 

While Arkwright was busy constructing and equipping mills, 
Samuel Crompton invented a machine which eventually super- 
seded both the spinning jenny and the water-frame. This was 
the mule-spinner, which combined the essential features of each. 
The first machines were made of wood, but in 1790 metal rollers 
were substituted and the mule was rapidly introduced. The 



THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 8i 

thread was both fine and strong; indeed, it was better than the c hap, v i 
thread hitherto produced by the Hindu spinners. With this i733-i800 
thread by 1783 musHns were made which could enter into com- 
petition with India goods. Two years later the production 
amounted to fifty thousand pieces. The way was thus marked 
out for the supremacy of British cottons. 

The invention of spinning machinery destroyed the balance in 
the textile industry. The spinners were now ahead of the weav- a Power 
ers, as after the invention of the flying shuttle the weavers had ^°"* 
been ahead of the spinners. Two consequences followed. A 
period of ten or twenty years ensued during which the great 
demand for weavers raised their wages, making them the aristo- 
crats among artisans. A second consequence was the danger 
that the surplus thread would be exported and that continental 
weavers would obtain part of the advantages of the invention. 
There was even talk of prohibiting the export of cotton thread. 
The problem of restoring the balance between spinning and weav- 
ing was a common topic of conversation. The solution was 
found, curiously enough, by Edmund Cartwright, a clergyman 
who was wholly without mechanical knowledge, and who had 
never even seen a weaver at work. Cartwright had been dis- 
tinguished hitherto only by his brilliant studies at Oxford and 
by certain poems in the style of Pope which he had published. 
In a chance conversation with two men from Manchester he 
argued that it was possible to construct a loom, while his more 
practical companions took the other side. Cartwright obtained 
the help of a carpenter and blacksmith and constructed a loom 
for which he obtained a patent in 1785. This machine was, 
however, so clumsy that it required two strong men to run it. 
Cartwright saw its defects and remedied them. Within two 
years he made looms which could weave ordinary cottons, cali- 
coes, or fine muslins. He fitted out a mill at Doncaster in York- 
shire, but it was badly managed and the enterprise failed. In 
1791, with the aid of two Manchester spinners, he constructed a 
more elaborate mill, capable of holding four hundred looms. 
The jealousy of the weavers was now aroused and the mill was 
burned. Cartwright's resources were exhausted, and the intro- 
duction of his invention was delayed, so that it was ten years be- 
fore his machines began to be widely used. 

Meanwhile the processes of making cast iron and malleable or 
bar iron had been revolutionized. The first furnace which used 
coal successfully in smelting iron ore was constructed by Abra- 
ham Darby in 1735. His invention attracted little attention for 
many years. The lack of a forced draft prevented him from 



82 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



Iron 
Foundries 



CHAP. VI producing more than five or six hundred tons of cast iron a year, 
1733-1800 Twenty-five years later Dr. Roebuck founded his famous iron 
works on the Carron River, near the Firth of Forth. Assisted 
by the engineer Smeaton he constructed a powerful blast by 
means of cylinders, which enabled him to triple the amount of 
cast iron produced by the furnace. He also partially solved the 
problem of transforming cast iron into malleable iron with the 
use of coal. The difficulty had been that this method did not 
free the iron from its impurities as did the use of charcoal. As 
long as coal could be used only for smelting the ore, only half 
the obstacles to the development of the iron industry had been 
removed. England had a vital interest in the success of these 
experiments, because she wished to become independent of for- 
eign producers. In 1783 the method known as " puddling," 
that is, purifying the cast iron in a " reverbatory " furnace, was 
discovered by Henry Cort. The masters of the great forges 
were at first incredulous, but they were soon convinced that the 
bar iron produced by the new process was equal or superior to 
the best Swedish iron. Before the close of the century the 
annual production of the furnaces around Coalbrookdale, where 
Abraham Darby won his first successes, amounted to thirteen or 
fourteen thousand tons. The Carron iron works were equally 
successful. They became famous throughout Europe and a can- 
non, the carronade, was named for them. 

The most famous ironmaster of the time was John Wilkin- 
son, who saw more clearly than his fellows the possibilities of 
the industry. He announced his intention to build a boat of iron. 
Men thought his head had been turned by the rapid industrial 
changes of the past few years, but in 1787 the boat was success- 
fully launched on the Severn. The next year he sold forty- 
eight miles of iron piping to the city of Paris for its waterworks. 
Already with the aid of Darby he had constructed an iron bridge 
across the Severn with a span of one hundred feet. It was 
about the year 1788 that iron began to be substituted generally 
for wood in spinning machinery. 

The development of the iron industry made possible a new 
method of printing calicoes. Up to 1785 the work had been done 
with engraved blocks ten inches long and five inches wide. 
" The printing of a piece of calico twenty-eight yards long and 
in a single color involved 448 separate applications of the block." ^ 
With the introduction of metal cylinders several colors could be 
laid on at once. This decreased the labor by ninety-nine per cent. 

1 W. Cunningham, Growth of English Industry and Commerce, III, 640, 



New 
Succesaes 



THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 83 

The improvements in textile machinery were not limited to the c hap, vi 
manufacture of cotton cloth, but were adapted to the spinning 1733-1800 
and weaving of woolens. The advance in this trade was not, 
however, so significant. At the same time the discoveries of 
Berthelot, the French chemist, made known in England by Watt, 
led to the abandonment of the old, wearisome methods of bleach- 
ing and dyeing. 

Among other inventions almost equally important was the per- 
fecting by Huntsman of the crucible process in the manufacture 
of steel. This confirmed the supremacy of Sheffield in the cut- 
lery trade. 

Most of the inventions which had been revolutionizing English 
industry had been the work of practical men, face to face with 
obstacles which had to be overcome if their business was to be 
made successful. The improvements in the iron industry would 
have been more rapid had men possessed the knowledge of 
chemistry which was soon to be gained. As it was they were james 
obliged to proceed empirically. The history of the steam engine ^^" 
was different. James Watt, who contributed most to its devel- 
opment, was a man acquainted with the recent discoveries in 
science. His mechanical genius had manifested itself early and 
he had chosen as a profession the construction of laboratory in- 
struments. He became deeply interested in the progress of 
chemistry and worked with Dr. Roebuck, founder of the Carron 
iron works. He made experiments upon the pressure of steam 
and undertook to improve a pump invented by Newcomen, which 
used steam to raise the piston in its cylinder, relying on atmos- 
pheric pressure to force the piston down again. When Dr. Roe- 
buck needed a better pump to get the water out of his coal mines, 
Watt set seriously to work upon the correction of the defects in 
Newcomen's machine. Although he did not succeed in time to 
save Roebuck from being ruined by his mining venture, he took 
out a first patent in 1769 and finally constructed an engine which 
used steam exclusively and could furnish motive power for fac- 
tories as well as pumps. His principal difficulties were due to 
lack of skill on the part of the workmen who made his cylinders. 
This was before the day of machine tools. Watt had entered 
into partnership with Roebuck, and with Matthew Boulton, an 
enterprising Birmingham manufacturer, when Roebuck failed. 
Boulton invested not only all he had but all he could borrow. 
Watt was many times discouraged and on the point of abandon- 
ing the struggle, but Boulton never faltered. By 1787 success 
was assured. Already one of Watt's steam pumps had been 
placed at Chaillot on the Seine in the suburbs of Paris. The 



84 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

C HAP. VI steam engine was also being used to run other machinery besides 
1733-1800 pumps. It was introduced into spinning factories, flour mills, 
and machine shops. 

These industrial changes were accompanied by an improvement 
in the routes between different parts of Great Britain. An era 
of road and canal building began, and such work speedily as- 
sumed the proportions of a mania. The first canal ran from the 
collieries at Worsley seven miles to Manchester. In one place 
its construction necessitated a tunnel through rock, and in 
another an aqueduct over a river. Soon the cities of the east 
and the west coast, as well as London and the Midlands, were 
connected by canals. The improvement in the roads was 
brought about by the extension of the turnpike system. New 
methods of road construction were planned by such engineers as 
Metcalfe, Telford, and Macadam. 

The progress of this industrial revolution in England had not 
The Rivals escaped the attention of her rivals in manufacturing. French 
of England travelers realized that France could not hope to compete with 
England unless French manufacturers adopted the new English 
machines and processes. One of them admired the success with 
which the English had constructed iron machinery. Writing in 
the year 1786, a year critical for the trade relations of the two 
countries, he said that the iron was of such quality that it re- 
sembled polished steel and he deplored the lack of that art in 
France. He added, " It is the only means of multiplying our 
manufactures on a large scale and of competing with the English 
on even terms, for it is impossible to pretend to such competition 
if we struggle on with our old machinery, especially with ma- 
chinery built of wood." 2 

The progress of invention in England, especially in manufac- 
turing cotton, gave British products a double advantage. It 
reduced the cost to the manufacturer, enabling him to compete 
successfully in every market, and so improved the quality of his 
goods that in several cases he monopolized the trade. A certain 
grade of cotton thread fell in nine years from thirty-eight shil- 
lings a pound to fifteen. Moreover, continental spinners could 
not produce thread as fine and strong as that spun by Crompton's 
machines. If continental weavers were to compete with British 
weavers, they had to buy British thread. That Great Britain 
profited by her advantages is indicated by the rapid rise in the 
consumption of raw cotton. At the beginning of the century her 
importations were a little more than a million pounds. In 1771 

2 P. Mantoux, La Revolution industrielle au dixhuitieme siecle, 315. 



THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 85 

they amounted to 4,760,000. By 1800 they had risen to 56,000,000. c hap, vi 
A few enterprising French manufacturers desired to utilize 1733.1800 
the new British machinery, Martin, a native of Amiens, in 1784, 
presented an Arkwright machine to the Academy of Sciences. 
An attempt was made to start a factory for the construction of 
such machines. About the same time spinning machinery was 
introduced in several mills in Languedoc. Enough was at- 
tempted to alarm the workmen in one or two cities. In 1789 
the artisans of Caen demanded that the use of the spinning 
machines be forbidden on the ground that it would deprive spin- 
ners of employment. France as a whole adhered for another 
generation to the old methods. 

In Germany also the new machinery was introduced slowly. 
It was 1798 before a mill equipped with spinning machines and 
run by water power was completed. Even the young republic 
across the seas was more enterprising, for in 1789 Samuel Slater, 
one of Arkwright's workmen, succeeded in fitting a mill at Paw- 
tucket, in Rhode Island, with spinning machinery. Hargreave's 
jenny had been used in Philadelphia still earlier. Such facts 
illustrate the spread of the new ideas, although as they were 
simply occasional, they show also the enormous advance the 
British were making over their rivals. 

It was at this juncture, when British industry was being revo- 
lutionized, and French industry clung tenaciously to earlier 
methods, that England and France entered into a commercial 
treaty which was conceived in the spirit of Turgot and Adam 
Smith. The eighteenth article of the Treaty of Versailles in ACommer- 
1783 had pledged the two countries to rearrange their commer- ciai Treaty 
cial relations within two years. Before the treaty was signed, 
in February, 1783, Vergennes, the French minister of foreign 
affairs, had written to his agent in London, " One does not get 
rich from very poor nations " ; in other words, that the richer 
England and France were the greater opportunity for each to 
profit by the trade of the other. The policy of exclusiveness 
was, therefore, in his opinion, a blunder. The French were ap- 
parently more eager for a treaty than the English, for they were 
filled with suspicions towards their neighbor, who had humbled 
them in the war of the American Revolution. William Pitt was 
then prime minister of England and, while he was in favor of 
freer trade, was exasperatingly slow in meeting the proposals of 
Vergennes. In 1785, as a reminder, the French issued a tem- 
porary order restraining the importation of English products, 
especially cottons, which were just then the rage in France. 
Finally, in the spring of 1786, William Eden was sent to Paris 



86 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

C HAP. VI to negotiate for the English. Pitt was a hard bargainer, and 
1733-1800 several times Eden felt that he demanded so much that the 
negotiations would fall through and commercial war would be 
the result. Pitt was anxious to open the French market to the 
products of the new English machinery as well as to English 
hardware and cutlery. He proposed that the French should 
reduce their duties to five and seven per cent., but he was un- 
willing to admit French silks on any terms. A bargain was at 
length struck, which gave French wines the terms granted to 
Portuguese wines by the famous Methuen Treaty, and which in 
turn admitted English cutlery and hardware at ten per cent, and 
cottons at twelve per cent. The same duties were also applied 
to French goods, but there was little likeHhood that the English 
would import either iron and steel or cottons from France at 
that time. The treaty was on the whole more favorable to 
England than to France. It became effective in May, 1787. 
In the wine districts it was popular, but in the manufacturing 
towns it was universally denounced. The effects of the treaty 
were heightened by the taste for English goods already wide- 
spread in France. An industrial crisis, due in part to the finan- 
cial embarrassments of the government, and to the crop failure 
of 1788, also aggravated the situation. When artisans were 
thrown out of employment and looms were idle, French public 
opinion held the treaty responsible. The unfortunate conse- 
quences appeared several years later when the two countries were 
involved in war and it became the policy of France to exclude 
English products altogether from France and from all other 
countries which the French could control. 

The industrial revolution in England had consequences even 
more significant than its influence upon the trade relations be- 
Ruinof tween Great Britain and the Continent. Its most important 
Sdusuiis consequence was the creation of the factory system, with all the 
changes which this drew in its train. Cottage industry or the 
domestic system was doomed, although it was continued in some 
trades for many years. The workmen who could not find em- 
ployment eventually under the new system were reduced to 
misery. The transition period between the old and the new was, 
therefore, peculiarly trying. It occurred at a time when a revo- 
lution in English land management was bringing to an end the 
rights in the common fields which the villagers had possessed 
since the Middle Ages. The weaver who cultivated a little plot 
of land and turned his cow or geese out upon the village com- 
mons found himself attacked in two directions. He was faced 
with a ruinous competition from the factory loom and at the 



THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 87 

same time lost that part of his livelihood which came from agri- c hap, vi 

culture. 1733-1800 

One of the clearest indications of the change which was taking 
place is found in the movement of population. The towns in changes in 
the new cotton, iron, and coal districts grew with great rapidity, Population 
while many of the older agricultural regions lost population. 
Between 1760 and i8(X) the population of Manchester was quad- 
rupled. Bolton, a mere village, grew to be a thriving town of 
17,000. Birmingham and Sheffield grew more slowly, only 
doubling their population in forty years. But the change is all 
the more striking because many observers earlier in the century 
were convinced that England was actually losing in population. 
The growth of the great cities was bound to have an effect upon 
the political development of the English people, leading toward 
democracy. That this did not occur as soon as might have been 
expected was due mainly to the French Revolution which ran a 
course so violent that the majority of Englishmen became im- 
moderately conservative. 



CHAPTER VII 

THE FALL OF THE OLD REGIME IN FRANCE 

CHAP, jp royal authority almost ceased to exist in France after a few 
A months of revolution, this was not because of the violence 

1788-89 ^j|.j^ which it was attacked or of any fixed intention on the part 
of the people to destroy it, but because abdication in the presence 
of difficulties had become habitual. The government of Louis 
XVI suffered from something worse than mere incapacity to 
suppress disorder. It did not persist in any of its policies long 
enough to overcome even those obstacles of the every-day sort 
which had no elements of mystery or surprise. It remained 
decked in the trappings of tyranny, without being able either to 
put them off or to play the part. The King, when the crisis 
became bewildering, sought to escape his perplexities by spend- 
ing his days in hunting. Nor was it probable that the situation 
would be corrected by the appointment of Necker. He was a 
man of petty expedients, rather than a statesman capable of de- 
vising a program of reform which would command the support 
of the nation. 

Necker's first task was to save the government from the dis- 

ecker'8 Credit of a partial bankruptcy and to secure money for current 

imsfr expenses. His appointment restored public confidence. State 
securities advanced thirty points and stock of the Bank of Dis- 
count increased in value almost as much. A royal decree soon 
withdrew the treasury notes that Brienne had provided for, but 
the notes of the Bank of Discount remained legal tender. 
Necker could not resort to public loans to obtain money, on ac- 
count of the panic from which the country was slow to recover, 
and he turned to the Bank of Discount for aid, as his prede- 
cessors had done for the past five years. From this and similar 
sources he obtained seventy-five million livres, satisfying the most 
urgent needs of the treasury until the spring of 1789. He ad- 
vanced two millions of his own fortune. 

Questions equally serious were raised by the industrial crisis 
and a partial failure of the wheat crop. For thirty years the 
price of bread had risen steadily and in several localities it had 
tripled and even quadrupled. At Paris, early in 1789, a four- 






THE FALL OF THE OLD REGIME IN FRANCE 89 

pound loaf cost fourteen sous and a half, which, taking into ^yn^' 

account the relative value of money, was a famine price. In 

many towns mobs tried to compel traders to sell grain at a price '^^^^•^^ 
below the market rate. To relieve the situation Necker re- 
turned to the methods of trade regulation already several times 
abandoned. In the preamble to one of his decrees he intimated 
that the measure was designed to thwart the schemes of mo- 
nopolists. He thus countenanced the popular suspicion that spec- 
ulation was at the bottom of the trouble. Parlements and 
administrative or municipal officers, fearful lest their communi- 
ties should suffer, issued decrees forbidding the transport of the 
grain beyond their jurisdiction. As a result, in large cities like 
Paris, the supply of bread and flour became very uncertain. 

The policy of the government in regard to the organization 
and work of the coming States General was the matter of most The 
immediate importance. By a decree, issued on July 5, 1788, ^^^^ 
officials and other " instructed " persons were requested to 
search for documents and to present memoirs to aid in deter- 
mining the method of convocation. The practical effect of this 
decree was to do away with the censorship of political writings. 
The presses turned out scores of pamphlets, and reputations 
were in the making. Men ambitious to be accounted statesmen 
labored to signalize themselves in these discussions. The 
theories they advocated belonged to a common body of doctrine, 
which affirmed the supremacy of the third estate and condemned 
class privilege, measuring the importance of communities by the 
size of the population rather than by the number of special priv- 
ileges contained in their charters. For the principle of historical 
rights was substituted the theory that the general will deter- 
mines the character of the law. One of the pamphleteers, 
Rabaut Saint-fitienne, a famous Huguenot preacher, pointed out 
that even if the clergy and the nobles were subtracted the nation 
would remain, because twenty-four million people would be left. 
But, he asked, what would be the case if the twenty-four million 
were subtracted? His conclusion was that the third estate 
should have at least as many representatives as the two privileged 
orders, and that the States General should meet as a single body, 
its members voting as individuals. Target, a Paris lawyer, 
argued that the clergy and the nobles were mistaken in thinking 
that they constituted two orders ; they formed, said he, only one, 
the privileged order, and there was only one other, the non- 
privileged. The best known pamphlet was written by the Abbe 
Sieyes and was a development of the ideas suggested by three 
questions : " What is the third estate ? Everything. What has 



90 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^yj^' it been in the political order? Nothing. What does it aspire 

to be? Something." The agitation was not carried on solely 

1788-89 j^y pamphlets. The same questions were discussed in the salons 
and wherever thoughtful men assembled. 

The government under the influence of Necker attempted to 
steer a middle course. Late in December, in a long and labored 
report, he announced that the third estate should have as many 
Plan of deputies as the other orders put together. He suggested that in 
utfoT*°' questions of common interest the States General should meet and 
vote as a single body, but he made this method dependent upon 
the wishes of the orders. His decision seemed liberal because 
the parlement of Paris had declared itself in favor of the mode 
of organization used in 1614. At the same time Necker brought 
forward in the name of the King a definite program of reform. 
In this he proposed that no taxes should be levied without the 
consent of the States General, that the expenses of the Court 
should be provided for separately by a civil list, and that the 
ministers should Hmit themselves to the sums assigned to their 
departments in the annual budget which was a part of his plan. 
He promised, also, that the practice of arbitrary arrest by let- 
tres de cachet ^ should be regulated by law and that the liberty 
of the press should receive legal sanction. His words implied a 
confidence that the clergy and the nobles would voluntarily aban- 
don their exemptions from taxation. But in regard to the feudal 
system, he said, " It will never occur to members of the third 
estate to seek to diminish the seigniorial honors and preroga- 
tives which distinguish the first two orders, whether in their 
property or their persons; for no Frenchman is ignorant of the 
fact that these prerogatives are a property as respectable as any 
other, that several are essential to the monarchy, and that His 
Majesty would never permit the slightest infringement of them." 
In the royal letter of convocation, the work of the States Gen- 
eral was stated in comprehensive, not to say vague, terms. The 
deputies were to propose measures concerning " the needs of the 
State, the reform of abuses, the organization of all parts of the 
administration, the prosperity of the kingdom, and the welfare 
of all." Groups of voters and of electors were permitted, as of 
old, to present their grievances and petitions in cahiers. The 
King expressed the hope that through this extraordinary con- 

lA lettre de cachet was an administrative order assigning a place of 
imprisonment to the person arrested. As he could not resort to habeas 
corpus proceedings, his imprisonment was at the pleasure of the govern- 



THE FALL OF THE OLD REGIME IN FRANCE 91 

sLiltation he would become acquainted with the needs and the ^^^' 
wishes of even the remotest inhabitants of his kingdom. 

The mode of choosing deputies to the States General pre- ^'^^^'^^ 
sented almost as many anomalies as the institutions of the old The 
regime. The electoral district was the bailiwick or senechaussee. ^^«<^*io°s 
In nearly all cases the elections of the three orders were separate. 
The nobles voted directly for the deputies of their order. This 
was true also of the bishops and of the parish priests. The 
monks, however, were given only one vote for each monastery. 
The arrangement which gave a parish priest as large a share as 
a bishop in the choice of clerical deputies was an immense gain 
to the cause of the third estate. The first consequence was that 
parish priests formed over two-thirds of the deputation. The 
elections of the third estate were indirect ; that is, the voters of 
a bailiwick chose the members of an electoral assembly, which 
selected the deputation to the States General. The ordinary 
townsman had less voting power than the villager, for all cities 
except the largest had a local electoral assembly, making the 
choice of the deputies to the States General doubly indirect. 
This accounts for the number of country lawyers who sat in the 
States General, and gave point to Edmund Burke's reproach that 
" its general composition was of obscure provincial advocates 
. . . the fomenters and conductors of the petty war of village 
vexation." The suffrage was practically universal, being granted 
to all those whose names appeared on the tax rolls. 

Paris, Metz, Strasbourg, and two other large cities had special 
electoral assemblies with the right to send deputies directly to the 
States General. In Paris the suffrage was restricted to those 
who paid six livres in taxes, or who possessed a university de- 
gree, or held letters of mastership in the crafts, or enjoyed an 
official title. Many Parisians did not appreciate their new priv- 
ilege. Only a fourth or a fifth of those entitled to vote took part 
in the election. Some like Bailly, future mayor of the city, en- 
joyed the sensation of "breathing a new atmosphere: it was a 
phenomenon to be something in the political order." Another 
Parisian noticed the absence of workingmen, and said, " Who can 
tell if the despotism of the bourgeoisie will not succeed the so- 
called aristocracy of the nobles." 

The assemblies of voters, as well as the electoral assemblies, The 
drew up cahiers. In some cases they adopted models prepared ^^^'®" 
by ambitious politicians, in others they debated fiercely what 
articles should be included, and in still others they recorded sim- 
ply the views of individual members, occasionally in the naive 



92 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

CHAP, language of the peasants. The cahiers of all three estates agreed 

in demanding a constitution embodying the liberties which 

1788-89 Necker had promised. The nobles and clergy declared them- 
selves ready to give up their exemptions from taxation, but 
they desired to preserve their other privileges. Many of the 
cahiers of the third estate contained complaints of oppressive 
feudal burdens, although they did not unite in demanding the 
abolition of the feudal system. It was liberty rather than 
equality that seemed to be the universal cry. 

Versailles was chosen as the place where the States General 
should meet. Prudent persons had suggested Soissons, or some 
other provincial town beyond the reach of a Paris mob, but the 
government did not wish to be put to the trouble and expense 
of moving the administrative bureaus. Necker urged the claims 
of Paris, because he thought that the public credit and the in- 
tegrity of the public debt would be safer in a city where many 
of the creditors of the State lived. 

The opening session of the States General took place on 

May 5. The great hall was crowded with deputies and spectators. 

Meeting of Gouvcmeur Morris, who was to succeed Jefferson as American 

the states . . _^ , ,. , • 1 , , 1 1 • 4. • 

General nunister to France, was obliged to go at eight o clock and sit in a 
cramped position until after twelve " in order to witness the 
ceremonies. It was easy to distinguish the different orders, for 
the costumes had been arranged by the government. Black had 
been imposed upon the deputies of the third estate, in striking 
contrast to the splendors of the dress worn by the nobles. The 
black costume of the priests also contrasted with the red or 
violet robes of the higher clergy. At one o'clock the King en- 
tered, followed by the Queen. The principal speech was made 
by Necker. He said nothing about the December program of 
reform, but spoke at great length about the finances. As Mira- 
beau declared in his newspaper, it was not a speech but a volume. 
At four o'clock the ceremonies were over. As the King rose, 
cries of '' Vive le Roi " filled the house. Even the Queen was 
applauded, which had not happened for months. She made a 
courtesy, and the applause redoubled. 

The aim of Necker's speech was to allay the anxieties due to 
the deficit of one hundred and sixty millions acknowledged by 
the government of Brienne. By subtracting anticipations and 
extraordinary expenses he reduced the total to fifty-six millions, 
and explained that by a few simple reforms and easy economies 
the remainder could be wiped out. He then exclaimed, " What 
a country, gentlemen, in which without taxes and with resources 
hitherto ignored we can remove a deficit w^hich has been the talk 



THE FALL OF THE OLD REGIME IN FRANCE 93 

of Europe ! " Upon the tasks of the States General he spoke ^yf/" 

only in vague terms, declaring that they " should note and follow 

the traces of national welfare in all its ramifications." This 1788-89 
futile attitude was apparently not Necker's fault, for the King 
was unwilling to renew the promises already made in his name. 

The States General represented the best intelligence of France. 
Few assemblies have held a greater number of distinguished men. 
Morris, who watched its proceedings closely, acknowledged that 
it had many good heads, although he added that they would have 
been better for a little experience. He meant, probably, experi- 
ence in deliberative assemblies, for many deputies had had ex- 
perience as administrators and councilors of government. Du- 
pont de Nemours had served in Turgot's administration and had 
assisted Calonne. Talleyrand was another of Calonne's advisers. 
About half of the deputies of the third estate were lawyers, some 
of them leaders in the profession, like Thouret of Rouen, Mer- 
lin of Douai, Treilhard and Tronchet of Paris. More than half 
the nobles were officers in the army, including no fewer than 
eleven lieutenant-generals. Two brigadier-generals, Montesquiou 
and Custine, were destined to take a prominent part in the cam- 
paign of 1792. Several officers had served in the American 
Revolutionary War, including Lafayette, Charles and Alexander 
Lameth, and the Viscount de Mirabeau, brother of the more 
famous Count. Political pamphleteers were there — Mirabeau, 
Sieyes, Target, and Rabaut Saint-£tienne. Mounier, a leader of 
the revolutionary agitation in Dauphine, was a deputy. Among 
the clergy were men distinguished in the administration of their 
dioceses. 

No sooner was the opening session of the States General over Deadlock 
than the deputies of the three orders were involved in a dead- 
lock which lasted seven weeks. The members of the third es- 
tate were determined that all should meet as a single assembly, 
while the nobles insisted upon their ancient right to act as a 
separate order. The clergy adopted a waiting policy. The 
bishops would have been glad to imitate the nobles, but they 
could not depend on the support of the parish priests who formed 
the majority of the ecclesiastical deputation. The controversy 
centered about the method of examining the credentials of the 
deputies. The nobles finished this business in a separate cham- 
ber and the clergy took similar action provisionally. The third 
estate refused to organize at all, regarded their body as an as- 
sembly of citizens, chose their oldest deputy dean, and invited 
the deputies of the clergy and nobles to unite with them and 
proceed to organization. Two commissions of conciliation, one 



94 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^y^^- appointed by the King, failed to bring about a settlement and 

public excitement reached the danger point. On June lo, the 

1788-89 third estate assumed the right to proceed with the organization 
of all the deputies as a single body whether the clergy and the 
nobles presented themselves or not. During the examination of 
credentials, which occupied several days, a few parish priests 
belonging to the clerical deputation appeared, submitted their 
credentials, and were accepted as members. When the work of 
organization was completed the new body, on June 17, took the 
title " The National Assembly." 

The ministry now decided to intervene. Necker wished by 
a mixture of concession and restriction to set limits to the course 
of a revolution which each day grew more menacing to the estab- 
lished order. He urged the King to declare that the present 
estates should meet as a single body to deliberate upon affairs 
of general interest, but without the right to settle questions con- 
cerning feudal property or the prerogatives of the Church. He 
hoped to make such restrictions acceptable by offering a liberal 
program of reform, including the immediate abrogation of the 
pecuniary privileges of the clergy and nobles and the admission 
of all citizens to civil and military employments. The ministers 
agreed only that a declaration should be made by the King at a 
session of the States General to be held on June 22. The con- 
troversy in the council between Necker and his opponents was so 
prolonged that the royal session was deferred one day. Mean- 
while, on June 20, when the members of the third estate at- 
tempted to enter their hall, they found it closed, ostensibly that 
preparations might be made for the coming joint session. They 
went to a covered tennis court near by, and there, amidst the 
wildest enthusiasm, bound themselves by an oath never to sep- 
arate until they had given a constitution to France. A day or 
two later the majority of the clerg)^ joined them. By this time 
the opposition to Necker in the council had been reinforced by 
the influence of the Queen and the King's brothers, and Louis 
rejected Necker's plan and adopted one which was certain to be 
obnoxious to the third estate. 

At the royal sitting on June 2t„ the King declared that the or- 
ganization by orders was an essential feature of the monarchy. 
He requested the nobles and the clergy to meet with the third 
Royal estate in a common assembly during the continuance of the ex- 

Session isting States General, but excluded from discussion feudal rights, 
the constitutional privileges of the clergy and nobility, and the 
manner of organizing future meetings of the States General. He 
promised to sanction the abandonment by the clergy and the 



THE FALL OF THE OLD REGIME IN FRANCE 95 

nobility of their pecuniary privileges. But he did not say that ^^^j' 

the meetings of the States General should be periodical. Indeed, 

a majority of the ministry wished the summoning and the dis- 1788-89 
solving of that body to continue to be a royal prerogative. The 
King's program of reform was extensive and specific, but was, 
after all, only a list of intentions, and Frenchmen had listened to 
the publication of similar lists many times during the past fif- 
teen years. In both his opening and his concluding words the 
King spoke as if the three estates, even in the present States Gen- 
eral, were to organize themselves separately. When the sitting 
was over and the King had gone out, the deputies of the third 
estate with many of the clergy and some of the nobles remained 
in their places. As the King had specifically ordered them to 
" separate immediately," the grand master of ceremonies asked 
them if they had not heard the King's commands. The Count de 
Mirabeau exclaimed that they would go only when driven out at 
the point of the bayonet, and the Abbe Sieyes declared in his sen- 
tentious manner that they were still what they had been the day 
before. 

The majority of the deputies of the third estate regarded the 
King's declaration as a belated act of tyranny, although they 
held his advisers rather than him responsible. Nevertheless, it 
was not perfectly clear at the time that the assembly was wise 
in adopting so uncompromising an attitude. Arthur Young, the 
English traveler, who was at Versailles, beUeved that the " Com- 
mons put immense and certain benefits to the chance of fortune, 
which may make posterity curse, instead of bless, their mem- 
ories as true patriots." He thought that the King could have 
been induced, in view of the need of money, to make further con- 
cessions, but, he added, the " people seem with a sort of frenzy 
to reject all idea of compromise." A few days later the situa- 
tion was changed, for the new assembly continued to gain re- 
cruits from the clergy, and forty-seven of the nobles came over 
in a body. Louis now yielded and requested the other clergy 
and nobles to follow their example. The deadlock was broken 
on June 27, and the States General gave place to the National 
Assembly. 

The Parisians watched the drama at Versailles with mixed 
feelings. The more zealous advocates of change were filled with 
rage. Crowds gathered daily within the gardens of the Palais 
Royal,2 eagerly listening to the latest pamphlets or applauding Paris 
the fiery outbursts of the statesmen of the cafes. Occasionally 

2 Belonging to the Duke of Orleans. The gardens were surrounded by 
cafes and shops. 



96 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

CHAP, they varied this diversion by assaults upon police agents or upon 

nobles suspected of opposing the popular cause. The number 

1788-89 q£ penniless strangers in the city rapidly increased because of 
distress in the provinces. The good bourgeois of the town were 
alarmed and began to clamor for the organization of a citizen 
militia. The government was also alarmed, fearing a sudden 
invasion of Versailles, which was distant only a short march 
from Paris. After June 23 the King's advisers urged that more 
regiments be ordered to the neighborhood of Paris. The Court 
party secretly hoped that the presence of an army would enable 
the government to reafifirm the declarations of June 23, perhaps 
to arrest the leading members of the National Assembly, and 
restore governmental authority, which was slipping from the 
feeble grasp of the King. In consequence of the orders issued 
between June 23 and July i, an army of 20,000 was collected near 
Paris and between Paris and Versailles. The last detachments 
were expected about the middle of July. This army was made up 
chiefly of the foreign regiments in the royal service, which 
were less affected by the excitement of the political struggle than 
the French regiments. The detailed orders show that the troops 
were to protect the Bourse, the Bank of Discount, the Royal 
Treasury, the Bastille, and the Invalides against mob violence. 
But the air was filled with the wildest rumors as to the schemes 
of the princes and the reactionary nobles. All the greater was 
the desire of the citizens of Paris for a militia, a desire ex- 
pressed repeatedly by the Paris Electors, who had continued their 
organization after the elections were over and who were holding 
sessions in a hall at the Hotel de Ville. The National Assembly 
also saw a menace in the presence of troops and asked for their 
removal. 

The court party took with ill grace their defeat of June 27 
and only waited until a sufficient army was at hand to get rid of 
Necker and assume control themselves. The King had little 
reason to be grateful to Necker for the conduct of the govern- 
ment thus far, and it was not difficult to procure an order for his 
dismissal on July 11, coupled with the requirement that he leave 
the country at once. The ministers who supported Necker's 
policy were dismissed at the same time, and a new ministry was 
formed which was expected to give a firmer tone to the manage- 
ment of affairs. 

When the news of Necker's dismissal reached Paris, early on 

Revolt Sunday afternoon, July 12, the city was thrown into an uproar. 

Men cried out that the National Assembly was to be dissolved 

and that Paris was on the point of being assaulted by the regi- 



THE FALL OF THE OLD REGIME IN FRANCE 97 

ments which were encamped on every side. The excitement was ^yn^" 

greatest in the Palais Royal. Camille Desmoiilins, a young 

journalist, mounted a table and summoned the crowd to arms, ^"^^^-^^ 
declaring in breathless accents that a " Saint Bartholomew of the 
patriots " was planned for that very night. Soon a collision took 
place between the excited crowds and the soldiers in the western 
quarters of the city. Many of the French Guard, a regiment en- 
trusted with the preservation of order both in the capital and in 
Versailles, and always ready for a quarrel with the foreign regi- 
ments, joined the mob and attacked a detachrnent of troops on 
the Place Louis Quinze.^ As the commander of the royal troops 
was left without positive orders, he withdrew late in the even- 
ing. That night terror reigned in Paris. The citizens not only 
feared an attack from the army, but expected that the vagabonds 
who had plundered the gun shops would begin a carnival of 
pillage and murder. The mobs were, however, restrained by the 
guards, who realized that if the resistance to the royal troops 
should degenerate into an aimless riot, a reaction must follow 
and they would be mercilessly punished. They were the only 
force which could check the worst deeds of violence, for the 
police had disappeared with mysterious swiftness as soon as it 
was evident that the royal administration was unable to cope 
with the insurrection. 

Before the night was over many of the Electors of Paris had 
assembled at the Hotel de Ville. Early the next day they or- 
ganized a permanent ■* or executive committee, and made Fles- 
selles, the provost of the merchants, its chairman. They directed 
the citizens of the sixty districts to reassemble as at the time of 
the elections, and to organize a citizen militia, to which each dis- 
trict was to furnish two hundred men. Meanwhile the Hotel de 
Ville was filled with citizens and vagabonds clamoring for arms. 
Nevertheless, the Electors and the permanent committee began 
to bring order out of chaos. By afternoon the streets assumed a 
more normal appearance. Armed citizens acted as patrols, and 
quietly disarmed men who could not show that they were mem- 
bers of any district. The city, however, still feared an assault 
by the royal troops. 

Early on the morning of July 14 a great crowd, partly com- 
posed of the new citizen soldiers, assembled before the esplanade 
of the Invalides, demanding the arms which they knew were 
stored there. The governor tried to gain time. The Electors 

3 Square of Louis XV, afterwards Place de la Revolution, now Place 
de la Concorde. 
* Meaning a committee which sat continuously, without adjournment. 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 

VII 



sent the law officer of the commune to harangue the mob and 
save the building from sack. It was in vain ; suddenly the crowd 
climbed over the low rampart or broke through the gate, and 
carried away the 30,000 muskets stored in the building. A sim- 
ilar crowd gathered about the entrance of the Bastille at the 
other end of the town. The Electors again attempted to inter- 
vene, gaining assurances from the commander, Delaunay, that he 
would not fire unless he was attacked. Through a misunder- 
standing the people were fired upon from the walls and a general 
struggle began. Men at the Hotel de Ville represented to the 
military committee of the Electors that citizens were being shot 
down at the Bastille and procured an order that cannon be used 
against the fortress. Some guards who were in the square in 
front of the Hotel de Ville joined the cannoneers and a more 
regular attack was begun. Delaunay was ill prepared to resist 
and oflfered to surrender, threatening, if his terms were not ac- 
cepted, to blow up the fortress and wreck the eastern section of 
the city. The leaders of the guards accepted the surrender, but 
were unable to protect all their prisoners. While Delaunay and 
one or two others were being conducted to the Hotel de Ville 
they were dragged away and murdered. Meanwhile the dis- 
order in the Hotel de Ville increased. A new mob from the 
Palais Royal accused Flesselles of being a traitor and insisted 
that he be tried at the Palais Royal. To save his colleagues 
Flesselles consented to go, but was murdered on the way and his 
body cut to pieces by the populace. This was not the last in- 
stance of lynch law. A few days later Foulon, a royal coun- 
cilor, who had been named to the ministry of July 11, and his 
son-in-law, Berthier, intendant of Paris, whose duty it had been 
to furnish the royal troops with supplies, were torn to pieces by 
mobs on the ground that they had been traitors to the nation. 

The fall of the Bastille warned the King that he was in the 
presence of revolution. He yielded to the demands of the Na- 
tional Assembly, promised to withdraw the troops, and recalled 
Necker. When a deputation from the Assembly carried the news 
to Paris, the exultant citizens chose Lafayette, one of its mem- 
bers, to be commander of the new militia, and Bailly, another, 
to be provost or mayor. A day or two afterwards the King con- 
sented to recognize the triumph of the citizens by proceeding to 
the Hotel de Ville and confirming the revolution which had taken 
place in the government of the city. 

The Electors of Paris at once assumed the task of reorganiz- 
ing the city, but after some controversy with the district assem- 
blies of citizens concluded that their special task was completed 



THE FALL OF THE OLD REGIME IN FRANCE 



99 



and made arrangements for the choice of deputies, whose duty chap. 

it should be to frame a constitution and assist the mayor in 

the management of affairs. A miHtary committee assisted La- I'^^s-sg 
fayette in planning the permanent organization of the militia, a New 
now called the National Guard. The work of the mih- Govern- 

ment in 

tary committee was promptly completed. Its most difficult prob- Paris 
lem was the management of the French Guard, which the King 
refused to receive again into favor. This regiment of 3,600 men 
was the only trained force upon which Paris could depend either 
for defense against the machinations of the Court or for security 
from mob violence at the hands of the vagabonds and deserters 
from the royal army who infested the city. If, however, the 
regiment should preserve its organization, it might become the 
master rather than the agent of the municipality. The military 
committee resolved to -.divide it into sixty companies, one for each 
district, and assign to these companies the burdensome work of 
police duty, which the ordinary citizen soldier had no time to 
perform. The scheme was not certain to succeed, for the guards 
were proud of their organization. Moreover, they advanced the 
extraordinary theory that by their insurrection they had captured 
their regimental chest, hospital, and barracks, and that if they 
consented to the plan of incorporation they must be paid for 
these. The municipal officers, Mayor Bailly confessed, were not 
in a position to argue the validity of the claim, and paid them 
the immense sum of a million livres. The colors of the new 
National Guard were blue, white, and red, the tricolor, made up 
of blue and red, the colors of Paris, and white, the color of 
royal France. 

The chief business of the communal assembly was to discuss 
the principles upon which their municipal constitution should be 
founded. The members at first accepted the theory of complete 
municipal autonomy, each community being master of its in- 
ternal affairs and bound to other parts of the country only by 
the federal tie. But as the mayor, the deputies, and the district 
assemblies could not work in harmony, little progress was made. 
Many months elapsed before the city received a permanent or- 
ganization and then it was at the hands of the National As- 
sembly. 

The triumph of Paris over the old government won the homage 
of other French cities and the applause of liberal men every- 
where. The monarchy seemed synonymous with despotism and 
its humiliation was a guarantee that men henceforward were not 
to breathe the air of a Bastille the moment they championed ideas 
of liberty. Samuel Romilly, an English lawyer, expressed the 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 

vn 



common feeling in a letter to a Parisian, " I need not tell you 
how much I have rejoiced at the Revolution which has taken 
place. I think of nothing else, and please myself with endeavor- 
ing to guess at some of the important consequences which must 
follow throughout all Europe." 

The Revolution was not confined to Paris. In some places the 
news of the dismissal of Necker and of the uprising of Paris 
prompted a similar insurrection. In other places the occasion 
was a bread riot or the necessity of taking vigorous measures to 
guard against a scarcity of food. The troubles at Strasbourg 
illustrate another phase. There a feeling of jealousy existed 
between the populace, which was French, and the municipality, 
still mainly under the control of the old German families, for 
until 1681 Strasbourg (then Strassburg) had been a Free City 
of Germany. The explosion occurred late in July. A band of 
vagabonds, joined by the town idlers, stormed the Hotel de Ville, 
destroyed its furniture and scattered its archives over the streets. 
The citizens armed themselves and with the aid of soldiers drove 
the vagabonds across the Rhine. But that did not end the trou- 
ble; for the troops, rewarded for their assistance, expended 
their money in reveling, threw open the prisons, and held high 
carnival in the streets, until sheer exhaustion made them docile. 
In August the old municipality retired and a new one was elected. 
In a few cities the municipality did not at once give way, but 
was reinforced or watched by a standing committee. Occasion- 
ally a municipality used the opportunity to strengthen its powers 
at the expense of a local parlement or a bishop. In all cases a 
national guard was organized. 

The m.ovement in the towns spread to the countryside. A 
strange panic ran through many regions, stirred up by such cries 
as, " The brigands are coming ! " Similar rumors had been car- 
ried to the Electors at Paris during the crisis. The terror was 
so acute and so mysterious in its origin that it has been called 
the " Great Fear." Peasants hastened to the market-place or 
hid in the woods, arming themselves as best they could, and 
awaited the coming of the " brigands." When the brigands did 
not come, a leader often appeared who transformed their terror 
into angry suspicions of the nobles or into a desire to destroy 
the records of feudal dues or even the chateaux. The " war on 
the chateaux " was especially violent in the eastern part of 
France. When the peasant bands did not break up voluntarily, 
the militia of the towns dispersed them and restored peace. 

The National Assembly did not intend that the King should 
find in these disorders an excuse for bringing together troops 



, 



and the 
Army 



THE FALL OF THE OLD REGIME IN FRANCE loi 

which might enable the government to renew the attempt to re- ^^^f' 

store monarchical authority. A new oath was imposed on the 

soldiers in which fidelity to the "Nation" received the chief "^a-sg 
emphasis. The officers were obliged also to swear, in the pres- The King 
ence of the municipal officers and of regiments, " never to employ 
those under their orders against the citizens, except at the requisi- 
tion of the civil and municipal authorities." The precaution was 
added that this requisition must be read to the assembled troops. 
Thus, as has been aptly said, the King's sword was broken. 

The news of the revolution in the provinces, and of the terrible 
excesses which occasionally accompanied it, interrupted the Na- 
tional Assembly in its t^sk of preparing a program of social August 
and political reorganization. Early in July a committee on the ^°"'*'^ 
constitution had proposed a plan of work and Lafayette had sub- 
mitted a declaration of rights. The dismissal of Necker sud- 
denly broke off this discussion of principles. After a new mu- 
nicipal government had been improvised at Paris, the Assembly 
took up the question whether the declaration of rights should 
precede or accompany the completed constitution. By August 4 
the news from the provinces was so alarming that vigorous 
measures of repression were at first deemed necessary. Several 
noblemen insisted that the best way to pacify the country, and 
especially the peasants, was to remove the injustices of the ex- 
isting regime, suggesting that certain feudal dues be abolished, 
that others be extinguished by purchase, and that the burdens 
of taxation be equalized. It was also proposed that all citizens, 
without distinction, be made eligible to office. A spirit of sac- 
rifice moved the Assembly, and nobles, clergy, the representa- 
tives of towns and provinces, all who by charter or custom had a 
situation more privileged than that of their neighbors, rushed to 
the speaker's tribune to surrender what they now considered un- 
just advantages. Dumont, a friend of Mirabeau, recalled, years 
later, seeing members weep with joy " at finding themselves car- 
ried on the wings of enthusiasm far beyond their wildest 
dreams." A few were startled at the untimely haste with which 
projects requiring a year's careful study were hurried through 
in a night. One deputy sent to the president a piece of paper 
on which were written the words, " Nobody any longer has any 
self-control ; break up the sitting." The Abbe Sieyes, who was 
not present at this session, declared in the Assembly, at a time 
when some of its decisions were being put into form, " You wish 
to be free, but do not know how to be just! " 

In their final form the decrees of August 4 outlined a pro- 
gram of reorganization based upon the principle of equality. 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
VII 



The law of land tenure was to be so changed as to destroy every 
vestige of the feudal system. Serfdom and all dues which rep- 
resented it were abolished without indemnity. All feudal or 
perpetual land dues, if not tainted by a servile origin, should be 
extinguished by purchase. Rights of the chase and similar noble 
privileges were annulled. The Assembly promised a new system 
of justice, replacing the existing courts, from the parlement of 
Paris to the humblest manorial court. The venality of office 
was to cease and the administration of justice was to be gra- 
tuitous. The program also included eligibility of all citizens to 
offices in the Church, the administration, or the army. Every 
one would be taxed according to his property or his income, 
without regard to privilege or rank. The landholders were prom- 
ised relief from the tithe, a change which amounted to a princely 
gift at the expense of the nation. Other church dues were to be 
abolished, on the understanding that a decent support should be 
provided for religious services and for the clergy. The Assem- 
bly went so far as to forbid further payment of the annates to 
the papacy, thus violating an agreement between France and 
Rome nearly three centuries old. 

These decrees bear the character of a great program of re- 
form, but they were understood by multitudes of the peasantry 
and the townspeople as acts of legislation. So many Parisians 
sought to enjoy their new right to the pleasures of the chase in 
the woods and private parks beyond the city walls that Lafayette 
was obliged to station detachments of the National Guard at 
the gates in order to prevent other guardsmen from yielding to 
the common impulse. Even ardent revolutionists like Brissot 
felt that sudden " restitutions intoxicate the people, who put no 
limits to what they assume has been granted to them." The 
ministry were at first inclined to take a critical attitude towards 
this program, but on September 21 the King agreed to have it 
published as a plan of work.^ 

After this program was completed, the Assembly resumed the 
discussion of its " Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen." In preparing it the deputies followed the precedent 
set by the Americans in their State constitutions. Some thought 
it would be better to postpone the declaration until the constitu- 
tion should be finished. All hoped to proclaim in such clear 
terms the rights commonly violated in Europe that the state- 
ment would serve as a program of liberty for all nations. The 
articles upon which the Assembly finally agreed set forth a theory 

5 The decrees were not regularly promulgated until November 3. 



THE FALL OF THE OLD REGIME IN FRANCE 103 

of society based upon the equality of man and upon the sover- ^^^i' 

eignty of the people. According to it law is an expression of 

popular will, and in formulating it the citizens may take part 1788-89 
directly or through their representatives. Public officers have 
only the authority delegated by law. The second part of the 
Declaration guarantees to the individual the historic liberties 
and the safeguards of personal security which had long been 
a part of the English and American legal tradition. Believers in 
religious toleration were alarmed, because the Declaration said 
that " the manifestation of religious opinions must not disturb 
the public order established by law." An article was added, as- 
serting that the principle of separation of the powers should be 
embodied in every constitution worthy of the name. This prin- 
ciple, narrowly interpreted, was to have an unfortunate influ- 
ence upon the work of the Assembly. The ministry took the 
same attitude towards the Declaration of Rights as towards the 
decrees of August 4. 

The delay of the King in accepting and promulgating the de- 
crees abolishing privilege alarmed the ardent revolutionists of 
Paris. A debate in the National Assembly upon the organiza- Beginnings 
tion of future legislatures and upon the power of veto also ex- gtitution 
cited them. These questions were closely related. The depu- 
ties were agreed that hasty legislation should be avoided, but 
many of them felt that it was unwise to adopt a system of 
" checks and balances," meaning by that the opposition which 
an upper chamber of a legislature might make to proposals of 
a lower chamber, as well as the danger that a particular piece of 
legislation might be postponed indefinitely by the exercise of the 
royal veto. When the system embodied in the new American 
federal constitution was advocated, the reply was made that 
there was no comparison between a presidential veto and a royal 
veto, because the latter would be supported by the prestige of an 
ancient monarchy. It was a system of two chambers, rather 
than the royal veto, which was sacrificed. Several of the advo- 
cates of the bicameral system were known to be secret admirers 
of the English House of Lords. To establish such a chamber in 
France would seem, however, to restore the regime of privilege 
which had just been condemned. The provincial nobility feared 
that the peers would be chosen from among the court nobles. 
The plan of dividing the legislature into two chambers was, 
therefore, rejected. The power of veto granted to the King 
was not absolute, although no measure to which the King op- 
posed a formal objection could be reenacted by the existing as- 



104 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
VII 



Agitation 
in Paris 



sembly or by its successor. If a third assembly passed it, the 
King could not use his veto. 

The agitators at the Palais Royal and some of the more vio- 
lent district leaders urged the patriots to march to Versailles and 
arrest the unfaithful deputies who were ready to grant the King a 
veto upon the will of twenty-five million people. The firmness of 
the National Guard under Lafayette checked an incipient riot late 
in August. The situation in the city was distressing. The lack 
of food was chronic. Laborers were often obliged to go to the 
bakeries at dawn and stand in line in order to obtain bread before 
the hour for beginning work. The city was crowded with un- 
employed men as well as with vagabonds. Many petty shop- 
keepers and artisans suffered because hundreds of wealthy peo- 
ple had been frightened away by the disorders. Moreover, the 
National Guard could not be confidently relied upon. Several 
of the companies, which had belonged to the regiment of the 
French Guard, were anxious to resume the duties and honors 
which had been theirs before July 12. They were especially 
jealous of the royal bodyguard. 

In September an attempt of the ministry to protect Versailles 
against an irruption of the Parisian mob led to the very disaster 
they feared. The regiment of Flanders was ordered to Ver- 
sailles, ostensibly at the request of the local national guard. The 
radical leaders in Paris pretended to see in this move a repetition 
of the attempt in June to overawe the Assembly and accomplish 
its transfer to Soissons or Compiegne, if not a plot to enable 
the courtiers to conduct the King to Metz and begin a civil war. 
The suspicions were turned to rage when the officers of the 
bodyguard gave a banquet to the regiment of Flanders, at which 
a few soldiers, heated with wine, insulted the National Assembly 
and the tricolor. The King and Queen appeared during the din- 
ner and were received with extravagant protestations of loyalty. 
The excitement in Paris was fomented, many believe, by in- 
triguers in the pay of the Duke of Orleans, the cousin of the King, 
who was suspected of a design to supplant him. The troubles 
culminated on October 5 in a furious riot. 

Early in the morning on that day the Hotel de Ville was in- 
vaded by a mob of market women, by men disguised as women, 
and by other men whom the Parisians of the time called " brig- 
ands." The insurrection seemed directed against the muni- 
cipality. Threats were made to burn the building. Soon the cry 
was raised, " To Versailles," and the mob streamed out the 
western gate of the city along the road to the royal town. Many 
companies of the National Guard now insisted on marching to 



i 



THE FALL OF THE OLD REGIME IN FRANCE 105 

Versailles to avenge the honor of the tricolor. For hours La- ^^f^- 

fayette struggled to restore obedience, but in vain. Finally he 

sent word to the municipal assembly that he could not hold the i"^88.89 
troops any longer, and received from it an order to lead the 
guard to Versailles, in spite of the fact that Versailles was not 
within the jurisdiction of the Paris municipality. Meanwhile 
the mob had reached Versailles and had broken into the hall of 
the National Assembly, clamoring for bread. Mounier obtained 
the King's sanction to the Declaration of Rights, and to certain 
constitutional decrees, and announced this triumph to the crowd 
with the futile hope that it would quiet their passions, but they 
cried out that they wanted bread, not decrees. The Paris army 
arrived late at night. Lafayette protested his devotion to the 
King, but was coldly received. Some one called out, " There 's 
Cromwell ! " He retorted, " Cromwell would not have entered 
alone." About five o'clock the next morning, after stationing 
guards at the entrances to the palace grounds, Lafayette tried to 
snatch a few moments of sleep. Unfortunately one entrance 
had been left unguarded and through it the " brigands " pene- 
trated into the inner courtyards and corridors of the chateau. 
Before the National Guard came to the rescue two of the body- 
guard were killed and their heads cut off, to be borne on pikes 
as hideous trophies by the victorious mob. For a moment even 
the Queen's life was in danger. As the day wore on Lafayette 
informed the King that it was the wish of the National Guard 
and of the Parisians that he, with the Queen and the dauphin, 
should make Paris their residence. The King consented, and the 
royal family, the soldiers, and the triumphant rioters took up 
the march for Paris. At nine in the evening the royal family 
entered the Tuileries, a palace which had not been occupied by a 
French monarch since the Regency. 

The court party now regarded Louis XVI as a prisoner, but 
the Parisians loudly proclaimed that at last he was freed from Louis xvi 
the intrigues of the aristocrats. The King, they said, would at^aris 
requite the love of the people by devotion to their cause and would 
become, as a decree of the National Assembly had declared him 
to be, the " Restorer of French Liberty." A few days later the 
Assembly transferred its sittings to Paris. Some of the depu- 
ties refused their consent to the change, and alleging one excuse 
or another, returned to their homes. Mounier, until this time 
one of the most influential men in the Assembly, retired to 
Dauphine and attempted to arouse the provincial estates to re- 
sist the radical measures adopted under the domination of Paris, 
but he failed dismally and soon left the country. It was too late 



io6 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^ VII*' ^°^ ^^^^ measures. The Revolution had passed beyond the con- 

trol of the conservatives. Royal authority was gone. The ques- 

1788-89 ^j^^ ^^g^ What would the radical leaders accomplish, now that 
power and opportunity were theirs? 



F 



CHAPTER VIII 

REVOLUTIONARY REORGANIZATION 

IVE months had passed since the opening of the States Gen- chap. 



eral, and yet Httle progress had been made toward a settle- 
ment of the questions which the King had brought to the atten- 1789-91 
tion of the deputies or toward a solution of the more difficult 
problems of legislation which they had added after the States 
General became the National Assembly. Momentous changes had 
taken place, but thus far their outcome was hardly more than the 
destruction of obstacles to reform. Only a beginning had been 
made of the detailed work of constitutional reconstruction. 
Other reforms had scarcely been outlined. Two years were to 
slip away before the work of the Assembly was completed. Its 
labors were often hindered by the necessity of attending to ques- 
tions of administration which under other circumstances would 
have been left to the royal ministers. 

Opinions upon the success of the Assembly have differed 
widely. Edmund Burke's judgment of it was a mixture of indig- The Revo- 
nation and contempt. The Swiss journalist Mallet du Pan was poreJ^n'^^ 
equally vehement in denunciation. But Samuel Romilly and Ar- opinion 
thur Young took saner views of the matter. When the career 
of the Assembly was only half over Romilly wrote, " Notwith- 
standing the injustice which the Assembly itself has been guilty 
of in several instances, it must be admitted that no assembly of 
men that ever met since creation has done half so much toward 
promoting the welfare of the human species as the National 
Assembly." The stupendous sweep of the changes which were 
proposed and the opportunity they seemed to offer of a renewal 
of the terms upon which oppressed mankind should conduct the 
struggle of existence, filled some men with hope and enthusiasm. 
Wordsworth, then a young man, was living in France, and over 
a decade later his impressions were still so vivid that he wrote. 

Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive, 
But to be young was very heaven! Oh! times 
In which the meager, stale, forbidding ways 
Of custom, law, and statute, took at once 
The attraction of a country in romance! 
107 



National 
Assembly 



1 08 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^^^' The special conditions under which the Assembly did its legis- 

lative work affected its success. It was in no serious danger of 

1789-91 j^QJij violence, although individual members might be insulted 
The on the streets. The disorderly element in Paris was put in 

wholesome fear by the adoption of a severe riot act, after the 
murder of an innocent baker, October 21. The unfavorable con- 
ditions under which the Assembly worked were of its own making 
or due mainly to the inexperience of its members. The hall of 
sessions was too large and its shape was unsuited to the needs of a 
deliberative body. Discussion was difficult where a speaker must 
force his voice in order to be heard. At first scarcely any one 
except Mirabeau ventured to speak without a carefully prepared 
manuscript. In many instances questions were not discussed, 
but orators, one after another, entered the speaker's tribune and 
read carefully prepared addresses, often repeating arguments 
which had been made by members of their own group. During 
such discussions, as the newspapers of the day remarked, the 
Assembly resembled a learned academy rather than a legislative 
body. Towards the close of its career impromptu speaking and 
real debate gained a larger place in its sessions. Rules of pro- 
cedure had been drawn up in July. They forbade interruptions 
from the visitors' galleries, but it was impossible to suppress this 
kind of disorder. Arthur Young, who visited the Assembly in 
January, 1790, wrote in his journal: "The audience in these 
galleries are very noisy: they clap, when anything pleases them, 
and they have been known to hiss ; an indecorum which is utterly 
destructive of debate." The manner in which the proceedings 
were conducted depended mainly upon the president, who held 
office for only two weeks. When Mirabeau became president 
in January, 1791, he showed a mastery of the difficult art of 
managing business which marked him as the ablest man in the 
Assembly. 

Mirabeau was also the greatest orator among the deputies. His 
strong face, made still more striking by the ravages of smallpox, 
his burly frame, and his powerful voice added extraordinary force 
to the expression of his thoughts, which, if not always sound, 
were full of vigor and originality. Although like the other depu- 
ties he carried a manuscript into the tribune, he occasionally 
made impromptu speeches which reached a high level of parlia- 
mentary eloquence. His written speeches were usually the work 
of one of a little group of confidential friends whose thinking 
he inspired. Another able speaker was Barnave, who came from 
Dauphine and was at first a follower of Mounier, but afterwards 
attached himself to Adrien Duport, the leader of the more pro- 



REVOLUTIONARY REORGANIZATION 109 

gressive deputies. One of the most conspicuous orators on the ^^^' 

conservative side was the Abbe Maury, who in the earher part of 

the reign had been a popular preacher at Paris and who came to 1789-91 
the Assembly with a reputation for liberalism. He disappointed 
his admirers by persistently advocating a system of things which 
too clearly resembled the old regime. About eighty of the depu- 
ties took frequent part in the debates, while fifteen were " in 
the breach all the time." 

The Assembly would have been more effective as a legislative 
body had it been divided into well-organized parties or groups. 
The only real party in France was the Jacobin Club, or Friends The 
of the Constitution, which met in one of the ancient halls of the ciub^*° 
Jacobin convent. It was originally composed of deputies alone, 
but afterwards many prominent Parisian revolutionists were ad- 
mitted. Similar societies were organized in other cities and car- 
ried on a correspondence with the Jacobins at Paris. By the 
fall of 1791 these affiliated societies numbered four hundred and 
six. Much of the influence of the Jacobin Club was due to the 
fact that the deputies who belonged to it frequently agreed at the 
club what should be their action when a project was brought 
forward in the Assembly. They also wrote to the clubs in the 
provinces urging them to join in the agitation, with the result 
that the Assembly was deluged with letters and memorials in 
favor of the idea. 

In the hall where the Assembly met the deputies were grouped 
according to their political opinions. Those on the extreme right 
of the president were called the " Aristocrats," while next to 
them sat the " Monarchists " or " Impartials." The deputies on 
the left were called the " Patriots " or the " Corner of the Palais Parties 
Royal." During the discussion of constitutional questions in 
the summer the group which Mounier led was carefully organ- 
ized and had a directing committee. The group led by Duport 
and two young noblemen, Alexander and Charles de Lameth, 
was more permanent. Among the deputies at the extreme left 
sat Maximilien Robespierre, an attorney from Arras, who boasted 
that he was of no party, but voted according to principle. 

The deputies were assigned without regard to their opinions 
to one of thirty bureaus to which projects were referred for 
examination. There were also many special committees, the 
personnel of which represented the opinions prevailing in the 
Assembly. These committees worked out the details of the 
principal projects of legislation. The most important was the 
committee on the constitution. Sometimes committees assumed 
administrative duties which properly belonged to the ministry. 



CHAP. 
VIII 



News- 
papers 



New local 
Govern- 
ment 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

or refused to work in harmony with the minister whose depart- 
mental poHcy their measures affected. The committee on finance, 
for example, would not cooperate with Necker or support his 
plans. 

The public opinion of the day was formed by the newspapers 
as well as by great speeches made in the Assembly. Several of 
them were edited or directed by members of the Assembly, as 
Mirabeau directed the Courrier de Provence and Barere the Point 
du Jour. The most popular paper was the Revolutions de Paris; 
the most notorious, L'Anui du Peuple, edited by Dr. Marat. 
Nearly all were periodical pamphlets rather than newspapers. 
In November the publication of the Moniteur was begun, and this 
aimed to give a full and faithful report of the proceedings in the 
Assembly, Such a journal was especially important because the 
Assembly did not keep a complete record of debates, although 
it frequently ordered particular speeches to be printed and an- 
nexed to the record of the day's proceedings. 

Next to the condition of the finances, the problem of most 
immediate concern to the Assembly was the creation of a sys- 
tem of local government to take the place of the provisional 
regime which had been established during the summer of revo- 
lution. The new municipalities were performing their unex- 
pected tasks with self-sacrificing good will. Their officials were 
sometimes unable to keep a footing as the earth quaked with suc- 
cessive shocks of political and social upheaval. They were pro- 
foundly loyal to France and felt the unifying impulse coming 
from devotion to a common ideal, but their inexperience, fears, 
and jealousies seriously hampered the restoration of order, pre- 
vented the resumption of trade, and rendered impossible in many 
places the collection of taxes, menacing the whole country with 
the evil consequences of anarchy. The Commune of Paris, 
chief of these self -constituted governments, was involved in 
quarrels with its constituent districts, which were infected with 
the prevalent spirit of local independence. 

The Assembly could not recur to the system, or rather the 
lack of system, of the old regime. The chaos of municipal rights 
and privileges had been condemned in the tenth article of the 
August decrees. Moreover, the preservation of a large meas- 
ure of the local autonomy which had become a fact in July 
seemed prudent to men still terrified by the shadow of the ancient 
monarchy. The projects which the Assembly adopted must be 
judged from the point of view of their real merit and lasting 
influence rather than from that of their incidental defects. For 
the first time a great nation was endowed with a uniforai rule of 



REVOLUTIONARY REORGANIZATION iii 

municipal organization. Closely connected with this was the ^y{^- 

establishment of a similarly uniform administration over the 

larger areas of local government. i789-9i 

The main features of the new law were ready before the iclose 
of 1789 and the new system was put into effect early in 1790. Depart- 
Instead of several differing systems of subdividing the country ^^^^^ 
for administrative purposes, a single system was adopted, cre- 
ating eighty-three departments of nearly uniform extent. Their 
boundary lines corresponded as nearly as possible to ancient 
local boundaries, large provinces like Normandy and Brittany 
being divided into several departments, while smaller provinces 
formed a single department, or, in one or two cases were united 
with other territory to form one. In this way little violence was 
done to the continuity of local development. The provincial names 
were not preserved, but the departments were named from the 
principal rivers, mountains, or other geographical features which 
distinguished them. Paris was in the department of the Seine. 
Surrounding it was the department of the Seine et Oise. The 
next department to the east was the Seine et Marne. Rouen was 
in the Seine Inferieure, Bordeaux in the Gironde, Toulouse in 
the Haute Garonne, Marseilles in the B ouches du Rhone, Dijon 
in the Cote d'Or, and Strasbourg in the Bas Rhin. 

Each department was subdivided into districts. Both depart- 
ment and district had administrators and councils, charged with 
the management of local interests or with the enforcement of 
national laws within their particular jurisdiction and acting as • 
the local agents of the central government in administrative mat- 
ters. The central government had no local representative, like 
the intendant under the old regime, entirely dependent upon it 
and subject to its orders. 

The life of the new local administration centered in the munic- 
ipality rather than in the department. In size the municipalities, 
or communes, varied from the little parish of less than 500 TheMu- 
inhabitants to the great cities of Lyons, Marseilles, and Paris, nicipaiities 
To these municipalities was given a uniform system according 
to which the number of officials was proportioned to the size of 
the community; the smallest having three, the largest twenty- 
one. Paris was given a special law on much the same lines 
several months later. The functions of the municipal govern- 
ment were twofold. It was the local administration and at the 
same time, like the districts and departments, the agent of the 
central government in carrying out general laws as well as in 
assessing and collecting taxes. So far as the latter function was 
concerned, it was in theory strictly subordinated to the district 



112 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

9^^^- and departmental administrations. In practice, partly because 

of the turbulence of the times, it was able to nullify laws and 

1789-91 leave taxes uncollected. Whenever this happened the cause was 
usually not the spirit of rebellion, but, rather, timidity or inex- 
perience in enforcing unpopular laws. 

To employ over forty thousand local governments as agents 
for the enforcement of law or the collection of the national taxes, 
and at the same time to concede to the central government no 
effective means of coercion, was to decree anarchy. The prob- 
lem was earnestly debated in February, 1790, when the news of 
the second war on the chateaux reached the Assembly. Con- 
servative royalists like Malouet argued that power should be 
given the King to move troops to the seats of disorder, since 
his ministers could be made responsible. Many deputies thought 
this would lead to a restoration of despotism, and the Assembly 
contented itself with making the proclamation of martial law 
mandatory in case of riots, and holding the municipal officers 
civilly and even criminally responsible if they were negligent. 
A year later the King was given the right in serious cases to 
suspend the members of departmental or district administrations, 
and the directors of the departments were given the same right 
over municipal officers, on the understanding that the National 
Assembly or its successors could restore the suspended official. 
This did not offer a remedy applicable in cases of ordinary negli- 
gence, nor was it in any sense preventive. As a result much of 
the work of the Assembly was discredited because it was not 
carried into effect. Not the least unfortunate result was the 
attempt three years later to recover by violent means a neces- 
sary central administrative control. 

If the decrees on local government declared in effect that the 

Powers King should not rule, the constitution of the central government 

by thr*^ did not leave him much more than the opportunity to obstruct. 

King It is true that he retained an extensive appointing power. The 

substitution of elections for venality as a method of entrance 

upon office was not necessarily a disadvantage to him. Had he 

been able to assume a strong leadership, the change must have 

increased his power. He could not appoint to all the positions 

in the army, but the patronage which was assigned to him was 

free from the obstacles of private privilege which under the old 

regime prevented the royal right of appointment from being a 

means of increasing the efficiency of the body of officers. He 

controlled foreign affairs even if he could not declare war or 

make treaties without the consent of the legislature. The 

fundamental weakness of his position lay in the fact that the 



REVOLUTIONARY REORGANIZATION 113 

Assembly refused to permit his ministers to be chosen from ^^^' 

among its own members. This did not mean simply that depu- 

ties could not act as ministers while retaining their seats in the i789-9i 
legislature. The constitution provided that an interval of two 
years must elapse from the time when a man ceased to be a 
deputy before he became eligible for the ministry. 

This restriction was dictated partly by theoretical considerations 
drawn from the doctrine of the separation of the powers and 
partly by dread of a revival of despotism. The distrust or jeal- The 
ousy which the schemes of Mirabeau excited in the minds of Ministers 
influential members of the Assembly was the immediate cause 
of its adoption. In October, 1789, Mirabeau attempted to carry 
through negotiations looking to the selection of the ministry 
from the Assembly, in order that the two bodies might work in 
harmony. On his lists were Lafayette, Talleyrand, and Sieyes. 
He was himself to become a minister without portfolio, taking 
the leadership in the Assembly. These schemes were noised 
abroad and aroused fears that the Assembly was to be muzzled 
and the work of reform hindered. On November 7 after a sharp 
debate it was voted that no member of the Assembly could ac- 
cept office. The consequence was more far reaching than was 
intended, for it implied that the King's ministers were suspected 
of being in collusion with him, planning a restoration of despot- 
ism. It left them disarmed and unprotected to bear the brunt 
of popular attack in case the ills of the country became still 
more irritating. 

Mirabeau did not abandon hope of being able eventually to 
carry through his plan. He saw that the only hope of saving Mirabeau 
the country from anarchy was in a group of ministers strong ^ourt ^ 
enough to lead the Assembly and at the same time to impose 
their advice upon the King. He felt an irresistible impulse to 
assume a great role in his country's affairs, although he realized 
that the scandals of his earlier career and the debts which still 
harassed him were an almost insuperable obstacle. In May, 1790, 
he accepted the dubious position of secret adviser to the King. 
The arrangement bore the aspect of a corrupt bargain, in spite 
of the fact that Mirabeau did not sacrifice his political independ- 
ence. The King supposed he was purchasing a dangerous dema- 
gogue, and was ready not only to give Mirabeau 6,000 livres a 
month, but also to give him a million livres at the close of the 
session of the Assembly, if his conduct should prove satisfactory. 
Meanwhile he paid Mirabeau's debts. The notes which Mira- 
beau prepared for the King and sent through the Count de la 
Marck show that he gave excellent advice. His judgments, with 



114 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^vm' ^^^ exceptions, were wiser than those of his contemporaries. 

His counsels were, however, lost on Louis XVI, who, as the 

1789-91 Qount de Montmorin, his minister of foreign affairs, said, listened 
to business as if one were talking about the concerns of the 
Emperor of China. Before Mirabeau died in the spring of 
1791 he elaborated a Machiavellian scheme for strengthening the 
monarchy by discrediting the Assembly. Part of the plan was 
to encourage extravagant measures proposed in the Assembly 
and part was to organize a campaign of hostile criticism. This 
also remained without effect. One suggestion only, and that the 
most mischievous, was adopted by the Court, When Robespierre 
proposed that no member of the National Assembly should be 
permitted to serve in the succeeding legislature, the deputies who 
belonged to the Court faction were instructed to vote for it. 

The Assembly, faithful to the idea of the separation of the 
powers, conceded to the King no initiative in legislation. His 

Royal Veto share was the negative one of being permitted to check any par- 
ticular form of legislation by a veto, which had the dangerous 
consequence of leaving the question open and of making him 
an obstacle to its settlement. It is not surprising that the new 
constitution has been termed an " engine of war " directed 
against the monarchy. The King was not so dull as to fail to see 
that his position was made inferior to that of the King of Poland. 
His only resource was to accept frankly the consequences of 
the Revolution and to march at the head of reform, instead of 
hesitating or resisting until he was dragged behind. 

If power passed from the monarchy, into whose hands did it 

c,^L„„- ^^^^^ Until later events modified the constitution, political power 
belonged to the middle class or bourgeoisie. This appears not 
merely from the personnel of the new government, but also from 
the restrictions which the constitution threw about the suffrage. 
The privilege of voting was granted to those possessing a prop- 
erty large enough to pay a tax equivalent in value to three times 
the local rate of an ordinary laborer's daily wage. An important 
minority in the Assembly, opposing even so small a restriction, 
obtained the concession that the qualifying tax should be paid 
by every man whose wages exceeded the sum fixed by the munic- 
ipality as the local rate, whether he had taxable property or not. 
The citizens who had the privilege of voting were called *' active," 
while the others were called " passive." The Assembly esti- 
mated the number of active citizens at 4,298,360, leaving about 
three million passive citizens. This was not universal suffrage, 
but it cannot be said that the right of voting was restricted to 
the middle class. 



Suffrage 



REVOLUTIONARY REORGANIZATION 115 



CHAP. 
VIII 



Whatever political control the middle class possessed was de- 
rived from the conditions of eligibility to membership in electoral 
assemblies as well as in local governmental bodies. In these cases ^'^^''^ 
the tax qualification was ten times as high as that of the simple 
voter. A higher property qualification was demanded of candi- 
dates to the national legislature, the payment in direct taxes of 
a silver mark, worth about fifty livres. The opposition to this 
provision was strong, and in its final revision of the constitution 
the Assembly withdrew the restriction, while at the same time 
it raised the qualification of electors. Henceforward only owners 
or tenants of property of an annual value of from one hundred 
to four hundred days of labor, according to the locality, were 
eligible to electoral assemblies. But this decree was adopted 
so late that it had no practical results, because all the elections, 
even those to the Legislative Assembly, were completed, and be- 
cause universal suflfrage was decreed before another year was 
over. 

In the program of August 4 the Assembly had promised a new 
judicial system. The privilege of administering justice, whether 
inherited from seigniorial ancestors or purchased from the King, judicial 
was to be abolished. In the Declaration of Rights the Assembly Reform 
had also solemnly undertaken to guard citizens against arbitrary 
arrest and imprisonment, to concede the presumption of inno- 
cence to the unconvicted, and to inflict only reasonable penalties 
upon the guilty. 

Early in the fall of 1789 the Assembly began to redeem these 
pledges by changing the procedure in the case of persons charged 
with crime. The occasion for this step is interesting. It ap- 
pears that the Paris National Guards were reluctant to make 
arrests because they knew that offenders would be tried accord- 
ing to the secret methods of the old regime and punished with 
unnecessary severity.^ Lafayette urged the municipal assembly 
of Paris to petition the National Assembly for a modification 
of the procedure. The result was a provisional measure which 
insured the presence of two chosen citizens at the drawing of 
any indictment, with the right to express their opinion upon the 
evidence or the procedure, performing in a tentative way the 
functions of grand jurors. As soon as the indictment was com- 
pleted, the accused person was to have access to the papers, was 
allowed counsel, and could summon witnesses in his own defense. 
The final law of criminal procedure was not passed until imme- 
diately before the close of the National Assembly. By this law 

1 See S. Lacroix, Actes de la Commune de Paris, I., 515-517. 



ii6 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

CHAP, the role of the two " notable " citizens was assigned to a " jury 

of accusation " composed of eight men acting with the assistance 

1789-91 q£ ^ director. The remainder of the provisional scheme was 
retained in a more developed form. 

Meanwhile the organization of the courts had been changed. 
The parlement of Paris and the provincial parlements were 
doomed by the Revolution. In November, 1789, they were or- 
dered not to resume their ordinary sessions, and their work was 
The Courts left in the hands of the "chambers of vacations." In August, 
1790, the new organic law was ready. One of its aims was to 
reduce the number of suits by offering a voluntary jurisdiction 
by arbitrators. It also brought judicial assistance within reach 
of all by providing a justice of the peace in each canton and one 
more in each of the larger municipalities. The district courts 
could hear appeals from one another, saving the litigant the long 
journey to Paris or to some important provincial city necessary 
under the old regime. The Assembly did not provide for the 
use of a jury for civil cases. In each district there was a crim- 
inal court, while the municipalities and the justices of the peace 
had jurisdiction in case of minor offenses. The judges were 
elected, — the justices of the peace by the primary assemblies, the 
district judges by the electors who chose the administrative offi- 
cers and the deputies to the National Assembly. There was no 
greater danger that judges would be unduly influenced by po- 
litical considerations than that the judges of the old regime would 
be influenced by class prejudices. The excellent choices made at 
the first elections in many departments showed that the electors 
took their responsibility seriously. The judges were to hold 
their position for six years, which would carry the time of the 
new election well beyond the period of violent revolution. The 
Assembly desired to provide a civil code which should unify the 
laws of France. This hope was not realized, but the penal code 
was changed. Its system of punishments was a great advance 
upon the previous system. The death penalty was to be in- 
flicted by decapitation, a mode hitherto reserved for noble of- 
fenders, and a special machine was soon devised for this pur- 
pose.2 Its name, the guillotine, has imposed upon its inventor, 
Dr. Guillotin, an unhappy fame. One of the defects in the 
system of procedure established by the Assembly was the refusal 
to give the judges any discretionary power in fixing penalties. 
This prevented the tribunals from taking account of mitigating 
circumstances or new evidence. 

2 Established as the mode of execution by the Legislative Assembly, 
March 20, 1792. 



REVOLUTIONARY REORGANIZATION 117 

The army was reorganized in such a way that it ceased to ^^ni' 

be royal and became national. This was symbolized by the adop- 

tion of a new flag — the tricolor — upon which should be in- ^789-91 
scribed the words " Discipline and Obedience to Law." Appoint- The Army 
ment to the lower grades was based partly upon experience and 
partly upon the result of examinations. Seniority determined 
the selection of two-thirds of the lieutenant-colonels and colonels. 
The King could appoint only one-third. He could appoint half 
the brigadier and lieutenant-generals and the six marshals. From 
the point of view of efficiency the change was excellent, reducing 
to a minimum the opportunities of sinister influence; but the 
prerogative of the King was touched in a sensitive spot. The 
peace establishment of the army was reduced to 113,630, not 
including the artillery and engineers. National guards, rather 
than troops of the line, were ordinarily relied upon for service 
in case of local disorders. 

In dealing with the colonies, as with the communities in France, 
the Assembly was compelled to take account of accomplished colonial 
facts. At the outset it made a significant concession by admitting ° ^'^^ 
as members deputies from Santo Domingo. The other colonies 
gradually gained a similar privilege until the colonial deputies 
numbered seventeen. The presence of these deputies was an 
admission that the old colonial system was at an end, and that 
the colonies were no longer to suffer from ministerial despotism 
or from the equally dangerous despotism of a national parlia- 
ment in which they could raise no voice of protest. Events also 
forced the Assembly to take a definite attitude on the question 
of the limits of colonial autonomy. The news of the Revolu- 
tion had encouraged each class of the colonial population to 
expect the realization of its peculiar hopes. The planters de- 
sired freer access to the markets of the world, the poor whites 
hoped for the advantages that their richer neighbors alone en- 
joyed, the free blacks for civil equality; even the slaves cherished 
hopes of liberty. The ministry permitted local assemblies to be 
formed. The clash of interests brought on a petty civil war, 
especially in Santo Domingo, The trouble was increased by 
the presence of regiments infected with the spirit of mutiny, so 
widespread in the army at home. 

The situation in Santo Domingo, the richest of the sugar col- 
onies, was serious. A colonial assembly was chosen, and did 
in miniature what the National Assembly undertook for all 
France. It assumed large powers, dismissed royal oflicers and 
royal troops, attempted to reorganize the administrative system 
and the courts, and even opened the ports to products specifically 



:i8 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

CHAP. excluded by a royal ordinance. In Santo Domingo also the ques- 
tion of the status of the free blacks reached an acute stage. As 

1789-91 property-holders their interests were identical with those of the 
whites, provided the whites did not exclude them from a share 
in the civil conquests of the Revolution. 

The National Assembly finally gave to the colonies an organ- 
ization similar to the local administrative system of France ex- 
cept that it delegated executive powers to a governor. The con- 
stitution of the colony, once approved by the national legislature, 
pould not be changed without the demand or consent of the local 
assemblies. To this local legislature was abandoned the respon- 
sibility for the making of laws on all matters except trade and 
defense. If the governor did not withhold his consent in order 
that the authorities at Paris should first be consulted, laws could 
be put into force provisionally before they received the final 
sanction of the National Assembly and of the Crown. 

On the question of the free blacks the Assembly, on May 15, 
1791, decided that those whose parents had also been free should 
be admitted to political privileges.^ In the last days of the 
Assembly, however, the friends of the planters succeeded in 
having the whole matter referred to the colonial assemblies. The 
result of this was that the free blacks and mulattoes were roused 
against the whites during the terrible slave insurrection which 
soon broke out and either remained indififerent or led bands of 
slaves. Except for the treatment of this question, the National 
Assembly adopted a colonial policy in remarkable contrast to 
that held, up to this time, by any other State. 

In the work of the National Assembly the distinction between 

Lboiition measures constitutional in character and others which were ordi- 

4udaiism "^^^ pieces of legislation was not rigorously maintained. Late 
in its career, with the first chiefly in mind, the Assembly took 
the name " Constituent," by which it is generally known. But 
some of its legislative projects were to have more far-reaching 
consequences than any of its constitutional devices. One of these 
was the legislation upon the feudal relations of the peasants. 

The peasant landholders, who saw in the decrees of August 4 
the prospect of immediate relief from feudal burdens, had rea- 
son for complaint as month after month passed and no law 
stated what dues were abolished without indemnity and what 
must be extinguished by purchase. The lawyers of the feudal 

3 Slavery in the colonies was not abolished by the Constituent Assem- 
bly, although it reaffirmed, September 28, 1791, the ancient principle which 
declared every person free as soon as he entered France. Slavery was 
abolished by the Convention. See p. 207. 



REVOLUTIONARY REORGANIZATION 119 

committee, appointed to report upon the matter, were not able ^y^j' 

to make recommendations until February, 1790, Their investi- 

gations convinced them that the distinction which the Assembly ^'^^^-^^ 
had attempted to establish in August was impracticable. How 
could it be determined, except in comparatively few cases, what 
dues originated in or represented serfdom? Moreover, dues had 
been bought and sold for centuries like other property, and why 
should the present owners be made to suflfer for the usurpations 
of their remote predecessors? A modern French jurist has 
asked a further question, touching servile tenements, which were 
widely spread in Franche Comte and Burgundy, and which car- 
ried with them a status of serfdom from which the tenant might 
be relieved by ceding the property. " How was any one to un- 
derstand," he writes, " why a family which had received a free 
tenement charged with perpetual rent should still be obliged to 
pay that rent, while a neighboring family which had received a 
servile tenement was relieved of all charges without having to 
pay any indemnity ? " The lawyers of the committee were, from 
their training and course of thought, disinclined to tear down 
the structure of feudal property, which it had been their pro- 
fessional business to strengthen and defend. They assumed that 
the Assembly had not intended to abolish without indemnity dues 
attached to servile holdings, if similar dues rested on free hold- 
ings, and held that all such charges must be treated as the con- 
sequence of an original grant of land or money or other things 
of value unless there was in each case evidence to the contrary. 

The law for the abolition of the feudal regime was adopted Law of 
on March 15, 1790. Its fundamental principle was expressed ^79^^^^' 
later in the statement that " man has never been able to become 
proprietor of man." Rights or privileges which gave one set 
of men imprescriptible claims upon either the services or the 
tribute of other men implied social superiority and were regarded 
as a species of proprietorship. As such they must be ended, 
and their possessors compensated if the rights were analogous 
to rent for the use of land or interest for the use of something 
else of value. Rights over milling or baking, ferries, bridges, 
and markets, were abolished without compensation. Release 
from the duty of providing for these common needs was treated 
as equivalent in value to the rights. Local industry was made 
free and the management of roads, bridges, and markets was 
transferred to the community. In case of feudal dues the lord 
lost the right to continue to collect, if the peasant offered to 
pay once for all the money value. The right ceased to be 
imprescriptible and could no longer confer social superiority. 



20 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

9?^^* The loss to the lord was social, not financial. Henceforward he 
was merely the leading citizen of the community. 

1789-91 jj^g nobles would have borne the loss with greater resignation, 
had not the Assembly passed a decree three months later which 
forbade them to use their titles, armorial bearings, and liveries. 
Each noble must use his true family name. According to the 
rule the Marquis de Lafayette should be styled M. Motier, and 
the Comte de Mirabeau, M. Riquetti. A majority of the Assem- 
bly was not in favor of the measure, but many, including prom- 
inent noblemen, feared they would be misunderstood if they 
voted against it. 

The peasant was disappointed by the terms of the March law 

iompiainta because they embodied the legal presumption that the ordinary 

^sants dues, cefis, champart or terrage, lods et ventes, originated in a 
valuable grant rather than in violence or usurpation. He must 
accordingly pay the estimated value of an annual charge in order 
to be rid of it. The courts were open to him to prove that the 
presumption did not apply in his case, but it was practically 
impossible to establish the truth of his denial, for the law said 
that proof of the validity of the charge should be made accord- 
ing to the procedure hitherto in effect. Sometimes this made 
possession for forty years satisfactory proof. Even if the 
usurpation were more recent, the peasant would have a difficult 
task to substantiate his denial. The papers in the case belonged 
traditionally to the lord. Moreover, although the lord could be 
compelled by judicial process to produce them, they would not 
facilitate the proof of such a fact as usurpation. The Assembly 
might have placed the burden of proof upon the possessor, re- 
quiring him either to produce the titles, or to establish by evi- 
dence a possession sufficiently ancient to show that his right was 
equitable. The special case of the destruction of titles by the 
recent mobs, or renunciation because of fear, was provided for 
in the law itself.* 

The peasant was also disappointed because the method of ex- 
tinction by purchase, fixed by the law of May 4, 1790, seemed 
unnecessarily burdensome. The peasants were obliged to pay 
for the annual charges at the rate of twenty or twenty-five years' 
purchase, according as the dues were in money or in kind. This 
assumed that the lords were receiving only four or five per cent, 
on their right in the peasant's land. Another difficulty was that 
the dues contingent upon a transfer of the property must be 

•*For a severe judgment on this feudal legislation, see Introduction to 
Les Comites des Droits feodaux et de Legislation, by Ph. Sagnac and 
P. Caron. 



REVOLUTIONARY REORGANIZATION 121 

bought at the same time, although a peasant might have no inten- ^^ni 

tion of selling his land and his liability to pay the former lord's 

claims was remote. The complaint against the lumping of the ^"^^g-si 
annual and contingent charges was in a measure justified, because 
where the State was a creditor the annual charges could be paid 
without at the same time paying the contingent charges. 

The dissatisfaction of the peasants did not limit itself to pro- war on the 
tests and petitions. Before the new laws were passed the dis- Chateaux 
trust of the peasants flamed up into a new " war on the chateaux," 
especially in the provinces immediately south of the Loire. The 
national guards, controlled by the larger towns, were able to 
disperse the peasants and restore order temporarily. It seemed, 
however, as if anarchy would become chronic. The officers of 
the rural municipalities naturally sympathized with the peasants, 
for they were themselves peasants. Occasionally they took the 
lead in repudiating the ancient obligations. Two municipalities 
ventured to summon the former lords to produce titles for all 
the dues they claimed. The Assembly annulled these acts by 
special decree. When harvest time came, it was very difficult 
to collect the champart. In 1791 the Assembly issued special 
instructions, recalling the peasants to a sense of what had been 
done for them and remonstrating with them for lawlessness and 
lack of respect for property. Such an appeal was rather a con- 
fession of failure than a step towards success. The peasants 
awaited more favorable legislation from a succeeding assembly. 

A year after the Assembly began its efforts to free agricultural The Guilds 
labor it freed trade and industry by abolishing the guilds or cor- Abolished 
porations which had survived Turgot's attack or had been re- 
established after his overthrow. This important reform met no 
resistance either in the Assembly or outside. The cahiers of 
several towns where the guilds were powerful urged their reten- 
tion, and, in a few cases, requested a reestablishment of the sys- 
tem which existed prior to Turgot's ordinance. For the costly 
and cumbersome restrictions of the system the Assembly substi- 
tuted simply the payment of a moderate tax called the patente. 
With the guilds disappeared also the minute regulation of the 
processes of manufacture. 

In their zeal to make effective the grant of liberty of work 
the deputies refused to permit citizens engaged in any industry 
or trade to unite in an organization to promote their interests. 
This law, which followed the other at an interval of three months, 
was suggested by the attempts of workmen in Paris and the larger 
cities to fix a minimum wage and to prevent others from working 
at lower wages. The Assembly threatened those who should 



Barriers 



122 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^vui' ^"S^S^ in a strike with fines and a temporary loss of active citi- 

zenship. Acts of violence were to be punished according to the 

1789-91 ig^^g against sedition. This legislation aroused no protest even 
on the part of radicals like Robespierre, who apparently did not 
anticipate an antagonism between middle class producers and 
workingmen. 

The abolition of the seigniorial monopolies, rights over roads. 
Customs bridges, ferries, and markets, removed many of the obstacles to 
industry and traffic in the interior. The same result, in larger 
measure, followed the transfer of tariff barriers to the frontier. 
France was no longer divided into provinces of the " five great 
farms," " provinces reputed foreign," and " provinces effectively 
foreign." The deputies of privileged districts protested against 
a change never ventured by even the most despotic kings, but 
provincial as well as class privileges had been condemned on 
August the 4th. Foreign commerce was also emancipated. 

The collection of taxes, already made with difficulty when the 
States General opened, was seriously disorganized by the revo- 
lutionary disturbances of July, 1789. In several cities the offices 
for the collection of the octrois were destroyed, and the municipal 
authorities could not or would not restore them promptly. Occa- 
sionally it was the offices of the excise that were the objects of 
the wrath of mobs. At some of the public storehouses mobs 
compelled a reduction in the price of salt. The Assembly did 
not improve the situation when on June 17, 1789, it branded the 
existing taxes as illegal, although it approved their collection as 
long as it should remain in session or until it should replace them 
by others. The temptation to oppose inertia, if nothing more, to 
their collection must have been strong. 

The loss of revenue from such causes was increased by the 
abolition of certain taxes by the Assembly. Its first attempt to 
redeem the pledges of August was to levy on the privileged classes 
for the six months of the fiscal year closing in September the 
direct taxes from which they had been exempt. The proceeds were 
to help lighten the burden of taxation for the year 1790. The 
next step was to equalize the burden of the salt tax by decreeing 
that from October i the price should nowhere be above six sous 
a pound. In many regions the people would listen to no com- 
promise on this subject. The news of the action of the Assem- 
bly provoked an uprising in Anjou which was imitated else- 
where. The efforts to collect the tax continued until March, 
1790, when its abolition was ordered, on the understanding that 
the loss should be made up by additions to the direct taxes for 
the year, an understanding not immediately carried into effect. 



REVOLUTIONARY REORGANIZATION 123 

In this way sixty millions of revenue were sacrificed. About a ^^ui 

year later the octrois were abolished, a step justified on the theory 

that the towns under the old regime had for the most part been 1789-91 
exempt from the taille, and now that all alike were to pay the 
direct taxes these special indirect taxes should cease. The excise 
on wines and liquors also disappeared, together with the state 
monopoly of tobacco, each step costing serious loss of revenue. 

In the abolition of nearly all the indirect taxes the Assembly 
was influenced by the theory of the Physiocrats that the net rev- 
enue from the land was the only proper subject of taxation. 
Compensation for the losses which these changes entailed it 
hoped to find in a greater readiness to pay the direct taxes. In 
this the Assembly was disappointed, especially after the organiza- 
tion of new local governments. The loss from May i, 1789, to 
January i, 1791, on the basis of the estimated revenue, was 
about thirty per cent. For the first three months of 1791 the 
loss was about one-half. The estimated deficit for 1789 was 
160 millions; for 1790 Necker estimated it at 294 millions. 

Not until the last days of 1790 and the early part of 1791 
did the Assembly fulfil its promise of a new system of taxation. New sys- 
This system consisted of a land tax, a personal property tax, a J^ation 
tax upon industrial and mercantile establishments, that is, the 
patente, and a tariff on imports and exports. In levying the land 
tax the Assembly was embarrassed by the lack of a satisfactory 
appraisement. The rules established for reaching a provisional 
valuation were impractical, because they presupposed a knowl- 
edge of the income from each piece of land during a period of 
fifteen years. Fortunately they permitted in case of necessity 
an estimate based upon the local market value. The tax on 
personal property was levied upon an income estimated by ex- 
ternal signs of wealth, of which the principal was the rental 
value of house or apartment. Rentals valued below 100 livres 
were reckoned as half the income, from 100 to 500 as one-third, 
and so on. 

The estimated product of the two taxes was to be divided 
among the departments and subdivided among the districts, munic- 
ipalities, and individual taxpayers. The preparation of tax lists 
was entrusted to the local authorities, a feature of the law re- 
sponsible for the bad start of the new system. The Assembly 
was five months late with its plan of distribution among the 
departments, and the local officials, either bewildered by the 
complexity of the system, or not zealous in taxing themselves 
and their neighbors, showed no energy in making the levy. By 
September, 1791, the Assembly found that half of the depart- 



124 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
VIII 



Tariff of 
1791 



ments had not been heard from, nor could the minister of the 
interior obtain answers to appeals for action. This evil was 
chronic during the Revolution and introduced into the payment 
of taxes a kind of inequality as arbitrary and unfair as any that 
flourished under the old regime. The farmers in many districts 
became a privileged class, paying neither taxes nor feudal dues, 
and receiving high prices for their produce. 

The tariff of 1791 was in part a means of raising revenue and 
in part a system of moderate protective duties. The committee 
which reported the original project was squarely protectionist 
in sentiment, but the Assembly was unwilling to go so far, and 
the committee was obliged to modify its project. The tariff 
included export as well as import duties, and combined with it 
was a short list of prohibited articles, ranging from ships to 
tobacco and linen thread. Among other things the exportation 
of coal and of wood for building was prohibited. The new rev- 
enue service was closely patterned upon the excellent system 
created by the Farmers General. It produced about the same 
amount of revenue as the preceding tariff. 

Much of the work of reorganization undertaken by the Con- 
stituent Assembly was permanent, although modified in partic- 
ular features by subsequent legislatures. The attempt to reor- 
ganize the Church cannot be reckoned among the Assembly's 
acts of constructive statesmanship. More than any other act it 
led to division and strife, and later to the reign of violence. 
This legislation, together with the financial projects associated 
with it, requires separate and more detailed treatment. 



CHAPTER IX 

THE FINANCES AND THE CHURCH 

A FINANCIAL problem of no ordinary magnitude perplexed chap^ix 
the leaders of the reform party in the Constituent Assem- i789-90 
bly. The revenue of the government had long been insufficient 
to cover its expenditures, and yet the Assembly proposed to in- The 
crease the expenditures enormously by carrying through a costly f^^^^^ 
program of reform. Venality of office was rooted in every cor- 
ner of the old regime, and when the old gave place to the new, 
judges, lawyers, notaries, officers of the King's military and. 
civil establishment, municipal officers, and masters of trade cor- 
porations, all must be compensated or reimbursed. The total 
amount needed to cover these requirements was over two thou- 
sand million livres. In addition several hundred millions more 
must be found in order to extinguish the heritage of " anticipa- 
tions " of revenue and unpaid government notes. To raise such 
an amount would require experienced management in a modern 
State equipped with a sound financial system. Whether an old 
system, falling to pieces under the shock of revolution, or a new 
one which had not the support of a strong central government, 
would be equal to the task was more than doubtful. 

Necker had defects as a financier, but his knowledge and 
experience might have saved the Assembly from some of its 
worst blunders. The principal lesson it seemed to have learned rinanciai 
from him was the art of minimizing difficulties and hiding Leadership 
deficits. Several of the leaders, like Mirabeau and Talleyrand, 
were his political enemies, and let slip no opportunity to weaken 
his hold on the country. By the close of 1789 he had lost con- 
trol of the finances and the Assembly gave little heed either to his 
advice or to his warnings. In September, 1790, he resigned and 
returned to Switzerland, although, as a pledge of good faith, 
he left behind, in advances to the government, two million livres 
of his private fortune. 

It was not lack of ability among its members that was mainly 
responsible for the mistakes of the Assembly. One of their 
number touched the difficulty when he said to them in 1791, 
" Do you think our finances would not have been administered 

125 



126 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

C HAP. I X better, more prudently, more economically, since the opening of 
1789-90 the States General, if we had then possessed the experience which 
we have acquired? " Some of the men who pointed out the true 
principles of finance were suspected of disloyalty to the Revolu- 
tion, because such arguments came most often from the self- 
constituted defenders of the Crown and the Church. At the 
last the Assembly branded as unpatriotic the attempt to force 
from it a full statement of its financial record. But its instincts 
may have been wiser than the warnings of the financiers. Many 
necessary reforms since Turgot's day had been checked by the 
argument from caution used consciously or unconsciously in 
the interest of privilege. The Assembly seemed confronted by 
the dilemma of shortening its program or refusing to be delicate 
in the choice of financial expedients. It has often been accused 
by its critics of having " muddled through." 

The Assembly soon discovered how difficult it was to ward off 
bankruptcy, to say nothing of paying the cost of a comprehen- 

Loans sive scheme of reorganization. No resources could be found 

by borrowing. Twice in August, 1789, and for relatively small 
sums, Necker attempted to negotiate loans. Both failed signally. 
Temporary assistance was obtained from the Bank of Discount, 
which was ordered to furnish money for the immediate require- 
ments of the treasury. Necker tried to persuade the Assembly 
to transform this Into a national bank, and permit it to issue 
notes to the amount of 240,000,000 livres while lending the gov- 
ernment 170,000,000, but the Assembly adopted only the part of 
the scheme which provided for the loan. Necker also tried 
the device of a " patriotic contribution " of a quarter of each 
citizen's income, payable in three years. The statements of 
income were to be voluntary. To this project the Assembly 
assented, throwing, however, the entire responsibility upon the 
minister, as his enemy, Mirabeau, suggested. The failure of the 
plan was disguised because of the long period of time which 
must elapse before its results could be known. Declarations 
of income were to be made to the municipal officers before Jan- 
uary, 1790. So few had been made by December that the Assem- 
bly postponed the date two months. Many were afraid to de- 
clare their income, for fear it would reveal to watchful creditors 
their deplorable financial condition. Moreover, the decree gave 
no instructions as to a method of estimating income. Declara- 
tions were made so slowly that in March, 1790, the Assembly 
required municipal officers to set down the amount in cases where 
no declarations were handed in. But municipalities which did 
not succeed in collecting the direct taxes were equally remiss 



THE FINANCES AND THE CHURCH 127 

with this contribution. By the end of 1790 not a third of the c hap, i x 
municipal rolls had been made out. During the first year i789-90 
30,000,000, instead of 150,000,000, were collected. If in the 
earlier stages of the Revolution such resources proved insufficient 
or useless, what must have been the situation when the size of 
the floating debt was increased by the hundred millions through 
the reimbursements that were voted ! 

The equanimity of the deputies in the face of these difficulties 
is accounted for partly by their decision in November, 1789, to 
use the accumulated wealth of the Church as an extraordinary 
resource sufficient to reassure all creditors of the State, old or 
new. The financial policy of the Revolution centers in the utiliza- 
tion of this resource. The failure to manage it wisely led 
through acts of successive legislatures to the stupendous bank- 
ruptcy of 1797. 

The attack on the property of the Church was not wholly a 
financial measure, but was suggested partly by the desire to 
weaken a great corporation, the rival of the State, and to reduce property 
the clergy to the position of individuals authorized and paid by q^^^\^ 
the government to perform certain religious duties. Many dep- 
uties also believed that the sale of the ecclesiastical lands would 
strengthen the cause of the Revolution, for every purchaser 
would naturally become an ardent advocate of its success. Such 
a measure was necessary, moreover, if the reorganization of the 
land system promised in the pledge to abolish feudalism was not 
to remain incomplete. Reformers were unwilling to have a fifth 
or even a tenth of the landed property of France immobile in 
the " dead hand " of the Church. This land, like the rest, must 
be brought into the market. 

The secularization of church property was a significant inci- 
dent in the process, extending over the centuries since the Prot- 
estant Revolution, by which civil society recovered its ancient 
supremacy and the sphere of the Church, so large in the Middle 
Ages, was narrowed to include only strictly ecclesiastical con- 
cerns. Northern Germany and England in the sixteenth century 
had witnessed the confiscation of much church property. The 
process, stopped with the check of the Protestant movement, was 
now resumed by France. It was to have far-reaching conse- 
quences. 

In the fall of 1789 the financial aspect of the affair was upper- 
most. The attack began during the enthusiastic assault on priv- 
ileges on the night of August 4. At this time it took the form 
of an abolition of tithes, but in the course of the debate the 
declaration was made that church property belonged to the na- 



[28 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



Decree of 
November 



tion. The first attack was led by Talleyrand in October and 
gained weight from the fact that he was a noble and a distin- 
guished officer of the Church. 

The debate opened on October lo and the decisive vote was 
taken on November 2. Most of the time between was occupied 
by other matters. Talleyrand's argument was based on the 
theory that the property of the Church had been given for the 
performance of certain duties, and that if the State guaranteed 
the performance of these duties and provided for the support 
of the clergy the property was at its disposal. Mirabeau urged 
the Assembly to declare without ambiguity that the property of 
the Church was the property of the nation on the understanding 
that the expenses of religion should be paid and that a minimum, 
salary of 1,200 livres should be provided for the parish priests. 
To the supporters of the motion the defenders of the Church 
replied that the property could not be considered as a single 
whole, given to the Church or to public worship, because it had 
been given or bequeathed to individual parishes, to hospitals, and 
to dioceses. They reminded the Assembly that the deeds of gift 
had been recognized for centuries in the courts and rested upon 
the same legal foundation as other property rights. The attack- 
ing party retorted that the necessities of the State were the su- 
preme law. This party finally changed the motion in such a way 
as to avoid the question of right, declaring that the property of 
the Church was at the disposal of the nation on condition that 
the expenses of worship, the support of the clergy, and the care 
of the poor were adequately provided for. The opposition of 
the parish priests had already been disarmed by the second part 
of the motion, which promised them a minimum salary of 1,200 
livres and lodging. In this form the decree was adopted on 
November 2. The defenders of the Church did not regard their 
cause as lost even then, for it was a long step between such a 
declaration and the enactment of specific measures to make ef- 
fective use of this property. Indeed, it was six months before 
the full, practical consequences were drawn from the declara- 
tion of November 2. 

The property of the Church was estimated at between two and 
three thousand million livres. Its exact amount could not be 
ascertained until the local authorities should make a detailed ap- 
praisement. The Assembly in dealing with the question was 
guided more by pressing needs than by any well considered 
policy. It seemed desirable to sell enough church property to 
refund the sums advanced by the Bank of Discount and to pay 
anticipations of revenue and arrears of interest on the public 



rirat Plan 
of Sale 



THE FINANCES AND THE CHURCH 129 

debt. Accordingly on December 19 a decree ordered the sale c hap, i x 
of royal domains and church lands to the amount of 400,000,000 1789-90 
livres, and established an extraordinary fund " into which the 
proceeds should be paid." Against these proceeds assignats 
would be issued, a part going to the bank in return for loans, 
including 80,000,000 which it was to lend the government within 
the next six months. The only consequence of the decree was 
the issue by the bank of notes, eventually about 112,000,000, 
which were claims upon the extraordinary fund, and which were 
sold at a discount of five or six per pent. 

No immediate steps were taken to designate the property 
which, according to the decree of December 19, should be sold. 
In February the suppression of the monastic orders opened the 
way. This decree did not compel all monks and nuns to abandon 
the monastic life ; the nuns being permitted to remain where they 
were, while the monks were brought together in certain monas- 
teries. Many houses, especially in the large cities, were thus 
freed for sale. 

The Assembly now abandoned the compromise measure of 
November 2 and declared the property of the Church the prop- 
erty of the nation. Believing that purchasers would be found 
more readily if the title was once transferred, the plan was 
adopted of selling to the municipalities, which, in turn, could 
sell to individual purchasers. The municipalities would also 
stand between the purchaser and the danger that the State might 
some day, moved by reactionary influences, reverse its policy. 
Under this plan Paris offered to buy half of the first property 
designated for sale. 

A law determining the rules for appraising the different kinds 
of property was required, but the need of money was so imme- 
diate that the mode of issuing the assignats was first considered. Assignats 
For months the country had been suffering from a dearth of 
money. Business was carried on by the use of all sorts of sub- 
stitutes for coin. Notes were issued by responsible firms, even 
by individuals. In Paris there were nearly a hundred kinds of 
unauthorized notes. A similar situation existed in the depart- 
ments. Necker did not think that the issue of more paper, even 
with the church lands as security, was the true remedy. In 
a report made in March he declared that the condition of the 
money market, rather than the needs of the treasury, should 
determine the amount of state notes to be put into circulation. 
He warned the Assembly that the addition of two or three hun- 
dred millions to the amount of notes of the Bank of Discount 
already in circulation would present a frightful total. The 



130 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

C HAP, j x advocates of the measure argued that the assignats would not be 
1789-90 paper money, because they were secured on first-class real estate 
and were to bear interest at three per cent. They professed to 
believe that the people would prefer assignats to coin, and that 
this would bring the hoarded coin upon the market again. The 
whole transaction was regarded as a sort of treaty between the 
State, its creditors, and all private debtors and creditors, accord- 
ing to which the new landed property was used to secure each 
one and to relieve the situation until a new system of taxation 
should render possible a return to ordinary methods. 

The issue was voted on April 17, and provided for assignats 
in denominations ranging from 200 to 1,000 livres. As soon 
as the receipts from the sale of the public lands reached a mil- 
lion livres, a million livres in assignats were to be withdrawn 
from circulation and burned. With the payments of the patriotic 
contribution in 1791 and 1792 proportional amounts of assignats 
were also to be destroyed. Each purchaser of land was assured 
that the assignats for which his land served as security would 
be called in. The municipalities, which were to take charge of 
the sale, were not to use the proceeds for ordinary expenses, but 
to turn the money over at once to the extraordinary fund. As 
no assignat below the value of 200 livres was issued, the circula- 
tion of ordinary coins, it was thought, would not be afifected. 
These would be as necessary as before, for the decree provided 
that the debtor must offer exact change in meeting his obliga- 
tions. The issue of the assignats would imply the withdrawal of 
the notes of the Bank of Discount, and until the assignats were 
ready the bank-notes were to have printed on their backs " prom- 
ise to furnish assignats." 

If the Assembly had voted no other issue of assignats, such a 
method of obtaining from the public a loan with the church prop- 
erty as security could not be criticized as more expensive than 

New Issues an ordinary loan. The assignats were simple mortgage notes 
and it was so stated on their face. The difficulty with the scheme 
was that for the time it seemed to remove all necessity of finan- 
cial prudence and to enable the Assembly to vote vast sums of 
money without considering too narrowly how they should be 
found. But the Assembly discovered even before the assignats 
were printed that they would not be on a par with gold and 
silver. In May the assignats which were to be delivered in 
June were at a discount on the market of from five to ten per 
cent. 

But the gravest danger in the plan was that the causes which 
led to the issue of April suggested another issue in September. 



THE FINANCES AND THE CHURCH 131 

Before an assignat was issued the Assembly had used up 143,- c hap. 1 2c 
000,000 by requiring the Bank of Discount to lend the treasury, i789-90 
in lieu of the assignats, twenty millions in April, twenty-eight 
in May, fifty in June, and forty-five in July. Coin in which to 
transact retail business was at a premium. Persons who had 
sums to pay which could not be met exactly by assignats were 
obliged to purchase the balance, and as early as May, 1790, were 
paying six per cent, premium. The need of instruments of ex- 
change, felt everywhere in France, was not the only motive im- 
pelling the Assembly to draw again upon its great resource. A 
report of the finance committee in August showed that the de- 
mand debt, not to mention the funded debt, amounted to 1,340.- 
000,000 livres and that the annual interest account was 257,- 
000,000. The total estimated annual expenses of 650,000,000 
could not be borne without new and heavy taxes, the thought of 
which the Assembly would not tolerate, for one of the reasons 
for its existence was the need of relieving the taxpayer. The 
battle of April was fought again in August and September, with 
the result that another issue, of 800,000,000 livres, was ordered. 
The interest feature of the first issue was abolished. To meet 
the demand for assignats of smaller denominations assignats of 
fifty livres were soon included and in the following spring assig- 
nats of five livres were substituted for those of the largest denom- 
inations. So great was the demand for money of any sort that 
the fifty livre assignats were at first disposed of at a premium. 
When the smaller ones were issued precautions were taken in 
order that they might not fall into the hands of speculators. 
The Constituent Assembly did not stop with its limit of 1,200,- 
000,000, but issued 600,000,000 more in June, 1791. Regularly as 
each month passed the Assembly turned to the extraordinary fund 
for from fifteen to forty million livres to cover the growing 
monthly deficits. In this way and in the payment of reimburse- 
ments the Assembly drew from this fund before its labors were 
over 1,453,000,000 livres. The movement of the national finances 
down the steep incline of an irredeemable currency was already 
so rapid as to make it improbable that any successive legislature 
could check the speed. 

The mode of selling the new public lands was determined in 
a series of decrees which followed the issue of the assignats. saieof 
The property was divided into classes, of which the first was the ^J^° 
arable land and its appurtenances. This should be appraised as 
equal in value to twenty-two years' revenue. Other classes of 
property, including dues of various kinds, were estimated at 
twenty years' purchase, forests at fifteen. The State guaranteed 



132 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

C HAP. I X ti^g property as free from feudal dues. If such dues were part 
1789-90 of its revenue, the annual and the occasional dues might be ex- 
tinguished separately, which made a land settlement easier than 
in the case of seigniorial lands. The purchase price was payable 
in instalments, twelve per cent, being due at once and the rest 
within twelve years. The property was to be sold to the highest 
bidder but not below the appraisal value. 

Shortly afterwards the Assembly decided to provide for the 
sale of all the public lands, except the woods and the forests and 
those reserved to the King. This time the sale was direct, pro- 
posals being made to the committee on " alienation," or the direc- 
tory of the department or district where the land was located. The 
sales were most active in 1791. The property generally brought 
much more than its appraised value. The explanation is that the 
appraisement was low, partly in order to insure the success of the 
sales and partly because the revenue upon which it was based was 
small under the lax management of the clergy. At first the 
Assembly professed the policy of subdividing estates to increase 
the number of small proprietors, but soon the needs of the 
treasury proved stronger than social theories. The lands nat- 
urally went to those who had money to pay for them. The 
relative number of small proprietors was not increased, although 
in distinctly rural districts the peasants acquired more than the 
bourgeois. Six-sevenths of the land in the district of Versailles 
was bought by citizens of either Versailles or Paris. In several 
districts of the department of the Gironde the proportion was 
similar. It has also been found that many of the clergy bought 
lands which had belonged to their parish churches. The ques- 
tion of the distribution of the church lands by these sales is 
(complicated by the fact that lands were frequently bought to 
be sold again. It is believed that these second sales slightly 
increased the number of peasant proprietors.^ 

No steps taken by the Assembly in dealing with the Church 
had thus far aroused formidable opposition, although their total 
Church effect was revolutionary. The clergy, once a State within the 
and Stat© State, managing a vast property, negotiating loans, offering " free 
gifts " to the King, had exchanged this position for that of 
simple ecclesiastics, receiving a salary or a pension from the 
government. The Assembly had gone still further and by de- 
crees forbidding the payment of papal dues, like the annates, 
had interfered with the relations of the French Church to the 
Pope. At the instance of Montmorin, the French minister of 

1 See especially, Marcel Marion, La Vente des Biens nationaux pendant 
la Revolution. 



THE FINANCES AND THE CHURCH 133 

foreign affairs, the Pope had agreed to waive his right for the c hap, i x 
time being, hoping that the storm would soon blow over. The 1789-90 
suppression of the monastic orders carried the Assembly still 
further into the field of religious reform. The question was 
whether it would pause or its zeal would lead it upon even more 
dangerous ground. Now that the course of the Revolution had 
elevated it to supreme power it was tempted to settle long dis- 
puted questions of Church and State and of the relations of the 
French Church to the papacy. It yielded to the temptation, and 
the laws which it undertook to enforce were the occasion, if not 
the cause, of bitter civil strife. 

It is not surprising that the Pope was opposed to a revolution 
which treated his rights with scant respect. In March, 1790, 
the French ambassador had with difficulty restrained him from 
publishing an encyclical condemning both the principles and the 
acts of the Assembly. This condemnation he embodied in an 
allocution delivered in secret consistory, on March 29. Already 
the ecclesiastical committee of the Assembly had begun work 
on their project of reform. The committee included a strong 
majority of Galileans, although none of its members were Vol- 
tairian or really hostile to the rights of the Church, as they 
understood them. Their project was laid before the Assembly 
late in May and was discussed during the next six weeks. The 
opposition of the bishops and of the majority of the other clergy 
in the Assembly did not at first appear to be irreducible. Their 
criticisms and objections were at once presented by Boisgelin, 
archbishop of Aix, a prelate of conciHatory disposition. While 
he explained the objections to the plan of the committee from 
the point of view of ecclesiastical law, he appeared to insist prin- 
cipally upon the necessity of seeking the cooperation of the 
Church, through the action of a national council or of the Pope, 
in introducing changes in a canonical manner. The difficulty 
with the leaders of the Assembly was that they expected the 
Church to accept every feature of their program. Churchmen 
alone were to illustrate the spirit of conciliation. If the bishops 
refused to use all the devices known to ecclesiastical diplomacy 
in carrying the plan out canonically, the bishops or the Pope must 
assume responsibility for a strife which was inevitable. 

The title of the proposed law was " Civil Constitution of the 
Clergy." The qualifying word " civil " was a disclaimer on the Civii con- 
part of the Assembly of any intention of interfering with religious fhe c*ie°rgy' 
concerns. The Assembly, however, undertook to accomplish by 
the action of civil authority changes hitherto regarded as lying 
principally within the competence of ecclesiastical authority. The 



134 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

C HAP. I X course of the debate showed that the members of the Assembly 
1789-90 were even less inclined to compromise than the committee. Men 
like Robespierre did not think the committee sufficiently " philo- 
sophical " in its attitude. 

Two fundamental purposes appeared to be embodied in the 
new constitution : first, to render the Church simply one depart- 
ment of the State, its clergy differing from other officials sim- 
ply in function; and, second, to destroy the effective jurisdiction 
of the Pope. Although learned canonists were on the commit- 
tee, they took the unhistorical attitude that it was possible to 
return to conditions which, they believed, were those of the 
primitive Church. They were, moreover, inconsistent; for in 
some respects they were not content with primitive conditions 
and wished to modify these to ensure the supremacy of the State. 
Frequently, too, they referred to the Pope as the Bishop of 
Rome, and one of their members spoke as if his functions were 
limited to the diocese of Rome. They ignored the fact that 
after proclaiming religious freedom in their Declaration of 
Rights they should not attempt to regulate the internal organiza- 
tion of any church. This inconsistency did not stir the church- 
men especially, as they did not believe in the Declaration of 
Rights, but they insisted that in these matters the Church of 
France or the sovereign pontiff must be consulted. Some of 
these questions were involved in the Concordat, a solemn treaty 
between the Pope and France, which had not been abrogated. 
The constitution reduced the number of bishoprics and arch- 
changes bishopries to eighty-three, abolishing fifty-two. Their limits 
Made v^grc to be identical with the boundaries of the departments. 

Instead of archbishoprics, ten bishops were to have metropoli- 
tan jurisdiction. Aside from the parish clergy and the vicars, 
who assisted the bishops in the management of their dioceses 
and in the instruction of young priests in the diocesan seminaries, 
there were to be no ecclesiastics. Many kinds of clergy of ancient 
origin disappeared both in name and function. The authority 
of the bishop also was reduced. He could perform no act of 
jurisdiction without the consent of his council of vicars. He 
was no longer nominated by the King and granted canonical 
institution by the Pope. He was to be elected in the depart- 
mental electoral assembly, the body which elected the deputies 
to the legislature, and from which no one was excluded on 
account of his religious opinions or the absence of them. Thus 
Protestants, Jews, and Voltairians could take part in the choice 
of bishops. For confirmation he was to look to the metropoli- 
tan or, in default of him, to the oldest bishop within the juris- 



THE FINANCES AND THE CHURCH 



diction of the metropolitan.^ Like the bishop, the parish priest c hap, i x 
was elected. Each, before being inducted into office, must take 1789-90 
an oath of fidelity, among other things, to the constitution, which 
seemed to include this Civil Constitution of the Clergy. The 
Pope's jurisdiction was cut off by the provision which forbade 
French bishops to submit to the jurisdiction of a foreign bishop. 
The newly elected bishops were expressly forbidden to look to 
him for canonical institution, but they should write him a let- 
ter as chief of the Church and in token of their communion with 
him. The Civil Constitution made liberal provision for the sup- 
port of the clergy; of those whose positions were destroyed by 
the law, as well as of those retained in active service. The rules 
in regard to residence were strict, insuring that the faithful 
henceforward should not be watched over by absentees. But 
in the eyes of loyal churchmen such features did not redeem the 
law from the vice of its origin. The project of the committee 
was adopted on July 12 and sent to the King for his signature. 
After waiting ten days the King announced to the Assembly 
that he would accept the measure, but would delay the formal Attitude of 
act of sanction in order " to take measures necessary to assure ^°"^^ ^^^ 
its execution." On the following day, July 23, there arrived 
from the Pope confidential letters to the King and two of his 
ministers, warning them that if the King approved the Civil 
Constitution of the Clergy he would lead his people into error 
and schism. In reply, advised by his ecclesiastical councilors, 
the King urged the Pope to delegate to the bishops the authority 
to put the changes into effect, at least temporarily. This expedi- 
ent appears to have had the approval of many of the bishops in 
the Assembly, who realized that it was impossible to force their 
fellow deputies to abate their demands and hoped to save the situ- 
ation by yielding. The appeal did not bring a prompt response 
and on August 24 the King gave his sanction to the law. 

Pope Pius VI was in an embarrassing position. The papal pos- 
sessions on the Rhone had been affected by the progress of revo- 
lution in the surrounding country. In June the Avignonese had 
driven out the papal legate and had voted in favor of annexation 
to France. The inhabitants of the Comtat Venaissin desired to Policy of 
live under the authority of the Pope, but they also desired to *^^^°p® 
enjoy the reforms offered to the French people by the Revolu- 
tion. When the question of annexation was brought before the 
National Assembly, it refused its consent, on the ground that 
the rights of the Pope as well as the wishes of the people should 

2 The election was to take place on a Sunday after mass, at which all 
electors were required to be present. Title II, art. 6. 



136 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

CHAP. IX ]be respected. The committee to which the matter was referred 
1789-90 declared that otherwise annexation would be an act of conquest 
and as such already forbidden by a constitutional decree. If, 
now, the Pope should condemn the Civil Constitution of the 
Clergy, his attitude was likely to exasperate the Assembly, lessen 
the force of its scruples, and lead to his own spoliation. It is 
not surprising that he sought to gain time. 

The legislation of the Constituent Assembly upon the Church 
may be criticized from the point of view of what it was right 
for a government to undertake after it had solemnly proclaimed 
the principle of religious liberty, but it should be judged, rather, 
from the point of view of practical statesmanship. Within a 
year it had become such a potent cause of strife that leading 
politicians thought seriously of modifying it or changing its 
character altogether. 



CHAPTER X 

THE MENACE OF CIVIL WAR 

TWO days after the enactment of the Civil Constitution of c hap, x 
the Clergy added a potent element of religious discord to 1790-91 
the other causes of division among Frenchmen, a great festival 
of federation was held in Paris. The occasion was the first anni- 
versary of the fall of the Bastille. Twenty-five thousand dele- 
gates from all parts of France represented the national guards 
and the soldiers and sailors of the line and the marine. Imposing Federation 
ceremonies in the presence of a vast crowd of spectators took f^^Q^^^'^' 
place on the Champ de Mars. An enclosure was built resembling 
a Roman circus, with places for the National Assembly and the 
King. An altar was erected and upon it mass was celebrated 
by Talleyrand, the bishop who had proposed the appropriation 
of a part of the church lands. King, Assembly, and troops took 
once more the oath of fidelity to the new order. Even the tor- 
rents of rain which fell at intervals could not chill the ardor 
of the delegates, who found in the success of the festival evi- 
dence that the constitution was at length assured. The shouts 
for the King were long and full of warmth. A year later he 
referred to these moments as the sweetest of his residence in 
Paris. 

The idea of federation appeared spontaneously during the 
municipal revolution of the preceding summer. At first there 
were federations of the national guards of neighboring cities. 
The movement spread until the soldiers of whole regions were 
brought together. It affirmed the unity of French sentiment 
at a time when the old regime was disintegrating and the coun- 
try seemed to be in danger of becoming a jarring multitude of 
half-independent communities. 

Not all Parisians shared the enthusiasm of the crowds on the 
Champ de Mars. Many of the nobles left Paris shortly before 
to avoid the festal scenes. Many other nobles, not merely resi- The 
dents of Paris but those of other parts of France, were already Emigration 
beyond the frontier. Some of them had emigrated in the sum- 
mer of 1789, because, like the Count of Artois and the Prince 
of Conde, they belonged to the defeated court party and feared 

137 



138 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

C HAP. X to jj^eet the fate of Foulon and Berthier. Others had fled from 
1790-91 their chateaux under the menace of peasant mobs. These at 
first took refuge in the towns, but as disorder increased many 
left the country, expecting to return after a few months. The 
insurrection of October 5 and 6 frightened away others, includ- 
ing several members of the National Assembly. The decree sup- 
pressing hereditary nobility, with its titles and armorial bearings, 
embroiled the nobles with the Revolution more than any other 
act of the Assembly. Many of them believed that the laws abol- 
ishing feudalism had dealt unjustly with their property, and they 
now thought their honor was touched. Some bore names asso- 
ciated with the glories of France, but these they were forbidden 
to use. Necker urged the King to veto the decree. But he 
signed it, taking the advice of the reactionary courtiers, who told 
him that to accept a measure like this, of which all Europe knew 
he disapproved, would show conclusively that he was a prisoner. 
The provincial nobles, always jealous of the court nobility, had 
for the most part resisted the appeals to emigrate, but their atti- 
tude now changed. 

The regular soldiers as well as the national guards were rep- 
resented at the festival of federation. The influence of the Revo- 
lution upon the army was, however, not altogether wholesome. 
The Army The soldicrs undoubtedly became capable of a more genuine 
patriotism since they were treated as citizens and were told 
that promotion depended upon their capacity and their services 
rather than upon court favor or wealth. But often they did 
not seem able to distinguish between the spirit of liberty and 
the spirit of disobedience. The news of the rich reward received 
by the French Guard at Paris after the insurrection of July 14, 
1789, impelled other regiments to demand a distribution of the 
contents of the regimental chests. They even tried to sell their 
equipment or their horses. Mutinies occurred in which the 
lives of the officers were endangered. The most formidable out- 
break took place at Nancy in Lorraine in August, 1790. It in- 
volved three regiments, one of which was a Swiss regiment in 
the service of France. The task of putting down the mutineers 
was assigned to the Marquis de Bouille, who was in command 
of the army of the East. He led a force of about four thousand 
men to Nancy. For a time it seemed as if the soldiers would 
return to obedience without a struggle, but firing began, perhaps 
by misunderstanding or accident, and a fierce battle followed in 
which the mutineers were defeated. The ringleaders were pun- 
ished with death or the galleys. The conservatives applauded 
this vigorous assertion of authority, while the radicals sought 



In the 
Soutb 



THE MENACE OF CIVIL WAR 139 

to represent the punishment as an act of despotism and to treat c hap, x 
the victims as martyrs of liberty. 1790-91 

There were other equally serious causes of anxiety. The con- 
troversies over the seizure of church property, the suppression Troubles 
of the monastic system, and the refusal of the Assembly to 
declare the Roman Catholic religion the religion of France had 
by the summer of 1790 roused religious passion to the danger 
point. The first consequence was an outburst of religious hatred 
in the South, where many bitter memories separated Huguenot 
and Catholic. In the cities of Montauban and Nimes the pros- 
perous middle class was mainly Protestant, while the mass of 
the population and the gentry of the surrounding country were 
Catholic. The Protestants naturally rallied to the cause of a 
revolution which gave them religious equality. They formed the 
majority of the national guards. Later private companies made 
up of Catholics were organized. At Montauban a serious riot 
broke out on May 10 when the municipality proceeded to take 
an inventory of the convent of the Cordeliers. A detachment 
of national guards was attacked by a fanatical mob, several 
were killed, and the rest thrown into prison. They were re- 
leased only on the approach of an army of fifteen thousand 
national guards from Bordeaux. The National Assembly held 
the municipality responsible for the affair, and its officials were 
cashiered. The troubles at Nimes a month later were of sim- 
ilar origin. On the first day the Catholics appeared to have the 
upper hand, but on the following morning hundreds of Prot- 
estants from the Cevennes marched into Nimes, and before the 
struggle ended three hundred Catholics perished. 

The Catholics worsted at Nimes sought to utilize the scheme 
of federation and assembled on the plain of Jales between thirty 
and forty thousand national guards drawn from four south- 
ern departments. The more restless spirits wished to attack 
Nimes, but wiser counsels prevailed and a petition was drawn 
up asking the National Assembly to permit the Catholic party 
at Nimes to arm and asking it also to order the release of the 
Catholics imprisoned after the riot. The Assembly treated the 
deliberations as illegal and ordered the prosecution of the lead- 
ers, but nothing was done. The ardent revolutionists saw in 
the meeting evidence of a conspiracy to restore the old regime, 
while the emigrant nobles hoped that the temporary organization 
effected might be used as the nucleus of a royalist revolt. 

The controversy over the Civil Constitution of the Clergy 
reached a crisis in the fall when attempts were made to enforce 
its provisions. The Pope continued to pursue a temporizing 



I40 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP.X 

1790-91 

Besistance 
of the 
Clergy 



An Oath 
Prescribed 



policy. The most influential clerical deputies in the Assembly, 
under the leadership of Boisgelin, held that until the Pope au- 
thorized the introduction of changes the French clergy must take 
the attitude of passive resistance. This policy Boisgelin an- 
nounced in an " Exposition of Principles " to which ninety-seven 
clerical members adhered. The struggle entered upon a nev^ 
phase when the Bishop of Quimper died and the Abbe Expilly, 
a member of the ecclesiastical committee, was elected bishop 
according to the mode prescribed by law. Anticipating the re- 
fusal of the metropolitan of Rennes and the oldest bishop of the 
province to consecrate him, the Assembly in November added to 
the procedure known as an " appeal against abuse of power," 
giving the district court the right in such cases to designate any 
French bishop to perform the act of consecration. The same 
law empowered local authorities to meet the policy of passive 
resistance on the part of their bishop by proceeding to reorganize 
the parishes without his cooperation. Before the month of 
November was over the Assembly resolved to discover by means 
of a test who were willing to obey the law and who were defiant. 
In the Civil Constitution a form of oath was provided which 
ecclesiastics were to take before assuming the duties of the office 
to which they had been chosen. It was now proposed that all 
bishops and beneficed clergy be required to take the oath at 
once. Those who refused should be regarded as having resigned 
their positions. After a short debate the project was voted on 
November 2,y. 

The decision of the Assembly to exact an oath ^ of the clergy 
threw the King into an agony of distress. His sconscience was 
troubled because he had sanctioned the Civil Constitution. Al- 
ready he had begun to plan an escape from Paris to a frontier 
fortress, where, surrounded by faithful regiments commanded 
by the Marquis de Bouille, he would be able to restore his shat- 
tered power. The completion of the plans waited upon the 
attitude of the neighboring sovereigns, especially of the Emperor 
Leopold, the Queen's brother. On November 26 the King gave 
the Baron de Breteuil, the principal member of the short-lived 
ministry of July, 1789, and one of the first emigrants, full pow- 
ers to open negotiations with friendly courts. But there was 
no hope of immediate aid from either Leopold or other monarchs. 
The King's only resource was papal action rendering possible 

iThey were "to swear to watch with care over the faithful of the 
diocese or parish entrusted to them, to be faithful to the nation, the law 
and the King, and to maintain with all their power the constitution decreed 
by the National Assembly and accepted by the King." Art. i. 



THE MENACE OF CIVIL WAR 141 

the enforcement of the Civil Constitution by delegated ecclesi- c hap, x 
astical authority. Advised once more by Boisgelin, the King 1790-91 
sent a supreme appeal to Rome early in December. Time for 
reply had not elapsed before the Assembly pressed the King to 
sanction the oath. The movements of the populace seemed to an- 
nounce a new October 5. Louis, " with death in his soul " as 
if he were committing a mortal sin, gave the decree his sanction 
on December 26. He exclaimed, " I should prefer to be King of 
Metz rather than remain King of France in such a posture, but 
this will soon be ended." He had assumed a double part that 
was to hasten civil war, bring about the ruin of the monarchy, 
and lead to his own death. 

According to the decree of November 27 the oath was to be 
taken by the clergy publicly on Sunday after mass ; by the bishops 
in the cathedral churches, by the priests in the parish churches. 
The Assembly unwisely inserted a provision that its ecclesiastical 
members should take the oath within its walls, thus furnishing 
them a conspicuous platform upon which to display their deter- 
mination to resist. The first to take the oath in the Assembly 
was the Abbe Gregoire, who had been one of the priests to 
join the third estate at Versailles in June, 1789. He afterwards 
explained that his oath was one of submission to law and 
that it did not imply approval of solutions given in the law 
to problems of ecclesiastical organization or discipline. His 
example was followed by only a third of the clerical delegation in 
the Assembly. Nearly two hundred either refused to take the 
oath or surrounded their act with qualifications not permitted by 
the law. Of the entire episcopate only four took the oath. One 
of these was Talleyrand and another was the former minister 
Brienne — neither of them conspicuous for piety. One of the 
two titular bishops to take the oath was Gobel, bishop of Lydda 
in partibus,- who three years later was to become notorious in the 
tragi-comedy of the Worship of Reason. Many of the bishops 
who refused to take the oath were moved, their critics believed, by 
prejudices of caste quite as much as by considerations of religion. 
Of the other clergy — vicars-general, superiors and directors of 
seminaries, parish priests and vicars, professors in colleges — 
about half declined to take the oath. Many who consented re- 
tracted a few weeks later when a papal brief, issued in April, 
threatened with suspension any who did not retract within forty 
days. 

The refusal of nearly all the bishops and half of the clergy 

2/n partibus infidelium, that is, in Moslem lands. 



142 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

C HAP. x ^Q take the oath brought the ecclesiastical reforms of the National 
1790-91 Assembly into a precarious situation. According to the law non- 
EeUgious jurors could perform no functions as official pastors. The con- 
sciiism sequence was that a multitude of communities were left without 
religious services, although the Assembly in the instructions which 
it issued permitted non-jurors to continue their duties until they 
were replaced. The machinery of election was at once set in 
motion to fill the vacancies. In order to increase the number 
of candidates for vacant sees, a special decree, bearing upon the 
elections of 1791, reduced the qualification of experience from 
fifteen years to five years, opening the road of promotion to 
young and ambitious men. With few exceptions the new bishops 
were chosen on the ground of their " patriotism " rather than 
for their piety. One of the best choices was Henri Gregoire, 
made bishop of the department of the Loire-et-Cher and destined 
to win distinction later in the Revolution for his defense of the 
Catholic faith. To consecrate the first bishops-elect, appeal was 
made to Talleyrand. Once consecrated, they officiated at the 
consecration of others. Gobel, the new bishop of Paris, conse- 
crated thirty-six between February 27 and April 26. 

The difficulty was not over when the new episcopate was in- 
stalled and the parish priests entered upon their functions. In- 
stead of one Church France now had two. One set of clergy 
was called " non-juror " or " refractory," the other " constitu- 
tional " or " intruder." In many communities the parish priest 
who refused to take the oath remained, holding religious services 
in a house or a barn, hearing confessions, granting absolution, 
and celebrating mass. By the " patriots " he was regarded as a 
law-breaker and he looked upon them as subverters of true 
religion, as schismatics and heretics. The religious liberty guar- 
anteed in the Declaration of Rights appeared to be almost as 
impossible as under the old regime. The difficulties increased 
rather than diminished, and in several departments the officials 
were busied hurrying troops here and there to protect " intrud- 
ers " from the wrath of the peasants. 

It was inevitable that the trouble should become acute in Paris, 
Many Catholics resorted to private chapels or to chapels of con- 
vents in order to receive the ministrations of a clergy whom they 
considered faithful to the principles of the Church. Mobs of 
Attempts " patriots " collected near by, seeking to interrupt the services 
to Preserve ^nd to terrify the worshipers. The directory of the department. 
Liberty anxious to preserve religious liberty and to put an end to dis- 
orderly scenes, authorized the rental of unoccupied churches or 
other buildings for the purpose of holding religious services, 



THE MENACE OF CIVIL WAR 143 

stipulating that the sermons should contain no criticisms of the chap, x 
laws or the established authorities. Accordingly, the former 1790-91 
priest of St. Sulpice rented the Church of the Theatins from the 
municipality and services were announced for April 17, Palm 
Sunday. Before the hour of worship a mob collected and re- 
fused to permit any one to enter the church. An insulting sign 
was placed over the door. The municipal authorities succeeded 
after a time in restoring order. The National Assembly now 
took up the matter, approved the decision of the Paris directory, 
and extended the privilege to all other communities. By the 
same decree, on May 7, non-jurors were also given the right to 
say mass in the official churches. This compromise testified to 
the desire of the Assembly to be just, but the affair was already 
beyond its control, and the compromise turned out to be a tem- 
porary palliative soon forgotten in the bitterness of the conflict. 
Ardent revolutionists could not understand how there could be 
two forms of worship in the same religion. 

The King, whom the agitators called the " first functionary," 
set an example of defiance to the law by continuing the services Louis xvi 
of the non-juring clergy in the royal chapel at the Tuileries. ^^^° 
Upon the approach of Easter he was tormented by the fear that 
in giving his sanction to decrees which had provoked a schism 
he was guilty of wrong and should not commune. But he wished 
to avoid having the ministrations of the constitutional clergy 
thrust upon him and prepared to spend the Easter season at 
St. Cloud, where he had resided for several weeks in the preced- 
ing summer. Rumor declared that this was a scheme to escape, 
and that from St. Cloud the King would go to Compiegne, and 
from Compiegne to Metz or some other fortress town. The 
day after the affair of the Theatins when the King and Queen 
entered their carriage to go to St. Cloud, they were stopped by 
national guards in the courtyard of the palace. Bailly and La- 
fayette appealed in vain to the soldiers to respect the rights of 
the King. After a scene lasting nearly two hours the royal fam- 
ily left the carriage and reentered the palace. Louis, urged by 
his ministers, consented to dismiss his almoner, who was a non- 
juror, and to hear mass on Easter Sunday at the Church of St, 
Germain-l'Auxerrois, the parish church of the Louvre, whose 
priest had taken the oath. 

The King and Queen were now more than ever determined 
to escape from their prison. The details of the plan were al- The King 
ready fixed. Montmedy, near the frontier of Luxemburg, was Plans to 
chosen as the place of refuge. Bouille was to concentrate close 
at hand the regiments, chiefly composed of foreigners, upon 



144 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

C HAP. X which he could rely. He was to find his excuse in a movement 
1790-91 of Austrian troops on the frontier of the Austrian Netherlands. 
At the last moment, when the King and the Queen were ready, 
he was to announce the despatch from Paris of a consignment 
of treasure and was to send cavalry detachments along the road 
toward Paris to convoy it safely. The arrangements for the 
escape from the city were entrusted to a confidant of the Queen, 
the Count de Fersen, a Swedish nobleman who resided at the 
Court.* 

Meanwhile to quiet the suspicions of the public, the King con- 
sented to send a circular to the French embassies abroad, signed 
by Montmorin, but probably composed by the leaders of the con- 
stitutional party in the Assembly, in which the statement that 
the King was not free was denounced as an " atrocious calumny." 
The sovereign nation was declared to have " no organs except 
the public functionaries, of which the King is the first." It was 
hardly necessary for Louis to send word through Breteuil to 
foreign courts that this language was dictated by the perilous 
situation. 

The preparations for flight were finally completed, and on the 
night of June 20 the royal family left the palace in disguise and 
were driven by Fersen to a village beyond the walls, where they 
were transferred to a large traveling carriage. The measures 
taken to insure the success of the flight were destined to make 
it fail. At first everything went well. The carriage was driven 
FUghtto rapidly until the King thought his escape was assured. He was 
varennes already beyond the place where the first detachments of cavalry 
were to meet him. But the appearance of soldiers aroused the 
suspicions and fears of the countryside, and the officers were 
obliged to lead their men away from the highroad. The vil- 
lages through which the coach passed seemed in an ominous 
state of expectation. The King was recognized once or twice. 
When the coach reached Varennes, almost within the lines of 
Bouille's army, it was delayed^by the inability of the couriers 
to find post-horses. The authorities, warned at that moment that 
the coach contained the royal family, arrested the party. The 
King acknowledged his identity and was detained to await orders 
from Paris. His brother, the Count of Provence, was more 
fortunate. Disguised as a private gentleman he traveled without 
interruption to the northern frontier. Had the King succeeded 
in carrying out his plan, the consequence would have been civil 
war. 

3 Fersen had served as an adjutant with Rochambeau in the American 
Revolutionary War. 



THE MENACE OF CIVIL WAR 145 

When the King fled from the Tuileries, he left a declaration chap^x 
condemning the principal features of the constitution which he 1790-91 
had repeatedly sworn to defend. He said he did not regret the 
sacrifices which he had made, but deplored the ruin of the 
monarchy and the spread of anarchy. Everywhere the agents of 
the royal administration were, he declared, without authority. 
Power had passed to the clubs, especially to the Jacobins, whose 
orders public officials were compelled to heed. He complained 
that no initiative in legislation was left to him, that decrees 
termed " constitutional " became effective without his sanction, 
and that in the administration of justice he did not retain the 
pardoning power. He complained also that, although few ap- 
pointments in the army were reserved to him, his nominations 
had been opposed. The influence of the clubs he felt to be 
fatal to military discipline. Turning to foreign affairs, he as- 
serted that successful negotiations with other states were impos- 
sible, since the right of declaring war was no longer his and the 
course of negotiations was subjected to the chances of debate 
before a large assembly. 

The Assembly, as soon as it was informed of the King's flight, 
adopting the theory of an abduction, ordered measures taken to The 
stop the royal family and to bring about the arrest of those who ^®?®™^^^ 
had contrived the abduction. It also voted that decrees should King 
be sealed and promulgated without awaiting the sanction of 
Louis XVI, and drew up a new military oath from which the 
King's name was omitted. Finally it published a proclamation, 
going over in an angry tone the points of the King's declaration, 
asserting that, if he did not some day declare that he had been 
misled by the influence of factious men, he should be denounced 
to the whole world as a perjurer. 

The news of the King's arrest was known in Paris by nine 
o'clock on the evening of June 22, Until that time the principal 
sentiment was the fear lest the liberties which had been achieved 
should be endangered by his escape. This was not unmixed with 
feelings of contempt for the King and a desire to destroy the 
symbols of royalty. The royal family was brought back to 
Paris on June 25 through streets guarded by soldiers and thronged 
by spectators. The soldiers did not salute the Kmg, the specta- 
tors did not raise their hats, but there were no insults, only an 
ominous silence. 

Louis XVI was now actually a prisoner, and the government, 
though carried on in his name, was directed by the Assembly. ARepubU- 
Its leaders were confronted by the problem of the political con- ^g'^^^"^^" 
sequences of the startling veto he had essayed to pronounce upon 



146 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



the constitution which was nearing completion. In Paris there 
was a small but growing sentiment in favor of treating the King's 
flight as an abdication, and of organizing a republic. The most 
noisy advocates of this solution were found in the club of the 
Cordeliers, whose leading member was Danton, a prominent law- 
yer. The sentiment of France, expressed in addresses sent to 
the Assembly, was still strongly monarchical. In the Assembly 
those leaders who had done most to destroy the King's power 
were, nevertheless, theoretical monarchists. The flight had 
proved to them, better than any other evidence, that they had 
gone too far and had rendered his position unendurable. They 
were not inclined to advance toward a republic, but rather to 
recoil and to undo measures which seemed too radical. They 
reopened the question of a single or a bicameral legislature, but 
concluded not to reverse the decision of September, 1789. They 
sought, however, to render the legislature more representative 
of the conservative interests of the country by increasing the 
property qualifications of the members of the secondary electoral 
assemblies. The King they resolved to restore, and on July 15 
they voted that when the constitution was completed he should 
be given an opportunity to declare, in entire freedom, whether 
he would accept it. At the same time they embodied in it a pro- 
vision which would lead to his deposition if he again attempted 
to put himself at the head of an army, to be used " against the 
nation," as he aimed to use that commanded by Bouille. 

The decision to restore the King led to a conflict with the 
Paris radicals. They drew up a petition demanding that the 
National Assembly consider his act an abdication and call a new 
" Constituent " Assembly to try him and to reorganize the exec- 
utive power. This petition they took to the Champ de Mars 
for signature. The Assembly, alarmed by attempts of similar 
petitioners to force their way into its hall, thought that the agi- 
tation foreshadowed an outbreak, and called upon the municipal 
officers to preserve the peace and guard the freedom of its coun- 
sels. On July 17, toward the close of the day, when rumors 
of all sorts were flying about, the municipal council declared the 
city under martial law and, informed that the crowds at the 
Champ de Mars were riotous, proceeded thither accompanied by 
national guards. The troops on their appearance were greeted 
with missiles, and fired into the crowd before Bailly or Lafayette 
could restrain them. A stampede took place and many persons 
were trampled upon. When the field was cleared, about twelve 
lay dead and as many wounded. 

The radicals called this affair the Massacre of the Champ de 



Affair 

of 

the Champ 



THE MENACE OF CIVIL WAR 147 

Mars, while the conservatives regarded it as a salutary act of c hap, x 
firmness. As the Jacobin Club was associated with one of the 1790-91 
petitions, all the deputies who belonged to it except Robespierre, 
Petion, Gregoire and a few others, attempted to reorganize the 
club at the convent of the Feuillants, The seceders took the 
same name, so that for months there were two clubs called 
" Friends of the Constitution," one sitting at the Jacobins and 
the other at the Feuillants. The clubs outside of Paris retained 
their affiliation with that at the Jacobins. Many of the seceders 
returned when the club adopted an attitude less extreme on the 
constitutional question. 

The general denial of religious liberty to those who refused 
to conform to the established Church was a new cause of emigra- 
tion. By this time it had become the fashion to emigrate. One Renewed 
nobleman wrote to his son, who sympathized with the Revolu- °^^^^^ ^°° 
tion, " At your age it is necessary to do what the other young 
people are doing." The Count of Artois sent appeals to the 
noblemen in the army to join the forces which were assembling 
on the frontier. Many went, moved by the strange notion that 
honor called. The exodus became so alarming that the more 
earnest revolutionaries concluded that either the whole army 
should be disbanded or the officers should be dismissed. The 
Assembly refused to go so far, but a few days before the King's 
flight it drew up a new form of oath. By it officers and sol- 
diers bound themselves to take no part in any conspiracy against 
the constitution, and any man guilty of unfaithfulness to his 
pledge should be " regarded as infamous, unworthy of bearing 
arms or being counted in the number of French citizens." Those 
who intended to emigrate reassured themselves by means of the 
subtlety that this oath was binding only as long as they remained 
" functionaries." To avoid infamy, it was only necessary to 
resign first. More than 2,000 officers did resign between Sep- 
tember, 1791, and December, many without previously sending in 
a resignation. Of 9,000 officers in the line about 6,000 resigned 
before this movement ended. 

The King's flight led to the enactment of a decree forbidding 
all persons except merchants to leave the kingdom. In July 
those who emigrated were subjected to a tax three times their 
regular assessment for the current year unless they returned 
within a month. Severe measures were justified not only be- 
cause the movement threatened the efficiency of the army, but 
also because the Prince of Conde had already collected a small 
army on the Rhine. During the preceding winter the Count of 
Artois had formed the project of using a new assemblage of 



148 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



King and 
Constitu- 



CathoHc troops at the Camp of Jales as a center for a royalist 
insurrection in the South. He was forced to abandon the project 
because the royal family thought that such a movement would 
compromise the success of their attempt to escape from Paris. 
Nevertheless, the manoeuvers at Jales seriously alarmed public 
opinion. 

When the work of revising the constitution was completed, 
the Assembly announced that the King might proceed to a town 
of his choice and there decide whether he would accept or reject 
it. To him this freedom seemed only apparent. He cherished 
the scheme of bringing about a congress which should represent 
the European powers and whose decisions should be enforced 
by their combined armies. This would, he thought, enable him 
to pose as a mediator between the indignant monarchs and his 
misguided subjects. He therefore regarded an acceptance of 
the constitution as a means of gaining time, and on September 
14 he promised to defend it loyally against attack from domes- 
tic conspirators or foreign foes. Marie Antoinette, in a letter 
to a friend, sadly remarked, " It would have been more noble 
to refuse." 

The folly of the King's brothers robbed the act of what little 
appearance of sincerity it possessed. In a letter which they 
addressed to him, and which was published in Paris, they 
declared that any acceptance on his part would be the conse- 
quence of constraint, for his heart would reject an act which 
his duty as king forbade. Their words gained meaning from 
the fact that the Count of Provence held court at Coblentz as 
" regent " of France, alleging that the King was a prisoner, and 
from the additional fact that the Prince of Conde maintained 
military headquarters at Worms, surrounded by an army of 
several thousand emigrants. The self-styled regent attempted 
to enter into diplomatic relations with the foreign powers and the 
Empress Catherine of Russia sent him an ambassador. 

The last session of the Constituent Assembly was held on 
September 30, and on the following day its place was taken by 
a new assembly, called the Legislative Assembly, that is, the 
legislature provided for in the constitution. The two differed 
in their functions, for the period of constitution making was 
ended and the time for normal legislation had come. Although 
no member of the Constituent Assembly could be chosen to the 
Legislative Assembly, the new body was loyal to the monarchy. 
The primary elections had occurred before the flight to Varennes, 
and in consequence the electors who formed the electoral col- 
leges or secondary assemblies were not seriously influenced by 



The Legis- 
lative As- 
sembly 



THE MENACE OF CIVIL WAR 149 

the radical movement of July, 1791. Even in Paris only three c hap, x 
or four deputies out of twenty-four were radicals. After the 1790-91 
Assembly was organized the Constitutional Royalists were the 
most influential group, numbering about 250, or one-third of 
the whole. The center which called itself Independent was 
somewhat larger and voted either with the right or left. The 
radicals were in a decided minority, numbering only 130. Among 
them were several deputies from the department of the Gironde 
— Vergniaud, Guadet, and Gensonne — a group which formed 
the nucleus of the later Girondin party. Brissot, one of the 
Paris deputies, was soon on intimate terms with them. This 
radical minority, through its energy, its zeal for the Revolution, 
and its uncompromising defense of the French view of every 
international question, often wrested the leadership from the 
right. The efforts of the radicals to interpret the constitution 
in a republican sense made its features less acceptable to the 
King and rendered the success of the experiment still less prob- 
able. 



CHAPTER XI 

THE REVOLUTION AND EUROPE 

C HAP. X I ^-r^HE Revolution began as the deliverance of a great nation 
1789-92 A from the trammels of arbitrary government and anti- 
quated privilege. So most liberal minds understood it, in other 
countries as well as in France. Two years passed and its course 
appeared to lie directly towards civil war. The principal rea- 
son for the sinister change was the failure of the leaders to 
listen to counsels of moderation and to estimate accurately the 
strength of the conservative or reactionary forces which succes- 
sive reforms, and especially the attempt to reorganize the Church, 
were rousing to resistance. 

The relations of Revolutionary France and her neighbors 
underwent a similar change. Many discerning minds in Eng- 
Franceand land, Germany, and Italy at first thought it meant the end of 
bors^"^^' despotism and feudal oppression everywhere. The Declaration 
of Rights was a new gospel of individual worth, bringing hope 
to men of all countries. Such a creed could recognize no na- 
tional boundaries. And yet Frenchmen remained Frenchmen, 
with traditional ambitions which influenced their aims and lurked 
beneath the most fraternal outbursts of cosmopolitan feeling. 
Moreover, a rigid adherence to what they were pleased to term 
principles would make trouble with their neighbors as it had 
at home. The statesmen of neighboring lands cared little for 
such principles, but were likely to keep their attention fixed 
upon their own interests and to object stubbornly if the French 
National Assembly insisted upon placing its interpretation upon 
their rights. Their antagonism was quickened by the danger 
that the revolutionary spirit would cross the borders of France 
and subvert their government or undermine their social system. 
For this reason the months which saw the approach of civil 
war in France saw also preparations for a foreign war. 

English public opinion, at first generally favorable, became 
more discriminating after the uprising in October, 1789. Men 
took sides and grouped themselves into defenders or opponents 
of the Revolution. New societies were formed or old societies 
revived, and these entered into correspondence with the French 
societies, particularly with the Jacobin Club. A sermon preached 

150 



THE REVOLUTION AND EUROPE 151 

by Dr. Richard Price before one of them was taken by Burke charxi 
as his text for a searching examination of the principles and 1789-92 
acts of the Revolution. Burke had become an open and scorn- EngUsh 
ful critic before the first year of revolution had passed, but his criticism 
Reflections on the Revolution in France did not appear until 
November, 1790, In spite of its defects, the book possesses 
historic importance, both because of its immediate effect upon 
public opinion in England and on the Continent and because it 
illustrates a method of thought upon poHtical institutions vi^hich 
was destined to displace the method of Locke and the French 
philosophers and to serve as a type for the best political think- 
ing of the nineteenth century. Burke insisted that reform must 
find limits in a reasonat^e respect for historical rights. He be- 
lieved that the conflict £>i established interests would lead to 
sound political life more surely than any ingenious mechanism 
for expressing the " general will." His criticisms of the acts 
of the French and of their assembly were unjust because they 
were based upon a prejudiced and defective knowledge of social 
conditions in France both before the Revolution and during its 
first year. Burke's book brought many replies, the most not- 
able of which were Sir James Mackintosh's Vindiciae Gallicae 
and Thomas Paine's Rights of Man. A more effective reply 
appeared in Arthur Young's Travels in France and particularly 
in the section describing the burdensome feudal privileges which 
had rested on the peasantry. 

The controversy over the Revolution was carried into parlia- 
ment, especially in the debates on the constitution of Quebec in 
1791, and led to a split in the Whig party and the alienation of 
Burke and Fox. The Revolution was beginning to alarm the 
classes which inherited a privileged position. They gained such 
a horror of reform that every scheme seemed equally reprehen- 
sible. The consequence was that the social and political de- 
velopment of England was retarded during a generation. There 
never was a real danger that admiration of French principles or 
of the achievements of the Revolution would lead to upheaval 
in England. The governing classes were not yet divided in 
attitude towards the principles of English social order or po- 
litical organization. Moreover, Englishmen had long enjoyed 
many of the liberties Frenchmen were struggling for. In Ire- 
land the situation was different. One of the societies organized 
was the United Irishmen, and a group of revolutionists was 
formed which was later to cause England anxiety. 

The full consequences of the Revolution for Germany were Germany 
momentous, but several years elapsed before they were even 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



partially apparent. Liberal-minded Germans were enthusiastic 
over the first conquests of the Revolution. They hailed the fall 
of the Bastille as a great symbolic event. Schlozer, of Gottingen, 
whose journal was a weight in political discussion and was al- 
ways upon the table of the Emperor Joseph, declared that the 
angels in heaven must have sung a Te Deum at the news. The 
poet Klopstock was fervid in his admiration. The philosopher 
Kant, who had been deeply influenced by Rousseau's writings, 
saw in the Revolution evidence of a truer appreciation of the 
essential worth of man. After the October insurrection, the 
Germans, like the English, began to be discriminating in their 
praises. They felt that the French were carrying too much 
passion into their work and that injustice would be the result. 
Gentz, who was to become one of Germany's foremost political 
thinkers, and who at first regarded Burke's criticisms as un- 
just, in 1792 translated the Rejections, adding valuable observa- 
tions, which were the first example in Germany of political dis- 
cussion in accord with the methods of the newer historical 
science. 

In Germany political conditions offered insuperable obstacles 
to the revolutionary propaganda. Its weakness as a loose con- 
federation of States practically independent was a source of 
strength in this respect, for there were many centers of local 
activity, each with its special traditions and attachments. The 
great States, Austria and Prussia, were not decadent, like the 
old Bourbon monarchy. Frederick the Great had been dead 
only three years. The Prussian landed aristocracy still pos- 
sessed feudal rights over the peasants, but they lived on their 
estates, and were a present force for good or for ill. Never- 
theless, in some of the petty States along the Rhine oppression 
was so odious and the contagion of revolution so near that dis- 
content produced local insurrections. Indeed, the news of the 
Revolution swept like a strong breeze across Germany, changing 
the moral atmosphere. 

The rulers of Europe watched the progress of the Revolution 
with feelings suggested by its bearing upon their cherished 
schemes. The financial crisis, out of which France had been 
attempting since 1787 to escape, had already exercised a paralyz- 
ing influence upon her foreign policy, but no one looked for so 
utter an overthrow of royal power as came suddenly in June 
and July, 1789. The impressions which it made were every- 
where distinct and fresh. For Austria it meant the collapse 
of an alliance which had been full of deceptions. If the cam- 
paign against the Turks had continued to be as disastrous as 



THE REVOLUTION AND EUROPE 153 

it was in 1788, the loss of the moral support of France would c hap, x i 
have been serious. But the Emperor Joseph and his minister 1789-92 
Kaunitz affected an attitude of indifference or disdain. Their 
disappointment must have been real, judging from the relief 
and joy with which the news from Paris was received in Ber- 
lin. The Prussians had not forgotten the perils from which 
the genius of the great Frederick delivered them in 1757, and 
it seemed possible that if the struggle in the East developed 
into a general European war France might again throw the 
weight of her army into the scale. With the fall of the Bastille 
this danger was averted. Late in July the Prussian minister 
Hertzberg wrote his master that the French monarchy was 
ruined, and that the opportunity had come to establish the in- 
fluence of Prussia upon firm foundations, since Austria could 
no longer reckon upon French support. The Prussian ambassa- 
dor in Paris was instructed to enter into relations with the 
radicals and increase the embarrassments of the French gov- 
ernment. 

The English government was suspected of pursuing a policy 
similar to that of Frederick William IL Shrewd observers felt 
that William Pitt, the prime minister, could not be indifferent 
to the fact that the revolutionary movement was ruining the 
power of France more certainly than a long succession of de- 
feats, and without drawing a single pound sterling from the 
British treasury for military expenditures. Since riots dis- 
astrous to French influence abroad were now cheap in Paris, 
few believed that so excellent a financier would resist the temp- 
tation to invest. In his first utterance in parliament on the 
Revolution, early in 1790, Pitt expressed the hope that France 
would emerge from her state of struggle and trial freer and 
therefore stronger, capable of taking a still more brilliant part 
in the affairs of Europe. His attitude was correct, but a quar- 
rel with Spain soon made evident the disappearance of France 
as an international factor. 

The Spaniards, attempting to render effective their occupa- 
tion of the northwestern coast of America, seized two English Nootka 
vessels in Nootka Sound, on the western coast of Vancouver ^^^ 
Island, a place to which English traders had occasionally re- 
sorted since Captain Cook visited it in 1778. As soon as Pitt 
was informed of this act, he demanded reparation from the 
Spanish government. By virtue of the offensive and defensive 
alliance known as the Family Compact, between Spain and 
France, Spain had a right to call upon France for support in 
case the quarrel resulted in war. When the formidable prepa- 



^54 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



C HAr. X I rations which England was making to enforce her demands were 
1789-92 known, Montmorin, French minister of foreign affairs, thought 
that the time had come to silence the strife of factions by an 
appeal to patriotic union against the ancient enemy. He sent 
word to the National Assembly that in view of the armaments 
in England the King had ordered the arming of fourteen ships 
that he might fulfil his obligations to his ally. This precipitated 
a debate upon the right of peace and war, during which the 
radical orators ascribed war in general to cabinet intrigue and 
dynastic ambition. At the close the Assembly decreed that any 
declaration of war or treaty of peace must be made by the 
national legislature, although to the King was still left the right 
to propose the declaration. The Assembly also seized the occa- 
sion to assure the world of the peaceful character of the Revo- 
lution, formally renouncing wars of conquest or attacks upon 
the liberties of other peoples. This was a noble attitude, if 
it was a fixed principle of policy, but it might degenerate 
into mere delusive pose. Neither the debate nor its conclusion 
ofifered much prospect of support to Spain, When in June, 
1790, Spain made a formal demand for help, Montmorin waited 
two months before he ventured to bring the matter again be- 
fore the Assembly. Under Mirabeau's influence the Assembly 
replied by ordering negotiations opened with Spain to give the 
alliance a purely defensive character. At the same time the 
Assembly voted the arming of forty-five ships. The Spaniards 
despaired of obtaining any real assistance and concluded to 
come to terms with the English, a conclusion hastened by the 
reception of an ultimatum from Pitt. A treaty was signed in 
October without even consulting France. The little that Mont- 
morin learned of the negotiations came through London. Noth- 
ing could have marked more significantly the destruction of the 
Family Compact and the ruin of French influence in foreign 
aflfairs. 

The conduct of the Assembly towards the rights of foreign 
Border States could be squared with its attitude of renunciation only 
Problems |-,y ^^ ingcnious method of definition and distinction. Its de- 
crees of August 4 attempted to destroy the rights which Ger- 
man princes possessed in Alsace and which were secured to 
them not only by the treaties of Miinster and Ryswick, but also 
in several instances by separate agreements with the French 
Crown. The abolition of the tithe, the confiscation of church 
property, and the destruction of foreign ecclesiastical jurisdic- 
tion within France, severing relations with German dioceses 
and provinces which had existed a thousand years, was a still 



THE REVOLUTION AND EUROPE 155 

more serious blow to several great princes of the Church in c hap, x i 
Germany. Among those who suffered by one feature or another 1789-92 
of this legislation were the Duke of Wiirttemberg, the Margrave 
of Baden, the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt, the Archbishop- 
Electors of Mainz, Treves, and Cologne, and the Bishops of 
Speyer and Basel. To them it seemed as if the spirit of Louis 
XIV had taken possession of the National Assembly and as if 
its acts were the sequel of the decisions of the Chambers of 
Reunion which had lighted the flames of war a century before. 
It was difficult for them to see how a nation which had solemnly 
renounced wars of conquest could settle by simple decree ques- 
tions of right which Louis XIV had been unable to determine 
by half a dozen campaigns. 

Even if an attempt had been made to settle the question of 
Alsace upon grounds of historical right, the French and the Alsace 
Germans would not have found agreement easy. When the 
French had obtained Alsace in 1648, they had received simply 
what the House of Hapsburg possessed. The treaty expressly 
stipulated that the princes, lay or ecclesiastical, who held fiefs 
directly, or " immediately," of the empire should not lose the 
rights and prerogatives attached to such a legal status. The 
same stipulation protected the autonomy of the imperial cities. 
These reserved rights were successfully ignored by Louis XIV, 
so far as they interfered with the exercise of sovereignty. The 
inability of the empire to protect its less powerful vassals led 
them to make separate arrangements with France, acknowledg- 
ing French sovereignty over their Alsatian territories, and re- 
ceiving in return a royal guarantee of their remaining rights. 
But when the Revolution began to exercise sovereignty, before 
which no barriers of local privilege were strong enough to 
stand, it was unlikely that princely rights in Alsace would be 
treated in a manner acceptable to the German legists. 

In no region did the burdens of the old regime rest with more 
crushing weight than in Alsace, where serfdom still lingered, and 
the people were taxed not only by the King of France but also 
by their German lords. The decrees of the National Assembly 
greatly reduced the burden and for the first time made the 
Alsatians feel like Frenchmen. In an obscure way the lawyers 
of the National Assembly perceived this, and declared that the 
union of Alsace to France rested on the will of the people and 
not on the treaties of Westphalia. They were ready to treat 
the rights of the German princes as relics of ancient and in- 
iquitous usurpations. These princes had, they said, no just 
ground of complaint, and if France should offer an indemnity, 



156 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

C HAP. X I ^\^Q offer would be prompted solely by a desire to live on good 

1789-92 terms with her neighbors. This attitude was embodied in a 

report which the Assembly adopted in October, 1790. 

To the German princes it was not wholly a question of right, 
or of income, but partly also of existence. What must be the 
effect upon the peasants of the States immediately across the 
Rhine or below Alsace, if they saw the Alsatian peasants sud- 
denly relieved of the burdens which had been oppressing them 
all for centuries, especially as relief came in the name of prin- 
ciples utterly destructive of the civil, ecclesiastical, and social 
order of Germany? The princes of the Church felt the dan- 
ger more keenly than other princes, and not without good rea- 
son. When the French sent a diplomat to take up the question 
of compensation, he suggested to the Margrave of Baden the 
plan of finding territorial indemnities in the domains of the 
Church on the right bank of the Rhine and offered him those 
that belonged to the bishopric of Strasbourg. It was natural 
that the ecclesiastical princes, especially the archbishops of 
Mainz, Treves, and Cologne should clamor for extreme meas- 
ures against the French. They urged upon the imperial diet 
the theory that France by ignoring the reservations made in 
the treaties had forfeited all right to Alsace, and demanded that 
the empire resume full jurisdiction. They were anxious, too, 
that a military cordon should be drawn along the French fron- 
tier to prevent the spread of the revolutionary plague. The 
lay princes were inclined to less aggressive views. The more 
impecunious would have taken money for their claims, had 
this not been forbidden by the diet. Others, under the leader- 
ship of Prussia, suggested that if the matter were properly 
brought before the French government it would recall the 
obnoxious decrees. Finally the long process of reaching a formal 
decision from the imperial authorities was begun after the Em- 
peror Leopold, who succeeded his brother Joseph in February, 
1790, had been unable to obtain a satisfactory answer from 
the French government. The decision came in 179 1, and its 
affirmation of the German claims was one element of a diplo- 
matic situation of which war was the consequence. 

The spirit in which a prince-bishop of the empire was likely 
to meet the demands of moderate revolution was illustrated in 

Liege the case of Liege. The news from across the border in the 

summer of 1789 created such an atmosphere of political en- 
thusiasm that a controversy about the prerogatives of the bishop 
led to risings in one or two towns, and finally in Liege itself. 
There was a general cry for the restoration of the liberties 



THE REVOLUTION AND EUROPE 157 

taken away a century before. The bishop appeared ready to c hap, x i 
yield every demand. New magistrates were chosen and the 1789-92 
estates were summoned. But no sooner was this done than 
the bishop fled to Treves. He had already appealed to the 
imperial court at Wetzlar for protection. With unseemly haste, 
this court, by which the most important affairs were delayed 
for years and sometimes for generations, annulled the proceed- 
ings at Liege as an infringement of the peace of the empire, 
and ordered an " execution " by the troops of the circle of 
Westphalia. Prussia, because the duchy of Cleves, a possession 
of Frederick William of Prussia, belonged to this circle, took 
the leading part in the execution, but the King was anxious 
to negotiate a compromise between the absent bishop and his 
subjects and promised them redress of grievances and an amnesty. 
Neither the bishop nor the imperial court, however, would listen 
to suggestions of compromise and the King withdrew his troops. 
The duty of levying execution was then assigned to the cir- 
cles of Franconia, Swabia, and the Rhine, but their troops 
were defeated and it was not until 1791 that Austria, acting 
for the circle of Burgundy, restored the bishop. He avenged 
himself upon his subjects with such unreasoning cruelty that 
a year or two later they welcomed the French invaders as 
deliverers. 

The conduct of France towards the princes who held lands 
in Alsace and the contagion of French revolutionary princi- 
ples might vex the minds of petty German princes, lay or ecclesi- 
astical, but neither Austria nor Prussia was at first turned from 
the plans they were seeking to carry out when the Revolution 
began. Austria wished to bring the Turkish war to a success- Relations 
ful conclusion, while Prussia hoped with the support of the of Prussia 
maritime powers to intervene between the contending States in Austria 
such a way as to win substantial benefits without the costs of 
war. Frederick William's minister, Hertzberg, believed that 
Turkey would welcome Prussian intervention, and, glad to be 
saved from ruin, would concede to Austria the frontiers of the 
Peace of Passarowitz, which included northern Servia, with 
Belgrade, and a part of Wallachia. In order that the balance 
of power might be preserved Prussia could then demand com- 
pensation through a system of exchanges, according to which 
Austria should return Galicia to Poland and Poland should 
grant to Prussia the cities of Danzig and Thorn with the 
palatinate of Posen and Kalisch, territory which Prussia needed 
to round out what she had gained by the first Partition. Other 
advisers of the King urged a grand alliance against Russia and 



58 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



The 

Austrian 

Nether- 

lauds 



C HAP. X I Austria, made up of Sweden, Poland, Turkey, and Prussia, 
1789-92 supported by the maritime States. Sweden was already at war 
with Russia, and Prussian influence in a measure had supplanted 
the influence of Russia in Poland. Meanwhile Prussia was able 
to embarrass Austria by encouraging sedition in Hungary and 
open revolution in the Austrian Netherlands. 

The revolution in the Netherlands had apparently been sup- 
pressed in 1788, The following year it gained new life from a 
quarrel over subsidies. The Emperor Joseph considered the 
time opportune for changes in the constitution of the provinces. 
This violation of ancient liberties aroused a spirit of resist- 
ance, and a small army of exiles, which entered the country 
in October, found so much popular support that by December 
the Austrian troops were obliged to retire to Luxemburg. Early 
the following year the States General declared the Netherlands 
independent and attempted to organize a federal republic. Fred- 
erick William despatched one of his ablest diplomatic agents to 
Brussels to assist the new congress. At his suggestion also 
a Hessian general undertook to reorganize the provincial forces. 
Frederick William carried matters further than Hertzberg's 
scheme required, seeing a good opportunity of crippling Austria, 
while Hertzberg wished to use Austria's embarrassments to 
bring her to the acceptance of his favorite scheme. 

This revolution in the Netherlands had nothing in it which 
ofTended Frederick William's devotion to the ancient order. It 
had only the name revolution in common with the events which 
were destroying the foundations of that order in France. At 
first, indeed, the French were deceived by the coincidence in name. 
The ardent revolutionist Desmoulins named his journal Les Rev- 
olutions de France et de Brabant, and Lafayette was suspected 
of desiring to transform both the Austrian Netherlands and the 
United Provinces into liberal republics under the patronage of 
France. But as soon as the Austrians were driven out of the 
Netherlands the revolutionists fell to fighting among themselves 
and it was at once apparent that the stronger party was made up 
of stanch defenders of the Church and of local privileges. 
This party could no more restrain the fanatical masses of its 
followers than the Parisian leaders could control the populace 
of the faubourgs. In March, 1790, there was a rising in Brus- 
sels, and the Belgian democrats had to fly for their lives in the 
veritable reign of terror which followed. Such a republic the 
French National Assembly refused to recognize, although equally 
disinclined to respect the claims of the Austrians to sympathetic 
support. 



THE REVOLUTION AND EUROPE 159 

The political situation in Europe was profoundly modified by c hap, x i 
the death of Joseph II and the accession of his brother Leo- 1789-92 
pold, who was celebrated for his mild and enlightened admin- 
istration as Grand Duke of Tuscany. Leopold did not approve The 
of his brother's summary methods of revolution from above. Emperor 
He succeeded in quieting the Hungarians and in persuading 
them to recognize him as King, although he did not give up 
all the reforms which Joseph had introduced. With the Bel- 
gians his negotiations were not successful. His greatest danger 
lay on the side of Prussia, which seemed determined to insist 
upon her fantastic scheme of exchanges, even at the peril of 
war. Leopold undermined the Prussian position, however, by 
convincing the English that he was ready to abandon Joseph's 
plan for the partition of Turkey and by urging upon their atten- 
tion the danger that he might give the Netherlands to France in 
return for aid against the Prussians. In the spring Prussia 
mobilized an army in Silesia and sent him an ultimatum, but 
he contented himself with suggesting modifications in the 
scheme of exchanges. Finally, in July, a conference was held 
at the Prussian headquarters at Reichenbach. There the dis^ 
agreeable news was brought to Frederick William that neither 
Turks nor Poles would listen to Hertzberg's propositions, and 
that England demanded that peace be made upon the basis of 
the situation at the opening of hostilities. All that was left 
to the Prussians was the dubious satisfaction of dictating to 
Leopold terms of agreement which he had arranged beforehand. 

One of the consequences of the conference at Reichenbach 
was that Gustavus III concluded to abandon his useless strug- 
gle with the Russians. Another was that Leopold was free 
to restore by force his authority in the Netherlands. He made 
liberal promises to the Belgians and gave them until Novem- 
ber 21 to submit. Representatives of England, Prussia, and the 
United Provinces, meeting at The Hague, made a futile attempt 
to mediate. Leopold's troops crossed the border and easily 
overthrew the new republic. These troops also restored the 
bishop of Liege. The negotiations for peace with the Turks 
dragged on into the year 1791. Finally, in August, Austria 
made peace with Turkey by the Treaty of Sistova and a few 
days later Russia signed preliminaries which the following Jan- 
uary became the Peace of Jassy. The ambitious schemes of 
Catherine and Joseph for the partition of Turkey had dwindled 
to mere rectifications of frontier. Prussia's intervention, which 
was to illustrate a new application of the great Frederick's pol- 
icy in 1772, had led to humiliating rebuffs and a signal loss 



i6o 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



Revolution 
in Poland 



of prestige. Meanwhile the Revolution in France forced itself 
upon the attention of the jealous rivals and Poland offered to 
Russia a better field of gain than the provinces of the Turkish 
empire. 

The Poles had shown an unexpected amount of political sense 
in bringing together a reform diet while Russia was involved 
in war with the Turks. This " Four Years' Diet " met in 
October, 1788. The anti-Russian party, supported by the as- 
surances of Prussian support, was successful in the elections. 
One of the first acts of the diet was a demand that Russian 
troops be withdrawn from the territories of the republic. This 
exhibition of energy, however, had no sequel, and the two years, 
the diet's term of service, expired before anything had been 
accomplished except the signature of a defensive treaty with 
Prussia. New elections were held in 1790, with the under- 
standing that the existing members of the diet should also sit 
in the new body. By the spring of 1791 the reform party, 
realizing that haste was necessary because the war clouds in 
the East were lifting and Russia's hands would soon be free, 
secretly agreed upon a draft of a constitution, which was pro- 
claimed by the King on May 3 and accepted by the diet. Only 
twelve members refused their approval. 

The new constitution made the monarchy hereditary and en- 
dowed it with effective powers of government. In place of a 
diet, paralyzed by the operation of the liberum veto, was a 
legislature, with two chambers. In the lower chamber repre- 
sentation was granted to the towns, depriving the nobles of the 
political monopoly which they had hitherto enjoyed. Personal 
liberty was also safeguarded. Although the Catholic religion 
remained the religion of the State, other creeds were tolerated. 
Serfdom was condemned in principle, but the constitution went 
no further than to sanction in advance any settlements which 
might be made by proprietors with individuals or with com- 
munities. As the opposition at first made no effort to organize 
resistance, it looked as if Poland had been regenerated and was 
about to enter upon a new career of greatness. 

The permanence of this revolution depended upon the atti- 
tude of the neighboring States, for if they should agree upon a 
policy of hostility and spoliation enough malcontents could be 
found in Poland to create a situation inviting foreign interven- 
tion. Prussian enthusiasm had been cooled by the refusal of 
the Poles to consider Hertzberg's project of exchange. The 
treaty of March, 1790, did not pledge Prussia to sustain the 
new constitution, although it did pledge her to defend the in- 



Attitude 
of the 
Powers 



THE REVOLUTION AND EUROPE i6i 

tegrity of Poland's territory. When Hertzberg learned of the c hap, x i 
Polish revolution, he pointed out to the King the danger it con- 1789-92 
tained for Prussia. The succession to the throne was offered 
by the constitution to the elector of Saxony and his heirs. If 
Saxony and Poland were united in a well-organized government 
Prussia's position would be imperilled. The total population 
of the new kingdom would be double the population of Prussia. 
Such a Poland would be the natural enemy of Prussia's progress, 
even if it did not deprive Prussia of the advantages won by 
Frederick the Great. But Frederick William still feared the 
possibility of war with Russia, and, if this took place, the friend- 
ship of Poland was necessary. Moreover, negotiations were 
already begun looking to an understanding between Prussia and 
Austria, and Frederick William learned that the Emperor Leo- 
pold was anxious to embody in any agreement a guarantee of 
the new order of things in Poland. Leopold's secret hopes were 
that Poland would become strong enough to curb the ambitions 
of both Russia and Prussia. Frederick William did not hesi- 
tate, therefore, to send word to Warsaw and to Dresden that 
he approved what had been done, and he indicated his readiness 
to join Austria in sanctioning the new constitution. Unfor- 
tunately for Poland the matter did not end there. Russia had 
to be reckoned with. Catherine II had twice guaranteed the 
old constitution of Poland, which was favorable to her schemes, 
and she regarded the coup d'etat of May 3 as fatal to her in- 
fluence. This strengthened her inclination to sign a peace with 
the Turks, in order to prevent the consolidation of the new 
Polish regime. 

Before the drama of Varennes none of the greater powers 
concerned itself with the troubles of France. The repeated de- Leopold 
mands of the emigrant princes only irritated Leopold. He *°*^'^^'i°« 
would give Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette no assurances of 
military support until they left Paris and drew about them a 
considerable party. The news of the flight and of the forced 
return of the King to Paris changed the situation. To the 
Emperor such violence seemed inexcusable and odious. He at 
once despatched to the principal powers a note suggesting com- 
mon action in order to restore the King to liberty and to restrain 
the excesses of a revolution which compromised the honor of 
monarchs and imperilled the existence of all governments. It was 
fatal to the success of this overture that England refused to take 
part in any intervention. The only consequence was that Prussia 
and Austria drew nearer together. Leopold seemed on the point 
of winning Prussia over to his Polish policy, and the Prussian 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



agent signed a preliminary treaty guaranteeing to Poland her 
territory and constitution. When the negotiations touched 
French affairs, the Prussians raised the question of indemnities, 
in view of the possibility that military intervention should lead 
to Austrian acquisitions on the French frontier. They Mrould 
not have been averse to the promise of Austrian Silesia. Eng- 
land's attitude, however, made intervention only a remote possi- 
bility. Frederick William and Leopold met at the chateau of 
Pillnitz in Saxony to discuss the situation. When the emigrant 
princes appeared demanding intervention, with the recognition 
of the Count of Provence as regent of France, Leopold and 
Frederick William refused to entertain such a scheme. The 
most they would do was to give the princes a " declaration " 
which was in the nature of a polite refusal. This is the famous 
" Declaration of Pillnitz," of August 27, 1791, which pronounced 
the restoration of the monarchy in France a matter of common 
interest and expressed the hope that other States would not 
refuse to employ their forces for this purpose. The declara- 
tion explained that " Then and in this case Austria and Prussia 
would be ready to act with sufficient troops." On the evening 
of the issue of the declaration Leopold wrote to Kaunitz that 
he had not bound himself to any definite action. " Alors et dans 
ce cas is with me," he said, " the law and the prophets — if 
England fails us, the case I have put is non-existent." He 
seems to have thought that the menace contained in the " decla- 
ration " might have a wholesome influence on public opinion in 
Paris and frighten the radicals into the adoption of a more 
moderate policy. Unfortunately for King Louis, his brothers 
published this declaration first a week after the King had ac- 
cepted the constitution and at the end of their open letter to 
him repudiating his acceptance as insincere and contrary to his 
sacred duty. They added, falsely, that not only Prussia and 
Austria, but England and the other powers, were making active 
preparations for intervention. Not all Parisians were deceived 
as to the character of the declaration, for many regarded it as 
a rebufif to the princes. 

Two weeks after the Declaration of Pillnitz the National As- 
sembly complicated the situation by annexing Avignon and the 
Comtat Venaissin, the papal territories in the South. Since the 
preceding summer the question had been raised repeatedly, be- 
cause the papal authorities were unable to restore order. The 
desire of the inhabitants of Avignon for annexation was un- 
doubted, the wishes of the Comtat were not so clear. As long 
as Mirabeau was alive the Assembly adhered to its first position 



THE REVOLUTION AND EUROPE 163 

that annexation would be contrary to the pledge inserted in the chapjxi 
constitution. The break with the Pope in the spring of 179 1 1789-92 
over the enforcement of the laws reorganizing the French 
Church removed one reason for caution. Old claims to the ter- 
ritory were drawn from the archives. The method of aggran- 
dizement through popular movements in neighboring States ap- 
peared to have nothing in common with the brutal seizures 
operated by Louis XIV. The Assembly finally decided upon 
annexation, basing the act upon the ancient rights of France 
as well as upon the wishes of the inhabitants. The consent of 
the Pope was not sought, but the Assembly offered to negotiate 
with him for the payment of any indemnities which might be 
due. The proceeding was well characterized in a letter which 
Mirabeau's friend, the Count de la Marck, wrote to the Aus- 
trian ambassador : " It is evident that after such conduct 
France will be in a state of war with all governments ; she will 
threaten them with domestic insurrection, and insurrection will 
lead to conquest." 

Neither the Declaration of Pillnitz nor the annexation of 
Avignon was enough to bring on war between France and her 
neighbors. Moreover, as soon as Leopold heard that Louis XVI 
had accepted the constitution, he withdrew the declaration and other 
received the minister of France. Frederick William took the controv/ray 
same attitude. But serious questions still remained, furnishing 
grounds of complaint to both sides. On the one hand the af- 
fair of the dispossessed German princes was at a critical stage. 
The imperial diet in August reached a " conclusion " maintain- 
ing the rights of the princes, and this action merely awaited the 
ratification of the Emperor. Austria and Prussia were more 
inclined to defend these claims, now that the rights of the Pope 
in Avignon had been flagrantly violated. If the rights of princes 
were to be settled in Paris without consulting them, whose turn 
would come next? On the other hand, it seemed intolerable 
to patriotic Frenchmen that the border German States should 
serve as a base of operations for emigrant conspirators. The 
Count of Provence continued to hold court at Coblentz as re- 
gent of France, and the Prince of Conde made Worms his 
military headquarters. Only the most conciliatory diplomacy 
on both sides could find a peaceful solution for these problems, 
but no attempt was made to conduct negotiations in this spirit. 

In France four policies were pursued at the same time: one 
by the King through Breteuil, his representative abroad; an- 
other by Narbonne, the minister of war ; a third by the Feuillant 
or constitutionalist group in the ministry ; and a fourth by the 



164 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. XI 
1789-92 



Legislative Assembly. The King, deeming intervention by the 
powers his only hope, sent pressing appeals to them. Narbonne, 
supported by Lafayette's influence, thought that a short cam- 
paign against the princes who were harboring the emigrants 
would popularize the monarchy. If Austria gave them military 
support, the result would probably be the same, for Prussia 
could be detached and England would preserve her neutrality. 
Delessart, Montmorin's successor in the ministry of foreign 
alTairs, had no firm* policy, but was inclined to listen to the con- 
stitutionalists, who assured him that a sufficient display of force 
on the part of Leopold would thoroughly intimidate the French 
radicals and lead of necessity to a compromise and a restoration 
of royal authority. The Assembly, believing that open war was 
preferable to the continuance of an equivocal situation, speedily 
assumed direction of affairs and conducted negotiations by means 
of decrees which menaced the King and the ministry as much 
as they alarmed the German princes and exasperated the Em- 
peror. 

The question of the armed emigrants could be approached in 
two ways. The Assembly could Tby decree threaten their lives 
and sequestrate their property, or it could order the invasion 
of the States which harbored them. The first method was tried 
in a decree of November 9, which declared that those who after 
the first of the following January remained on the fron- 
tier in arms should be charged with revolt and upon their ap- 
pearance in France should be tried, and, if found guilty, should 
be put to death. The princes also were to be indicted for trea- 
son, if they did not return before January. This method was 
rendered futile by the refusal of the King to sanction the decree, 
although two months later he did approve of a measure seques- 
trating the property of the emigrants. 

The Assembly, on November 29^ tried the second method. 
A deputation was sent to the King requesting him to use in 
dealing with foreign powers " language suitable to a King of 
the French. ... To the German princes he should declare 
that if they continued to favor preparations made against France, 
the French would bear amongst them not fire and sword but 
liberty." On November 29 also a young deputy named Isnard 
expressed the same thought in more striking language. " Say 
to Europe," he cried out, " that if cabinets engage kings in a 
war against peoples we will engage peoples in a war against 
tyrants." The King decided to yield to the Assembly's de- 
mands, believing that the consequence would be a European in- 
tervention or a war. If war resulted, he thought the resistance 



THE REVOLUTION AND EUROPE 165 

of France would be broken down in a single campaign and that c hap, x i 
his people would turn to him as mediator, to save them from 1789-92 
the vengeance of the Powers. Accordingly on December 14 
he announced to the Assembly the despatch of an ultimatum to 
the Elector of Treves, declaring that if he did not disperse the 
emigrants within a month he would be treated as an enemy. 

On the same day the King informed his confidential agent 
abroad that he hoped the Powers would intervene, disperse the 
emigrants, and defend the Elector. This they in effect did. 
When the Elector appealed to them, Austria and Prussia prom- 
ised aid, biit insisted upon the dispersion of the emigrants. The 
Elector [complied and the hapless exiles were obliged to seek 
a refuge elsewhere, traveling, many of them on foot, through 
the mud and snow of a German winter. The Landgrave of 
Hesse, the Duke of Wiirttemberg, and even the King of Prus- 
sia refused them asylum. On December 21 the French gov- 
ernment was informed that these measures had been taken, and 
the incident was closed. 

Unfortunately for France the war had got into politics. The 
Girondin leaders, especially Brissot, Vergniaud, and Isnard, be- 
lieved that war would unite all patriotic Frenchmen in support TheNon- 
of the Revolution. The King and his ministers would be obliged '^'^'^°" 
to support the national cause or be convicted of treason. Louis 
had irritated the radicals by his veto of a decree aimed at the 
non-jurors who were accused of fomenting civil war. Early 
in its career the Assembly had been informed by a special com- 
mission of the hostility of many parishes toward the new clergy. 
In some cases the non-jurors still retained their pulpits, or, if 
they had been expelled by force, they held services in the woods 
or the fields. The acts of the new clergy were often denounced 
as invalid, a serious accusation because the registry of births 
and marriages remained in the hands of the clergy. Sentiment 
in the Assembly first took the sensible direction of undoing in 
part the work of the Constituent Assembly by depriving the oath 
of its semi-religious connection, by renaming the Civil Consti- 
tution of the clergy a " law " concerning the civil relations of 
worship, and by taking from the clergy their character as offi- 
cials. Public opinion seemed to be moving toward a separation 
of Church and State, in order that in a free State the Church 
might also be free and might not continue to be a source of 
civil troubles. This moderate attitude was changed when news 
reached Paris from western France that the non-juring priests 
were organizing the peasants for resistance. In one or two 
places a repetition of the riots of Nimes and Montauban was 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

feared. The Assembly now decided to impose on the non- 
jurors a civic oath, depriving those who refused of their pen- 
sions and placing them under surveillance as suspicious persons. 
The King vetoed this decree the same month in which he vetoed 
the decree against the emigrants. He seemed to the radicals, 
therefore, the ally of traitors at home as well as of conspirators 
abroad. 

If the Assembly wanted war, excuses could easily be found. 
To the Emperor's announcement that he would support the 
" conclusion " of the German diet, it replied by a decree declar- 
ing " infamous " and a traitor any one who should take part 
in a congress looking toward the restoration of the rights sup- 
pressed by the Constituent Assembly. The Austro-Prussian 
treaty of July 25, 1791, based on the idea of intervention, which 
Leopold had not renounced altogether when he withdrew the 
Declaration of Pillnitz, was also treated as a pretext for war. 
The Girondins urged that France imitate the example of Fred- 
erick II in 1756 and not wait to be attacked. Their views tri- 
umphed and on January 25 the Assembly " invited " the King 
to declare to the Emperor Leopold that his acts were an in- 
fringement of the treaty of 1756 and to give him until March i 
to renounce all hostile combinations and to explain satisfactorily 
his conduct hitherto. 

The course of the negotiations had already convinced both 
Leopold and Frederick William that war was unavoidable and 
they resumed the task of arranging a definite treaty of alliance. 
This was signed on February 7, although the details were left 
for subsequent settlement. Leopold's reply to the summons of 
January 25 was full of strictures upon the French political sit- 
uation, and in it Kaunitz made the Emperor appeal to " healthy " 
public opinion to restrain the factious. When this was read in 
the Assembly, on March i, it aroused general indignation. A 
few days later the overthrow of the ministry followed. Nar- 
bonne sought the support of Lafayette in imposing his policy 
upon the King and was summarily dismissed. The war party, 
led by Brissot, then turned upon Delessart, who was working 
in sympathy with the Feuillant policy, accused him of treason 
in permitting Austrian insolence to go unrebuked, and imme- 
diately ordered his arrest. In the debate Vergniaud, the great- 
est of the Girondin orators, menaced the life of the Queen, 
declaring that perfidious counsels were misleading the King, 
that " he alone was inviolable," and that " no other head con- 
victed of being criminal could escape the sword of the law." 

The consequence of this struggle was the appointment of a 



THE REVOLUTION AND EUROPE 167 

ministry composed of men committed to the Girondin policy, chap, xi 
Foreign affairs were given to Dumouriez, a bold, clear-sighted 1789-92 
man, but an adventurer rather than a statesman; the finances a Girondin 
to Claviere, a Swiss banker, and the interior to Roland, who, Ministry 
with Madame Roland, belonged to the inner circle of the Giron- 
din group. Dumouriez sought the support of the Jacobin Club 
and conducted his negotiations with the Austrian Court in the 
tone and with the accent of Jacobin eloquence. War became 
simply a question of days or, at most, of weeks. 

Meanwhile, on March i, the Emperor Leopold had died, and 
had been succeeded by his son Francis, who was more inclined 
to war than his father and who immediately drew nearer Prus- war with 
sia. The natural reluctance of Louis XVI to consent to war Austria 
was lessened by his conviction that the resistance of the French 
would break down speedily and that his people would turn to 
him as the only means of obtaining favorable terms of peace. 
Accordingly on April 20 he proposed to the Assembly a decla- 
ration of war against Austria. The sentiment in favor of war 
was so overwhelming that only seven deputies voted against the 
decree. The Assembly repeated the renunciation of conquest 
which the Constituent Assembly had placed in the constitution, 
asserting that France took up the sword simply in defense of 
liberty and independence and that the war was not of " nation 
against nation, but the just defense of a free people against the 
unjust aggression of a king." 

The war was directed against Francis not as emperor, but 
as head of the House of Hapsburg, whose royal title was " King 
of Hungary and Bohemia." The ministry attempted to separate 
the cause of Prussia from that of Austria, but Frederick Wil- 
liam took the attitude that a declaration of war against his ally 
was directed against him also. With the minor princes of 
Germany, France had better success, because they were exposed 
to the first shocks of the conflict. Bavaria adopted a policy of 
neutrality, and only Hesse-Cassel promised the allies assistance. 
Prussia and Austria threatened, if the minor States pursued a 
particularist policy, to limit their efforts to the defense of their 
own frontiers. Soon the kingdom of Sardinia, whose duchy 
of Savoy was on the French side of the Alps, was added to the 
list of the enemies of France. 

This war, undertaken " with a light heart," meant the ruin 
of the party which advocated it and the dethronement and death 
of the King who sanctioned it. The Girondins, who dreamed 
of a glorious struggle of liberty against tyranny and of peo- 
ples against kings, discovered that in the tempestuous sea of 



i68 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

C HAP. X I popular passion heaved up by war they were not strong enough 
1789-92 to guide the ship of State. The King, instead of being mediator 
between subjects humbled by defeat and an angry Europe, be- 
came an object of distrust and hatred. In the turmoil and 
anarchy of the struggle supreme power was seized by the rad- 
ical Jacobins, who were not men of half measures and subtle 
combinations, and who were embarrassed by no alliances with 
the beneficiaries of the old regime or the ministers of the King. 



CHAPTER XII 

THE WAR AND THE MONARCHY 

ALTHOUGH war was declared on April 20, 1792, no serious ^^rf* 
operations were undertaken by either side until July. The 

French army was still seriously disorganized. The feeling of 1792-93 
distrust between soldiers and officers had been increased by the 
emigration of thousands of officers. In August, 1791, when 
the flight of the royal family occasioned rumors of war, the 
Constituent Assembly ordered the enlistment of 100,000 volun- TheFrenc 
teers. It tried to make the service attractive by offering priv- ^^^^ 
ileges which the regular soldiers did not enjoy, including bet- 
ter pay, the right to choose their officers, and the permission 
to return home at the close of each year's campaign. Never- 
theless, volunteers came in slowly. After the war had been 
in progress for two months only half of the battalions were 
ready, and only half of these had any share in the actual fight- 
ing two months later. The spirit of disorder infected the vol- 
unteers as well as the regular soldiers. Their officers were often 
chosen for ability to manage political gatherings rather than for 
military qualities, although there were striking exceptions. Sev- 
eral were destined to become famous in the Napoleonic wars — 
among them Jourdan, Davout, Moreau, Desaix, Brune, Soult, 
and Lannes. 

The army suffered from other difficulties. Equipment and 
supplies were lacking. Frequent changes in the ministry of war 
added to the confusion. No fewer than seven ministers occu- 
pied the office within six months. Each worked zealously to 
bring order out of chaos, but the task was discouraging. The 
difficulties were increased by the depreciation of the assignats, 
which were quoted at 56 ^ in June. This caused suffering, 
especially among the officers. 

Neither Frederick William nor Francis was able to take ad- 
vantage of the situation. Francis would not be ready to open 
the campaign until his election as emperor had been secured. Delays of 
and both monarchs wished to settle the question of the in- Austria 

^At Paris. The rate of depreciation differed in different localities. 
For example, assignats were, at the same time, 67.6 -f- in the Cotes-du- 
Nord. 

169 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XII 



demnities which they might claim in the event of victory, each 
fearing to be overreached by his rival. The alliance between 
the two seemed a political monstrosity, in view of the half cen- 
tury of bitter conflicts just ended. Arthur Young wrote that 
the two would agree as well as " oil and vinegar — fire and 
water." Frederick William's chief anxiety was on the side 
of Poland, for the Empress Catherine of Russia during the 
fall and winter had been nursing the opposition of the Polish 
nobles to the settlement of May 3. They were ready to organ- 
ize a " confederation," counting on the support of Russian 
troops, which the Peace of Jassy made available. All that was 
needed to assure the complete success of Catherine's Polish 
policy was the absorption of the energies of Austria and Prus- 
sia in a struggle with France. Accordingly Catherine urged 
upon Frederick William and Francis the need of combating the 
Revolution; but they were not her dupes. 

Russian intervention in Poland came the month that war broke 
out between France and Austria. The Poles were ill prepared 
to resist. The mass of the population was indifferent, having 
no share in the promised reforms and no relief from serfdom. 
King Stanislas was too timorous a leader to utilize the forces 
which the patriotic members of the diet offered. When Prus- 
sia was appealed to for support on the strength of the defensive 
treaty of 1790, Frederick William replied that the May con- 
stitution had invalidated the guarantee. By July the struggle 
was practically over and the King obliged to give his adhesion 
to the Confederation of Targovitz, as the association of mal- 
contents was called. The fires of resistance were everywhere 
stamped out by merciless bands of soldiery. Catherine held the 
prey in her grasp, but she realized that she could not refuse to 
satisfy Prussian and perhaps Austrian greed of territorial gain. 
Before Frederick William moved an army towards the French 
frontier he had reason to believe that he would receive indemni- 
ties in Poland, but neither to him nor to Austria were Catherine's 
assurances clear. The Prussian and Austrian diplomats con- 
sidered an exchange of the Austrian Netherlands for Bavaria 
as offering Austria the necessary indemnification, but it proved 
impossible to reach a definite agreement. 

In France the unreasoning enthusiasm for war was succeeded 
by anger at the discovery that the country was unprepared and 
that the efforts of the French foreign office to detach Prussia 
from Austria were futile. The Girondins skilfully turned sus- 
picion towards the King and the ministers in power before the 
March crisis. Delessart had already been accused of treason; 



THE WAR AND THE MONARCHY 171 



they now demanded the same accusation against Montmorin, 
his predecessor, still one of the secret counselors of the King. 
They declared that the King's friends, far from abhorring the 
projects of the enemy, desired an invasion and were seeking 
to assure its success. This assertion was only too true. Since 
the beginning of the war the Queen had been informing the 
Austrians of French mihtary plans, of which she learned through 
the King. Towards the end of May a royalist journalist, Mallet 
du Pan, left for Germany, provided with letters and instructions 
from the King, with the mission of convincing the Allies that, 
on the one hand, they should separate their cause from that of 
the emigrant princes and renounce publicly any design to restore 
the old regime, and, on the other hand, they should frighten 
the radicals by threats of condign punishment, and so afiford 
moderate men an opportunity of recovering control. 

The situation was rendered still more perilous because religious 
strife in western France threatened to grow into a peasant in- 
surrection encouraged by non-juring priests. The Legislative 
Assembly struck at the priests by a bill which empowered the 
local authorities to expel them from the country. Its suspi- 
cions of the King prompted it to accept the proposal of the 
minister of war for a camp of 20,000 federated national guards 
near Paris. Louis XVI was no more inclined than in the 
previous November to harass the dissident priests, and he was 
not willing to strengthen the radicals by furnishing them with 
an army of national guards. He was already weary of the 
ministers whom the March crisis had forced upon him, and 
when early in June Roland insisted upon the acceptance of the 
decrees the King dismissed him, with his colleagues Claviere and 
Servan. The Assembly declared that the fallen ministers car- 
ried with them the regrets of the nation. For two or three days 
Dumouriez remained, hoping to play a great role now that he 
was rid of his embarrassing colleagues ; but, when he saw that 
the King was not disposed to listen to his advice and that he 
might be held responsible for the dismissal of the " patriot " 
ministers, he withdrew. 

The ministerial revolution roused political passions in Paris 
as the dismissal of Necker had three years before. A new 
element was introduced by a letter from Lafayette, in com- 
mand of the army of the Center, criticizing the late ministers and 
denouncing the intrigues of the Jacobin Club. The intervention 
of a popular general, which was of sinister presage for the 
orderly course of constitutional life, emboldened the King to 
veto the project of a camp of federes as well as the plan of 



CHAP. 
XII 



172 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XII 



A Mob in 
the Tuil- 
eries 



deporting priests accused of sedition. He also appointed a new 
ministry composed of dependents of Lafayette. 

After this intervention of the army came an intervention of 
the street. It took the form of an armed procession of peti- 
tioners, which finally was permitted to defile before the Assem- 
bly, and which soon afterwards broke into the Tuileries and 
crowded for hours past the King and Queen. The mob was 
moved by brutal curiosity or the desire to frighten the King 
into recalling his ministers and accepting the vetoed decrees. 
The incident occurred on June 20, the third anniversary of the 
Tennis Court oath. The news aroused indignation in different 
parts of the country, which was in the main still loyal to the 
King and the constitution. Even the radicals in Paris and the 
Assembly felt that the affair was a blunder. Lafayette hurried 
to Paris and demanded the punishment of the conspirators re- 
sponsible for the outbreak. There was a chance that he would 
rally the Paris National Guard and close the Jacobin Club, 
but the King and Queen treated him coldly and he returned 
to his troops without accomplishing anything. 

Before Dumouriez withdrew from office he occupied the min- 
istry of war for three days and signalized his presence by re- 
porting the deplorable condition of the army and the defense- 
lessness of the frontier fortresses. France now began to realize 
her peril. The Girondins, their friends no longer in the min- 
istry, redoubled their attacks upon the Court. Vergniaud in a 
powerful speech, on July 3, declared that the Allies, the emi- 
grant princes, and the deserting officers all acted in " the name 
of the King," to " restore his authority " and " the splendor of 
his throne," and intimated that, while in the conduct of the 
war the King complied formally with the terms of the consti- 
tution, he had not felt it his constitutional duty to provide for 
the needs of the army or to win victories. 

The Assembly, realizing that invasion was imminent, sol- 
emnly announced that the country was " in danger." This proc- 
lamation carried with it special obligations for the people. 
Every one must wear the national cockade; all citizens who had 
been members of the National Guard or who were capable of 
bearing arms were called to active service; and all administra- 
tive bodies must exercise unremitting vigilance. Attempts were 
made to strengthen the army by adding new battalions of vol- 
unteers. When it was known that several departments, in spite 
of the royal veto, had despatched their contingents for the pro- 
posed camp, the Assembly renewed the project in a different 
form, providing that after taking part in the anniversary cele- 



THE WAR AND THE MONARCHY 173 



CHAP. 
XII 



bration of July 14 the guards should march to Soissons to form 
a camp of reserves. July 14 came and the King proceeded to 
the Champ de Mars and renewed his oath to the constitution. ^'^''^•'^'<i 
A few days later he issued a special proclamation urging all 
Frenchmen to unite loyally in repelling the invader. This was 
a ghastly mockery, for Marie Antoinette was sending letter upon 
letter to her friends begging the Allies to hasten their march 
upon Paris. 

July 14 was also a day of festival for Germany. On that 
day the newly elected emperor, Francis, nephew of Marie An- 
toinette, made his formal entry into Frankfort, and was crowned 
amid medieval splendors. Soon afterwards Frederick William 
and Francis met at Mainz to confer upon the plan of the com- 
ing campaign and to discuss the question of indemnities. Al- 
ready the Duke of Brunswick had been chosen commander of 
the invading armies. He had been brought up in the school 
of the great Frederick and was accounted a prince so " philo- 
sophical " that a few months earlier Narbonne had proposed to 
offer him the command of the French army. 

The allied monarchs determined to issue a manifesto before 
they ordered their armies to cross the French frontier. This 
idea they borrowed from the draft which Mallet du Pan had Manifesto 
brought to their headquarters, but the language of menace was ^^"^'^^' 
dictated by the rancor of the emigrant nobles, one of whom 
wrote the manifesto. It was reluctantly signed by the Duke 
of Brunswick as commander-in-chief. In it the French were 
bidden not only to restore Louis XVI to complete liberty of 
action, but also to obey the orders of the allied monarchs, and 
abstain from every form of opposition to the invading army. 
If any national guards or administrative officers should resist, 
they would be punished as rebels ; and if Paris offered any insult 
to the King or invaded the Tuileries, the city would be given up 
to military execution and total ruin. The King was asked to 
name a place near the frontier to which he might retire, and 
where, aided by chosen counselors, he might provide for the re- 
establishment of order in the kingdom. Until he had done this, 
the Allies protested, they could not accept any declaration of 
his as a free act. The manifesto also intimated that the sound 
part of the French nation secretly wished the success of the 
invaders, because this would permit them without peril to de- 
clare against the radicals who were now oppressing them. 
Nothing that Vergniaud or even Marat ever said hinted more 
plainly the disloyalty of the King and his supporters to the 
national cause. 



174 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

CHAP. jj^g Qj^ly ^ay Q^^ q£ ^\^q dilemma was through the overthrow 

of the King. France could not hope to defend herself success- 

1792-93 fully Yv^ith such 3. mouarch, furthering secretly the schemes of 
Plot to the enemy and able by the use of his constitutional prerogatives 
the^Efng^ to hamper the effectiveness of the national defense. This fur- 
nished a unique political opportunity to the violent men who had 
risen to influence in Paris. The constitutionalists occupied a 
position fatally weak. They still believed in the King and felt 
it dishonorable to suspect him of lack of fidelity to the common 
cause. The Girondins suspected him, but were confused by 
their desire to return to control through the reappointment of 
their friends as ministers and the King's acceptance of them as 
his political guides. They were also disinclined by temperament 
to acts of violence. The radical Parisians and their leaders, 
impelled by simpler passions, moved with brutal directness to- 
ward the solution. They had been fed on suspicion for months, 
or had sedulously fed others upon it. They believed that Paris 
was in danger and that all would soon be lost unless loyal and 
energetic hands grasped the helm. Only in a few departments, 
chiefly in the southeast, was there any similar agitation, Mar- 
seilles, bolder than the rest, ventured to demand the deposition 
of the King. 

The demand of Marseilles reached the Legislative Assembly 
on July 12. With it came the announcement that early in July 
a battalion of five hundred men, well furnished with patriotism 
and munitions, would set out for Paris.^ The tone of the docu- 
ment displeased the Assembly, but delighted the Paris radicals. 
Matters there were fast reaching a crisis. The directory of 
the department, made up of constitutionalists, had suspended 
Mayor Petion, a friend of the Girondin deputies, for his failure 
to check the insurrectionary movement on June 20. The King 
confirmed the suspension, but almost immediately afterwards 
signed a decree of the Assembly annulling it. Robespierre, Dan- 
ton, and others who had promoted or countenanced the move- 
ment the year before for the deposition of Louis now resumed 
their agitation with better prospects of success. When the 
federated national guards began to arrive the Jacobins sought 
to indoctrinate them. Of the 4,500 men who came before the 
end of the month about 1,800 remained, defying repeated efforts 
of the government to send them on to Soissons. They formed 
a committee, with headquarters at the Jacobin Club, and as 

2 On their way toward Paris the Marseillais sang a patriotic song writ- 
ten by Rouget de Lisle for the army of the Rhine. The song was soon 
known as the Marseillaise, which it has been called ever since. 



THE WAR AND THE MONARCHY 175 



CHAP. 
XII 



early as July 17 petitioned the Assembly for the deposition of 
the King. It was not until the end of the month that the Mar- 
seilles battalion arrived, preceded a few days by a battalion from 
Brest. The sections or wards of the city had meanwhile been 
authorized to hold daily meetings. Delegates from these meet- 
ings, most of which were controlled by radicals, met at the Hotel 
de Ville and early in August drew up an address to the Assem- 
bly, repeating the request already made by the federated guards. 
On August 4 the section of the Quinze-Vingts threatened that 
if the Assembly did not depose the King before midnight of 
August 9 the tocsin would be rung and the people would rise. 

Two or three times before the fateful night attempts were 
made to start an insurrection. One of these was on the day 
when the battalion from Marseilles reached the city. The rad- August 10 
icals counted not only upon the federates who had refused to 
leave Paris for Soissons, but also upon the national guards 
of the more revolutionary sections. Although the mayor 
formally complied with his duty by exhorting the people to 
calmness, he was in sympathy with the movement. The guards 
from the revolutionary sections were provided with a full sup- 
ply of cartridges at the arsenal by order of the police commis- 
sioners. For the defense of the King the chief reliance was 
the Swiss Guard, which was reinforced from the barracks out- 
side the city. Mandat, commander of the Paris National Guard, 
was a stanch royalist and he looked for support to the guards 
from the moderate or conservative sections. He had formed 
a sound plan of defense, which aimed at the dispersion of the 
insurrectionary forces before they could reach the Tuileries. 

The signal for the insurrection was given by the Quinze- 
Vingts, the section which had fixed the date. Because the As- 
sembly adjourned on the evening of August 9 without acting 
on the petition of the Paris sections, and especially because by 
a substantial majority it exonerated Lafayette, against whom an 
accusation had been brought for his conduct in June, the sec- 
tional assembly voted that each section should send three com- 
missioners to the Hotel de Ville to take counsel about the means 
of " saving the country." In this action a majority of the sec- 
tions appear to have concurred. Before morning commission- 
ers of twenty-eight sections were present at the Hotel de Ville. 
Until about seven o'clock they contented themselves with urging 
upon the city council measures calculated to cripple the defense 
of the Tuileries. The council, few in numbers, enfeebled by 
indecision or intimidated by the galleries, perhaps half sympa- 
thetic, consented. The measure which proved fatal to the royal 



176 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

°xn^* cause was the summons sent to Mandat to present himself at the 

Hotel de Ville. While there the commissioners, substituting 

1792-93 themselves for the council, ordered his arrest, whereupon, as he 
was leaving the building, he was shot by the mob. 

The death of Mandat disorganized the defense. The King 
was persuaded to go down into the courtyard of the Tuileries 
Attack and speak to the soldiers, but his very countenance and bearing 
Tuileries seemed to say : " All is lost ! " Some of the cannoneers, desert- 
ing their pieces, shouted : " Down with the King ! Down with 
the fat pig ! " Others declared that they would not fire upon 
their fellow-citizens. Upon this the law officer of the depart- 
ment urged the King to take refuge with his family in the hall 
of the Legislative Assembly, As the party crossed the Tuileries 
Gardens the dauphin tossed the dry leaves into the air, and the 
King remarked : " They are falling early this year." It was 
a curious coincidence that the presiding officer of the Assembly 
was the Girondin Vergniaud, who five weeks before had bitterly 
attacked the King in a speech. His words now sounded like a 
profession of loyalty : " Sire, you can count upon the firmness 
of the National Assembly ; its members have sworn to die in 
defending the rights of the people and the lawful government." 
But these were only words. 

About eight o'clock bands of insurrectionists, led by the men 
from Marseilles, advanced upon the palace. The national 
guards either fraternized with them or dispersed. The Mar- 
seillais entered the courtyard and attempted to win over the 
Swiss. It was a futile effort, for the Swiss believed their honor 
as soldiers was pledged to the defense of the palace. How the 
battle began is still uncertain, but the Swiss speedily cleared the 
courtyard and even the square beyond. The defeated Marseil- 
lais returned to the attack, supported by the revolutionary masses 
from the faubourgs. The cartridges of the Swiss were soon 
exhausted, and then an order to cease firing, written by the King 
at the hall of the Assembly, was given to them. The battle had 
been furious and nearly four hundred of the assailants had been 
killed. The vengeance of the mob was pitiless ; before its en- 
ergies had spent their force eight hundred, — Swiss, royalists, and 
even palace servants, — were dead. The mob also vented its rage 
upon the costly furnishings of the royal apartments. One of 
those who watched the battle was Captain Napoleone de Buona- 
parte. 

The insurrection of August lo not only overthrew the mon- 
archy, it discredited the Legislative Assembly. Its leaders could 
only register the will of revolutionary Paris, covering the articles 



THE WAR AND THE MONARCHY 177 



XII 

considerations. They left for a convention, the election of which 

they decreed, the task of changing the constitution. Meanwhile i''92-93 
they voted that the King should be suspended provisionally from The King 
the exercise of executive functions. At first they did not con- suspended 
template the organization of a republic, and began to prepare 
a project for the appointment of a governor for the dauphin. 
Before the day was over, however, they substituted a decree 
declaring that the King and his family were hostages. A day 
or two later they surrendered the King to the care of the revo- 
lutionary Commune, as the irregular body organized on August 
10 was called. By its officers he was conducted, amid the in- 
sulting cries of the populace, to the ancient tower of the Tem- 
ple, which once was part of the chateau of the crusading order 
of the Templars. 

The threatening attitude of Paris forced the Assembly to 
change the ministry immediately. The first minister chosen was 
Danton, one of the organizers of the insurrection of August 10. 
In making this choice the leaders of the Assembly offered a 
pledge of reconciliation to the promoters of the insurrection. 
As Condorcet later explained, they saw in Danton a man strong Danton in 
enough to control the " despicable instruments of a glorious ^°'^*'^ 
revolution," and yet of such ability and standing that neither 
the Assembly nor the other ministers would be humiliated by 
being forced to deal with him. The " patriot " ministers, whom 
the King had dismissed in June, were now reinstated by ac- 
clamation. The virtual head of the ministry was Danton, min- 
ister of justice, rather than the " virtuous " Roland, minister of 
the interior, the best known of the former Girondin ministry. 

In preparing for the primary elections the Assembly abolished 
the distinction between " active " and " passive " citizens, and 
gave the suffrage to every man over twenty-one years of age 
who was not in domestic service.^ In order to make the changes 
in the government acceptable to the departments, couriers were 
despatched in every direction. Only a few departments hesi- Accept- 
tated to recognize the validity of what had been done. The most the^New 
serious resistance occurred in the department of the Ardennes f^l^^^' 
and in the municipality of Sedan, where Lafayette, unwilling 
to recognize the new government, attempted to carry his army 
with him in a movement to restore the King and put down the 
Paris revolutionists. The refusal of his soldiers to follow him, 
although up to this time he had possessed their complete confi- 

3 For this restriction, see Aulard, French Revolution, Miall trans., II, 
77-78. 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 



dence, compelled him to abandon the project. He crossed the 
frontier with several of his staff, hoping to take refuge in 
America, but the AlUes held him as a prisoner and treated him 
with great harshness as the fomenter of the ills from which 
France was suffering. France as a whole would not quarrel 
with victorious Paris in the presence of the enemy. Moreover, 
the French had too long been trained to obey those who bore 
the insignia of authority to assume other than an attitude of 
submission. 

The results of August lo in legislation were also profound. 
Projects of law which the King had not signed were legalized 
by a general provision. The Assembly had already, on July 2"], 
declared the property of the emigrants confiscated and had or- 
dered it sold. The sweeping character of the measure, making 
no distinction between emigrants and holding out no promise 
of restoration, as did the decree of sequestration the preceding 
February, showed the exasperation felt by the Assembly as the 
allied army was about to cross the frontier at the call of these 
emigrants. The measure was also financial in its bearings. The 
assignats had fallen to a discount of nearly fifty per cent., and 
the deputies believed that the property of the emigrants would 
double the security. The Assembly had authorized the issue 
of 900 million assignats, making a total of 2,700 million pro- 
vided for since April, 1790.* 

The Assembly struck another blow at the nobles by reversing 
the principle of the feudal legislation of 1790. Not only was 
the burden of proof transferred from the peasant, who denied 
that his holding was the result of a property grant, to the noble, 
but the noble must produce the original titles, which in most cases 
had disappeared. Furthermore, contracts of enfranchisement, 
maintained in 1790, were annulled, and the dues which repre- 
sented them were abolished without indemnity. Considering that 
the State was already, or was soon to become, through the fact 
of emigration, the principal owner of this sort of property, and 
expected to use it, with other confiscated property, in financing 
the Revolution, the decree showed an ill-considered generosity. 
At the same time, urged by the ruder voices at the Hotel de 
Ville, the Assembly ordered the destruction of the mute evi- 
dences in stone and bronze of the departed regime, except in 
cases where a commission should decide that pieces of sculpture 
or statuary interested the arts. 

With the non-juring priests the Assembly dealt in summary 

4 The circulation October i, 1792, was 1,972 million, 617 million having 
been annulled. 



THE WAR AND THE MONARCHY 179 



CHAP. 
XII 



fashion on August 26, giving them fifteen days to leave the 

country on pain of being deported to Guiana. If they recrossed 

the frontier they should be condemned to ten years' imprison- I'^^^-es 
ment. On the last day of the session the Assembly took the 
significant step of entrusting the records of civil status — births, 
marriages, and deaths — to the municipalities, depriving the offi- 
cial priesthood of one of its important functions. 

The Assembly had no thought that such measures would 
w^eaken the force of its appeal to liberal minds, and it embodied 
this assurance in the renewal of a decree conferring French 
citizenship upon the friends of humanity in Europe and America, 
notably upon Bentham, Wilberforce, Mackintosh, Paine, Wash- 
ington, Hamilton, Klopstock, Pestalozzi, and Kosciusko. It also 
attempted to conciliate opinion by repeating the renunciation of 
all projects of conquest. 

As the war had given the radicals an opportunity to destroy 
the monarchy and seize supreme power, the approach of the 
allied army enabled them to terrify their political opponents into 
submission, under the guise of organizing effectively the na- 
tional defense and protecting the city of Paris against traitorous 
royalists. Brunswick's army did not cross the frontier until 
nine days after the King's overthrow. The news of August 10 
made the Duke and many of his advisers, who felt no en- 
thusiasm about the project, still more hesitant. Even if it were 
true that generals of French armies and commanders of French The 
garrisons would, as the emigrant princes declared, either open invasion 
the road to Paris or make a feigned resistance, it was evident 
that these secret sympathizers with the Allies would now be 
deprived of the chance to aid the project and that the army 
would be put into the hands of men wholly committed to the 
idea of stubborn defense. Furthermore, the Austrians had not 
brought into the field all the troops they had promised, and the 
army of invasion numbered 80,000 instead of 110,000, the num- 
ber regarded as adequate. Still the army marched on. Longwy, 
the first important frontier fortress, fell, and a week later Verdun 
was invested. The town was badly fortified and contained many 
royalists who were unwilling to suffer in a cause which they 
considered to be that of a faction and not of France. The city 
surrendered on September 2, and Brunswick now thought that 
his army would be before Paris by the middle of October. The 
Parisian leaders did not realize how slow were the movements 
of the Prussian army, how the heavy rains would retard its 
advance, and how hunger and disease were enlisted against it. 
They knew simply that for four weeks it had been steadily 



i8o THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XII 



drawing nearer, and they also knew that their own army was 
disorganized by the flight of Lafayette and the inability of old 
^^^ ■ Marshal Luckner to resist the Prussian advance. What Du- 
mouriez and Kellerman, who took the places of Lafayette and 
Luckner, could accomplish, was uncertain. In the light of this 
perilous situation the history of the last days of August and the 
early days of September must be judged. 

During the weeks which followed August lO the Revolutionary 
Commune exercised a virtual dictatorship. This was not due 
The BeTo- to the talents of its members, who with few exceptions belonged 
comm^ to the petite bourgeoisie. Huguenin, most conspicuous at the 
outset, possessed a record as a deserter and a swindler. He 
signalized his qualities by ordering the slaughter in cold blood 
of ninety-six Swiss soldiers brought as prisoners to the Hotel 
de Ville. There were one or two literary men of consequence, 
M. J. Chenier and Fabre d'Eglantine; but others, like Hebert 
or Chaumette, subscribed themselves " literary men " because 
reluctant to give a more exact designation. Among the com- 
missioners were also Billaud-Varenne and Robespierre, the lat- 
ter elected after the insurrection was over, both destined to 
notable careers within a few months, and Tallien, who was to 
compass Robespierre's fall. Petion remained mayor, but with- 
out influence. The administrators of the constitutional Com- 
mune were displaced, but afterwards restored through the in- 
tervention of the Legislative Assembly. 

The leaders of the Commune were determined that the " con- 
spirators of August 10 " should be punished. By this term they 
described those who had defended the King, and who intended, 
it was alleged, to gain control of Paris and hold it until the 
Prussians should arrive. Five of the King's ministers had been, 
sent before the High Court at Orleans for trial. A court-martial 
to try ofiicers, notably of the Swiss, had been created. These 
measures did not satisfy the Commune, whose representatives 
demanded an extraordinary tribunal, formed in Paris, with 
judges and jurors chosen by the sections, and with the right 
to pronounce without appeal upon the cases of conspirators. 
The Assembly, under threat of insurrection, conceded what the 
Commune demanded, but attempted to save its dignity by pro- 
viding that the judges should be chosen by an electoral assembly 
instead of by direct vote.^ 

The Commune would not tolerate criticism of its acts either 
by the press or by committees of the Assembly. It declared 

5 This is commonly called the Tribunal of August 17. 



THE WAR AND THE MONARCHY 



publicly that several of these committees contained traitors, and ^^^T' 

it suppressed reactionary journals by forbidding their trans- 

mission through the mails. When its agents attempted to arrest 1792-93 
the editor of the leading Girondin newspaper, the Assembly, 
already outraged by the attitude of the Commune upon all mat- 
ters of controversy, adopted a decree replacing the existing body 
of commissioners by a provisional council of two deputies from 
each section. The Commune resolved to resist and it found sup- 
port in most of the sections. The Assembly, partly influenced 
by the danger of continuing the struggle in the presence of the 
invader, endeavored to submerge a body which it could not 
destroy, by asking each section to name six deputies — including 
the existing commissioners, if the section desired. This com- 
promise was effected on September 2. 

On the morning of September 2 the news came that Verdun 
was besieged. Fear spread over the city, for this fortress, the 
last which guarded the road to Paris, could not long resist. Massacres 
The fall of Longwy had alarmed several of the ministers, and ^l^^^^^ 
the government might have been transferred to the region of 
the Loire but for the determination of Danton to defend Paris. 
Both Commune and Assembly united in an effort to bring to- 
gether on the Champ de Mars a great army of volunteers and 
forward recruits to the danger line as fast as possible. But 
sinister spirits cried out that it was not safe to go, as long as 
the conspirators of August 10 were unpunished. The tribunal 
of August 17 was meting out justice, while the populace wanted 
vengeance. A decree ordering a general search of houses for 
arms was utilized by the Commune to effect the arrest of a 
multitude of its opponents. The prisons were filled. The jour- 
nalist Marat, whom the insurrection had furnished the opportu- 
nity of printing his mad provocations to wholesale murder, had 
urged repeatedly that the prisoners be put to death. On Septem- 
ber 2 he became a member of the municipal committee of surveil- 
lance, which had just been reconstituted of men ready for such a 
brutal enterprise. On this day also two or three sections voted 
that the prisoners should be put to death. When the tocsin 
sounded from the church towers, summoning courageous citizens 
to the Champ de Mars, a band of priests who were being con- 
ducted to the prison of the Abbaye were set upon and murdered. 
What began apparently as an outburst of popular fury immedi- 
ately took on the appearance of an operation carefully meditated 
beforehand. The mob rushed off to the convent of the Carmelites 
not far away and murdered over one hundred non-juring priests 
and bishops confined there. During the night two tribunals 



82 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

CHAP, were improvised at the prisons of the Abbaye and La Force, by 
which the prisoners were interrogated, and in almost every case 

1792-93 hurried away into neighboring streets or courtyards to be cut 
down by the merciless band of volunteer executioners. 

When the council of the Commune heard that the " people " 

onduct had broken into the prisons, it voted merely that prisoners for 

ommune ^^^* ^"^ ^^^ ^^"^^^ causes should be removed, showing at least 
a guilty indifference to the fate of the other prisoners. Billaud- 
Varenne proposed that commissioners be sent to the prisons 
with instructions to deliver to the people the prisoners accused 
of having a part in the conspiracy of August lo. At first the 
council seems to have adopted such a decree, but it soon re- 
turned to a better sense of its responsibility. The committee of 
surveillance, however, expressly sanctioned what was being done. 
Billaud-Varenne and several other councilmen, either at the 
Abbaye or La Force, uttered words of approval to the murderers 
or assisted the work of the tribunals of blood. On the second 
day of the massacres the committee sent a circular to the other 
municipalities of France commending the example of Paris and 
urging as the common cry, " We march upon the enemy, but 
leave behind no brigands to slaughter our wives and children." 

The council as a body now attempted to dissociate itself 
from an affair which was reaching frightful dimensions. Late 
in the session of September 2 it despatched deputies to the pris- 
ons to restore " calmness " and to protect the prisoners.*' But 
its most important member, Robespierre, had no word of pity 
for the men who were perishing by the score, and endeavored 
to lengthen the list of victims by directing popular suspicion 
against the Girondins in the Assembly. The committee of sur- 
veillance launched orders of arrest against several of them, but 
no arrests were made. As the Legislative Assembly was too 
terrified or too weak to act with effect the massacres did not 
cease until September 6, after more than a thousand persons 
had been killed. The saner councilmen refused to assume re- 
sponsibility before the country for the circular of the committee 
of surveillance, and sent another, September 7, repudiating it. 
Few Parisians realized what a hideous stain blurred the glory 
of the Revolution. 

The massacres gave to some men a new motive for remaining 
in power, since any loss of influence would expose them to the 
charge of being " Septemberers " or plain murderers. Even 

6 On the morning of September 3, however, it voted to pay the " execu- 
tioners " of the preceding night. See F. Braesch, La Commune du Dix 
Aout, p. 506. 



THE WAR AND THE MONARCHY 183 

Danton, who, it is believed, disapproved the deed, and whose ^^n* 

policy of retaining the friendly neutrality of England it seri- 

ously compromised, did not dare to condemn it openly. His 1792-93 
conduct has been explained on the assumption that rather than 
permit the Commune to reap all the advantages of the fear which 
it inspired he was willing to be thought to have planned the 
whole operation^ 

At the beginning of September, in the face of a common dan- 
ger, the Legislative Assembly and the Commune had seemed Elections 
ready to sink their differences and unite for the common de- c°onven- 
fense of Paris; but the massacres made compromise impossible, tion 
As soon as they dared raise their voices the Girondins con- 
demned the crime in unmeasured terms and demanded the pun- 
ishment of the men responsible for it. The elections to the Con- 
vention rendered certain the continuance within its walls of the 
strife between the Commune and the Girondin leaders. The 
Paris electoral assembly, which began to choose deputies on Sep- 
tember 2, placed upon its list the names of three members of 
the committee of surveillance, including Marat. Billaud-Varenne, 
who had countenanced the work of the murderers, was also 
chosen. It is equally significant that the names of Brissot 
and Condorcet, the two most notable members of the Paris dele- 
gation to the Legislative Assembly, did not appear on the list. 
The election was a defeat for Brissot and his Girondin friends 
and a triumph for Robespierre and his followers. Danton was 
the only man of force in the delegation who would be likely 
to seek the basis of a compromise, but he was to some extent 
the prisoner of a faction. 

Outside of Paris the elections were more favorable to Brissot, 
Vergniaud, and their friends. Their strength in the Convention 
has been placed at 165 out of the total of 783 deputies. They 
were commonly called Brissotins, Rolandistes, or Bnaotins, from 
Buzot, another member of the party, while in history they are 
known as Girondins. Their opponents, a few months later by 
common consent called the Montagnard, or Mountain party, were 
not as numerous, and were divided loosely into groups inclined 
to follow the leadership of Danton or Robespierre or even Marat. 
The mass of the Convention took a more neutral attitude, al- 
though at first generally voting with the Girondins. No funda- 
mental difference of policy divided the Girondins and the Moun- 
tain, and their antagonisms grew mainly out of the settled dis- 
trust the Girondins felt for all adherents of the insurrectionary 

7 Deforgues and Duplain, two of his intimates, were members of the 
Committee of Surveillance. 



1 84 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XII 



The Re- 
public 
Pro- 
claimed 



Conflicts 

in the j . • 

Convention deputies 



commune and out of their detestation, repeatedly expressed, of 
those responsible for the massacres. 

The Convention met on September 20. Its first important 
work was to recognize in law the abolition of the monarchy 
accomplished in fact six weeks before. Decrees should hence- 
forward be dated from the " First Year of the Republic." Like 
the Constituent Assembly, although the circumstances were alto- 
gether different, the Convention formally voted that the office of 
deputy and of minister were incompatible. Danton anticipated 
this vote and resigned his position as minister of justice, feeling 
that as a minister he would be supported loyally neither by 
friends nor critics. Another vacancy was made by the resigna- 
tion of Servan, the minister of war. Two weaker men were 
chosen to fill these places, lowering the level of competence in 
this body. 

The Convention had not been in session two days before a 
violent controversy opened between the Girondins and the Paris 
The Girondins made the blunder of including Danton 
with Robespierre and Marat in the sweep of their condemnation. 
Danton would gladly have united with moderate men in giving 
France a sane administration, but the refusal of the Girondins 
to listen to offers of peace threw him back upon his Paris fol- 
lowing, and eventually led to their ruin as well as his own. In 
the reconstitution of the Commune, ordered by the Convention, 
under the influence of the Girondins, who hoped to deprive the 
radicals of control, the radicals were successful. The choice of 
Chaumette, an' extremist, as solicitor, and of Hebert, one of the 
" Septemberers," as his assistant, exasperated the distrust which 
the Girondins felt towards the Commune. They had already 
proposed a departmental guard for the Convention. In Decem- 
ber they secured the passage of a decree summoning the 
primary assemblies to purge the Convention, hoping to drive out 
their enemies; but upon second thought they abandoned the 
rash scheme. Only upon one subject was a semblance of union 
preserved. This was the national defense. 

It was on September 20 also, the opening day of the Con- 
vention, that the Prussian invaders were checked about one hun- 
dred miles away at Valmy. When Dumouriez received com- 
mand of Lafayette's army he planned to prevent an invasion by 
creating a diversion in the Austrian Netherlands, but the in- 
sistent cry of Paris that the city be covered compelled the aban- 
donment of this scheme. Dumouriez and Kellerman, one start- 
ing from Sedan, the other from Metz, now endeavored to unite 
behind the defiles of the Argonne and hold the road to Paris. 



THE WAR AND THE MONARCHY 185 

The deliberateness of Brunswick's movements rendered this pos- ^^f^' 

sible. He had at first intended to secure the hne of the Meuse 

and to defer a further advance until spring, but he was overruled 1792-93 
by Frederick William, who felt that he would be unfaithful to 
his knightly task if he left Louis XVI so long exposed to the 
vengeance of his rebellious subjects. Brunswick compromised 
the King's purpose by putting too much caution into his opera- 
tions. A panic which seized a large French division gave him 
a chance of disorganizing Dumouriez's army by a quick advance, 
but he was reluctant to risk his own army, especially because 
the Austrians had not sent all the troops they promised and be- 
cause of the precarious situation in Poland. 

On the morning of September 20 the Prussians moved against 
the French lines on the hill of Valmy and the plateau beyond, 
and a decisive struggle seemed at hand. The Prussians were 
confident that their better training would soon put to rout the 
undisciplined masses of the French. Again the prudence of 
Brunswick disappointed the expectations of the Prussian army. 
He was reluctant to push home his attack, and seemed to think 
that by a smart cannonade he could compel the retreat of the 
French, The movement was a failure. The French main- 
tained their positions until nightfall. The Prussians were 
discouraged, while the French were correspondingly elated be- 
cause they had inflicted a check upon the " invincible " army 
of the great Frederick. 

Dumouriez now sought to gain time by negotiating with the 
Prussians until he was strong enough to attack them. The 
Prussian army was in a sorry plight, fast becoming a traveling 
hospital, as the poet Goethe, who was with the army, remarked. 
The loss through disease during the next eight days was 6,000. 
Retreat became inevitable, especially when rumors reached head- 
quarters that an attack by the French upon the Netherlands and 
along the Rhine was imminent. This danger caused the Aus- 
trians early in October to withdraw one of their supporting 
corps. Verdun was abandoned and then Longwy. On October 
23 the Prussians recrossed the French border. 

The retreat of the Prussians was none too soon, for since the 
early days of October a great panic had swept the Rhine coun- 
try from Speyer to Coblentz and even Cologne. It was caused 
by an amazingly successful raid of a small French army under custine 
Custine, who captured Speyer and Worms without a fight. On 2^.*^® 
October 21 the important fortress of Mainz surrendered, and 
the French crossed the Rhine and laid Frankfort under con- 
tribution. These disasters were due to the improvidence of the 



i86 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

*^xn^' Allies, who upon their entry into France had drawn off for opera- 

tions on their flank the small force that protected this region 

1792-93 against a coup de main. Custine saw opportunity for a great 
venture in war and politics. He would carry the revolutionary 
gospel into the Rhine country at the point of the bayonet. A 
little coterie of German enthusiasts at Strasbourg — clergymen, 
university professors, and literary men — had inflamed his zeal. 
He could count on the neutrality of several of the lay princes. 
His policy was " war upon palaces, and peace to cottages." He 
severely repressed pillage, although he exacted more than two 
million livres from Speyer and Worms. As soon as the news 
of the capture of Worms reached Mainz the archbishop-elector, 
his clergy, the nobles, and many of the wealthy, fled down the 
Rhine or further into Germany, carrying all the property they 
could move. They paid for transportation more than enough 
to have put Mainz in a good state of defense. After he was 
safely in Wiirzburg the Elector forbade any of the ordinary 
inhabitants to leave Mainz. No wonder that neither citizens 
nor peasants had a mind to be shot down in defense of the 
sovereignty of such a master, and that the fortress made no 
show of resistance. Custine promised to respect the rights of 
property and not to levy war contributions. He also declared 
that the inhabitants might remain in their ancient slavery, if 
they preferred it to the freedom that went with French institu- 
tions. The government was first carried on in the name of the 
Elector. Custine's harsh levy of two millions upon the im- 
perial city of Frankfort was taken by the Germans as a sig- 
nificant commentary upon his constant and grandiose offers of 
French liberty. 

The news of the capture of Mainz frightened the Elector of 
Treves away from Coblentz. His subjects made overtures of 
surrender to Custine, although Custine had no serious thought 
of attacking Coblentz. Even the imperial judiciary at Wetzlar 
attempted to secure protection from the French. At this junc- 
ture the return of the Prussians put an end to the panic and im- 
medial^ly threw Custine on the defensive. He had missed the 
opportunity to hamper the retreat of the Prussians, and soon 
was driven out of Frankfort and was obliged to retire to Mainz. 
Meanwhile a group of Mainz agitators and enthusiasts, among 
whom Georg Forster was the most noble figure, thought the 
time had come to put an end to priestly rule on the left bank 
of the Rhine. They formed a club in Mainz and began to 
work for union with France. Custine, no longer recognizing 
the electoral sovereignty, appointed a provisional government 



THE WAR AND THE MONARCHY 187 

for Mainz, Worms, and Speyer, and the county of Falken- ^5^/*" 
stein. 

The Revolution had made greater progress in Savoy than 1792-93 
along the Rhine. With the exception of the clergy and the Savoy 
nobles, the people were more in sympathy with France than 
with her enemies, although their ruler, the King of Sardinia, 
had signed a treaty with Austria, and thus had dragged them 
into war with the French. When the French army crossed 
their border the day after the battle of Valmy it was received 
with acclamations by the inhabitants. Those opposed to revo- 
lutionary ideas fled. The syndic of Chambery declared to Gen- 
eral Montesquiou, " We are not a people conquered, but a peo- 
ple that is freed." Montesquiou promised that their laws should 
be respected and that their destiny should rest in their own hands. 
A few weeks later a " National Assembly of the Allobroges " 
met and in three days hurried through the entire program of 
French revolutionary legislation, including the seizure of church 
property and the sequestration of the property of those who had 
fled at the approach of the French army. The question of union 
with France had already been referred to the communes. Out 
of 658, 583 voted for union, 72 gave their deputies power to 
settle the question, and the three that remained were still under 
control of the Sardinian army. The Savoyard assembly, ac- 
cordingly, sent a deputation to Paris to lay the wishes of the 
" Allobroges " before the Convention. 

While this delegation was on its way to Paris, Dumouriez 
advanced to the conquest of the Austrian Netherlands. His The 
troops outnumbered the Austrians about three to one. The f^^^^^' 
Austrians were also weakened by the hostility of the most active 
local political leaders. Dumouriez took advantage of this, pub- 
licly declaring that the French would not interfere with the 
efforts of the " Belgians " to organize a government, provided 
they would no longer recognize the jurisdiction of the " Haps- 
burg tyrants." He ordered his generals to assemble the towns- 
people, proclaim their sovereignty, and require them to elect a 
provisional administration. If any towns refused to d# this, 
and declared for their Austrian master, they were to be treated 
as Brunswick had threatened to treat Paris. Incidentally, Du- 
mouriez ordered that any armed French emigrant who should 
fall into the hands of his generals should be shot within twenty- 
four hours. Since both the democratic and the Catholic revo- 
lutionists, who hated one another cordially in 1790, were united 
in their desire to throw of¥ the Austrian yoke, the policy of 
Dumouriez was acceptable to them. After he broke the Aus- 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XII 

1792-93 

Foreign 
Policy of 
the Con- 
vention 



The 

' 'National 

Limits" 



trian resistance at Jemappes, on November 6, he rapidly over- 
ran the provinces and the bishopric of Liege. 

This astonishing series of triumphs brought in its train a 
number of perplexing problems. In each case the French ad- 
vance had been made easy by the cooperation of a part of the 
inhabitants. In several of the small States along the border an 
incidental result had been a revolution, and the party vi^hich 
could rely upon the support of French troops had seized power. 
The French had not conferred the blessings of liberty without 
charge. The usual military requisitions were made. Custine 
had accompanied his bulletins of victory with sacks of German 
gulden. The minister of foreign affairs had suggested that in 
the towns to which he should " bring liberty " he should select 
important books to enrich the French national library. Voices 
were already raised in the. Convention arguing that the generals 
should seize the property of princes, nobles, and priests, in 
order that France might be recompensed more adequately. In 
this as well as in the question of the attitude which the govern- 
ment should take towards the brood of revolutionary adminis- 
trations in Savoy, Germany, and the Netherlands, the French 
were embarrassed by their own declared principles. When the 
Convention had announced the advent of the republic, it pledged 
itself not to interfere in the internal affairs of its neighbors. 
It also declared that it would not engage in wars of conquest. 
But if it refused to countenance those who had assisted it in 
putting to flight the Prussians, Austrians, and Sardinians, it 
could never hope for such assistance again. Underneath the con- 
fused mass of good intentions and sentimental phrases lay also 
the desire for a France greater than that of which even a Louis 
XIV had dreamed, a France which should unite to herself all 
peoples dwelling within the limits of the- Alps and the Rhine. 
When, therefore, a definite appeal came from the republicans of 
Mainz, expressing fear that they might finally be abandoned, 
the Convention, on November 19, in a whirlwind of enthusiasm 
declared that it would succor all peoples who should wish to 
recover their liberties and that orders would be given to the 
French generals to carry aid to any who had been vexed for 
this cause. 

Two days after this great declaration the delegates from 
Savoy appeared at the bar of the Convention with their petition 
for annexation. Many members of the Convention wished to 
vote at once, but the more scrupulous felt that reflection was 
necessary, in order to discover how such a step comported with 
the principle of renunciation of conquests. The search did not 



THE WAR AND THE MONARCHY 189 

require many days. The committee reported that, although the chap. 

French had renounced the " brigandage of conquests, they had 

not declared that they would repulse from their bosom men 1792-93 
brought near to them by an identity of principles and of in- 
terests " and whose territory was enclosed within the " limits set 
by the hand of nature to the French Republic." If such peo- 
ples freely chose to be united to the French, their petitions 
should be granted. The report of the committee was accepted 
and Savoy became a part of France. Nice, which was con- 
quered at the same time, was not annexed until January, 1793. 
What had happened in Savoy might happen in Germany west 
of the Rhine and in the Belgian lands. The danger was that, 
as the Convention had discovered a way to make gains of ter- 
ritory without making conquests, it might also discover who 
were and who were not to be reckoned as " people " in investi- 
gating petitions for annexation. This was likely to be the case 
when the visionary enthusiasts of the Girondin group were 
forced to yield in matters of foreign policy to the more practical 
radicals of the Mountain party. 

Neither the declaration of November 19 nor the annexation 
of Savoy made clear to the generals of French invading armies 
the line of action which they were to follow. Events in the 
Belgian lands hastened a decision upon this question, though 
hardly on principles which the leaders of the Convention had The 
originally contemplated. Dumouriez had driven the Austrians 5®^^^*°^ 
out of the Netherlands, but this proved the least of his difficul- 
ties. Pache, the new minister of war, who had been a member 
of the Commune of August 10, embodied the distrust of Du- 
mouriez felt by the Paris radicals, and his agents in the Nether- 
lands were more eager to thwart the victorious general and to 
plunder the country than to provide supplies for the army. They 
insisted that war requisitions should be paid in coin and that 
this coin should be forwarded to Paris, while the army supplies 
were paid for in assignats. In this way the fall of the assignats 
was to be stayed. But such a policy alienated the Belgians and 
rendered the country insecure as a base of operations for the 
campaign Dumouriez was conducting to drive the Austrians 
across the Rhine. The Belgians were glad to be rid of the 
Austrians, but they were opposed not only to any scheme of 
annexation to France or even to the introduction of French in- 
stitutions. As the difficulties of the situation increased, the Con- 
vention sent several deputies, among them Danton, to investigate 
the situation. He and his companions not merely studied the 
situation, they sought to give control to the small minority of 



190 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XII 



Decree of 
December 
15, 1792 



France 

and 

England 



Belgians who wished a French regime, if not annexation to 
France. To assist them they called in a crowd of Jacobin re- 
tainers from the nearest towns of northern France. They 
finally concluded that a new law was needed, authorizing French 
generals to abandon the attitude of benevolent spectators and to 
become active agents of social and political reorganization. The 
report of its commissioners led the Convention, December 15, 
to adopt a decree formulating a definite policy of revolutionary 
propaganda. 

According to this decree existing authorities were to be super- 
seded by provisional administrations chosen by the people, but 
in the number of the " people " were not included nobles or any 
persons who had been officials, civil or military, of the old gov- 
ernment, or members of privileged corporations. The system 
of taxation, the tithe, feudal dues of all kinds, titles of nobility, 
all special privileges, were to disappear, and the property of 
both State and Church was to be put " under the safeguard and 
protection of the French Republic." An account was to be kept 
of the expenses which the French should incur for the common 
defense, and the amount charged to the peoples enfranchised. 
If the French government should discover that " the common 
interest required that French troops remain in the country after 
the provisional government has given place to an organized ad- 
ministration, this administration shall provide for their sub- 
sistence." In this way the burden of supporting the armies of 
France might be shifted to the shoulders of her neighbors. 
The Convention further declared that any people which should 
refuse this brand of liberty, and should recall its ancient masters, 
should be treated as enemies. They would cease to be " people " 
and should be reckoned as slaves. 

The French policy of territorial aggrandizement added an- 
other State to the list of the enemies of the republic. As late 
as the beginning of November the English ministers believed 
that a policy of neutrality was sound. They even cherished the 
hope of making further reductions in taxation. But the inva- 
sion of the Netherlands changed the situation, for it menaced 
the security of the United Provinces, guaranteed by treaty with 
Great Britain. Pitt evidently did not regard the invasion alone 
as ground for English intervention, although Englishmen had not 
forgotten that the terrible War of the Spanish Succession at 
the beginning of the century had been provoked by an aggres- 
sion hardly greater. In a war with the Austrians the French 
had a right to invade Austrian territory. When, however, the 
French asked the Dutch for permission to sail up the Scheldt, in 



THE WAR AND THE MONARCHY 191 

order to facilitate an attack upon Antwerp, when a little later the ^^^' 

French declared the Scheldt an open river, in violation of the 

treaty rights of the Dutch, and when the declaration of Novem- 1792-93 
ber 19 seemed to invite the Dutch radicals to overthrow the gov- 
ernment of the stadtholder, Pitt believed a passive attitude no 
longer safe. Accordingly the English government opened tenta- 
tive negotiations with the Austrians and Prussians, pledged its 
support to the Dutch in case of attack, called out the militia, 
and hastened forward military and naval preparations. Reas- 
suring explanations of the November declaration sent by the 
French minister were counterbalanced by news of the decree of 
December 15, which threatened to force French institutions upon 
unwilling populations. 

There were other causes of friction. Moderate opinion in 
England had become hostile, especially after the overthrow of 
Louis XVI and the massacres of September. The members of 
the English Corresponding Societies felt it their duty to increase 
the vehemence of their advocacy of French principles, and sent 
memorials to the Convention protesting against British neutral- 
ity in the struggle between France and her enemies, and giving 
hope of the organization of a convention in England. These 
noisy pronunciamentos deluded the French into the conviction 
that the English people were really on their side. Meanwhile 
the British government began to repress agitation. In the sum- 
mer a proclamation against seditious writings had been issued 
and Thomas Paine had been prosecuted for seditious libel on the 
ground of what he had written in The Rights of Man. In De- 
cember parliament by the Alien Act placed foreigners under 
surveillance and authorized the government to expel them from 
the kingdom whenever such a step seemed advisable. It was 
less and less probable that the new repubHc would be recognized 
or that formal diplomatic relations, broken off after August 10, 
would be resumed. Meanwhile the desire of the government to 
reach an understanding with the Allies was cooled by the in- 
formation that Prussia was to be permitted to indemnify her- 
self for the losses of the war by annexing a portion of Poland, 
while Austria was to find reward in an exchange of the Nether- 
land provinces for Bavaria. Between the morals of the AlHes 
and the morals of the French, those of the old and those of the 
new regime, there did not appear to be much choice. 

The decision of the Convention to exact vengeance of Louis Execu-iou 
XVI for his disloyalty to the Revolution hastened on war not ^Jg*^ 
only with England, but also with the United Provinces and with 
Spain. The King's supporters had been punished on August 



192 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^xrf' ^^ ^"^ September 2; why should the principal culprit escape? 

So felt the radicals in the Commune and their friends in the 

1792-93 Convention. But the majority of the Convention, and especially 
the Girondin leaders, were reluctant to insult a fate so tragic as 
that of the fallen monarch. This reluctance seemed to expose 
the Commune and the Paris deputies to the danger of being 
marked for sacrifice in case of any compromise with the Allies 
or the old regime. Until the Convention also dipped its hands 
in blood these men were not secure. Their clamors were sup- 
ported by the more excitable patriots of the Convention, who 
saw in the Revolution a struggle between despotism and liberty, 
between kings and peoples, and believed that in this struggle 
Louis had played the part of traitor. They suspected that those 
who argued the inviolability of the King, according to the con- 
stitution of 1791, which made deposition the extreme penalty 
for his offenses, were at heart royalists and enemies of the 
republic. The discovery late in November of compromising pa- 
pers in a secret receptacle in the Tuileries revealed the war of 
intrigue which the King had waged upon the Revolution, This 
made the position of those who argued against a trial untenable, 
and early in December Louis was formally arraigned. He did 
not decline the jurisdiction of the Convention, but his answers 
to the questions addressed to him were disingenuous. The vote 
for conviction was practically unanimous. When the question 
of penalty was raised the radicals sought to intimidate their 
opponents by demanding that the votes be given individually as 
each person's name was called. To vote for some other penalty 
than death required courage in the face of hostile galleries and 
in a city controlled by the men of August and September, and 
yet 321 voted against inflicting the death penalty. At first there 
was only a majority of one for immediate execution. The sin- 
ister event took place on January 21. One consequence was the 
expulsion of the French diplomatic agent from England. France 
retorted by declaring war upon England and upon her Dutch 
ally, the United Provinces. War with Spain and with the 
Empire followed a month later. 

Two days after the French republicans executed a king, the 
Second chivalrous defenders of monarchical right, Frederick William 
of Prussia and Catherine of Russia, agreed upon the destruction 
of a kingdom. Poland was the victim. At this second dis- 
memberment several of its best provinces and half of its popu- 
lation were annexed by its neighbors. Thorn and Danzig, with 
Posen and other districts, later called South Prussia (containing, 
all told, a million inhabitants), were assigned to Prussia; while 



Partition 
of Poland 



THE WAR AND THE MONARCHY 193 

Russia's share was Kief, Volhynia, Podolia, and Wilna (about ^^^^' 

twice as much). Russia would have desired to exclude Prussia 

altogether from the spoil, but Frederick William had marched i792-9S 
an army into Poland, the war with France giving him opportunity 
to mobilize his entire forces. Such an argument convinced 
Catherine. But neither Prussia nor Russia saw any reason to 
admit Austria to the solemn duty of stamping out Jacobinism 
at Warsaw, because Austria was not in a position to support 
effectively her claims for indemnity, since the advance of the 
French occupied all her energies. The agreement of January 
23 was kept secret, to enable Russia and Prussia to complete 
their arrangements for its enforcement. 



CHAPTER XIII 



THE REIGN OF FORCE 



CHAP. 
XIII 



The Revo- 
lution and 
the People 



THE necessities of national defense, which had borne the 
men of August lo into power, should have marked the 
bounds of their undertaking and guarded them from assuming 
the attitude of repubhcan rigorists and defying all the States 
of western Europe. The task of carrying liberty, of the Jacobin 
brand, into the neighboring lands at the point of the bayonet did 
not appeal to the soberer portion of the French population, espe- 
cially after news of defeat succeeded the earlier tidings of vic- 
tory. The people were weary of being dragged from crisis to 
crisis. Industry was in ruins, famine menaced the cities. One 
of the members of the Convention wrote from the south in 
March, 1793 : " Everywhere the people are tired of the Revo- 
lution. The rich detest it, and the poor are persuaded that we 
are at fault because they lack bread. Even the clubs have lost 
their energy. The municipalities chosen by the people themselves 
are weak or corrupt." " But," he added, " we must conduct the 
ship of state to port or perish with it, for we shall never be par- 
doned for wishing a liberty pure and unmixed." The republic 
was undoubtedly in peril, but the situation was due to the politi- 
cal excesses of the radical leaders as much as to the perversity 
of the enemies of the Revolution either in or out of the country. 
Patriotic France could not heartily unite for the common de- 
fense under such leadership, and yet these leaders were des- 
perately resolved to remain in power. They identified their su- 
premacy with the safety of the repubUc, they regarded their 
political enemies as traitors, and secured union by methods of 
violence and terror. They may have saved the country from 
being despoiled by the Allies, but they hopelessly compromised 
the permanence of the republic and made its name a byword in 
Europe for a generation. The conduct of the Allies was on no 
higher plane. They devised schemes of sanguinary vengeance 
and reckoned the list of indemnities in terms of French prov- 
inces or of Polish territory. In England the governing classes, 
frightened at the inroads of Jacobinism, clamored for the sus- 
pension of liberty of assemblage, of speech, and of the press. 
The Reign of Force was already begun. 

194 



THE REIGN OF FORCE 



195 



CHAP. 
XIII 



Search for 
Allies 



After the war with the English and the Dutch opened, the 
French ministry redoubled its efforts to create a diversion which 
should relieve the pressure of attack upon the borders of France. 
Overtures were made to the King of Sardinia for a treaty in 
accordance with which France should assist him in conquering 
the Milanese, while he in return should cede Sardinia, and recog- 
nize the annexation of Savoy and Nice. The French were ready 
to promise him in addition the ancient republic of Genoa, al- 
though they did not yet control it. This was merely a formal 
difficulty, which might be overcome by persuading the Genoese 
to admit a French garrison as a protection against the covetous- 
ness of the King of Sardinia. The most cherished scheme was 
the resumption of the classical combination of Turkey, Sweden, 
and Poland, against Austria and Russia. Sweden had despatched 
an ambassador to France and the Polish patriot Kosciusko was 
in Paris, but the French emissary to Constantinople could at 
first get no further than Bosnia. The ministry was not above 
making indirect overtures to Austria with the hope of detaching 
her from Prussia by holding out the old bait of the recovery of 
Silesia, being equally ready to promise Frederick WilHam Aus- 
trian Silesia in return for an alliance. 

French diplomacy reached across the Atlantic and attempted 
to find an ally in the young republic of the United States, many 
of whose citizens were watching the progress of the Revolution 
with deep sympathy. The relations of the United States with ^ 
both England and Spain were so strained that the French had states 
a reasonable hope of success. English garrisons had not been 
removed from the frontier posts and it looked as if the EngUsh, 
urged by the Canadians, were attempting to retain a hold upon 
the unsettled lands of the northwest, or, at least, to create an 
Indian territory which would serve as a barrier to the expansion 
of the United States. The Indians were furnished with sup- 
plies which enabled them to keep up their attacks on the border 
settlements. Feeling in the United States was made still more 
bitter when these Indians defeated General St. Clair. Another 
grievance was the reluctance of the British to negotiate a treaty 
of commerce. They sent no minister until 1791, and when he 
arrived his principal function seemed to be delaying the settle- 
ment of all questions at issue. With Spain the difficulty con- 
cerned the southern boundary of the United States and the rights 
of trade by the lower Mississippi. A movement to organize a 
separate commonwealth west of the AUeghanies seemed immi- 
nent unless the settlers in that region were supported in their 
controversy with the Spaniards. 



France 
and the 
United 



196 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^xin' When war broke out between England and France, American 

sympathies were mainly with the French; but many warm ad- 

1793-94 n^irers of the Revolution had found their ardor chilled by the 
news of the massacres of September and the execution of Louis 
XVI. The United States was bound by the treaties of 1778 to 
guarantee the territories of France in the West Indies and to 
permit French prizes to be brought into American ports. It was 
a question whether under those treaties the United States could 
remain neutral. Washington's cabinet was not agreed on this 
question, but he decided to publish a declaration on April 23 
that the United States was at peace with both England and 
France and that American citizens should abstain from acts 
hostile to either nation. Early in April a new French minister, 
Genet, a political friend of the Girondins, arrived at Charleston, 
and, without waiting to be received by the government, proceeded 
with the greatest energy to carry out what he deemed to be the 
spirit of his instructions. He despatched privateers to prey on 
British commerce along the coast and appointed consuls with 
admiralty functions to condemn prizes. He also attempted to 
organize expeditions against the Spaniards and contemplated an 
attack on Canada. When he reached Philadelphia and discov- 
ered that Washington was likely to interfere with these schemes, 
he thought a direct appeal to the people advisable, declaring in a 
letter to the ministry that " America is lost to France if the purg- 
ing fire of our revolution does not reach its midst." 

Meanwhile the policy of the French towards territories lying 
within their " natural boundaries " became more clearly defined. 
An^exa- Their leaders declared that the Alps, the Rhine, and the Ocean, 
were also the " Ancient " or Gallic boundaries, and that to re- 
cover these lands was not conquest, but merely " reunion." Steps 
were taken to hasten the holding of primary assemblies in regions 
occupied by the French army, placing them under the control 
of commissioners who were to secure " liberty of voting," These 
commissioners were instructed by the ministry that the annexa- 
tion of the Belgian lands would add forty million livres to the 
annual revenues of France and a thousand millions in the form 
of security to the assignats. They did not permit the question 
to be submitted to a general assembly of Belgian delegates, as 
was done in Savoy, but dealt with municipal assemblies, using 
soldiers to keep the opponents of annexation from disturbing 
the harmony of the meetings. Under the circumstances, it is 
not surprising that many communes petitioned the Convention for 
annexation and that the Convention yielded to their desire. But 



tions 



THE .^EIGN OF FORCE 197 

most of these annexations occurred in March, when the hold ^^J' 
of the French upon the Netherlands was already shaken. • 

On the Rhine, sentiment war, more favorable, and the French 1793-94 
commissioners sought to bring together a Rhenish convention. 
They found it hard, nevertheless, to discover a sufficient number 
of men willing to take the oath to liberty and equality, which was 
the indispensable qualification for voting. Those who refused 
the oath were expelled. Finally 345 voters were assembled in 
Mainz, 479 in Speyer, and 250 in Worms. The convention met 
at Mainz on March 17 with 100 delegates, representing the dis- 
trict from Landau to Bingen, and declared for union with France 
on the ground that it could not defend itself against the Allies 
and that the new-found liberties would perish save under French 
protection. Forster and two other deputies were sent to Paris 
with the petition for annexation. Many German communes had 
already been annexed separately. The Convention accepted the 
petition on March 30. A few days later the Prussians and Aus- 
trians laid siege to Mainz. 

As soon as war was declared upon Great Britain and the 
United Provinces, Dumouriez was ordered to invade Dutch ter- Downfall 
ritory. He met no serious obstacles until he reached the Rhine, dumouriez 
but he realized that unless success was immediate the enterprise 
would end in disaster, because the Belgian lands were seething 
with discontent and would rise if the French forces were once de- 
feated. He was unable to cross the Rhine immediately, and be- 
fore he could obtain boats he was recalled by the threatening prog- 
ress of the Austrians on his flank. The Austrians and Prussians 
had agreed that their first task should be to drive the French from 
the left bank of the Meuse, leaving the complete reconquest of 
the Netherlands until Mainz should be captured and the Rhine 
route reopened. Success against Dumouriez led to a change 
of plan. 

Dumouriez had long meditated the design of using the pres- 
tige of his victories and the fidelity of his troops to overthrow 
the politicians in power at Paris and restore the monarchy, with 
the King's son, Louis XVH, on the throne, and with himself as 
a sort of " mayor of the palace " or lieutenant-general. To ren- 
der the scheme feasible a final victory in the Netherlands was 
indispensable. Before an occasion for battle offered he ven- 
tured to oppose the policy of the government, closing revolu- 
tionary clubs in Belgian cities, dismissing the commissioners, and 
assuring the inhabitants of the restoration of their plundered 
treasures and of protection against French agents. In a letter 



198 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERICjD IN EUROPE 

CHAP, to the Convention he attributed the liscontent in the Netherlands 

to its poHcy and to the conduct of t le commissioners. The min- 

1793-94 isters did not lay this letter before the Convention until an at- 
tempt had been made through Danton to persuade Dumouriez 
to withdraw it. Before Danton reached the headquarters of 
the army the expected battle took place, but it ended in a decisive 
defeat for the French. The disaster occurred at Neerwinden 
on March i8. In spite of this Dumouriez persisted in his design 
and tried to bargain with the Austrians for an armistice long 
enough to enable him to set up a new government in Paris. He 
was ready to place frontier fortresses in their hands as a pledge 
of good faith. When finally the minister of war ^ and commis- 
sioners from the Convention were sent to arrest him, he sur- 
rendered them to the Austrians as hostages for the safety of the 
royal family. But his design failed because the army refused 
to follow him in such a treasonable enterprise. On April 5 he 
rode across the frontier with most of his general officers. Unlike 
Lafayette he had bargained with the national enemy, and in the 
eyes of France he was a traitor and not merely a victim. 

To the peril which menaced the country from the loss of the 
The Belgian lands and the treason of Dumouriez was added the peril 

venddan of civil war, half religious and half political, in the old provinces 

Insurrec- r -r^ • ia-t <i-iti' • 

tion of Poitou and Anjou. It was named the Vendean msurrection 

from the department where it originated. The treatment of the 
dissident priests drove the western peasants into a rebellious 
mood, and the spirit of dumb resistance was transformed into 
open insurrection when the news came of a law, adopted Feb- 
ruary 24, providing for the levy of 300,000 soldiers. Every man 
from eighteen to forty was liable to service, and might be re- 
quired to enUst if there were not enough volunteers among his 
neighbors to make up the local quota. The first insurrectionary 
bands assembled about the middle of March under leaders of 
their own choosing — a gamekeeper, a carter, and a wigmaker. 
Priests took control and the bands were called the " Christian " 
or " Roman - Catholic " army. The royalists saw that they could 
use the peasants to fight for the restoration of the monarchy, and 
nobles like Lescure and La Roche jaquelein assumed the leader- 
ship. The army was now called Catholic and Royal. 

The first news of retreat in the Netherlands nearly brought 
about in Paris another August 10, directed this time against the 
Convention. The people were suffering for lack of bread. 
They had learned well the lesson of suspicion and cried out for 

1 Beurnonville, successor of Pache. 

2 In distinction from the " constitutional " Catholics. 



THE REIGN OF FORCE 199 

the punishment of traitors. For several hours on March 9 the ^^l' 

ministers were besieged at the ministry of foreign affairs and 

few deputies dared attend the evening session of the Convention. 1793-94 
To " save the people from being terrible," as in the days of Sep- Organiz- 
tember, Danton argued that the government should become ter- ^f^^g 
rible by organizing a new extraordinary criminal court, giving ctovem- 
it power to try without appeal all offenses against the Revolution '°*°* 
and the Republic. This was agreed upon on March 10. 

An attempt was now made to give more unity to governmental 
action by authorizing the selection of ministers from the mem- 
bership of the Convention. The council of ministers had steadily 
lost in influence and effectiveness, and all recognized that the 
Convention was the real center of power. At the beginning of 
the year a Committee of General Defense had been appointed; 
but this committee, the sessions of which were public, did not 
succeed. The project of choosing ministers from the Convention 
was wrecked by personal fears and jealousies, like a similar 
project in 1789. This time it was Danton who was suspected 
of arranging for his own passage to control. A middle course 
was taken by organizing, on April 6, an executive committee, 
or Committee of Public Safety, composed of nine members, hold- 
ing secret sessions, and empowered to issue orders to the min- 
isters or other executive agents, subject to a report to the Con- 
vention. Its term of service was a month and its right of arrest 
affected only its agents. Danton was the most influential mem- 
ber, but the majority of his colleagues represented the moderate 
party in the Convention. 

In order to compel local administrative officers to work in har- 
mony with the government, the practice of despatching members 
of the Convention on important occasions to different parts of 
the country was developed into a system of permanent control. 
Such deputies, called " Representatives on Mission," were to pro- 
ceed by twos through the departments assigned to them, hasten 
the levy of volunteers, suspend and even arrest suspected offi- 
cials, order necessary measures, and keep the Committee of Pub- 
lic Safety and the Convention accurately informed of the local 
situation. The plan, if successfully worked out, would check 
the evil of administrative anarchy, from which the country had 
suffered since 1790, but it gave weak men an opportunity to play 
the tyrant. It was virtually a resumption of the ancient prac- 
tice of sending out Intendants. The plan was applied to military 
affairs as well as to civil administration, three deputies, clothed 
with full powers, being sent to each army. 

Before the reorganization of the government was effected, the 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XIII 



The Revo- 
lutionary 
Tribunal 



legislation of the Convention against reactionaries and royalists 
had become more severe, not to say vindictive. Emigrants, de- 
1793-94 f5^j^gj as persons who could not prove an uninterrupted residence 
Emigrants in France since May 9, 1792, were banished and declared civilly 
dead. If found within the limits of French jurisdiction they 
were to be executed summarily. Even girls between fourteen 
and twenty-one, if they returned after being deported, were to 
be executed. The aim of this law was principally fiscal, and it 
contained provision for the confiscation of the eventual, as well 
as the existing, property of emigrants. Although emigrants were 
civilly dead, the Republic could claim all that otherwise might 
fall to them for the next fifty years. Nor could its hold upon 
this property be shaken off by gifts, sales, or other methods of 
evasion, against which the law guarded specifically. 

The new criminal or " Revolutionary " Tribunal seemed at 
first unlikely to gain a better reputation for being " terrible " 
than that of its unhappy predecessor, the Tribunal of August 
17, 1792. The Convention had reserved the presentation of 
cases to a commission, and had filled the commission with depu- 
ties from the Girondin group. When the organization of the 
tribunal was completed, its officers, jealous for its reputation, 
complained that no cases were ready for them. Marat, appear- 
ing once more in an appropriate role, demanded the suppression 
of the commission, and this the Convention agreed to; but still 
the obstacle remained in another form, for decrees of accusation 
must now be presented by the Convention. After a few days, 
however, the right to take up cases was given to the prosecutor, 
Fouquier-Tinville, a broken-down attorney who had served as 
director of the jury of the preceding tribunal. He could do this 
of his own motion or upon denunciation of any public body or 
private citizen. Only members of the Convention, ministers, and 
generals of the army could not be arraigned without a special 
decree. In the first month of its career the tribunal condemned 
only nine persons, but it gave the measure of its judicial compe- 
tence by sending to the guillotine an ex-soldier and a maid-serv- 
ant for uttering, when drunk, anti-revolutionary cries. Their 
offense was called conspiring for the restoration of the monarchy. 
The other judgments were simple acts of vengeance, without 
value as a warning to the real enemies of the Republic, but the 
fault lay with the law rather than with the tribunal. 

Meanwhile a new political crisis menaced the country. Eco- 
nomic distress was acute. Chaumette, the city solicitor, threat- 
ened the Convention with insurrection if it did not check the rise 
in the price of bread by fixing a maximum price for grains. 



THE REIGN OF FORCE 



The Convention yielded, although its maximum law of May 3 ^^^' 

remained practically a dead letter. But while the question of 

food, and the danger of foreign invasion, made possible by the 1793-94 
treason of Dumouriez, roused the passions of the people, the 
factional struggle in the Convention and the determination of 
the Paris radicals to control the government precipitated the 
conflict. 

The Girondins distrusted Danton and the Committee of Pub- 
lic Safety. A few days before the committee was organized one a New 
of their leaders had accused him of complicity in the treason 
of Dumouriez. This did not keep him, after the first angry pro- 
tests had been uttered, from seeking to end the strife of fac- 
tions and direct the energies of all towards a reorganization of 
the national defense ; but the Girondins spurned his overtures. 
They also made the blunder of persuading the Convention to 
accuse Marat formally before the Revolutionary Tribunal of 
provocation to sedition — so blind were they to the impossibility 
of securing a verdict of condemnation from such a court. The 
retort of the radicals was prompt. With the mayor at their 
head delegates from the Commune demanded the expulsion of 
twenty-two Girondins. A new committee of insurrection had 
already been organized by the sections. On May 18 rumors of 
a projected attack on the Convention led the more violent Giron- 
dins to propose that the substitute deputies meet at Bourges and 
that the Commune be dissolved. The Convention decided in- 
stead to appoint a commission with the duty of investigating all 
conspiracies, especially those directed against the national rep- 
resentation. The Girondins succeeded in naming the personnel 
of this commission. Besides proposing measures of precaution 
against a possible uprising in Paris, the commission ventured to 
arrest Hebert, editor of the Pere Duchesne, and the president of 
a section. The Committee of Public Safety adopted a neutral 
attitude, endeavoring to direct the attention of all factions to the 
necessary work of the hour, although it naturally desired the 
dissolution of a rival body like the Girondin commission. 

The struggle culminated on May 31, when commissioners from 
the sections superseded the existing council of the Commune (al- May 31, 
though immediately afterwards associating the councilors with -^^^^ 2, 
themselves) and despatched a demand to the Convention for the 
withdrawal of the obnoxious commission and the arrest of 
twenty-two Girondins. After a bitter controversy the Conven- 
tion annulled the commission. For a few hours Paris seemed 
satisfied. Not so Marat and Robespierre, and their friends at 
the Hotel de Ville. They were resolved to drive from the Con- 



02 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^xni ' vention these enemies who were forever appeaUng from Paris to 
the provinces. A new insurrection was organized. A great 

1793-94 army marched upon the Convention, June 2. Surrounded, co- 
erced by cannon, betrayed by its radical leaders, the Convention, 
or rather the minority present, ordered the arrest of twenty-nine 
deputies, together with the ministers of finance and of foreign 
affairs. The Committee of Public Safety a few days later made 
a futile effort to persuade the Convention to reassert its authority 
and to deprive the Commune of control of the armed forces of 
the city. The intervention of Robespierre defeated the attempt. 
The Convention was for months to govern by grace of the Com- 
mune, and had to share the enthusiasms and satisfy the passions 
of the faction that ruled Paris. 

The increasing exasperation of the departments against the 
I Paris radicals resulted in civil war even before the victory of 

ederai- the Commune over the Convention. The moderates in Lyons 

™ rose on May 29, overthrew their radical municipality, and im- 

prisoned several of its members. The news of the struggle in 
Paris caused not only Lyons but other cities — Bordeaux, Mar- 
seilles, Nimes, and Toulon — to refuse to recognize the Conven- 
tion as the government of France. Many departmental admin- 
istrations took a similar attitude of resistance. This movement 
was stigmatized as " Federalism," as if it were inspired by the 
idea of substituting for the " Republic, one and indivisible," a 
federation of departments. The strength of the radicals was in 
the municipalities and in local branches of the Jacobin Club, 
whose energetic action checked the departmental movement and 
prevented the larger cities from joining hands in a conflict 
against Paris. They had the great moral advantage of being 
able to appeal to the patriotic sentiment of France for union 
against the invader, who was again menacing the frontiers, and 
who would certainly use civil strife as a means of despoiling 
France like another Poland. Moreover, the Convention, though 
humbled and decimated, was the government. The " federal- 
ists " at Bordeaux attempted to call another convention at 
Bourges. To allay the fear that the continued rule of the Con- 
vention might mean the domination of Paris, the Committee 
of Public Safety hurried to completion the draft of a constitu- 
tion. It was adopted by the Convention on June 24, was submit- 
ted to popular vote in primary assemblies throughout the country, 
and on August 10 its acceptance was announced. No steps were 
, taken, however, to put it into effect. 

During the month of June the Committee of Public Safety 
sought by negotiation to disorganize or reduce the resistance of 



THE REIGN OF FORCE 



the departments. In the north resistance collapsed after the °xm 

defeat at Vernon of a small force of Normans which had begun 

a march upon Paris. Bordeaux, unable to gain the support of 1793-94 
Languedoc, was soon isolated and compelled to surrender. Mar- 
seilles and Lyons made an effort to unite their forces, but this 
was thwarted. With these failures the insurrection assumed a 
royalist character in Marseilles, Lyons, and Toulon. Marseilles 
was captured on August 25, as the royalists were planning to 
admit the English. Three days later English and Spanish war- 
ships occupied Toulon. Lyons prepared to endure a siege. 

Before the crisis of civil war was passed, the country was 
threatened with an invasion as serious as that of 1792. The 
Committee of Public Safety, under the influence of Danton, had Danton's 
made efforts to open the way for a return of peace, or, at least, ^^*°^ 
to diminish the number of the enemies of the Republic. Taking 
advantage of a frontier incident, Danton, within a week of the 
creation of the committee, persuaded the Convention to reverse 
the policy of revolutionary propaganda and to declare that while 
the Republic would tolerate no intervention in its affairs it would 
not meddle in the affairs of any other government. The policy 
of the committee looked towards a use of the territory actually 
occupied as a means of facilitating desirable rectifications of 
frontier. It did not propose to insist on the " natural " fron- 
tiers, particularly in the case of the Netherlands, although it had 
no intention to give up Nice and Savoy. But its plans were ren- 
dered futile by the fatal defect of the instability of its powar. 
In Prussia there were a few advocates of peace with France, 
but quarrels with Austria over Poland were the only ground for 
hope that Prussia might be detached from the coalition. Even 
Sweden did not venture to confirm a treaty already drawn by 
her minister at Paris, and took an attitude of strict neutrality. 
All chance of a general pacification disappeared on July 10, when 
a new committee was elected of which Danton was not a mem- 
ber, and to which, later in the month, Robespierre, who had no 
sympathy with Danton's plans, was elected. 

If Prussia and Austria had cooperated heartily, the Allies 
might have reached Paris before the summer was over. The 
French troops were in dire distress. Clothing, food, and muni- 
tions were lacking. The staffs were disorganized by the arrest 
of officers whpse chief fault was that they belonged to the old rrance 
nobility or were unable to satisfy the deputies sent by the Con- i^Taded 
vention to watch them and control their policy. After a long 
siege Mainz was compelled to surrender on July 23. Five days 
later Valenciennes, a northern fortress town, fell. Conde, an- 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

other important fortress, had already fallen. The French ad- 
vance in the Alps was checked, and the southern frontier at both 
ends of the Pyrenees was- broken. The surrender of Mainz 
gave the Austrians a chance to conquer Alsace and Lorraine, 
but Brunswick would not lend the needed assistance. Prussia 
was reluctant to aid Austria in procuring indemnities before Aus- 
tria consented to the indemnification of Prussia in Poland, prom- 
ised by the treaty of January 23. The consequence was that 
only England was heartily engaged in the struggle against 
France, but England did not put many troops in the field and 
worked mainly by subsidizing the continental powers. The peril 
to France was great, although not as great as it appeared. In 
the presence of the twofold danger of foreign invasion and civil 
war the Convention resolved to call upon every able-bodied man 
for military service. This was termed the levee en masse and it 
was decreed on August 16.^ Men from eighteen to twenty-five 
formed the " first requisition " and were to be enrolled immedi- 
ately. Later requisitions might be made upon older men, in- 
cluding those of forty. Such was the origin of the conscription, 
which, when fully organized five years later, gave France im- 
mense advantage over other powers in the possession of a regu- 
lar channel for the supply of vast numbers of recruits. 

Increasing industrial distress and financial disorder aggravated 
all the evils from which France was sufifering. By May the in- 
come from taxation was 500 million livres in arrears. The re- 
ceipts from the three direct taxes in 1792 had been only five 
millions, and the receipts for 1793 were to be still smaller. The 
sole resource was confiscated property, which might be turned 
into quick assets in the form of assignats. The amount of as- 
signats in circulation in February was nearly 2,400 millions, and 
it was soon increased by 2,000 millions more. The financiers 
of the Convention consoled themselves with the reflection that 
their resources still reached the enormous total of 7,000 millions, 
but their decrees proved that confidence in the assignats was 
shaken. 

During the spring and summer of 1793 the Convention re- 
sorted to extreme measures to stay the depreciation of the as- 
signats. Heavy penalties, finally the penalty of death, were pro- 
vided against those who sold coin at a premium or distinguished 
in commercial transactions between coin and assignats. The at- 
tempt was made through a forced loan of a milliard to with- 
draw a third of the total issue from circulation. According to 

8 The mode was regulated by the decree of August 23. 



THE REIGN OF FORCE 



the first plan this loan was to be exacted from the rich, that is ^^m 

from persons with an income of at least 6,000 livres. The excuse 

for such discrimination was that the machinations of the rich 1793-94 
caused the Republic heavy expenditures. Furthermore, a loan, 
interesting them in its prosperity, would transform them from 
enemies into supporters. By the end of summer it was found 
necessary to charge all incomes with the contribution, increasing 
the relative share until the excess on incomes above 9,000 livres 
was claimed by the State. The loan did not bear interest, but 
evidences of payment might be used in the purchase of the lands 
of the emigrants — friends, it was presumed, of the unhappy 
lenders. This device for reducing the amount of the assignats 
was ineffective on many accounts, and especially because the as- 
signats paid in were reissued and because new issues were voted. 
Another scheme provided for the demonetization of all assignats 
of a nominal value above one hundred livres, if issued before 
August 10, 1792, and so bearing the royal effigy. The loss, it 
was supposed, would fall mainly upon the rich, for the poor 
would not be likely to have large bills among their savings. Of 
these assignats 558,000,000 were still in circulation. They could 
be used for arrears of taxation and for the purchase of public 
lands until the following January. Even after they were de- 
monetized they were at a premium in some quarters. Indeed 
it was the preference for them, indicating a lack of confidence 
in the Republic, which had incited the Convention to demonetize 
them. 

If the government was unable to stop increasing the amount 
of assignats in circulation, their value must inevitably depreci- 
ate. By the beginning of July they had fallen to 36. Prices, The Maxi- 
accordingly, rose at an alarming rate. The grain markets were 
not well stocked, although there had been no crop failures. The 
farmers waited for still higher prices, or feared that their wagons 
would be plundered, if they tried to market their grain. The 
prices of other necessaries also rose, and the distress of the peo- 
ple was fast becoming unbearable. Persons with moderate in- 
comes found them inadequate, and holders of government securi- 
ties, even when the interest was paid, were reduced to penury. 

The general distress prompted the Convention to seek a rem- 
edy by fixing a maximum for prices. France, the deputies ar- 
gued, was like a beleaguered town, where the ordinary rules about 
the rights of property were no longer applicable. A grand ac- 
counting of stock of all kinds should be made, and its owners, 
whether wholesalers or retailers, must agree to place it on sale 
in small lots, on pain of being punished as monopolists, that is, 



mum 
Laws 



!o6 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^ ^f ' criminals worthy of death. Not until the failure of the first 
maximum law for grains was this legislation developed by de- 

1793-94 fining what were the necessaries of life, by providing for taking 
an account of stock under municipal supervision, and by forcing 
the sale of any item of this stock which the customer might de- 
sire, whether the current price was satisfactory to the merchant 
or not. The final step was to fix the same maximum price for 
grains and flour all over the country, providing a rate per league 
for transportation. The price of other necessaries was the price 
of the year 1790 plus one-third. Wages were fixed at the rate of 
1790 plus one-half. Millers and bakers were not permitted to 
withdraw from trade without giving three months' notice. In 
order to render possible the application of these decrees the Con- 
vention ordered the preparation of schedules of prices for all 
localities, permitting the retailer to add five per cent, to the maxi- 
ijl^im rate. The collection of this material proved a formidable 
task and the report was not ready until February, 1794. 

The maximum legislation was respected where the local au- 
thorities were thoroughly in earnest about its enforcement. In 
Paris the loss fell chiefly upon wholesalers, who could be super- 
vised easily, and who were forced to sell also at retail. Butchers 
and bakers were watched by their neighbors, and did not dare 
to close their shops even when business was carried on at a loss. 
The authorities at Paris did not enforce the law of wages and 
so the employer suffered a double damage. The first effect of 
the law fixing the rate on necessaries was a rush of purchasers 
to the shops, eager to take advantage of the lower prices, and 
fearful lest the stock when once exhausted would not be re- 
plenished. While the shopkeeper utilized this resource of for- 
getting to refurnish his shelves with commodities, the manu- 
facturer possessed the simple remedy of debasing the quality 
of his goods. 

What effect these laws had upon the value of the assignats is 
difficult to determine. Other causes were also at work. The 
Convention triumphed over its enemies at Lyons and Toulon. 
Its armies were again victorious on the frontiers. The govern- 
ment was given a more efficient organization. Moreover, " ter- 
ror was made the order of the day," and the first impressions 
were strong, if not salutary. By the end of the year the as- 
signats had risen to 51, but after this time the fall was resumed 
and was never checked again. 

jaws of The legislative work of the Convention was not limited to 

enUon°" measures dictated by circumstance. During these troubled 
weeks it undertook to destroy what remained of feudal property. 



THE REIGN OF FORCE 207 

By a decree of July 17 any lease described in feudal terms or ^^m* 

embodying feudal elements was annulled and the property passed 

to the holder. The task of determining whether the feudal taint 1793-94 
was present was thrown upon the courts, with a vast amount of 
litigation as the consequence. Since the value of feudal dues 
had been counted among the assets of the republic and had been 
estimated at fifty millions, the rich and the noble were not the 
only sufferers from such legislation. The Convention also at- 
tempted to distribute existing fortunes by depriving fathers of 
the right to determine the amount which should go to each heir. 
Property was to be divided equally among the children, if there 
were any ; if not, among the other heirs. In their desire to find 
appHcations for the sacred principle of equality the deputies gave 
natural children rights equal to those of children born in wed- 
lock. Early in 1794 a wiser application of the principle was 
made in the decree abolishing slavery. Far-reaching though 
these measures were, they were overshadowed by the sanguinary 
laws dictated to the Convention by fear and passion during the 
critical months of 1793 and 1794. 

The military situation in September, 1793, was better than it 
had been in August, but the accumulation of impressions led in 
September to the adoption of measures which characterized what The 
is known as the " Reign of Terror." These included a definition Terror °' 
of treason within whose dreadful sweep any enemy or even 
critic of the party in power could be brought, a reorganized and 
enlarged Revolutionary Tribunal, with more summary methods 
of trial, a Revolutionary Army to terrorize Paris and the neigh- 
boring departments, and, finally, a Committee of Public Safety 
transformed into an irresponsible board of despots. The im- 
pulse to such action came primarily from the Commune and the 
Jacobin Club. Paris was under the control of its most violent 
men, of whom Hebert was a conspicuous figure, Marat had 
been assassinated in July by Charlotte Corday, a young Norman 
girl, who believed she was slaying the leader of the radicals and 
avenging the fallen Girondins. Her act seemed to justify in 
advance the cruelties perpetrated in the name of the law. The 
radicals were made secure against a revolt of the sections by a 
provision that the poorer citizens should be paid forty sous a 
day for attendance at the sectional meetings. The demands of 
the Paris agitators had great weight with the Convention, but 
the measures which it adopted, on recommendation of the Com- 
mittee of Public Safety, generally fell short of what was asked. 
When, for example, the Jacobins and the Commune asked for 
a Revolutionary Army, divided into sections, each accompanied 



!o8 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

*^xm' ^y ^ tribunal and a guillotine, with a procedure unembarrassed 
by the ordinary rules of justice, the Convention voted simply the 

1793-94 organization of a Revolutionary Army. 

Among the measures of Terror devised in September, 1793, 

he Eevo- was the reorganization of the extraordinary criminal court, now 

wbunaf formally named the Revolutionary Tribunal. The number of 
judges was increased to 16, of jurors to 60, and the court was 
divided into four sections, to secure the swift punishment of any 
who ventured to resist the government party. Service on the 
jury became, in general, a permanent, highly paid function. 
Among the new jurymen were Duplay, Robespierre's landlord, 
and other members of his faction. It is alleged that Fouquier- 
Tinville in important cases chose jurors who were " solid," that 
is, could be relied upon to bring in a verdict of guilty. The court 
degenerated into a mechanism for registering proscriptions. 
These were rendered easy by the Law of Suspects adopted on 
September 17, which treated as suspicious persons, liable to im- 
mediate arrest, all former nobles, or relatives of emigrants, who 
had not constantly manifested their attachment to the Revolu- 
tion, and, in general, all "partisans of tyranny, federalism, and 
enemies of liberty." The condemnations of the tribunal, which 
were only 5 in August and 14 in September, ran up to 50 in 
October, and 69 in December. Among the victims were the 
Queen, the astronomer Bailly, who had been the first mayor of 
Paris, Barnave, who next to Mirabeau was the greatest orator 
of the Constituent, even the Duke of Orleans, although he had 
voted the death of the King, and twenty-one of the Girondins 
with Mme. Roland. The case against the Girondins was on the 
point of breaking down for lack of evidence, when, on the de- 
mand of the Jacobin Club, the Convention decided that the hear- 
ing might be closed as soon as the consciences of the jurors 
were sufficiently enlightened. It is hardly necessary to add that 
this happy consummation was reached before the Girondins had 
begun their defense. The ceaseless war of the Republic upon 
conspirators was the special business of the Committee of Gen- 
eral Security, originally appointed in October, 1792. Its per- 
sonnel was long an object of contention between the Girondins 
and the Jacobins, but was finally controlled by the Committee 
of Public Safety. It grew into a ministry of police, with a juris- 
diction covering France and a salary account of nearly 400 mil- 
lion livres.* 

The Republic reserved its most savage punishments for the 

4 Local committees of surveillance assisted the Committee of General 
Security. 



THE REIGN OF FORCE 209 

Ven deans and for the towns which had risen against the Con- ^^J' 

vention. Lyons surrendered early in October. The Convention 

declared that it should be destroyed, and that only buildings dedi- 1793-94 
cated to industry and education and houses occupied by the poor Terror 
or by patriots should be left standing. Its name should be Ville ^<,*^inces 
Affranchie or Freetown. This monstrous decree, an echo of 
Roman vengeance, was impossible of execution. Couthon, a 
friend of Robespierre, first undertook the task, but was too mod- 
erate in his action, and was recalled. In his place Collot d'Her- 
bois, a sanguinary sentimentahst, and Fouche, an ex-Oratorian 
schoolmaster, were despatched to do the work. They were sup- 
ported by the Paris Revolutionary Army, which reached Lyons 
late in November. Upon the city itself their destructive wrath 
went no further than the partial ruin of a score or two of houses 
in the fashionable quarter. The walls were also pulled down. 
Upon the prisoners was visited the penalty of armed rebellion, 
and it was done with a refinement of cruelty. At one time sixty 
were struck down with cannon, those who were only wounded 
being finished with the saber. At another time 200 were killed 
by musketry fire. For five months a " Commission of Justice " 
sent men to the guillotine, until nearly 2,000 had perished. Tou- 
lon met a similar fate in December. Before the year closed the 
Vendean revolt was also crushed. Scattered bands disturbed 
the west, but the insurrection was no longer a serious danger. 
This success was disgraced by the conduct of a half-mad fanatic, 
the deputy Carrier, whom the Committee of Public Safety sent 
to Nantes. Finding excuse in the fact that the Vendeans had 
rarely given quarter, he caused nearly 2,000 prisoners to be shot 
on the plain beyond the walls. He discovered a more expeditious 
method of killing prisoners through the sinking, perhaps acci- 
dental, of a barge loaded with ninety dissident priests. Of this 
he ordered repetitions until about 2,000 more had been drowned. 
When the Committee of Public Safety learned what he was doing, 
he was recalled, but no attempt was made to punish him. The 
only rebellious district to escape was Corsica, which in 1794 
oflfered the crown to George III. Paoli had led the insurrec- 
tion, but the English did not permit him to remain as viceroy. 

The dangers of the country led to the concentration of ex- 
traordinary powers in the hands of the reorganized Committee 
of Public Safety, powers which several of its members — Carnot, 
Lindet, and Saint- Andre — used to further the national defense, 
and which fanatics like Billaud-Varenne and Collot d'Herbois, 
and sometimes even Robespierre, utilized to satisfy vindictive 
political hatreds or to crush factions which dared to oppose their 



2IO THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^xni* policy. In August the Committee was granted a credit of fifty 

millions for secret expenses, and used the money in part to secure 

1793-94 j^g Q^j^ control. Two months later the plan of putting the new 
Committee constitution into effect was formally abandoned and the govern- 
safety'"° ment declared " revolutionary " until the war ended. The super- 
vision of all constituted authorities was entrusted to the Com- 
mittee. It was to nominate generals and to authorize measures 
adopted by the ministry. In December its powers were more 
clearly defined in a law which brought to an end the anarchy 
of conflicting authorities, whether legal or self-constituted. 
Through national agents, who replaced district and municipal 
solicitors, the Committee could see that the laws were enforced. 
For one thing, this checked the independent activity of the Com- 
mune of Paris. Departmental administrations were reduced to 
the supervision of public works and the distribution of tax levies. 
Their councils and solicitor-generals were suppressed. The per- 
sonnel of many local bodies was also changed by " deputies on 
mission " acting for the Committee. In the spring of 1794 it 
gained the additional right of filling provisionally vacancies 
created by removals which it had ordered. When, on April i, 
the executive council was replaced by twelve commissions, sub- 
ordinated to the Committee, the Committee finally appeared in 
its true role as a governing board rather than a committee of the 
Convention. 

The triumph of the radical Jacobins during the Reign of Ter- 
ror was fatal to the state Church which the Constituent Assembly 
A New had created. Its clergy, whether chosen in 1791, or priests of the 
a en ax q\^qj. Church, could not be expected to cooperate heartily with 
the faction in control of the government. Some were Jacobins, 
but others lagged behind in the paths of " moderation." The 
Jacobin leaders, accordingly, began to transfer to the constitu- 
tional clergy, in whom they saw the fomenters of civil tumults, 
the hatred which they felt for the proscribed dissidents. Men 
who cherished the opinions of Voltaire and the Encyclopedists 
confused their contempt of CathoHcism with love of country. 
The Convention gave countenance to this feeling by adopting a 
new calendar and by substituting for the Christian era a new 
republican era.^ 

According to the new calendar the first year opened on Sep- 
tember 22, 1792, the day when the Republic was proclaimed. The 
months were named from the processes of nature; the cold au- 

5 Another motive was to provide a rational mode of measuring time. 
On August I, 1793, the Convention had adopted the metric system of 
weights and measures. 



THE REIGN OF FORCE 211 

tumnal mists, for example, giving the name Bruinaire, the winter ^^^' 

rains Pluviose, the growth of the seeds Germinal, the waving 

fields Prairial, and the summer heats Thermidor. Even the 1793-94 

structure and sound of each name, as Fabre d'Eglantine said in 

his report, was intended to indicate the character of the month." 

For the week was substituted the decade, and the festal day was 

the tenth or Decadi. By such changes the legislators hoped to 

break the associations of the old calendar with its saints' days 

and recurring festivals. 

In the same anti-Christian spirit they welcomed deputations 
which offered at the bar of the Convention the spoils of parish 
churches. In response to one of these deputations, on Novem- The wor- 
ber 6, it empowered the local authorities to suppress official par- ^^H^^l^ 
ishes by merging .them in neighboring parishes. The radicals of 
the Commune concluded that they were in the presence of a 
great popular movement which would lift to supreme influence 
those who managed to appear as its leaders. They forced Gobel, 
metropolitan bishop of Paris, and his vicars, to proceed to the 
Convention and renounce their offices. Three days later, on No- 
vember 10, they organized a festival of liberty in the cathedral 
of Notre Dame, transformed for the occasion into a " Temple 
of Reason." In the municipal council they ventured still further, 
voting to close all churches in Paris and to place the priests under 
surveillance. The Convention was at first intimidated by the 
Parisian phase of the movement, and many of the ecclesiastics 
among its members renounced their functions or abjured their 
faith. A few, led by Bishop Gregoire, stood firm. The most 
influential men in the Convention and in the Committee of Pub- 
lic Safety realized that such a movement would compromise the 
cause of the Republic abroad, foment civil strife at home, and 
jeopardize the national defense. Robespierre became the spokes- 
man of this feeling and denounced the leaders of the movement 
as ill-disguised emissaries of the invader. The Convention sol- 
emnly reaffirmed the liberty of worship, but threw so many quali- 
fications about the act that in most cases the decree remained a 

« " Nous avons cherche meme a mettre a profit rharmonie imitative de 
la langue dans la composition et la prosodie de ces mots et dans le 
mecanisme de leurs desinences ; de telle maniere que les noms des mois 
qui composent I'automne ont un son grave et une mesure moyenne, ceux 
de I'hiver un son lourd et une mesure longue, ceux du printemps un son 
gai et une mesure brieve, et ceux de I'ete un son sonore et une mesure 
large." Again he remarks : " C'est ainsi que des le premier de Germinal 
il se peindra sans effort a I'imagination, par la terminaison du mot, que 
le printemps commence. . . ." Proces-verbaux du Comite d'Instruction 
Publique, II. 700, 701. 



tions in 



212 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

CHAP, (jgad letter. Notre Dame was still called the Temple of Reason, 

and the movement spread from Paris to other large towns, some- 

1793-94 tiiY^es supported by the " deputies on mission," occasionally re- 
strained by them. In its correspondence the Committee sought 
to check outbreaks of anti-religious violence, but was reluctant 
to have the principle of religious liberty interpreted Hterally. In 
some places the churches never were closed, in others they were 
now reopened. In many country districts the people looked 
upon the constitutional priests with suspicion and regarded their 
overthrow with indifference. Before the anti-Christian move- 
ment ran its course it led to violent factional struggles within 
the Jacobin party and was responsible for a long list of pro- 
scriptions. 

The faction which had organized the festival of liberty and 
The Fac- the Worship of Reason was called Hebertist because its leading 
member was Hebert, assistant city solicitor and editor of the 
Pere Duchesne. In his attack upon this faction Robespierre had 
the support of Danton and of their common friend, the journal- 
ist Camille Desmoulins. Desmoulins began in December the 
publication of a new journal, the Vieux Cordelier, its name re- 
calling the time when the Cordelier Club was not in the hands 
of the Hebertists, but was managed by Danton and his friends. 
This journal in witty paragraphs, with biting sarcasms, attacked 
the Hebertists and ridiculed their methods of promoting the new 
religion, intimating that the consequence would be a fresh out- 
break of the Vendean insurrection. But Desmoulins was ready 
to go farther than Robespierre, and in his third number, under 
guise of defending the acts of vengeance by which the Republic 
had frightened its enemies into submission, he showed that some 
of these deeds resembled the most odious excesses of the Roman 
tyrants as described by Tacitus. About the same time Philip- 
peaux, a deputy on mission in the Vendean region, revealed the 
gross mismanagement of the government and held the Committee 
of Public Safety responsible. Desmoulins also referred to com- 
mitteemen so proud that one hardly ventured to address them. 
His attack on the system of Terror brought a deputation of weep- 
ing women to the Convention, begging for the release of innocent 
relatives. At this juncture Collot d'Herbois returned from the 
butcheries at Lyons, and both he and his friends realized that a 
reaction against the policy of Terror would ruin them politically, 
even if it did not menace their lives. Philippeaux and Desmou- 
lins were attacked in the Jacobin Club, and before the incident 
closed Desmoulins was repudiated by Robespierre. The jour- 
nalistic struggle between the Pere Duchesne and the Vieux Cor- 



stroyed 



THE REIGN OF FORCE 213 

delier increased in violence. The Committee of Public Safety, ^^f' 
restive under criticism, and fearing loss of prestige, resolved to — - 
reassert itself. In the midst of the controversy it caused the 1793-94 
arrest of Fabre d'Eglantine, a Dantonist, accusing^ him of em- 
bezzlement; and, when Danton asked that Fabre be heard by 
the Convention in his own defense, Billaud-Varenne threatened 
Danton himself. 

The denouement seemed long in coming. Although the quar- 
rel was at its height by the middle of January, it was two months 
before the Committee concluded to crush both Hebertists and H^bert- 
Dantonists. The Hebertists precipitated the crisis by at- panton^ 
tempting to take advantage of the distress in Paris and the chronic i^ts^ce 
lack of food in order to stir up a popular insurrection against 
the Convention and the Committee. This time the people were 
not deluded and attributed their ills to the Hebertists themselves, 
and to the Revolutionary Army which frightened the farmers into 
concealing grain. The Hebertists were arrested, tried summa- 
rily, and executed. After destroying those who sought to exag- 
gerate the policy of repression, the Committee turned on the 
Dantonists, or " Indulgents," arrested and tried them on the ab- 
surd charge of conspiring to restore the monarchy, and, as in 
the case of the Girondins, cut short the trial before the defense 
was heard. So perished Danton, the organizer of August 10, 
the principal minister of the first period of the Republic, the 
creator of the Revolutionary Tribunal, the head of the First Com- 
mittee of Public Safety; judicially murdered to satisfy rancorous 
jealousies and to save the rulers of France from being ques- 
tioned too narrowly. The Republic seemed to have become a 
monster eager to tear and devour her own children. The im- 
mediate consequences of the destruction of the Hebertists were 
greater than those which followed the death of Danton and his 
friends, for it brought to an end the independence of the Com- 
mune, already seriously undermined by the decree granting 
powers of control to the Committee of Public Safety.^ The 
mayor retired and the Committee replaced him, as well as the 
national agent, and his assistant, with its own appointees. Paris 
was now simply a part of the governmental machine. 

The death of Danton left Robespierre the greatest figure among 
the rulers of the Republic. In the Convention he seemed su- 
preme. The new commissions, which replaced the ministry, were 
filled with his partisans, who also controlled the Commune. 
Only in the two governing committees did he face even a latent 

' The Revolutionary Army of Paris was also suppressed. 



214 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^xm' opposition. He was not yet regarded as responsible for the Ter- 

ror, and was sometimes appealed to for the restoration of reli- 

1793-94 gious liberty. He had actually saved seventy-five members of 
Robes- the Girondin group from proscription after the death of their 
Pierre leaders. His chief desire seemed to be the introduction of the 
reign of " virtue," but his conception of virtue (true public spirit 
or good citizenship) was drawn from the pages of Rousseau, and 
he could not understand, any better than a grand inquisitor, how 
a just man could depart in thought or deed from the law of recti- 
tude which he expounded with arid eloquence in reports and 
addresses. 

Two acts characterized the period of Robespierre's supremacy. 
The first gave to the religious ideas of Rousseau the sanction of 
a decree of the Convention. By it France solemnly recognized 
"the Existence of the Supreme Being and the Immortality of 
the Soul," appointed a festival for the symbolic introduction of 
this religion of the Savoyard Vicar, and provided for annual 
festivals celebrating the principal virtues and relationships of 
life. The first festival occurred on June 8, and Robespierre, 
then president of the Convention, acting as a sort of supreme 
pontiff, advanced and applied the torch to an effigy of atheism. 
This festival was followed two days later by a second charac- 
teristic event, the reorganization of revolutionary justice, ren- 
dering procedure against the enemies of the Republic more swift 
and sure. Robespierre was personally responsible for the terms 
of the law which deprived the accused of counsel and suppressed 
the hearing of witnesses in case there was material or " moral " 
evidence enough to convince the jurors. Every imaginable at- 
titude of opposition was a crime. When it was remembered 
what Robespierre meant by republican principles, it was ominous 
that the law pronounced a criminal whoever sought to distort 
their energy and purity. The Tribunal itself was reorganized. 
Only jurors known to be sure were retained ; the weak were 
eliminated. Fouquier-Tinville redoubled his sinister activity. 
Already in the month before the law was passed the tale of death 
had risen to 354, but in the next seven weeks 1,376 were exe- 
cuted, more than had perished during the previous fifteen months 
of the Tribunal's existence. Why Robespierre gave such fright- 
ful speed to the enginery of death is a mystery, unless his orig- 
inal intention was by such means to destroy the remnant of op- 
position, and, with no rivals to obscure his devotion to the Re- 
public, introduce the reign of order and clemency, fitting 
accompaniments of the triumph of virtue. But already the op- 
position, prompted partly by fear, partly by disgust at Robes- 



THE REIGN OF FORCE 215 

pierre's religious ideas, had begun to organize its forces. It ^^if" 

was aided by victories on the frontier which rendered the daily 

butcheries on the Paris squares a horrible anachronism. 1793-94 

The military disasters of 1793 had ended with the surrender 
of Mainz, Conde, and Valenciennes. New leaders were fighting successes 
their way to the front. The general direction of the army was AmfeT*^'* 
entrusted to Carnot, a member of the Committee of Public Safety. 
Jourdan, who the year before was only commander of a battalion 
of volunteers, won a victory at Wattignies, October 16, and relieved 
Maubeuge, an important barrier fortress. By the end of the year 
all the frontiers of France except Roussillon were cleared. The 
government completed the reorganization of the army by the 
consolidation of the volunteers and the line, combining two bat- 
talions of volunteers and one of the line in a demi-brigade of 
about 3,000 men. The system of the levee en masse brought the 
numbers in the army up to 850,000 by the spring of 1794. Robert 
Lindet, also a member of the Committee, reorganized the service 
of provisions and military supphes. The generals were begin- 
ning to develop the art of manceuvering in the field so that they 
could take advantage of the superior power of individual initia- 
tive possessed by French citizen-soldiers. Clouds of skirmishers 
were used to open the battle and columns were employed to break 
the enemy's line. Artillery was massed that cannonades might 
have a more decisive effect. The great event of the campaign 
of 1794 was the victory of Fleurus, on June 25, when Jourdan 
defeated the Austrians so completely that they again evacuated 
the Netherlands. The Prussians were also forced to retreat 
towards the Rhine. This delivered France from the nightmare 
of invasion and took from the Terrorists all excuse for the policy 
of sanguinary repression. 

The growth of opposition in the Committee of Public Safety 
so offended Robespierre that towards the end of June he prac- opposi- 
tically ceased to attend its sessions. The center of opposition "0^ *» 
was, however, in the Committee of General Security. After long pierre 
reflection, on July 26 (8 Thermidor), Robespierre made a long 
speech in the Convention, defending himself against the charge 
that he had attempted to dominate his colleagues, or in any way 
to separate his cause from that of the Convention, and threaten- 
ing vaguely those who had exaggerated the Terror. He de- 
clared that several men should be expelled from the Committee 
of Public Safety and that the Committee of General Security 
should also be purged. His failure to mention names was fatal, 
for every one who had been associated with the Dantonists or 
the Hebertists, and those who had otherwise antagonized him. 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP, 
XIII 



feared that they would be destroyed in a new " amalgam," ^ and 
this fear consolidated the opposition. A struggle followed over 
the question of ordering the speech printed and distributed to 
the communes, the usual compliment in such cases. The Con- 
vention finally agreed that it should be printed, but refused to 
send it to the communes. 

That night the conspirators sought to unite moderate men and 
extremists in an effort to overthrow Robespierre. The moderates 
The Ninth wcre told that their turn would soon come, if the tyrant were 
midor^'^ not Overthrown, while to the extremists Robespierre was de- 
nounced as an enemy of revolutionary severity. The next day 
(9 Thermidor) in the Convention Robespierre's friend Saint-Just 
began to read a prepared speech by which he aimed to restore 
harmony, suggesting precautions against the ambitions of any 
single member of the Committee, but he was violently interrupted 
by Tallien, who demanded that " the curtain be torn apart." 
Billaud-Varenne denounced Robespierre, asserting that the de- 
cree of June 10, which reorganized the Revolutionary Tribunal, 
was intended to support Robespierre's schemes. When Robes- 
pierre rushed to the speaker's tribune, Collot d'Herbois, who was 
presiding, refused to recognize him. The session soon resolved 
itself into the despairing struggle of Robespierre to obtain a hear- 
ing in spite of the clamors of his enemies. His efforts were 
vain, and after hours of turmoil the Convention voted to place 
him under arrest as a " dominator," With him were arrested 
Saint-Just and Couthon of the Committee, Robespierre's brother 
Augustin, his friend Le Bas, and Henriot, commander of the 
Paris National Guard. 

When the Commune heard of this action, it declared itself 
in insurrection, and summoned the sections to its assistance. 
Robespierre and his friends were delivered from prison and con- 
ducted to the Hotel de Ville. He still hesitated to countenance 
any acts of rebellion against the Convention. Meanwhile it de- 
creed that the prisoners and their partisans were outlaws, and 
rallied the majority of the sections to its cause. About mid- 
night a heavy rain dispersed the crowds on the square in front 
of the Hotel de Ville. Shortly afterwards the troops of the 
Convention pressed into the building and found Robespierre 
stretched out on the floor, his jaw fractured by a bullet. 
Whether he was wounded by one of the first men to penetrate 
the room or had attempted to commit suicide is not known. At 
the close of the day he was executed on the Place de la Revolu- 

8 This was the nickname for a combination in a single proscription of 
persons accused of various offenses against the Republic. 



THE REIGN OF FORCE 217 

Hon amidst shouts of execration from the people who had lav- *5Sii' 

ished adulation upon him in his days of power. With him per- 

ished, then or soon afterwards, 103 of his partisans in the Com- i^DS-g* 
mune and the Jacobin Club. Now that the idol was overthrown, 
it became the fashion or the excuse of every man who had cow- 
ered under the Terror or who had voted its decrees of proscrip- 
tion to load Robespierre's name with infamy and to hold him 
responsible for all the crimes of the Revolution. 

France believed that by a regime of merciless severity she had 
preserved her unity and repelled the invader from her borders. 
During the same months Poland attempted to rise against her Third 
spoilers, failed, and was blotted from the map. After the Diet 0^*5"/°^^ 
of Grodno had agreed to the cessions demanded by Russia and 
Prussia, groups of Polish patriots began to organize in order to 
undo this shameful work. Their principal leader was Thaddeus 
Kosciuszko, a nobleman who had served in the American army 
during the Revolutionary War. The Russian pohcy compelHng 
the dismissal of a large part of the Polish army assisted the plans 
of the Poles, for from these soldiers were gathered recruits for 
an uprising. The conspirators worked so secretly that the Rus- 
sian commander, who still occupied Warsaw, could not seize any 
of the threads of the conspiracy. The struggle opened at Cracow 
on March 23, 1794. A month later Warsaw was in the hands 
of Kosciuszko. King Stanislas swore to live and die with his 
subjects. The fatal obstacle to a successful struggle was the 
existence of serfdom, which divided the interests of the nobility 
and the peasants. Kosciuszko did not venture to abolish serf- 
dom: he tried to lessen its unjust burdens, but this alienated 
many of the nobles. In the larger towns the mercantile class 
deplored a conflict which they felt must fail, and which was cer- 
tain to bring ruin upon them. Under the circumstances it was 
impossible to organize a successful resistance ; Kosciuszko's small 
army was defeated in October, and Warsaw was stormed a month 
later. Russia had won the victories, but Prussia and Austria 
sent armies into the field, with the consequence that the spoil 
had to be divided. Months passed, however, before the three 
could agree upon a plan of division. France, blood-stained but 
triumphant, bleeding and ruined Poland, were the two tragic 
figures of this terrible period. 



CHAPTER XIV 



CHAP. 
XIV 



THE ATTEMPT TO ORGANIZE THE REPUBLIC 

THE men who had brought about the overthrow of Robes- 
pierre did not intend to abandon a scheme of government 
which had raised their party to power. Their motive had been 
to save themselves. None were more surprised than they that 
their triumph ended the Reign of Terror. There was something 
irrational about such a result. Robespierre had been no more 
responsible than half a dozen others for the sinister violence of 
Jacobin rule. It is true that the reorganization of the Revolu- 
tionary Tribunal in June, 1794, was mainly his work, but several 
of the leaders in the conspiracy against him were fanatics more 
sanguinary than he — for example, Collot d'Herbois, who had 
ordered the fusillades at Lyons, Tallien, who had sent many 
" federalists " at Bordeaux to the guillotine, and Freron, who 
had directed the fusillades at Toulon. 

Nevertheless, after the death of Danton, Robespierre was the 
only great Revolutionary name left. His immense influence was 
partly due to this fact. With the semblance of power came in- 
creasing responsibility for the regime under which France began 
to writhe as if tormented by a horrible nightmare. When he 
fell the shock was so great that France was aroused. Sanity, 
a sense of justice, and courage were restored. A continuance 
of the Reign of Terror became impossible. 

The men who had taken the principal parts on the Ninth of 
Thermidor — Tallien, Barras, and Freron — discovered the next 
day that they were popular heroes. As soon as they perceived 
the strength of the reaction against the Robespierrist govern- 
ment they were glad to play this part, for it might save them 
from proscription. Tallien was the most popular of the three. 
He it was who had interrupted Saint Just on the fateful morn- 
ing. Pasquier relates that Tallien appeared at the theater after 
rumors had been circulated of an attempt to assassinate him. 
" It was known that he was to be there. Never was a theater 
so full. The stairways were as crowded as the hall itself. He 
appeared at last : what a reception ! What applause ! The spec- 
tators, men, women, and children stand on the seats, they cannot 
gaze at him enough. He was young, rather handsome; he had 

218 



THE ATTEMPT TO ORGANIZE THE REPUBLIC 219 

a serene air. Mme. Tallien was beside him and shared in his ^^^' 

triumph." Freron was a journahst, and his newspaper, L'Ora- 

teur du Peuple, took the lead in the reaction against the impeni- ^"^^^-^^ 
tent Jacobins who attempted to save the Terrorist regime from 
destruction. Stimulated by his words young men of fashion, the 
jeunesse doree, armed themselves with cudgels and attacked the 
Jacobins on the street or invaded their meetings. The party 
which united in pulling down piece by piece the great machine 
of Jacobin domination was called Thermidorian from the date 
of its origin. 

The first part of the revolutionary government to be affected 
by the change was the Committee of Public Safety. Even after 
Robespierre's death the Convention was afraid to leave govern- Eeorgan- 
mental powers concentrated, lest a self-appointed successor might Jj^^^^^^J^ 
seize them. On the eleventh of Thermidor the deputies voted Govern- 
that all committees should be renewed by quarters each month, '^^°* 
and that in the case of the two principal committees an interval 
of a month must come between the close of service upon them 
and a reelection. This did not reassure the timid and a few 
weeks later they distributed the work of administration between 
sixteen committees, assigning to the Committee of PubHc Safety 
only war and diplomacy. Such subdivision of responsibihty was 
dangerous, but it had the effect of giving the executive commis- 
sioners more of the character of ministers, since they remained 
in office while the personnel of the committees was constantly 
changing. The Convention also assumed greater importance as 
the center of government as well as of legislation. In the spring 
of 1795, however, the Committee of Public Safety was made the 
executive agency through which all committees acted. 

The Revolutionary Tribunal was promptly reorganized. The 
law of June 10 (22 Prairial) was repealed and adequate means 
of defense were granted to the accused. Barere, a member of 
the Committee of Public Safety, had the assurance to propose 
the reappointment of Fouquier-Tinville as public prosecutor. 
Fouquier was, instead, arrested and after a trial which was not 
finished until May, 1795, was condemned to death. With him 
perished fifteen of the former judges and jurors of the Tribunal. 
The infamous Carrier had preceded him to the scaffold. After 
these efforts to reestablish the balance of justice the Tribunal 
ceased to act and was soon abolished. 

The Jacobin Club, which had become an instrument of the 
Robespierrist rule, was first changed and then destroyed. Robes- 
pierre's partisans were driven out of the club immediately after 
his overthrow. In October the Convention forbade correspond- 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XIV 



ence between the mother society and the societies in the depart- 
ments. This act exasperated the Jacobins, one of whose lead- 
1794-96 gj.g ^^g Billaud-Varenne, no longer a member of the Committee 
The of PubHc Safety. Three weeks later in a speech at the club he 

Jacobin threatened the Thermidorian party, crying out : " The Hon is 
not dead when he sleeps and at his awakening he will exterminate 
his enemies." The jeunesse doree took up the challenge, be- 
sieged the club and maltreated the members. The government 
then ordered the club closed. 

The Paris Commune also ceased to exist. Most of its officials 
had perished with Robespierre. The Convention appointed two 
commissions, one of police and one of taxation, to administer 
the city. The assemblies of the sections or wards were permitted 
for a time to meet, but when in the following year they served 
again as recruiting centers for revolutionary mobs they were 
closed. The local revolutionary committees, which had been di- 
rected by the Committee of General Security and had spread a 
gigantic police net over the country, were reduced in number, 
and afterwards quietly allowed to go out of existence. 

The operation of the rule upon the renewal of committees speed- 
ily changed the personnel of the two governing committees. Each 
month the members who were to retire were indicated by lot. 
Barere was one of those in the Committee of Public Safety who 
withdrew for this reason, while Collot d'Herbois and Billaud- 
Varenne were forced by public opinion to resign. Carnot who 
Committee had rendered important services in organizing the defense of the 
Safety"'' country was chosen by lot for retirement, but the Convention 
thought he could not be spared and elected him to one of the 
positions made vacant by resignation. As new members were 
selected to fill these vacancies, the committee resembled the Dan- 
tonist committee of 1793 in attitude and policy. 

The political complexion of the Convention was also changed. 
The Con- The men who had overthrown Robespierre had been obliged to 
vention ^^^ ^j^^ members of the center or the Plain for support. Till 
this time the moderate men in the Convention had voted silently - 
for measures demanded by the dominant faction. Many of them 
were like the Abbe Sieyes, who when asked what he did during 
the Reign of Terror repHed, " I lived." But in the struggle of 
Thermidor the moderates held the balance of power. After that 
it was impossible to treat them as so many votes to be captured 
by intimidation. Three weeks later Durand-Maillane, one of 
their leaders, demanded the adoption of a decree which should 
permit them to address the Convention without being molested. 
The Jacobins were slow to perceive the change that was taking 



THE ATTEMPT TO ORGANIZE THE REPUBLIC 221 

place. It became still more evident in December with the re- °5rv ' 

admission of the seventy-five Girondins who had been impris- 

oned during the Reign of Terror. In March, 1795, the Giron- 1794-96 
dins who had escaped from Paris after the insurrection of June 
2, 1793, and had eluded capture, were admitted. Among them 
were Louvet, who was famous for his speech against Robes- 
pierre in the fall of 1792; Isnard, who in May, 1793, had prophe- 
sied the utter destruction of Paris if the Girondins were attacked ; 
and Lanjuinais, who had demanded on June 2, 1793, that the 
Commune be dissolved. The Girondins promised to forget their 
injuries, but this was beyond the power of human nature. 

The Convention did not leave untouched the economic system 
which the Jacobins had constructed by decrees upon the assignats, 
upon monopolists, and upon maximum prices. The value of the 
assignats had fallen steadily since the beginning of 1794 in spite 
of the law and of the guillotine with which it was enforced. By 
September they were worth only 27, and by December, 20. It 
was in December that the opponents of the law finally succeeded 
in obtaining its repeal, arguing that if it remained on the statute 
books, famine would be inevitable. Nevertheless, repeal was only Paper 
a partial remedy, for the government kept on printing assignats ^"^""^igj^ 
at the rate of sixty or seventy millions a day. By the time the prices 
sessions of the Convention came to an end twenty-nine billions 
had been issued! The government was obliged to establish a 
manufactory of paper, in order that the supply might be sufficient. 
So hard worked were the employees engaged in making assignats 
that they threatened to strike. Under the circumstances it is 
not astonishing that prices continued to rise. In September, 
1795, the price of flour was one hundred times what it had been 
in 1790. Sugar which had been eighteen sous a pound in 1790 
was sixty-two livres or francs.^ A pound of butter was thirty 
francs, a pair of shoes two hundred, and a hat three hundred. 
The mass of the population in Paris lived upon distributions of 
bread, meat, and coal, made either gratuitously or at reduced 
prices. Many persons, especially women, were obliged to stand 
in line all day in order to obtain even a scanty ration for their 
families. 

One consequence of the depreciation of the assignats was the 
waste of the national resources in public lands. Only a part of 
the purchase price had to be paid immediately. The remainder 

1 The Convention, on April 7, 1795, in a law providing for the intro- 
duction of the metric system, voted in principle two years before, declared 
the franc to be henceforward the monetary unit, replacing the livre, which 
was of substantially the same value. 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XIV 



could be paid in annual instalments. The longer the payments 
were delayed the less the purchaser had to pay. He had com- 
monly made only four or five payments before 1795, when the 
assignats were rapidly becoming worthless. The Convention in 
alarm, on June 21, 1795, decreed that if the balance was not paid 
within forty days the assignats would be received only at a scale 
of depreciation fixed by law. This caused a rush to make pay- 
ments, and the greater part of the purchase price was, therefore, 
paid at a time when the assignats were worth about one-thirtieth 
of their nominal value. In consequence the government lost the 
bulk of the value of the property which it took from the Church 
and the emigrants, and the purchasers were enriched at the ex- 
pense of less fortunate Frenchmen. In many cases the purchas- 
ers were peasants or townsmen, but in others they were specula- 
tors. At no time was the transfer of property from one set of 
men to another more rapid or less justifiable, and never were 
the contrasts between insolent wealth and abject poverty greater. 

The industrial outlook was gloomy. Trade had fallen off 
since 1792 not only because of civil war, in which great produc- 
ing communities, like Lyons, had suffered, but also because of 
the loss of colonies and of over-sea markets. The coast trade 
was interrupted by the close blockade which the English main- 
tained, rendering communication between various departments 
difficult, for the roads were in a state of neglect. The decrease 
in manufactures is illustrated in the case of woolens in which 
the production fell from 2,606,977 pieces in 1788 to 802,408 in 
1795. In consequence of the maximum laws and of the general 
disorganization the methods of manufacture had been cheapened 
and inferior material had been used. French goods lost a repu- 
tation difficult to regain. The recovery of trade was hindered 
by the attempt to exclude all English products, in order to strike 
at an enemy who could not be attacked directly. 

The farmers were better off than the townsmen, for the Revo- 
lution had swept away feudal and church dues and had not or- 
ganized effectively the collection of taxes. The farmer who 
rented his land was most fortunate as long as he could pay fixed 
rent charges in depreciating paper. An instance is recorded of 
one whose rent was 600 livres, and who paid it with one sack of 
wheat, demanding 600 livres in change, wheat being then worth 
1,200 livres a sack. But the farmers, like the rest, suffered from 
the insecurity of the roads and sometimes did not venture to 
market their crops. They also felt the drain of the " blood 
tax," which took away so many young men to fight the battles 
of the Republic. 



THE ATTEMPT TO ORGANIZE THE REPUBLIC 223 

Although the Jacobins had made their supremacy odious, they ^^^' 

had not discredited the RepubHc utterly, and in 1795 there was 

little prospect of a return of the Bourbons. It is true that bands i'^^*-^^ 
of men styling themselves " Companies of the Sun," " Companies The Roy- 
of Jesus," and " Companies of Jehu " infested one or two de- *^^*" 
partments of the south and east, broke into the prisons of Mar- 
seilles, Tarascon, Aix, and Lyons, and massacred Jacobins who 
were awaiting trial. There were royaHsts in these bands, no 
doubt, but the savage vengeance taken was not royalist but sim- 
ply human. During the early part of 1795 it seemed as if peace 
had settled over the western departments where Vendeans and 
Chouans ^ in scattered groups had been successfully defying ef- 
forts to crush the rebellion. This result was reached by the 
wise promise of an amnesty and by generous terms of peace nego- 
tiated with the leaders. But a new turn in affairs soon threat- 
ened the agreement. In June the dauphin, called by the royalists 
Louis XVII, died in prison, after long months of cruel neglect. 
The Count of Provence now proclaimed himself Louis XVIII, 
" by the Grace of God King of France and Navarre." His dec- 
laration that the old order in State and Church must be restored 
made still more unlikely the reorganization of a strong royalist 
party. Isolated risings took place among the Vendeans and 
Chouans, and the English attempted a landing of emigrants on 
the peninsula of Quiberon, but the little army was beaten by 
General Hoche, and seven hundred emigrants were shot by order 
of the Convention. Hoche again pacified the Vendeans, even 
permitting church bells to be rung in order that the grievance 
on the score of religion might be removed. 

As the spring of 1795 approached, the feeUng in the Conven- 
tion against committee-men of the Terror became more intense, 
although most of the deputies had been either actors or super- Reaction 
numeraries in that tragedy. All through the fall and winter the ^^^^S- 
preliminary hearings in the case of Fouquier-Tinville were being rorists 
held. The evidence constantly brought out his relations with 
the Committee of Public Safety and the Committee of General 
Security. Why punish a poor tool like Fouquier, and the judges 
and jurors who worked with him, and leave the men who con- 
trolled them uncondemned ? In the centers of fashion, the salons 
of Mme. Talhen, Mme. de Stael (Necker's daughter), and of 
Mme. Recamier, the Terrorists were constantly decried. The 
Jacobin atrocities were even turned into a ghastly joke by organ- 
izing bals des victimes, to which no one was admitted who had 

2 A nickname for the Breton rebels. 



224 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^^^' not lost a relative on the scaffold. In these dancing parties 

" one of the favorite figures was an imitation of a guillotinade." 

1794-96 jj^ ^i^g theaters anti- Jacobin pieces were popular. A new hymn, 
the Reveil du Peuple, the rival of the Marseillaise, was sung 
everywhere. This hymn consoled the shades of the Terror's in- 
nocent victims with the grim assurance that 

Le jour tardif de la vengeance 
Fait enfin palir vos bourreaux. 

Early in March a committee, appointed the preceding December, 
reported in favor of placing Collot d'Herbois, Billaud-Varenne, 
Barere, and Vadier on trial before the Revolutionary Tribunal. 
The Convention accepted the report and ordered them arrested. 
This act roused the Jacobins in the Convention and in Paris 
to fury. They tried to persuade the people that only the Con- 
stitution of 1793 could bring relief from their sufferings. On 
April I a mob crying "Bread and the Constitution of 1793!" 
broke into the hall of the Convention. The Jacobin or Mon- 
tagnard deputies took sides with the mob, but the National 
Guard arrived and drove the invaders out. One consequence was 
that the Convention ordered the four accused deputies deported 
at once. A still more serious outbreak took place two months 
later. On this occasion several Montagnard deputies assisted 
the mob in its attempt to force the Convention to take action 
favorable to its demands. As soon as the insurrection was sup- 
pressed, the Convention ordered that eleven deputies impHcated 
in the affair be tried before a commission. Two of them es- 
caped, one committed suicide, and six of the others were con- 
demned to death. When the sentence was announced the six 
attempted to kill themselves with a knife passed from hand to 
hand. Three were successful, but the other three only wounded 
themselves and they were guillotined. These men were called 
the " Last of the Montagnards." Feeling against the Montag- 
nard group became so bitter than even Carnot was in danger of 
arrest. He was saved by the exclamation of a deputy, " Carnot 
organized victory ! " 

It was high time for the Convention to provide France with 
a constitutional government. At first the deputies hardly dared 
constitu- to discuss any project except some modification of the Consti- 
1795°^ tution of 1793, which had been revered but not introduced. They 
were emboldened, however, by the insurrections of April and 
May, 1795. These events prompted them to reduce the political 
importance of the Paris populace by abandoning universal suf- 
frage. A new project was, accordingly, brought forward, which 



THE ATTEMPT TO ORGANIZE THE REPUBLIC 225 

fixed the qualifications for suffrage at substantially what they ^^^iv*' 

had been in 1791. This gave property owners control in the 

electoral assemblies, and enabled them to designate the national i*79*-96 
legislators as well as the principal administrative and judicial 
officers. The project embodied a system of local government 
different from that adopted in 1789. Instead of preserving all 
the communes from the great cities down to the small villages, 
it created cantonal municipalities of almost uniform size. This 
seemed to assure a more vigorous municipal life and greater ef- 
ficiency of administration. According to the proposed consti- 
tution resident commissioners were to be appointed by the cen- 
tral government to keep the municipal and departmental admin- 
istration to the strict enforcement of the laws. The acts of the 
local administrative bodies could be annulled by the ministry " if 
contrary to law or the orders of the higher authorities." 

By the new constitution the national executive was a directory 
or board of five members, a Committee of Public Safety reduced 
in number. The directors could not initiate legislation, nor could 
they veto bills. Even the treasury was withdrawn from their 
control and was placed in charge of a special committee. The 
separation of powers was carried so far as to invite disputes and 
make coups d'etats probable. 

The legislature was divided into two bodies, a council of 500, 
which was to initiate bills, and a council of Elders, which was 
to accept or reject what was submitted to it. The Convention Elections 
was so haunted by specters of returning royalism, it had so long 
confused its own supremacy with the safety of the Republic, the 
habit of power was so ingrained, that it required the electoral 
assemblies to select two-thirds of the councilors from its mem- 
bership, and provided that, if the assemblies did not comply, the 
members who were returned should choose a sufficient number 
of their former colleagues to bring the total to the required two- 
thirds. This requirement was embodied in supplementary de- 
crees, which, like the constitution, were submitted to popular 
vote. In the plebiscite, or " referendum," universal suffrage was 
permitted. The vast majority of the voters, however, stayed at 
home. Only 49,978 took the trouble to vote against the con- 
stitution, while 1,057,390 voted for it. In the case of the sup- 
plementary decrees the opposition was more pronounced, for a 
third of those who voted — 314,282 — refused to accept them. 
In Paris they were rejected by a vote of 21,734 to 1,156. 

Paris did not limit its opposition to a hostile vote. On Octo- 
ber 5 (13 Vendemiaire) an army of National Guards, chiefly 
from the conservative sections, marched against the Tuileries, 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP, 
XIV 



where the Convention held its sessions. The Convention, fore- 
warned, was prepared for a struggle. Although it had only a 
fourth as many soldiers as the hostile sections, its army was bet- 
ter managed. The commander, Barras, had called to his assist- 
ance General Napoleon Bonaparte, an artillery officer who had 
distinguished himself at the siege of Toulon. During the night 
guns had been brought by Major Murat from an artillery park 
near the city, and when the conflict began it was quickly decided 
by cannon. 

This ill-starred attempt had two important consequences. It 
was the beginning of the prodigious fortunes of General Bona- 
parte, who as a reward was soon made commander of the army 
of the interior with headquarters at Paris, and who a few months 
later was entrusted with the more important command of the 
army of Italy. The immediate consequence of the 13th Ven- 
demiaire was the strengthening of the radicals in the Conven- 
tion. They used the opportunity to strike another blow at the 
conservative forces of the country by a decree excluding all 
returned emigrants and their relatives from any office, legisla- 
tive, administrative, or judicial. As the lists of emigrants in- 
cluded 120,000 names, a large body of men was shut out from 
all share in the public life of France. 

Another consequence was that the scheme of forcing the elec- 
tion of two-thirds of the members of the Convention upon the 
voters was not only carried through, but the board of directors 
was filled with ex-members of the Convention who were also 
regicides. The electoral assemblies chose only 379 members of 
the Convention, and these men chose, from supplementary lists, 
made by the electoral assemblies, enough men to make up the 
necessary two-thirds. The ex-members of the Convention were 
stronger in the Council of 500 than in the Council of Elders. The 
constitution provided that the directors were to be chosen by the 
Elders from a list of fifty selected by the 500. The Conven- 
tionals took advantage of this to present to the Elders a slate 
composed of five prominent names and forty-five " obscurities." 
In this way they forced the choice of their candidates. The di- 
rectors were Barras, a ci-devant viscount and ex-Terrorist, and 
four other regicides of less sinister reputation — Reubell, Sieyes, 
Letourneur, and La Revelliere. Sieyes would not serve, because 
he felt that such a government would soon become discredited, 
and Carnot was chosen in his place. Among the members of 
the councils whose election was not forced were many former 
members of the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies. They 
were for the most part attached to the Republic but opposed to 



THE ATTEMPT TO ORGANIZE THE REPUBLIC 227 

the faction which had controlled it since 1793. With them were ^J^" 

naturally associated those ex-members of the Convention who 

had led the reaction against the Montagnards. Several of these i''^*-^^ 
had been the free choice of the electors. Indeed, Lanjuinais had 
been elected in seventy-three departments and Boissy d'Anglas 
in seventy-two. 

No government ever faced gloomier prospects, at least so far 
as the internal condition of the country was concerned. The 
minister of finances significantly remarked that the manufacture The New 
of assignats could not keep pace with the expenditures. When Govem- 
the directors took possession of the Luxembourg palace, which 
was to be their official residence, the table upon which they drew 
up their first record had only three sound legs, and the chairs 
in which they sat were borrowed from the janitor. Had they 
not received help from the requisitions laid by successful gen- 
erals upon conquered territory the administrative machine must 
have come to a standstill. A forced loan exacted of the " rich " 
was a dismal failure. The issue of assignats went on until 
February, 1796, and when this stopped the government made 
another experiment in paper money, the mandats territoriaux, 
which collapsed in a few weeks. 

Nor was the day of political plots and Jacobin specters past. 
The first year of the Directory witnessed the efforts of " Grac- 
chus " Babeuf to overthrow not only the government but also Babenf 
bourgeois society. Babeuf had begun his career as a petty offi- 
cial. During the Revolution he had made several ventures as 
a journalist, the last as editor of the Tribun du Peuple, a name 
adapted from that of Marat's famous sheet. Babeuf had also 
gathered about him a number of sympathetic spirits who called 
themselves the " Society of the Equals " and who worked out 
an elaborate scheme of social reorganization upon the basis of 
common property. According to their ideas the object of society 
is to defend the equal right of every individual to the enjoyment 
of all goods. No one is to have a superfluity. All are to work, 
and are to be divided into classes to which shall be assigned 
particular kinds of work. Each class is to choose magistrates 
to see that there is an equal distribution of tasks. Products 
are to be kept in storehouses and each one is to be supplied as 
his needs require. All are to eat at a common table. The 
movement gained a certain moral enthusiasm from the disgust 
felt by many at the effrontery of the men whom the Revolution 
had enriched. The inability of the Directory and the councils 
to relieve the distressing condition of the country gave force 
to the criticisms which the " Equals " hurled at the existing 



228 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^xiv*' order. In Sylvain Marechal the movement found its poet, who 

apostrophized the councils as mere machines for making decrees, 

1794-96 ^jj.]^ futile plans of finance, and prophesied that 

L'Egalite saura sans vous 
Ramener I'abondance. 

The followers of Babeuf found allies among the radicals whom 
the Thermidorian policy had deprived of power and influence. 
This group included Robert Lindet, an ex-member of the Com- 
L Con- mittee of Public Safety, and several less known ex-members 
piracy q£ ^j-,g Convention. They were ready to join in the overthrow 
of the government and a return to the policies of 1793, although 
they did not subscribe to Babeuf's extreme doctrines. Their 
headquarters were at the Club of the Pantheon, a revived Jacobin 
Club, which at one time numbered several thousand members. 
For military assistance they counted upon the Legion of Police, 
which had been formed by the Convention before the 13th 
Vendemiaire out of the remnants of the Revolutionary Army 
of Paris, a choice collection of Jacobin cutthroats. Babeuf 
and his friends proposed to take possession of the government 
by means of an insurrection, in which the members of the Di- 
rectory and the councils should be summarily executed. A new 
national assembly was then to be formed, chosen by the people 
" in insurrection, upon nomination by the insurrectionary com- 
mittee." 

The director Barras encouraged the conspirators somewhat, 
because it was his custom to have a foot in every camp. Carnot, 
however, who regretted his connection with the Reign of Terror, 
was determined to put down the " anarchists." Through his 
influence an order was given to General Bonaparte to close the 
Club of the Pantheon and a few weeks later the Legion of 
Police was disbanded. The details of the conspiracy were re- 
vealed to Carnot by one of the men who had been admitted to 
its inner council, and the conspirators were arrested on May 
10, 1796, on the eve of the insurrection. Before their trial was 
begun their partisans attempted to win over a body of troops 
which was stationed in the suburbs of Paris, and which in- 
cluded a part of the disbanded Legion of Police. The attempt 
failed and thirty-two of those implicated in it were executed. 
Babeuf's trial was not concluded until May, 1797, when he and 
one of his fellow-conspirators were condemned to death. A 
more appropriate fate would have been confinement in a mad- 
house, for the society of which he dreamed was dreariness it- 
self and the methods by which he proposed to introduce it were 



THE ATTEMPT TO ORGANIZE THE REPUBLIC 229 

worthy of Marat or the other authors of the September Massa- ^^*' 

cres. 

One of the most difficult situations which confronted the Con- ^'^^^'^^ 
vention and the Directory was presented by the religious ques- 
tion. The constitutional Church had never recovered from the The 
incidents of November, 1793. In the spring of 1794 few of ^uest^on^ 
the priests who remained in the Church received their salaries, 
and even the pensions promised to those who abdicated their 
functions ceased to be paid. After the fall of Robespierre the 
government resumed the payment of pensions, but in September, 
when the priests demanded their salaries, the Convention voted 
that the Republic should not pay the expenses of any worship. 
This decree in effect repudiated the obligation which the Con- 
stituent Assembly had solemnly and repeatedly assumed when 
it took possession of the property of the Church. It was also 
the beginning of a regime of separation of Church and State, 
although unaccompanied by any measure which guaranteed 
either to the constitutional or to the dissident (non-juror) priests 
real religious freedom. Attacks were made in the departments 
upon religious worship and the Convention still meditated schemes 
for the organization of festivals which should make the people 
forget the splendor of ancient ceremonial. Bishop Gregoire 
seized the occasion of one of the debates upon the subject to 
declare that the Republic must be Christian if it would endure. 
In the following January he reopened the churches in his diocese. 
His example was imitated elsewhere, until the movement became 
irresistible. The Convention yielded so far as to proclaim re- 
ligious liberty once more, although it forbade the establishment 
of any permanent funds by the communes for the support of 
religion and threw all sorts of restrictions about acts of wor- 
ship. The concession, however, was received with enthusiasm 
all over the icountry. On the next day mass was said in all 
the chapels of Paris, It was the same in the departments. 
As soon as the decree reached Chalons-sur-Marne, for example, 
" the excitement of trying to procure suitable places for the 
exercise of worship was universal. Although extremely numer- 
ous they could not contain the crowd, especially on Sundays and 
feast-days; the congregation sat on the staircases, in the court- 
yards, or even in the streets," ^ The advocates of the ancient 
Church, as well as those anxious for religious peace, now per- 
suaded the Convention to permit the use of church buildings 
which had not been sold, if in each case the officiating clergy 

3 From a contemporary letter cited by Aulard, Tr. Ill, 261. 



230 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

CHAP, would make a declaration of submission to the laws of the 
Republic. In Paris the result was the restoration of Notre 

1794-96 Dame and twelve other churches. The changed situation was 
beneficial to the non- jurors as well as to the constitutional clergy. 
They were still technically regarded as emigrants, but they re- 
turned to France in crowds and began to celebrate the offices 
of religion openly. Many of the common people resorted to 
them rather than to the constitutional clergy, who were affected 
by the charge of schism brought against them by the people. 
But on the day before its sessions ended the Convention re- 
newed the laws against the non- jurors, and the directors of 
the new government sought to enforce their provisions. Never- 
theless, the return of the French to the religion of their fore- 
fathers was unchecked. 

One of the last decrees of the Convention provided for the 
organization of a public school system. The task of carrying 

iducation the law into eflfect was left to the directorial administration. The 
leaders of the Revolution had early appreciated the necessity 
of establishing schools for the people. In no other way was 
it possible to assure the realization of that ideal of equality 
set forth in the Declaration of Rights. There was a more prac- 
tical reason. By confiscating the property of the Church and 
destroying corporate privileges of various kinds the Constituent 
Assembly had disorganized the existing system of education, 
which was closely dependent upon the Church. Nevertheless 
this assembly did nothing beyond inserting in the new consti- 
tution the principle of free primary instruction. Talleyrand was 
requested to prepare a report on the subject, but it was not ready 
until the close of the session. His report contained, however, 
several of the elements which became distinctive of the French 
school system. It was the report of Condorcet, the friend of 
Turgot, a member of the Committee of Public Instruction of the 
Legislative Assembly, that formed the actual basis of subsequent 
plans. 

In this report, presented on April 20, 1792, Condorcet recom- 
mended the establishment of one primary school for every four 
hundred inhabitants. His plan included under other names the 
present French superior primary schools, the lycees, the local 
universities, and the Institute, or, as Condorcet described it, a 
National Society of Arts and Sciences. He wished to secure 
the independence of the teachers and members of the National 
Society, and, accordingly, made it a self-perpetuating body, with 
the right to name the members of the university faculties. 
Primary school teachers were to be nominated by the faculty 



THE ATTEMPT TO ORGANIZE THE REPUBLIC 231 

of the local university and chosen by the " fathers of families." ^^^' 

Instruction was open to everybody and free at all stages. Con- 

dorcet was also a member of the Committee of Public Instruc- 1794-96 
tion of the Convention, but in 1793 he was drawn into the 
quarrel between the Girondins and the Jacobins and perished. 
The Convention in only one respect went beyond him; it de- 
cided that primary instruction should be compulsory as well as 
free, although it finally abandoned this principle. 

The law concerning primary schools, which received its per- 
manent form on October 25, 1795, provided rather vaguely for Law of 
one or more schools in each canton, a measure far less liberal ^"^^^ 
than that suggested by Condorcet Attendance was neither 
compulsory nor gratuitous, although the local authorities were 
permitted to admit a certain number of " indigent " pupils. The 
schools for boys and for girls were to be separate. On the same 
day central schools, that is lycees, were established in each de- 
partment. Only a few of these were successful, which is not 
surprising, since trained or competent teachers were almost 
wholly lacking. Private schools, a continuation of the old col- 
leges, were more flourishing. The Convention was not unmind- 
ful of the need of normal schools, and one of its greatest cre- 
ations was the Ecole Normale of Paris, which was opened on 
January 20, 1795. 

The Institute dates from the same legislation which estab- 
lished the primary and secondary schools. It was intended to The in- 
replace the Academies which had been destroyed in 1793. Its '*^*"*® 
three classes : physical and mathematical sciences ; moral and 
political sciences ; and literature and the fine arts, contained 
twenty-four sections. The number of members resident at 
Paris was 144, including many distinguished men, for example, 
Laplace, BerthoUet, and Chaptal. Lavoisier, a still greater sci- 
entist, had not survived the Reign of Terror, for he had been 
sent to the scaffold together with every other former farmer- 
general whom the Terrorists could seize. The Convention also 
reorganized the Library of the King as the National Library, 
and enriched it with many of the treasures taken from the 
libraries of the suppressed monasteries. 

The task of rebuilding a better France amidst the ruins with, 
which short-sighted leadership, political passion, civil war, and 
foreign invasion had covered the land was thus begun. Its 
successful accomplishment was hindered by the adventurous for- 
eign policy which French statesmen and soldiers now adopted. 



CHAPTER XV 



CHAP. 

XV 



IMPERIALISM AND BANKRUPTCY 

IN 1792 the French had learned to regard the Alps and the 
Rhine as the limits set by nature to the Republic. The theory 
seemed plausible as long as Dumouriez occupied the Netherlands 
and Custine held Mainz. But by the summer of 1793 the situa- 
tion was very different. The Allies were everywhere successful 
and the problem was to save France from dismemberment. 
Nevertheless the doctrine of the natural boundaries was not 
abandoned by French statesmen. When the armies once more 
advanced beyond the ancient borders, public opinion, although 
eager for peace, expected that its terms would extend France 
to the Rhine as well as to the Alps. And it was not unlikely 
that a new series of victories would tempt French statesmen to 
adopt policies still more venturesome. 

The second conquest of the Austrian Netherlands had begun 
with the battle of Fleurus on June 25, 1794. The advance of 
the French to the Rhine was rendered easy by the dissensions 
of the Allies, and especially by the fears of the Prussians that 
they might be deprived of their share in the final partition of 
Poland. By the end of October the only positions held by the 
Allies were Luxembourg, Mainz, and the tete du pont of Mann- 
heim. The people of the Netherlands and of the districts on 
the left bank of the Rhine had no cause to rejoice at the return 
of the Republican armies. The Allies had plundered them, but 
their deliverers were greater masters of the art of pillage, all 
the while professing the policy of peace to cottages and war 
to chateaux. The government agents extorted sixty million 
livres from the Belgians and twenty-five million from the region 
between the Meuse and the Rhine. The plan was to levy on 
the rich, upon those who fled at the approach of the French, and 
upon church treasuries, but such burdens have a way of distrib- 
uting themselves, and the agents were not always nice in their 
discrimination. Besides money, pictures were taken, and gal- 
leries were robbed to enrich the museums of Paris. The despair 
of these peoples boded ill for the French in case they were 
again forced to retreat. 

But the French did not retreat. When winter came, they 
232 



IMPERIALISM AND BANKRUPTCY 233 

invaded the United Netherlands (or United Provinces), which an ^^^' 

unusually cold season made easy of approach. They were urged 

forward by the Dutch " patriots," the victims of Prussian inter- ^'^^^■^'^ 
vention in 1787, more than two thousand of whom had been The 
forced to take refuge in France. Those who had remained in j^ether- 
the country eagerly awaited the icoming of the French. A com- lands 
mittee was formed in Amsterdam to prepare for the organization 
of a provisional government. Both this committee and the 
States General, the government which it sought to overthrow, 
assembled at The Hague and sent agents to Paris to negotiate 
with the Committee of Public Safety. The Prince of Orange, 
the stadtholder, concluded that resistance was useless, and be- 
lieving that the French would not agree to a treaty as long as 
he was in Holland, withdrew with his family to England. The 
old States General dissolved itself, making way for a body named 
chiefly by the committee of patriots at Amsterdam. This party 
was now anxious to come to terms with the French, who had 
been received as friends by the radicals everywhere. The sur- 
render of Zeeland had been accepted under guarantee of inde- 
pendence and protection of property. What alarmed the patriots 
was not the conduct of the French soldiers, which was admirable, 
but the attitude of the Convention, which meant to draw heavy 
indemnities from the Dutch and to annex the lands south of 
the mouth of the Rhine. From February until May the nego- 
tiations dragged on. The Dutch reminded the French of their 
often proclaimed principles, while the French retorted that their 
interests were their real principles. Finally two members of 
the Committee of Public Safety, Reubell and Sieyes, were sent 
to The Hague, and under threats of using force compelled the 
Dutch to yield. By a treaty signed on May 16 Dutch Flanders, The 
Venloo, and Maestricht were ceded to France, and Flushing, an ^HfJ **' 
important commercial port, was to receive a French garrison. 
The Dutch also promised to pay an indemnity of one hundred 
million florins, and maintain a French army of 25,000 men dur- 
ing the war with England. An interesting commentary on the 
latter provision is the fact that in the following September the 
Dutch were actually paying 36,000 French soldiers, although 
only 7,000 were within the frontiers of the Netherlands. More- 
over, the French frequently changed the troops quartered in 
the Netherlands, sending ragged and poorly fed soldiers to take 
the place of soldiers whom the Dutch had supplied with cloth- 
ing and food. The Dutch were also compelled to permit the 
free circulation of assignats. The most serious consequence was 
that the alliance being offensive as well as defensive the Dutch 



;34 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^^^^- republic would be dragged into every war in which France 
might become involved. Its disadvantages were not left to fu- 

1795-97 |.yj,g demonstration, for within a year nearly every Dutch col- 
ony in the West or East Indies passed into British control. 
Soon after he arrived in England the Prince of Orange sent 
orders to the Dutch colonial governors to admit British ships 
and troops as those of allies. In only one or two colonies was 
there serious resistance. Among the colonies occupied were 
Ceylon and the Cape of Good Hope. 

In 1795 peace was also made with Prussia. Negotiations had 

'eace been opened before the invasion of Holland, but the interests of 

•russia Prussia and France clashed at too many points to render a 
settlement easy. The French demanded that Prussia cede her 
territories on the left bank of the Rhine, while the Prussians 
were anxious to establish a demarcation line beyond which 
French armies should not penetrate. Delay was disadvantageous 
to both: to Prussia because her forces were needed to prevent 
the Austrians from gaining an advantage in the final partition 
of Poland, to France because the distress of the people was 
so great that peace was absolutely essential. 

Austria and Russia agreed secretly in January to a plan for 
the partition of Poland, and concluded an alliance to fore- 
stall too forcible a protest by the Prussians against the size 
and location of their share. At the same time Russia agreed 
that Austria should be permitted to compensate herself for her 
lack of a share in the partition of 1793 by seizing a part of 
Venetia, and to make up for the probable loss of the Nether- 
lands elsewhere, presumably in Bavaria. The terms of the 
agreement were not communicated to Prussia for several months, 
but the Prussians were aware of their danger and hastened to 
conclude a treaty with the French. 

The treaty was signed on April 5 at Basel. It permitted 
French troops to occupy the Prussian possessions west of the 
Rhine until peace should be made between France and the 
empire. A secret article provided that in case these territories 
were finally ceded to France, Prussia should receive suitable 
indemnities in Germany. A year later in a secret convention 
it was stipulated that part of the indemnity should be found 
in the domains of the Bishop of Miinster. Prussia thus ac- 
cepted the French policy of secularizing ecclesiastical principali- 
ties and restricting the spiritual princes to their purely ecclesi- 
astical duties. By another provision of the treaty a line of 
demarcation was drawn beyond which the French armies should 
not advance. Most of the States north of the Rhine and the 



IMPERIALISM AND BANKRUPTCY 235 

Main were thus neutralized. Prussia in appearance became the ^^f' 

defender of the empire, although by her secret agreements she 

was pledged to assist in dismembering it. 1795-97 

There was, perhaps, little that was heroic in the attitude of 
Prussia in 1795 and 1796. But none of the other members of 
the coalition formed against France was moved by loftier pur- 
poses. None was engaged whole-heartedly in the task of de- 
fending the liberties of Europe against French aggressions. 
Even if the treaty signed at Basel has nothing to commend it 
from a political point of view, it was not without some conse- 
quences useful to northern Germany. The peace lasted eleven 
years, and those years formed the most brilliant period of Ger- 
man literature. They were the years when Goethe and Schiller 
reached the fullest development of their powers, and when Fichte 
and Schleiermacher were beginning to exert a wide influence. 
This intellectual movement was in no sense due to the peace, 
and yet it might have been seriously hindered by the disturbing 
incidents which a continuation of the war would have made 
probable. 

The treaty with Prussia was soon followed by peace with 
Spain, which gave to France the Spanish part of Santo Domingo, peace 
Only two formidable enemies remained — Austria and England. IJ^n 
The Convention did not wait lor further victories over the Aus- 
trians to make certain the retention of the Austrian Netherlands, 
but by a decree in one of its last sessions recognized the annexa- 
tions made in the spring of 1793, and organized this territory, 
together with the bishopric of Liege, into departments. The 
new frontier was regarded as " constitutional," to be defended 
by the French armies as zealously as any other part of France. 

In England the desire for peace became so strong as to over- 
come the unwillingness of the ministry to negotiate with the 
" regicide " republic. The partial failure of the wheat crop in 
two successive years threatened the country with famine. The condition 
government occasionally resorted to the extreme measure of "f^J"^" 
stopping neutral vessels loaded with grain bound for France 
and compelling them to sell their cargoes in English harbors. 
The distress of the common people was almost as great as in 
France. In London immense meetings were held denouncing 
the war policy. On October 29, 1795^ when the King was on 
his way to open parliament his carriage was mobbed and he 
was menaced with cries of " Peace, Peace ; Bread, Bread ; No 
Pitt; No Famine." Agitators demanded universal suffrage and 
annual parliaments. The ministry took advantage of the inci- 
dents to pass two bills, one making treasonable words which 



CHAP. 

XV 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

threw contempt on the " established government and constitu- 
tion of the realm," and another punishing as seditious all per- 
sons who attended unauthorized meetings of more than fifty. 

The attempt of the British ministry to negotiate for peace was 
doomed to failure, because the French would not consider the 
abandonment of any of their conquests, although they demanded 
the return of their colonies seized during the war. This un- 
compromising attitude rendered the war less unpopular in Eng- 
land. In the fall of 1796 the situation of England became more 
difficult, for the Spaniards became active allies of the French, 
and the English sea power seemed endangered by the combined 
battle fleets of France, Spain, and Holland. One consequence 
was that the English fleet was withdrawn from the Mediter- 
ranean for eighteen months. 

The French hoped to bring Austria to terms by a simultaneous 
attack in southern Germany and in Italy. The principal cam- 
paign they expected to make in Germany, where they placed two 
large armies : one under Jourdan to advance on the line of the 
Main, the other under Moreau to proceed down the Danube, 
This suited the plans of Austria, for England, whose subsidies 
the Austrians needed, was unwilling to aid them in rounding 
out their Lombard territory by the acquisition of Venetia and 
the Papal Legations. In Germany, therefore, the Austrians 
organized a large army under the Archduke Charles. The cam- 
paign ended disastrously for the French, partly because of the 
strategy of Carnot, who was one of the directors, and who 
thought that if Jourdan and Moreau operated on the right and 
left of the Austrians they would outflank the Archduke's army, 
defeat its wings, and then crush its center. For a time their 
plan seemed on the point of triumph. The French armies in- 
vaded southern Germany in what seemed overwhelming force, 
and the South German circles, with Bavaria, Baden, and Wiirt- 
temberg, in alarm, negotiated for peace, offering to pay heavy in- 
demnities. Baden and Wiirttemberg abandoned their territories 
west of the Rhine, and agreed to accept compensation at the 
expense of the ecclesiastical States. Fortunately for Bavaria, 
the tide turned before her treaty was approved by the Elector. 
The Archduke Charles, leaving a screen of troops before Moreau, 
marched ofT and crushed Jourdan's army, sending it fleeing in 
disorder towards the Rhine. Only the skill of Moreau, and 
the failure of subordinate Austrian officers to carry out the 
spirit of the Archduke's plan, saved the second French army 
from like defeat. By the close of October, French prospects 
in Germany were worse than they had been a year earlier, but 



IMPERIALISM AND BANKRUPTCY 237 

the government could console itself with the unexpected tri- c^^^- 
umphs of French arms in Italy. 

The command of the Army of Italy was given to General ^'^^^-^^ 
Bonaparte, who had won the favor of the government by his Bonaparto 
defense of the Convention, and whose plans for a campaign in ^^ ^^^^^ 
Italy were approved by Carnot. The forces with which the 
French had to contend belonged to the King of Sardinia, the 
ruler of Piedmont, and to the Austrians, who controlled Lom- 
bardy and Mantua, The ancient republics of Genoa and of 
Venice were neutral, Tuscany had made peace with France. 
The Pope was hostile but inactive, and Naples would be unable 
to furnish many troops. The directors hoped to compel the 
Piedmontese to withdraw from the coalition and to drive the 
Austrians out of Lombardy. If the campaign should be suc- 
cessful, they believed that Austria would be willing to purchase 
the recovery of Lombardy by the renunciation of the Nether- 
lands. 

The prospect of victory did not appear brilliant. The army 
of Italy had for two years been fighting over this ground with- 
out making much progress. The soldiers were unpaid and des- 
titute, and thousands were barefooted, many without guns. 
Their food supply was uncertain, because the roads to central 
France were in bad condition, and most of their grain was 
drawn from Tuscany and the Barbary States by means of the 
coasting trade along the Riviera. As the English still had a 
fleet in the Mediterranean this trade might be interrupted. But 
many of the disadvantages under which the French labored at 
first would disappear, if once they succeeded in breaking through 
the wall of the Apennines into the rich plains of Piedmont or 
of Lombardy. 

The French had advantages as well as disadvantages. Their 
army was a better instrument of warfare than that of their The 
opponents. In the course of the Revolutionary wars, partly by ^^y^ 
necessity, because the number of soldiers was becoming very 
large, partly under the influence of military theorists, their lead- 
ers had gradually reorganized the armies and had begun to 
develop a new art of fighting. A system of divisions had been 
introduced, each of which was a miniature army, with infantry, 
artillery, and cavalry, commanded by a general responsible for 
the details of its management. This gave greater mobility and 
enabled the commander-in-chief to issue brief orders. Hours 
so vital in a campaign were thus economized. The somewhat 
tumultuous methods of fighting, first illustrated in the campaign 
of 1792, were becoming the usual practice. Instead of drawing 



238 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XV 



up an army in the ancient stiff line of battle still used by the 
Austrians and Prussians, the French sent forward clouds of 
skirmishers, under the screen of which columns could advance 
and strike the enemy's line with the force of a battering ram. 
As the French did not depend upon long supply trains for food, 
but spread out in foraging parties, their armies moved forward 
with unheard of rapidity. In the course of the Italian campaign 
a division fought a battle on one day, marched during the night 
sixteen miles to take part in another battle, and the day follow- 
ing that marched twenty-five miles. The most signal advantage 
of the French was that their new commander proved to be one 
of the great masters of warfare, capable of perfecting the 
methods devised by the Revolutionary generals. He was twenty- 
six years old, a man of extraordinary energy and endurance. 

The campaign opened on April 12, 1796, and closed tri- 
umphantly a year later with the signature of the Preliminaries 
of Leoben, when the French army was within sixty miles of 
Vienna. Its eventual aims far exceeded the original intentions 
of the directors, diplomacy as well as war having slipped from 
their hands into the grasp of the young general. Their inability 
to control the situation was evident as soon as Bonaparte won 
the first series of startling victories. 

At the beginning of the campaign the French army was guard- 
ing the roads leading from the Riviera into the valleys of the 
Apennines. Savona was its base of operations. The Aus- 
trians, supposing that Bonaparte planned to seize Genoa, made 
the mistake of putting the crests of the mountains between two 
sections of their army. He immediately threw superior forces 
against the troops they had left in the mountains above Savona 
and seized the junction of the roads by which alone they could 
communicate with their allies, the Piedmontese, or Sardinians. 
He then drove the Austrians down the valley of the Bormida 
towards Alessandria. Meanwhile he had struck savage blows at 
the Sardinian army, against which he was now able to concen- 
trate the bulk of his troops. He had sent his divisions from 
one field of operations to the other with such rapidity that it 
has been compared to the throwing of a shuttle. The Sardinian 
army could not withstand his assaults. They were driven back 
towards Turin and compelled at Cherasco on April 28 to sign 
an armistice. 

Within two weeks more Bonaparte manoeuvered the Austrians 
out of Lombardy, defeating their rear guard in a spectacular fight 
at Lodi. Before they heard of this success the directors pro- 
posed to divide the army, leaving part of it under Kellerman 



IMPERIALISM AND BANKRUPTCY 239 

to hold Lombardy, and sending the rest under Bonaparte on a ^^^' 

great raid toward Rome, to seize British merchandise at Leg- 

horn, in the neutral State of Tuscany, and to collect the spoils I'^^^-s? 
of the papal State for the support of the bankrupt government 
in France. Bonaparte replied with dignity that success could 
not be expected of him if he were constantly interfered with, 
or the command divided, and he offered to resign. But he was 
already indispensable ; his victories were needed for the prestige 
of the Directory, and a golden stream of war contributions, 
beginning to flow towards Paris, was replenishing the empty 
coffers of the administration. From this time forward, when- 
ever the government made a serious attempt to recover control, 
he met them with new bulletins of victory and new statements 
of accomplished facts. 

As soon as Bonaparte heard that the directors had consented 
to transform the armistice of Cherasco into a definitive treaty 
of peace with the King of Sardinia, he attacked the Austrians End of 
again and drove their main army into Tyrol. A large body paign^"^" 
of troops took refuge in the fortress of Mantua, to which he 
laid siege. He also crossed the Po into the papal legations and 
compelled the Pope to sign an armistice. The Austrians did not 
resign themselves to the loss of Lombardy without three more 
great efforts; the first toward the end of July, when Marshal 
Wiirmser led an army from the valleys of Tyrol. In order 
to envelop the French and prevent their escape, he divided his 
army into two parts, sending one to the east, the other to the 
west of the lake of Garda. The consequence was that by rapid 
concentration, now on the left and now on the right, Bonaparte 
crushed both parts separately. A second Austrian advance was 
made in November, during which the French army was in grave 
peril near Areola, but was eventually victorious. A final effort 
was made in January and ended at Rivoli with another French 
victory. The Austrians intended to make one more attempt, 
under the Archduke Charles, but before his army could be con- 
centrated it was attacked by the French and forced back toward 
Vienna, until the Austrian government was ready to sign the 
Preliminaries of Leoben. 

During the latter part of the Italian campaign the French posi- 
tion in Italy was more secure because of the withdrawal of the 
British fleet from the Mediterranean. At the same time the 
death of Catherine II and the accession of the Emperor Paul 
deprived the Austrians of any hope that Russian troops would 
be despatched to support them in Italy. But after Jourdan and 
Moreau were obliged to recross the Rhine, Bonaparte suffered 



240 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XV 



War Con- 
tributions 



Problem 
of Peace 



from the danger that the Austrian armies might be heavily re- 
inforced by soldiers drawn from Germany. 

In their original instructions to Bonaparte the directors or- 
dered him to levy heavy contributions upon the districts which 
he occupied. Not only must war pay for war, but half of the 
indemnities exacted must go toward the maintenance of the 
government at home. The directors also wrote Bonaparte that 
Italy owed much of its glory to the fine arts, that this glory 
should now pass to France, and that the " National Museum 
should receive the most celebrated monuments of all the arts." 
At Rome especially they wished him to take statues, pictures, 
medals, libraries. Commissioners were sent to Italy to select 
the finest masterpieces. The young general did not find such 
a program of robbery revolting, and carried it out with merciless 
severity. The Milanese hailed him as a savior from Austrian 
tyranny, but soon were chilled by the news that he not only 
levied millions as the price of their deliverance, but shipped their 
finest pictures to Paris and seized even the property of the poor 
in the public pawnshops. The Dukes of Parma and Modena 
must pay other millions and more paintings for immunity. Leg- 
horn was raided and English merchandise and shipping seized, 
in spite of Tuscan neutrality. The Pope agreed to pay millions 
in money and supplies, and promised 500 precious manuscripts, 
100 pictures, and especially a bronze bust of Junius Brutus and 
a marble bust of Marcus Brutus, precursors of the French heroes 
of liberty and virtue. The French commissioner, Saliceti, re- 
ported that by the end of July, 1796, 61 million francs had 
been levied. This amount did not include what French generals 
had collected for themselves, nor the plunder carried away by 
the army furnishers. The soldiers were able to send home a 
little gold to cheer faces saddened by the sight of worthless 
assignats. The generals, remembering that victory is a fickle 
goddess, caused much gold to pass into safe hands in neutral 
Switzerland. This was part of the price the Italians paid for 
freedom from Austrian domination and for an opportunity to 
reconstruct their institutions on a better model. 

General Bonaparte's victories in Italy might have resulted 
simply in forcing the Austrians to make peace with France on 
the basis of the " natural " limits. This would have satisfied 
the Directory and French public opinion. But Bonaparte meant 
to go further, duplicating on a larger scene the action of the 
French agents in the United Netherlands ; he meant to try his 
hand at the building of states. If the consequence was to sub- 
stitute an imperialistic for a national policy, this pleased his 



IMPERIALISM AND BANKRUPTCY 241 



CHAP. 
XV 



imagination, ready to manoeuver boundary lines, states, and 
peoples on the map of Europe as battalions on the battle-field, 
and not too deeply troubled by the risks of such operations, i'^^^'®^ 
His policy was made apparent by the terms of the Preliminaries 
of Leoben, which he negotiated while the diplomatic agent of 
the Directory was absent. In effect he gave the Austrians their 
choice between the terms of the Directory and his own terms. 
The directors wished to obtain for France a guarantee of the 
" natural " limits, regarding the recognition of the independence 
of Lombardy as desirable, but secondary. He offered as an 
alternative scheme a guarantee of the " constitutional " limits, 
that is, the cession to France of the Austrian Netherlands, and 
the recognition of Lombard independence. If the Austrians 
accepted his scheme, he promised them indemnities about six 
times as large as in the other case. Both he and the directors 
were agreed that the indemnities for Austria should be found 
in Venetian territory, although the directors would have re- 
stored Lombardy rather than fail to gain the " natural " limits. 
The Austrians accepted his terms, receiving in secret articles 
the promise of the Terra Firma of Venice between the Oglio, 
the Po, and the Adriatic, together with Istria and Dalmatia. 
They regarded the settlement as "miraculous," while he tried 
to make it palatable to the Directory by showing them that at 
the final peace the " natural " limits could be gained by offering 
the Austrians still more Venetian territory. 

The movement for Italian reorganization and unity had its 
beginnings in June, 1796, when Bonaparte entered the papal lega- 
tions. He had given vague encouragement to the people of Begin- 
Milan, but could not disregard the express instructions of the ^n^°^°' 
directors, who wished to use Lombardy, if necessary, to obtain Italy 
a cession of the Netherlands and a recognition of the left bank 
of the Rhine as the boundary of France. When Bonaparte en- 
tered Bologna, he told the local senate that he had no aim save 
to restore their ancient liberties. In the latter part of August 
an uprising in Reggio spread through the Duchy of Modena, and 
he covered it with his protection. The duke was obliged to 
yield and early in October the republic of Modena and Reggio 
was organized. The senate of Bologna was at this time engaged 
in drawing up a constitution modeled on that of France. Later 
in October delegates of Reggio, Modena, Bologna, and Ferrara 
met at Bologna and established a federation. There, as has been 
remarked, the " idea of Italian unity and independence first 
awoke the enthusiasm of any considerable body of men." The 
sequel was a congress held in December, which founded the 



242 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 

XV 



Cisalpine 
Bepublic 



Cispadane Republic, with a constitution similar to that of Bo- 
logna. 

The Lombards were restive under the restrictions which the 
necessities of diplomacy put upon their aspirations. In March, 
1797, Lombard agitators, with French help, stirred up tumults 
in the neighboring Venetian territory, and the citadels of Ber- 
gamo and Brescia were seized by the inhabitants. The hapless 
Venetian senate could only send a protest to Bonaparte. After 
the Preliminaries of Leoben made it clear that peace with Aus- 
tria would be made at the expense of Venice rather than of the 
Lombards, Bonaparte set committees at work drafting a con- 
stitution for Lombardy, modeled on that of France. As he 
made the constitution, he did not hesitate to start the machinery 
by appointing the officials as well as the legislators ; fearful, more- 
over, to expose his work at the outset to the risks of factional 
conflict, he ventured even to modify the principles of Lombard 
law before the new legislature came into existence. The new 
republic was named " Cisalpine," and at its formal inauguration, 
on July 9, delegates appeared from the Cispadane Republic plead- 
ing for a greater federation. Bonaparte consented, and he 
eventually added the Valtelline and the western part of the 
Terra Firma of Venice, so that it extended from the Alps be- 
yond Lake Como to the Adriatic at Rimini. 

General Bonaparte had already, a month before, accomplished 
another revolution in Italy, transforming the ancient republic of 
Genoa into the Ligurian Republic, with a more liberal constitu- 
tion. The occasion was a tumult, fomented by French agents and 
Genoese agitators. The conspirators had become the victims, 
because the Genoese government brought into the city moun- 
taineers, who speedily cleared the streets of the revolutionaries. 
Bonaparte was angry that the agitators had acted prematurely, 
and, especially, that they were unsuccessful ; but he consoled him- 
self that he now had an excuse for intervention. With threats 
of dire vengeance he forced the doge and the senate to abdicate, 
and established a government on the usual French model, but 
mitigated the injustices which had often characterized the intro- 
duction of this system. Nothing should be done contrary to the 
Catholic religion, and provision was made for the nobles who 
had been impoverished. But the new dictator would brook no 
delays, giving the constitutional commission only a month to 
complete its work. No citizen called upon to serve in the pro- 
visional government could decline on pain of a fine of 2,000 
crowns. Under guise of protecting the republic a French gar- 
rison was maintained in the city at its expense. 



IMPERIALISM AND BANKRUPTCY 243 

A harder fate was in store for Genoa's ancient rival. Dur- chap. 

ing the war both armies had violated Venetian neutrality con- 

stantly, and a large part of the campaign was fought within the 1^95-97 
Terra Firma. While Bonaparte was offering at Leoben to treat Fau of 
Venice as Poland had been treated, a terrible rising at Verona '^^'^^^ 
furnished him with an excuse for acting more in accord with 
traditional practice. This uprising of an exasperated populace 
was known as the " Veronese Passover," and it began on April 
17. Before it was over many Frenchmen were killed, even 
soldiers in the hospitals. As soon as Bonaparte heard of the 
massacre, he ordered the Venetians to be treated as enemies, 
scorning the offers of the senate for reparation. He wrote to 
the Directory, " The Venetian States are now at our disposal." 
As a last resource the ancient government abdicated and a demo- 
cratic republic was formed. With this republic Bonaparte in 
May signed a treaty, which permitted the French troops to enter 
the city, ostensibly to restore order, but under promise of with- 
drawing when their presence was no longer required. Secret 
articles gave him sixteen millions in indemnities, besides five war 
vessels fully equipped. He did not forget to stipulate in addi- 
tion twenty paintings and 500 manuscripts. In a letter to the 
directors he explained that the treaty provided a simple way 
of effecting an entrance into the city and offered conveniences 
for carrying out the proposed agreements with Austria without 
too much scandal. While he assured the Venetian republicans 
of his intention to consolidate their liberties, he suggested to the 
Austrian diplomatic agent that the Austrians might obtain the 
city of Venice, as well as the territories promised at Leoben, if 
they would accept the Adige as their western boundary in Italy 
and would assist France in gaining the left bank of the Rhine. 
In this case, as he wrote to the directors, he planned to remove 
from Venice all the ships, the cannon, the contents of the arsenal, 
and the funds of the bank, leaving the Austrians the empty shell. 
His sentiments toward Venice later were more favorable, but he 
did not mean to sacrifice new French armies that she might 
remain an independent republic. 

The original armistice with the Pope was broken off in the 
summer of 1796 when Bonaparte was obliged to face Wiirmser's 
advance, but the victory of Rivoli made submission inevitable, 
and a treaty was signed at Tolentino, on February 19, 1797. 
The Pope was obliged to renounce not only Avignon and the 
Comtat Venaissin, but the legations of Bologna and Ferrara. 
It was expressly stipulated, however, that in the legations no 
attack should be made upon the Catholic religion. Ancona was 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XV 



to remain in French hands until the general peace, increasing 
the influence of the French in the settlement of questions touch- 
ing the Turkish empire, and giving them control of the Adriatic. 
The directors hoped that Bonaparte would seize the opportunity 
to disorganize the Roman Church, or, as they termed the opera- 
tion, " extinguish the torch of fanaticism " in Italy. He con- 
soled them with the assurance that the antiquated machine would 
soon fall in pieces. In this case again he met their plans with 
accomplished facts. 

While the victorious general was playing the proconsul in 
Italy, a political storm broke in Paris which threatened the 
results of his work; and not of his alone, but of other generals 
who had extended the frontier of French rule. Many conserva- 
tive Frenchmen were more impressed by the wretchedness of 
the people and the bankruptcy of the government than by the 
glories of the Italian campaign. Only army contractors and 
speculators seemed prospering. The policy of conquest and 
expansion appeared to make the war interminable. Other men 
detested the politicians whom the Convention had forced into 
the councils and the board of directors. They longed to see 
the end of exceptional legislation and to live under a genuine 
constitutional government. Still others demanded that religious 
liberty exist in reality as in name. Such sentiments were con- 
trolling factors in the elections of 1797, by which one-third of 
the members of the councils were renewed. Out of 216 ex- 
members of the Convention whose term now closed, scarcely a 
dozen were reelected. Barthelemy, the new director, belonged 
to the same group as the new councilors. Even Carnot, weary 
of violence, was inclined to oppose exceptional measures. News- 
paper opinion was overwhelmingly against the radical majority 
of the directors. 

As soon as the new councilors took their places they attacked 
the laws which excluded relatives of emigrants from office and 
which condemned to banishment priests who refused the required 
oaths and declarations. One by one such partisan laws were 
repealed. The National Guard was reorganized, excluding those 
who paid no taxes. Political excitement became acute, and bit- 
ter party epithets — " royahsts," " Vendean," " Chouan," " an- 
archist " — were hurled back and forth in debate and in the 
press. Many seriously believed that a Bourbon restoration was 
at hand, and royalist conspirators hurried to Paris to fish in 
troubled waters. Purchasers of public lands, once property of 
the Church or of the emigrant nobles, were afraid of being 
despoiled. Generals in the field were alarmed and angry. 



IMPERIALISM AND BANKRUPTCY 



Hoche in the north and Bonaparte in Italy provoked from their ^J^-^- 

soldiers declarations threatening the royalists and the " friends 

of England." The majority of the directors, led by Barras, 1795-97 
determined to purge the councils and to arrest their colleagues 
Carnot and Barthelemy. For this work they needed as com- 
mander of the troops in Paris a general who could be depended 
upon. After an abortive attempt to use Hoche, they turned to 
Bonaparte, who, unwilling to compromise himself personally in 
the affair, sent General Augereau, a noisy Jacobin. 

On September 4, 1797 (18 Fructidor), the expected coup 
d'etat was accomplished. The city gates were closed and the 
editors and proprietors of opposition newspapers, hostile coun- isth 
cilors, and the director Barthelemy, were arrested. Carnot sue- rructidor 
ceeded in escaping. The councils, purged of the opposition, 
condemned to deportation fifty-three deputies and the editors 
or proprietors of forty-two journals. The elections in forty- 
nine departments were annulled, depriving of their seats nearly 
all deputies recently chosen, including those of Paris and of 
neighboring departments. The press was subjected to police 
control, and the laws against the emigrants and the dissident 
priests were renewed. The consequence was a little reign of 
terror, a dictatorship of the faction of the ex-Conventionals. 
Hoche thought the republic was saved, and Bonaparte was glad 
that the press was silenced and that the legislature was taught 
to eschew ambition. 

Three weeks after the coup d'etat the directorial government 
confessed itself to be bankrupt by paying two-thirds of the pub- 
lic debt in bons, which at first could be used in payment for Bank- 
public lands, although at a later time only for buildings upon ^^^^'^^ 
those lands. The bons at once fell to thirty per cent., and 
before long to three. As they were called in four years later 
and credited on the public debt at about one-twentieth of their 
nominal value, the repudiation amounted to sixty-three per cent, 
of the debt, representing a capital of 1,522,000,000 francs. In 
February, 1797, the assignats and mandats, a mass of paper 
money worth nominally forty billions, had been repudiated. 
This, like the repudiation of the debt, was scarcely more than 
the recognition of a situation with which public opinion had long 
been familiar. For some time business had been conducted on 
the basis of gold and silver. That part of the debt which was 
not repudiated was called the " Consolidated Third." It was 
worth very little because the government could not pay the 
interest. 

It was the triumph of the directorial party, rather than the 



XV 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^^^' national bankruptcy, which had its echoes in the negotiations for 
peace with Austria. Bonaparte's imperialistic policy was not 
now likely to be interfered with. In order to make the Pre- 
liminaries of Leoben palatable to the government he had prom- 
ised to obtain from Austria concessions in regard to the left 
bank of the Rhine, which he expected to purchase at the expense 
of Venice. He also desired to increase the territory of the Cisal- 
pine Republic and to add the Ionian Islands to the French share 
of the booty. Had the moderates in the councils retained their 
influence, these advantages would have been sacrificed and France 
would have contented herself with the " natural " limits, or, it 
may be, even less. The spirit of compromise disappeared with 
them, as is indicated by the fact that fresh negotiations with 
England were broken off summarily. The directors showed a 
determination to concede so little to Austria that a prolongation 
of war was probable; but Bonaparte refused to risk his laurels 
in a new campaign, and completed the negotiations for peace 
without much attention to their wishes. By the terms of the 
treaty, dated at Campo Formio, October 17, 1797, Austria was 
to receive the city of Venice, consenting that the western bound- 
ary of its lands in the Terra Firma be the Adige, rather than 
the Oglio. Istria and Dalmatia, promised at Leoben, were also 
to be hers. The western part of the Terra Firma was to go to 
the Cisalpine, and, to facilitate the union of the Cispadane with 
the Cisalpine, the Duke of Modena was transferred to the Aus- 
trian Breisgau. The possession of the Ionian Islands was con- 
ceded to France., Austria renounced the Netherlands, and prom- 
ised to use her good offices with the empire in order that at a con- 
gress called to meet at Rastadt France should receive the Rhine 
frontier from Basel to the Nette above Andernach. Princes hold- 
ing territory on the left bank should receive compensation on 
the right bank ; doubtless at the expense of the ecclesiastical 
principalities, for it was expressly agreed that Austria should 
have the archbishopric of Salzburg, and further that the other 
indemnities should be selected in " common accord with the 
French Republic," which since 1792 had been dangling this 
particular bait before the German princes. Prussia, however, 
should receive no indemnities, Bonaparte subscribing to the 
proposition that France would restore to the King his territory 
on the left bank of the Rhine. In France indignation at the 
treatment of Venice was lost in joy at the return of peace 
on the Continent. The only enemy remaining was " Perfidious 
Albion," and the victorious general was appointed commander 



IMPERIALISM AND BANKRUPTCY 247 

of the " Army of England " to cross the Channel and dictate ^^f " 
terms of peace in London. 

The chances of a successful attack upon Great Britain were ^'^^^•^'^ 
not so good as they seemed a year earlier. In the fall of 1796 
an expedition had been fitted out which was to convey an army 
under Hoche to Ireland. Hoche had the promise of the co- crisis in 
operation of a strong Irish revolutionary party. The expedition England 
was, however, badly managed, and did not secure a foothold on 
the Irish coast. The alarm in England hastened a financial 
crisis, for the timid withdrew their deposits in the banks. The 
demands for coin made at the country banks compelled them to 
draw their balances from the Bank of England, which was 
already seriously embarrassed through the withdrawal of specie 
to pay loans or subsidies to Austria. The government owed the 
bank more than seven million pounds sterling. On February 
25, 1797, only £1,272,000 remained in the vaults, and it was 
expected that this would be drawn out on the next banking day. 
The government immediately suspended payments in coin, and 
shortly afterwards parliament passed a bill prohibiting such 
payments in amounts above one pound. So strong was the 
financial system, nevertheless, that the notes of the bank stood 
at par for several years longer. But the government was obliged 
to pay higher rates for loans. The national debt was already 
over four hundred million pounds sterling. 

A serious mutiny in the navy enhanced the crisis. The com- 
plaints of the sailors were far from being without reason. The 
special grievance was the refusal of the government to raise the 
traditional rate of pay, although prices were at famine height. 
General conditions in the navy were oppressive to the men. A 
mixture of wise concessions and timely firmness restored order. 
There was small encouragement for France in these troubles, 
for both her allies were defeated that very year by English 
fleets. The first battle was fought on February 14 between the 
English and the Spaniards oiT Cape St. Vincent. The victory 
was due to the energy of Sir John Jervis and the dashing cour- 
age of Nelson, his second in command. In October followed a 
victory over the Dutch at Camperdown. Thus vanished the 
danger that the sea power should slip from the grasp of the 
British. The " Army of England " would be obliged to find 
some other occupation than a descent upon the poast of Eng- 
land. 



CHAPTER XVI 



CHAP. 
XVI 



THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AS A GREAT POWER 

THE Peace of Campo Formio marks only a pause in the con- 
flict between France and Europe. This conflict was due 
quite as much to the spirit of domination which interpreted the 
rights of neighboring States in terms of French interests as to 
a persistence of the antagonism between the principles of the 
Revolution and the antiquated regime which prevailed beyond 
the French borders. The French seemed to possess no states- 
man capable of showing them with authoritative clearness the 
limits beyond which revolutionary zeal and a passion for ag- 
grandizement would not carry them safely. The Directory could 
have contrived no measures more certain to render French in- 
fluence odious than those which they now undertook to enforce. 
For these General Bonaparte was also, in a measure, responsible. 
The problems of the government were undoubtedly perplexing. 
For one thing, it was impossible to pay the ordinary expenses 
out of the receipts from taxation. General Bonaparte had been 
indispensable, not only because he gained prestige for France, 
but because he furnished money for the administration. The 
cessation of conquest checked the refreshing stream of indemni- 
ties, and the annual deficits ran up to 300 millions. It was diffi- 
cult to reduce the army to a peace basis, because the soldiers 
could not be sent home unpaid. A part might be supported at 
the expense of vassal republics, and the rest from the profits 
of new conquests. The most serious difficulty arose from the 
triumph of Bonaparte's Italian policy, which had engaged the 
government in a situation likely to cause further conflicts. To 
recede meant loss of prestige, while to go forward would furnish 
excuses for another coalition. 

The Congress of Rastadt was opened in December, 1797. A 
deputation appointed by the Diet represented the Empire. The 
Emperor had promised to use his influence to procure for France 
the cession of the left bank of the Rhine, but he pursued a policy 
of delay, apparently hoping that the French would increase the 
bid made at Campo Formio by abandoning to him the legations, 
now a part of the Cisalpine Republic. But as his troops 
evacuated Mainz, which was equivalent to its surrender to the 

248 



THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AS A GREAT POWER 249 

French, the German princes reahzed that his public insistence chap. 

on the integrity of the empire was a mere formahty. Prussian 

support could not be expected and no resource was left except 1797-1802 
to make the best possible terms with the French, who renewed 
the proposal that the dispossessed princes should find indemnifi- 
cation in the ecclesiastical States. The lesser princes were gen- 
erally ready to accept this solution, especially after fear of com- 
plete secularization was removed by the assurances of the French 
diplomats. The deputation then agreed to the cession of the 
left bank on the understanding that the French troops should 
be withdrawn from the right bank. This decision, although com- 
municated to the French, was not confirmed by the Emperor, 
who soon opened negotiations with Russia for a new coalition 
against France. 

The directors did not wait long before they showed the sense 
in which they interpreted the independence of the republics ere- prench 
ated in the Low Countries and in Italy. The directors of the Rule in 
Cisalpine Republic were summoned to Paris and forced to sign ^ 
a treaty agreeing to support a French army of occupation of 
25,000 men and to keep on foot an Italian army of 22,000. The 
treaty was unacceptable to the senior Cisalpine council, and 
could not be confirmed until, by a new application of the method 
of Fructidor, two of the directors and four of the senior coun- 
cilors were excluded from office. Three times within six months 
the personnel of the councils was changed by military force: 
— in August, 1798, in the interest of the moderate party; in 
October, to restore the radicals; and in January, 1799, to undo 
the work of October. The poHcy of the French did not possess 
even the qualified advantage of continuity. All that seemed 
certain was the continuance of military requisitions. The " in- 
tellectuals " throughout Italy were convinced that if the Revolu- 
tion was to benefit Italians, rather than Frenchmen, they must 
substitute for the existing governments, weakened by local and 
dynastic aims, a great republic, strong enough to drive French 
as well as Austrians from the peninsula. Agents of this party 
attempted to start a revolution in Piedmont, where French agi- 
tators were already at work. The result was a condition of 
anarchy which rendered the King of Sardinia powerless and 
gave the French government an excuse for intervention late in 
1798. The King abdicated and retired to the island of Sardinia. 
Within the next three months the French levied over ten million 
francs in Piedmont. They intended to prepare the country for 
annexation, but instead prepared it for revolt. 

The plight of the Dutch was still worse than that of the north- 



250 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^xvi' ^^" Italians. As the National Assembly which had been chosen 

to draft a constitution was moderatist in sympathy, the radicals 

1797-1802 resolved to " Fructidorize " it. They borrowed a French gen- 
The eral (Joubert) to play the part of Augereau, and in January, 

ilnds"" ^79^> arrested a sufficient number of their opponents to obtain 
control. They then drew up a constitution which transformed 
the United Netherlands into the Batavian Republic " one and in- 
divisible," abolishing the old provinces and dividing the country 
like France into departments. They also proclaimed separation 
of Church and State. A new treaty was made with France, 
promising in addition to the support of 25,000 French soldiers 
a subsidy of 1,200,000 guilders. The high-handed way in which 
the victorious faction proceeded led to a split in its own ranks, 
and as the government at Paris now inclined toward the moder- 
ates a new coup d'etat in June drove the victors of January out 
of the administration. Meanwhile the country was beginning 
to feel the effects of the French alliance. In one year the num- 
ber of vessels entering Dutch ports declined from 4,300 to 1,600. 
The trade with Russia, which had required 430 ships, was car- 
ried on in sixteen. The East India Company, with a glorious 
history of two centuries, fell into ruin and was abolished. The 
financial position of the Bank of Amsterdam was compromised. 
The poverty in that city increased so rapidly that more than a 
third of the population had to be given relief in the winter of 
1798-1799. Dutch agriculture, however, was in a prosperous 
condition during this period. 

Meanwhile the Directory was engaged in creating other repub- 
The lies of the same kind, plundering them in the first instance, and 

EepnbUo afterwards subjecting them to the usual burdens of French pro- 
tection. The first of these was the Roman Republic. The di- 
rectors never relished the terms which Bonaparte had granted 
at Tolentino, and, when a French officer was shot in a riot be- 
tween radical agitators and papal soldiers, they seized the occa- 
sion to despatch an army against Rome. General Bonaparte 
was asked to draw up the instructions to General Berthier, its 
commander, who had been his chief-of-stafT in the Italian cam- 
paign, Berthier was charged to turn everything into money, a 
task which he accepted with enthusiasm, assuring Bonaparte in 
a letter that " in sending me to Rome you have named me treas- 
urer of the expedition," meaning an expedition which was being 
organized at Toulon ; and he added, " I will try to fill the fund." 
The Pope, Pius VI, was given the choice of abdication or impris- 
onment, and as he refused to abdicate was arrested and taken 
eventually to Valence, where he died. A French commission 



THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AS A GREAT POWER 251 

drew up a constitution providing for consuls, senators, and ^^^J 

tribunes, a variation from the ordinary model only in the choice 

of ancient Roman official names, but the important matter was I'^^^-isoa 
the agreement of the new finance minister to pay France 
15.300,000 francs in coin, in addition to the indemnities already 
exacted, and, besides, other millions in supplies. The French 
estimated that they had now drawn from papal territory seventy- 
seven millions, without including sums taken by generals or 
commissioners, or by contractors and hangers-on. Certainly they 
could not be charged with holding too cheap the liberty they 
brought. Their treatment of the Pope embittered the Catholic 
populations of Europe, and indicated that they were not seek- 
ing peace, but the triumph of Jacobin dogma and French domi- 
nation. 

To the Roman Republic was soon added the Helvetic Republic, 
" one and indivisible." The motive in this case was mainly switzer- 
plunder, and the chief consequence was that the eastern frontier ^ 
was opened to attack, because the neutrality of Switzerland was 
destroyed. An excuse for intervention was found in the quarrels 
between the Swiss democrats and an oligarchic party particularly 
strong at Berne. Intervention was begun in January, 1798, but 
the revolution was not over until September, when the stubborn 
resistance of the last mountain cantons had been crushed. The 
treasury of Berne, which contained five million francs in coin, was 
seized, while a commissioner with the suggestive name of Rapinat 
was sent to levy contributions. The new republic was forced to 
sign an offensive and defensive treaty with France. The money 
from Berne was sent to Toulon to pay for the equipment of an 
expedition about which a veil of mystery still hung. At the same 
time the republic of Geneva, long allied to the Swiss Confedera- 
tion, was annexed to France. 

General Bonaparte as commander of the Army of England 
was ordered to make preparations for the great venture, but an 
inspection of the northern coast and of the resources for trans- 
port convinced him that such an attempt would be futile, at least The ex- 
for a year. His thoughts were already absorbed by a project of to^*^pt 
a descent upon Egypt, which twice before his day had been sug- 
gested to the government. In September, 1797, he wrote to 
Talleyrand, recently appointed minister of foreign affairs, urging 
the retention of the Ionian Islands, and suggesting the seizure 
of Malta; for with these as a naval base the control of the 
Mediterranean would be assured. He added that if England 
should retain the Cape of Good Hope (which she had lately seized 
from the Dutch), France must take possession of Egypt, and 



252 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XVI 



Battle of 
the Pyra- 



renew by way of the Red Sea the struggle with the English for 
supremacy in India. In the following February Talleyrand pre- 
sented a memoir to the French Institute, arguing the advisability 
of seizing Egypt. The project had the good fortune to please the 
directors as well as Bonaparte; the first because it would rid 
them of the burdensome presence of a popular general, the second 
because such a mission promised freedom from petty govern- 
mental interference and an easy triumph in the glorious East. 
Preparations for the expedition were completed secretly at 
Toulon. In addition to the army Bonaparte planned to take with 
him a group of scientific men who might study the resources of 
Egypt and the remains of its ancient civilization. 

None seemed to anticipate the risks of the enterprise, probably 
because for eighteen months no English fleet had been in the 
Mediterranean. At this very time, however, the English were 
organizing a squadron strong enough to destroy the Toulon 
armament. Nelson, who had distinguished himself at the battle 
of Cape St. Vincent, was made its commander, but the ships 
did not reach their rendezvous until three weeks after the French 
had sailed. Nelson steered for Naples and then to the coast of 
Sicily, where he learned that the French had eflfected the capture 
of Malta and had sailed eastward. Twice within the next few 
days he nearly overhauled them. This would have been 
their ruin, for their decks were encumbered with soldiers and 
army stores and they would have fought under difficulties. Nel- 
son reached Alexandria before the French, but uncertain that this 
was their destination, missed them by leaving before they arrived, 
the English topsails disappearing over the eastern horizon just 
as the French appeared from the west. 

Egypt was nominally a vassal state of the Sultan of Turkey, 
but the Turkish pasha at Cairo was controlled by the Mamelukes, 
praetorian bands of feudal warriors, recruited from Circassian 
youths and led by chiefs or beys, of whom the most powerful 
were Ibrahim and Murad. Besides these bands of horsemen, 
there was no army to oppose the French. Alexandria was cap- 
tured without difficulty. The decisive battle was fought near 
Cairo on July 21. The French army, formed in squares, easily 
repulsed the few thousand horsemen whom Murad led against 
it, while Ibrahim's followers for the most part watched the con- 
flict from across the Nile. This affair, eloquently described by 
Bonaparte, who greatly exaggerated the number of the enemy, 
has been named the " Battle of the Pyramids." Murad retired 
into southern Egypt and Ibrahim to the borders of Palestine. 
Bonaparte entered Cairo, organized provincial administrations or 



THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AS A GREAT POWER 253 

divans, seeking to allay the fears of the Moslem population by ^xvi** 

posing as a believer in the message of the Prophet and an instru- 

ment in the hands of God which it would be perilous to resist. ^797-1802 
He was anxious to make it appear that he had come simply to de- 
liver the land from the domination of the Mamelukes and that 
his acts were not contrary to the Sultan's authority. Hardly had 
his work of reorganization begun when he received the terrible 
news that his fleet was destroyed and that the army was now cut 
off from France. 

Nelson had at last found the French fleet. When he had left 
Alexandria he sailed for Syria, then for Crete, returning almost 
in despair to Sicily. Proceeding eastward again, off the coast 
of Greece he heard of the destination of the French. On his way Battle of 
to Alexandria he decided, in conference with his captains, that *^® ^^^® 
if the French were found at anchor he would concentrate his 
ships against their van and center, crushing them before the ships 
in the rear could come to the rescue. The French commander, 
obliged to remain on the coast, and yet unable on account of the 
shallow water to gain the protection of the harbor of Alexandria, 
had moored his ships in Aboukir Bay, a few miles east. It was 
his intention to anchor so close to shoal water that the English 
could not attack him on the land side, but his captains carelessly 
left several hundred yards of deep water within his lines. The 
English fleet arrived in sight of the French position early in the 
afternoon of August i ; and, although it would not be possible 
to bring the struggle to a decisive issue before nightfall. Nelson 
ordered his ships forward. A favoring breeze blew down the 
French line, and five of his ships ran inside, while the rest sailed 
along the seaward side. The French fought with stubborn cour- 
age, but one after another of their ships was disabled and sur- 
rendered. About ten o'clock the admiral's ship blew up. After 
a lull, the fight went on until morning. Only two French battle- 
ships and a frigate were able to escape, the remainder of the fleet 
being captured or destroyed. No victory more decisive was 
gained on the seas during this long series of wars. One of the 
first consequences was to embolden the Sultan of Turkey to de- 
clare war on the French. This enabled the Czar of Russia, who 
had been chosen Protector of the Order of St. John, nominally 
sovereign in Malta, to send a fleet through the Dardanelles to 
avenge the French attack on the island. 

The news of the disaster at Aboukir Bay, often called the 
Battle of the Nile, seemed only to stimulate Bonaparte's courage. 
He declared to one of his generals, " Well ! we must remain in 
these lands, and come forth great, as did the ancients." Nor was 



254 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XVI 



Scienti- 
fic Ee- 
sults of 
the Ex- 
pedition 



Failure 
in Syria 



he daunted by a fierce revolt which threatened the destruction of 
the army at Cairo. Punishing this with a ferocity truly oriental, 
he devoted himself to the organization of the resources of the 
conquered land. Monge, Berthollet, Denon, Jomard, and other 
scientists or savants who accompanied the expedition were formed 
into an institute, in four sections, two of which were assigned to 
public economy and to literature and the arts. Practical problems 
were necessarily emphasized, but the ruins of buildings and monu- 
ments were measured by Denon and his companions. Jomard 
began to decipher the hieroglyphics. Somewhat later the famous 
Rosetta Stone with its trilingual inscription was unearthed. 
This work laid the foundation for the scientific investigation of 
Egyptian history and revealed a long- forgotten world. It is the 
only permanent result of the ill-fated expedition. 

Early in 1799 Bonaparte attempted to open communications 
with Tippoo, the Sultan of Mysore, a formidable enemy of the 
growing influence of the British East India Company. He or- 
dered two corvettes to be constructed on the Red Sea ; and, had 
he not been diverted from such efforts by the danger of a Turkish 
attack, his presence in Egypt might have been more than an 
empty menace to the English in India. As it was, it only hast- 
ened the fall of Tippoo, whom Lord Wellesley threatened with 
war if he did not renounce his dealings with the French. A dila- 
tory answer did not satisfy Wellesley, who assembled an army 
and stormed Seringapatam, capital of Mysore, in May, 1799. 
The Sultan perished and his kingdom was divided. 

The hostile attitude of the Pasha of Acre, with whom Ibrahim 
Bey had united his forces, determined Bonaparte to carry the 
war into the enemy's country. Leaving an adequate force in 
Egypt, he started for Syria with a small army. No serious ob- 
stacle troubled the expedition until it reached Acre, the fortifica- 
tions of which had been strengthened by a French engineer, a 
former fellow student of Bonaparte at Brienne, but now an emi- 
grant. Bonaparte's attack was compromised by the loss of a 
flotilla containing his siege guns; nevertheless, his troops after 
almost superhuman struggles gained a foothold within the walls 
of the town. The defenders, encouraged by the English naval 
commander, clung stubbornly to their inner lines, until Bona- 
parte, having lost about 5,000 men and not daring to risk further 
sacrifices, withdrew and retreated towards Egypt. With sub- 
lime assurance he reentered Cairo on June 14 as if he had been 
triumphant. A month later he did have the good fortune to win 
a spectacular victory, for, when a Turkish army landed in Egypt 



THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AS A GREAT POWER 255 

to complete his ruin, he defeated it near Aboukir, inflicting a loss ^^^f' 
of more than 10,000 men. 

During negotiations for an exchange of prisoners the English 1797-1802 
put into his hands a bundle of European journals, which con- 
tained news of another coalition against France, the defeat of the Bonaparte 
French army in Italy, and the perilous situation of the Republic, g*^^ 
He at once resolved to return to France, leaving the army in 
command of General Kleber. He had originally planned to re- 
turn before the close of 1798, but the destruction of his fleet made 
this impossible. In May, 1799, the directors sent a message re- 
calling him, and issued orders for the concentration of a fleet to 
bring back the army, but neither message nor fleet appeared, nor 
did Bonaparte know of the project. He kept his own plans secret, 
telling only those offlcers and scientists who were to return with 
him, because the army was so weary of its enforced stay in Egypt 
that it was not safe to make known his intended departure. This 
was not a flight nor a desertion, but it was the abandonment of 
an enterprise which even his genius could not save from ulti- 
mate failure, while it left the responsibility for the final collapse 
to rest upon others. He was to return to France to utilize the 
greater opportunity which the blunders of the directors and the 
disasters of the French armies now furnished him. He and his 
companions embarked during the night of August 22. 

The situation had become critical even before General Bona- 
parte sailed for Egypt. When the Austrians found they were 
likely to obtain no further :concessions of Italian territory, they 
resolved to check the increasing demands of the French on the 
Rhine, and appealed to the Czar to mediate between France, Aus- 
tria, and Prussia in the settlement of the German question. In a new 
July, 1798, the Czar promised the aid of an auxiliary force, which Jj^^^®**^ 
in a few weeks was in Galicia, slowly marching southward. Aus- 
tria also entered upon negotiations with Naples for an offensive 
and defensive alliance. The Neapolitans had been in an agony of 
fear lest Bonaparte's expedition was directed against them, the 
spectacle of the conquest of papal Rome warning other States of 
their approaching fate. To guard against this danger was part 
of the reason why the English sent Nelson into the Mediterranean. 

The news of Nelson's victory filled the Neapolitan court with 
exultation. The victorious admiral was received at Naples with 
eflfusion, and added the prestige of his influence to the project of 
war against the French. England and Austria officially warned 
the Neapolitans against precipitate action, but their counsels were 
unheeded. Retribution was swift ; not long after the Neapolitan 



256 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 

XVI 



Dissen- 
sions 
of the 
AlUes 



army crossed the frontiers of the Roman Republic it was de- 
feated in detail by General Championnet and driven disorganized 
back upon Naples. The Court fled on English ships to Sicily, and 
the French proclaimed the fall of the Bourbon monarchy, estab- 
lishing in its place, on January 23, 1799, the Parthenopean Repub- 
lic. In Naples the story of systematic plunder was repeated. 
Besides exacting an indemnity of sixty million francs, officers 
and soldiers were rewarded according to a scale, like pirates at 
the capture of a rich prize. Championnet, disgusted with the con- 
duct of the French commissioners, expelled them from Neapolitan 
territory ; but they complained to the directors, who removed him 
and placed in command a general more ready to share in the 
spoil. 

The occupation of Naples weakened the French position in 
Europe, because the French armies were scattered from the 
North Sea to southern Italy. Little compensation was to be 
found in the numbers of the recruits which could be demanded 
of these ill-affected vassal peoples. Meanwhile England signed 
a treaty with Russia, promising subsidies for a large army. 
The presence of the Russian auxiliary force within the Aus- 
trian dominions provoked an ultimatum from France, and the 
War of the Second Coalition began on March i, 1799. 

The war did not proceed far before the fabric reared by vic- 
tory, but undermined by greed, seemed on the verge of utter 
ruin. In Germany the French were defeated at Stockach by 
the Archduke Charles. An allied army, under command of the 
Russian Suvorof, overran northern Italy in a shorter time than 
Bonaparte had required to conquer it, entering Milan, the capital 
of the Cisalpine Republic, before the end of April. The French 
hastily abandoned Naples and Rome. The Bourbon king re- 
turned to Naples and from the deck of Nelson's ship organized 
a reign of vengeance and terror. In the north the French were 
driven to Genoa as a final refuge. A supreme effort at Novi, on 
August 15, led to the death of the commander. General Joubert, 
and the disastrous defeat of his army. 

At this juncture France was saved, as in the previous war, 
by the jealousies of the Allies. The Austrians, once in pos- 
session of Piedmont, refused to recall the King of Sardinia, and 
the Russians and the English were in no mood to sacrifice men 
and money for the aggrandizement of Austria in Italy. The 
English also feared that Russia had designs on certain islands 
in the Mediterranean as a permanent naval base, while the 
Russians suspected England of purposing to capture and hold 
Malta. Prussia, although neutral, was suspected of scheming 



THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AS A GREAT POWER 257 



CHAP. 
XVI 



to use the difficulties of the other powers as an opportunity to 
increase her territory in northwestern Germany. These fears 
and jealousies, some well-grounded, others baseless, brought 
about a lack of cooperation among the Allies and fatally com- 
promised the successes of the spring and summer. The Rus- 
sians withdrew from Italy into Switzerland, towards which a 
second Russian army under Korsakoff was marching. Had the 
Austrians under the Archduke Charles cooperated with them, 
the French would have been driven from Switzerland, but the 
Archduke was directed to move towards the Rhine in order 
to prevent the Prussians from securing new advantages in case 
an English-Russian army operating in the Dutch Netherlands 
should be successful. Massena seized the opportunity of a di- 
vided enemy and defeated Korsakoff at Ziirich, on September 
25-26, before Suvorof could reach him. After this disaster 
Suvorof, to avoid capture, plunged into the untrodden paths of 
the higher Alps and made his way with terrible losses into the 
Grisons. Three weeks later Brune defeated the English-Rus- 
sian army in the Netherlands and compelled it to reembark. 

Unless the French were ready to abandon their territorial pre- 
tensions, the victories of Massena and Brune would bring only 
respite from the fear of invasion. To recover the position which politics 
France occupied at the Peace of Campo Formio was far more 
difficult, and it seemed hardly likely that the Directory would 
be equal to the task. In 1797 the directors supposed they had 
saved the Republic by the proscriptions of the i8th Fructidor, 
but the elections of the following spring were also hostile, al- 
though the menace came from the left, rather than from the 
right. The directorial party in the councils, accordingly, an- 
nulled sixty-four elections, enough to preserve a governmental 
majority. This was called the coup d'etat of the 22nd Floreal. 
Again in 1799 the elections were unfavorable, but the directors 
were so discredited that they dared not repeat the manceuvers of 
Fructidor or Floreal. For several months they had been sub- 
jected to a campaign of hostile criticism. To their opponents in 
the councils they seemed the protectors of speculators, army 
contractors, and commissioners in vassal republics ; indeed, of 
every one who was fattening upon the public calamities. When 
the time came to fill the annual vacancy in the Directory, Sieyes 
was chosen. He held aloof from the other directors and allied 
himself with the opposition in the councils, some of whose mem- 
bers were more conservative than the directorial group, while 
others were more radical. This coalition proceeded to annul the 
election of one of the directors on the ground that it had been 



at Paris 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XVI 



unconstitutional, and forced the resignation of two more. From 
the day on which the events culminated the incident is commonly 
called the coup d'etat of the 30th Prairial. With success 
achieved, the allied groups separated in mutual distrust. 

Sieyes and his friends now formed the design of revising the 
constitution. They required the aid of a victorious general, 
whose prestige would give popularity to the enterprise, and who 
would, if necessary, use soldiers to overawe the radicals. Gen- 
eral Joubert was chosen for the part, but instead met defeat and 
death. The opponents of Sieyes took advantage of the situa- 
tion to propose in the Council of Five Hundred a resolution de- 
claring " the country in danger." They approached General 
Bernadotte, minister of war, with the scheme of seizing the gov- 
ernment and organizing an administration of radicals. The tide 
of discontent among those who had anything to lose was already 
high. On the excuse of military necessity the councils early in 
the summer had adopted a decree levying a forced loan of one 
hundred millions on the rich. It was exacted, first, of those pay- 
ing taxes on real estate, and increased in amount with the amount 
of the tax, taking as much as three-quarters of the income of 
the richer tax-payers. In the second place, those whose wealth 
consisted of personal property should contribute according to 
their presumed ability, the basis to be fixed in each case by a 
jury of inquiry. This feature would enable the government to 
compel speculators and contractors to disgorge their ill-gotten 
gains. The mere proposal of the law created a panic in Paris. 
Men saw that their only escape was in proving that they were 
not rich; shops were closed, dealers declared themselves bank- 
rupt, and creditors tried to collect their debts in coin and hide 
the money. Such legislation arrayed against the Republic, or, 
at least, against the politicians in the councils, the great body of 
those whom the Revolution had enriched and who desired to 
enjoy their riches in security. The councils also alienated mod- 
erate men by passing a law of hostages, which aimed to restore 
peace in the regions infested by brigands or by royalist conspira- 
tors, by ordering the arrest of former nobles and relatives of 
emigrants, threatening them with deportation if the disorders 
continued. Paris was alarmed by the reappearance of the Ja- 
cobin Club under another name, omen of an approaching Reign 
of Terror. With the return of victory political passions had 
begun to subside. The directors had met the crisis firmly, using 
the ex-Terrorist Fouche, now minister of police, to close the new 
club. 

Late in September Sieyes resumed his plans. He and his 



Bonapaxte 



THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AS A GREAT POWER 2- 

friends believed that they could count upon a majority of the ^^vi* 

Council of Elders. They expected serious opposition from 

many members of the Council of Five Hundred and from several 1797-18( 
generals, like Augereau, Jourdan, and Bernadotte, who were sieySs 
identified with the radicals. Among the directors Ducos was 
closely associated with Sieyes, Barras was thoroughly discredited, 
and Gohier and Moulins anything but formidable. To overawe 
the opposition Sieyes needed the cooperation of a distinguished 
and popular general. He thought of Moreau, but Moreau had 
little taste for political intrigue. As the two were discussing the 
question one day in October, it was announced that Bonaparte 
had landed at Frejus on the southern coast. " There 's your 
man ! " exclaimed Moreau. But Sieyes was full of misgivings, 
for, as Lucien Bonaparte afterward remarked, he feared that 
Napoleon's " sword was too long." 

The news that Bonaparte had landed at Frejus on October 9 
caused great rejoicing. His reputation for invincibility had 
been enhanced only a few days before by the arrival of a bulle- 
tin from Egypt describing in glowing terms his victory over the 
Turks at Aboukir. All other reputations were dwarfed by com- 
parison. Upon his arrival in Paris his brother told him the details 
of the Sieyes plan and he agreed to support it, although he re- 
fused to see Sieyes at first. He shrewdly contrived to keep all 
factions in a state of expectation. When finally the interview 
with Sieyes took place, it was decided to obtain the appointment 
of three provisional consuls and two legislative commissions, one 
from each council, to carry on the administration until the neces- 
sary constitutional measures could be drawn up and submitted to 
popular vote. For this purpose the Council of Elders, utilizing 
the powers conferred upon it by the constitution, was to decree 
the transfer of both councils to St. Cloud beyond the reach of a 
hostile Jacobin mob. The excuse was to be found in rumors of a 
new Jacobin plot. Bonaparte was to be put in command of the 
troops, in order to block any action by those directors who were 
not in the scheme. Sieyes and Ducos were to resign, and it was 
believed that Barras could be bribed or forced to resign, leaving 
only a minority, which would be powerless. Even in the Council 
of Five Hundred the conspirators were not helpless, for Lucien 
Bonaparte had just been elected president out of compliment to 
his brother. ■ H the Council of Elders should take the initiative, 
it might be possible by a mixture of parliamentary manoeuvering 
and military force to rush the appointment of a provisional ad- 
ministration through the Council of Five Hundred. 

Early on the morning of November 9 (18 Brumaire), the 



26o 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XVI 



18th 
Biumaire 



day selected for the coup d'etat, the decrees transferring the 
councils and appointing Bonaparte commander of the troops 
were adopted by the Elders and announced to the Five Hundred, 
after which the latter body was immediately adjourned, to give 
the opposition no time to ask inconvenient questions. Mean- 
while the directors Sieyes and Ducos resigned, and Barras, rumor 
said, was handed a resignation, accompanied by a substantial sum 
of money ; he signed one and put the other in his pocket. Gohier 
and Moulins, the two remaining directors, refusing to resign, 
were guarded at the directorial palace by soldiers under com- 
mand of General Moreau. During the day placards and inspired 
editorials served to allay public fears. Everybody was aware 
that the Directory was doomed. But when the councils met the 
next afternoon at St. Cloud, the Elders, after a night's reflection, 
had lost their confidence in a scheme the details of which had 
not been confided to them. Some inquired about the alleged 
Jacobin conspiracy, but Sieyes and his friends had overlooked 
the necessity of providing answers to unseasonable curiosity. 
Disturbed by the vexatious delays, General Bonaparte entered the 
council, where, unaccustomed to the manners of deliberative as- 
semblies, he became confused and incoherent, and his friends 
were obliged to lead him out. In the Council of Five Hundred 
the radicals, who had recently plotted to save the Republic by 
seizing the government themselves, were swept by a furor of 
patriotic emotion, denounced the conspiracy, and compelled every 
member to swear fidelity to the constitution, a proceeding which 
served the purpose of Lucien Bonaparte and Sieyes, now anxious 
to gain time until their proposition was voted by the Elders. 
News of the resignation of a majority of the directors added to 
the uproar. Suddenly General Bonaparte appeared in the hall, 
hoping perhaps to provoke an outbreak and justify intervention 
with troops. His entrance was greeted by cries of " Down with 
the dictator ! " many radicals rushing upon him, shrieking in his 
ears, and hustling him. Officers and soldiers in the doorway 
hastened to his rescue and bore him half-fainting from the hall. 
The radicals first demanded a decree of outlawry, but after- 
wards hit upon the more practical plan of placing the troops 
under the immediate orders of the councils, and nothing but the 
fact of Lucien Bonaparte's presence in the chair prevented its 
adoption. Finally, Lucien, powerless to resist, made his way 
out of the hall, and declaring to the troops that the assembly was 
dominated by a group of conspirators with drawn daggers, called 
upon the legislative guards to drive them out. The guards en- 



THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AS A GREAT POWER 261 

tered the hall, with bayonets fixed, and the members fled out of ^^^f " 
the windows into the gathering darkness. 

During the night of November 10 (19 Brumaire), a few of the 1797-1802 
dispersed councilors reassembled and with the Elders adopted a provis- 
a decree appointing a provisional :consular commission, composed guiate 
of Bonaparte, Sieyes, and Ducos, and two legislative commis- 
sions, representing the Council of Elders and the Council of 
Five Hundred. The legislative commissions received the task 
of preparing changes in the organic law of the Republic and 
of adopting, at the suggestion of the consuls, legislative meas- 
ures immediately necessary. Most of the men who had a share 
in the events of the i8th and 19th Brumaire believed that they 
had saved the Republic, and the soldiers marched back to Paris 
singing revolutionary songs. The " Consolidated Third " rose 
from 11.38 on the 17th Brumaire to 20 on the 24th Brumaire. 

The men who overthrew the Directory were confronted by a 
double task: they must settle many perplexing constitutional, 
financial, and social questions, and must also bring to a successful 
issue the War of the Second Coalition. The first could scarcely 
be begun before the second must be undertaken, and prestige 
enough to carry through schemes of reform or reorganization 
must come primarily from triumphs on the battle-field. Of the 
political situation it is enough to say here ^ that the provisional 
government gave way before the close of the year to the Con- 
sulate. General Bonaparte was made First Consul, and to him 
were granted the chief executive powers. He also had a con- 
trolling influence over foreign relations and directed the military 
campaigns, although it was not expected that he would command 
in the field. 

General Bonaparte required no penetrating genius to discover 
a foreign policy. His program was marked out for him in the 
terms of the Treaty of Campo Formio, which he had himself cam- 
negotiated. His administration would soon be discredited unless ^f^^ °^ 
he could recover the ground in northern Italy lost during the 
year 1799. When, accordingly, he wrote to George III and to 
Francis II, offering to negotiate for peace, the obstacle lay not in 
his personal insincerity, but in the incompatibility of the aims of 
the Allies with those of France. Peace would come, as in 1795 
and 1797, only through new French victories or through the fail- 
ure of the enemies of France to cooperate heartily. Bonaparte 
did not have to fear the active hostility of the Czar Paul, who 

1 For details of the new political system, see the following chapter. 



i62 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^xvi"' looked upon him as a restorer of order in France. The incidents 
. of 1799 had also embittered the Czar against the Austrians. 

797-1802 ^g jj^ j^0^ ^Yie most decisive battle was fought in Italy. The 
strongest forces of the Republic were in Germany under com- 
mand of Moreau, while the Army of Italy under Massena was 
disorganized by the defeats of the previous year. Bonaparte 
assembled a reserve army in eastern France, intending to rein- 
force Moreau and himself take personal charge of a campaign 
in southern Germany. But Moreau was unwilling to play such 
a subordinate part, and, therefore, the First Consul changed the 
scene of the principal military effort. He utilized his central 
position in the upper valley of the Rhone to open the campaign 
in spectacular fashion and accomplish at a stroke what had 
required half a dozen battles in 1796. He planned to descend 
into Italy from the Great St. Bernard pass and cut the Austrian 
line of [communications in the valley of the Po, compelling the 
Austrians to abandon all northwestern Italy, which they had 
been occupying since the preceding summer. This would also 
relieve General Massena who was shut up with half of his army 
in Genoa. The reserve army was nominally under command 
of Berthier, but the real commander was the First Consul. In 
May everything was ready and the great operation was begun. 
The passage of the Alps occupied five days, from May 15 to 
May 20, and took the Austrians completely by surprise, for 
they did not dream that the French would attempt the higher 
Alpine passes. 

On June 2, Bonaparte entered Milan, the capital of that Cisal- 
pine Republic which he had created in 1797 and which the 
Austrians had destroyed during his absence in Egypt. He 
thought that the Austrians would immediately concentrate all 

larengo their forces and attack him in order to keep open the roads lead- 
ing into Venetia, and he selected the defile of the Stradella on the 
southern bank of the Po as the best position at which to check 
such a movement. A part of the Austrian army attempted to 
fight its way through, but failed. Bonaparte then advanced into 
the plain in front of Alessandria. On June 13, afraid that the 
Austrians would attempt to escape either to the north or the 
south, he detached divisions to head them off, one under Desaix 
towards Novi. The following morning at nine he sent orders 
to Desaix to persist in his movement, but within a little over 
an hour the Austrian general, Melas, marched out of Alessandria 
in full force and fell upon the weakened French army. In spite 
of the most stubborn fighting about the village of Marengo, the 
French were driven back. By noon Bonaparte sent a frantic 



THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AS A GREAT POWER 263 

appeal to Desaix, which fortunately reached him in time, because ^^y?' 

he had halted upon the sound of cannonading. When Desaix 

arrived on the field at five o'clock the French were in full re- 1797-I802 
treat, the battle apparently lost. A vigorous onslaught by the, 
fresh troops, a charge of cavalry, and the victorious Austrians, 
surprised in turn, were thrown into disorder and driven routed 
towards Alessandria. By seven o'clock a second battle had 
been fought and won. 

In his bulletin of victory Bonaparte so described the strug- 
gle that success seemed due to his forethought in placing Desaix's 
division. Desaix did not live to claim his share in the glories 
of the day, for he was killed in the conflict. His contribution 
to the final triumph need not detract from the honor due to 
his chief, for Marengo was only an incident, although a culmi- 
nating incident, of a campaign which ranks amongst Bonaparte's 
most brilliant successes. The consequences of the victory were 
immense. The Austrians signed an armistice which gave to the 
French control as far as the Mincio. It was also a personal 
triumph for Bonaparte and consolidated his hold upon France. 
As Pasquier remarked : " What strength did this victory not 
give him who only had to show himself to conquer Italy in a 
day ! " 

The French under Moreau were also successful against the 
Austrians and compelled them a month after Marengo to agree 
to another armistice. The negotiations for peace were at first 
unsuccessful, partly because the Austrians would lose an Eng- 
lish subsidy if they should sign a treaty with France before 
February i, 1801. Moreau's decisive victory at Hohenlinden in 
December, opening the road to Vienna, and further French suc- 
cesses in Italy brought the struggle to a close. 

The treaty of peace, which was signed at Luneville, on Feb- 
ruary 9, 1801, repeated the main features of the Treaty of 
Campo Formio, but obliged the Emperor to agree, without fur- Peace of 
ther consultation of the German diet, that the territories west Luneviiie 
of the Rhine should go to France. Another blow at Hapsburg 
influence in Italy was struck by the transfer of the Grand Duke 
of Tuscany to Germany, leaving the grand duchy, changed into 
a " Kingdom of Etruria " for the benefit of the Duke of Parma 
and his wife, the Spanish Infanta. Austria also consented to 
recognize the Helvetic and Batavian republics, uniting with 
France in guaranteeing their independence, and the " freedom 
of the inhabitants to adopt such a form of government as they 
should see fit." ^ 

2 A contemporary caricature represents the French Republic as a large 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 

XVI 



Bonaparte did not attempt to restore the Parthenopean Re- 
public, but made a treaty with the King of Naples which per- 
mitted the establishment at Taranto of a French expeditionary 
force destined for Egypt and maintained in the meantime at the 
expense of Naples. The King also promised to exclude the 
English from his harbors. The newly elected pope, Pius VII, 
was assured by Bonaparte that he would not be disturbed in the 
possession of the States left him at the Peace of Tolentino. 

The position of France was strengthened at this time by a 
union of the northern powers against England, a revival of the 
Armed Neutrality of 1780, finding its motive in an intolerable 
extension by the English of the rights of belligerents over neu- 
tral commerce. The English wished to include under the term 
contraband wheat, hemp, pitch, and timber, indeed anything 
which could facilitate the military or naval enterprises of the 
French. They also interpreted loosely the conditions of a block- 
ade, seizing on the high seas ships whose papers showed that 
they were bound for a port nominally in a state of blockade, 
but not continuously blockaded. The English, however, could 
not without grave danger permit the neutral to take advantage 
of his lower insurance risks and underbid the English ship- 
owner and merchant, for upon their prosperity depended in large 
part the payment of taxes and the maintenance of a war fleet. 
They contemptuously refused to accept the neutral doctrine that 
" free ships make free goods," with its corollary that neutral 
property must be respected even on ships of the enemy. French 
diplomacy did all it could to sharpen the antagonism of the north- 
ern powers to the English as the most effective way to bring 
the English to terms. Bonaparte conciliated the Czar by offer- 
ing to restore Malta to the Knights of St. John, of whom the 
Czar was now the " protector," calculating that this would 
alienate the Czar still more from the English, because they were 
on the point of forcing the French garrison to surrender. The 
Armed Neutrality, constituted in December, and including — 
besides Russia — Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia, was short- 
lived. England sent a strong fleet into the Baltic, a part of 
which under Nelson gained a victory over the Danes at Copen- 
hagen on April 2, 1801. Meantime the eccentric and tyrannical 

mushroom surrounded by several smaller mushrooms, — the Batavian, 
Helvetic, Ligurian, and Cisalpine republics. The three continental mon- 
archs are gazing at it in alarm. The King of Prussia exclaims, " Good- 
ness, how it grows ! " The Czar of Russia remarks, " That would be 
pleasant to eat " ; whereat the Emperor protests, " Don't touch it, my 
friend; it is poisonous." 



THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AS A GREAT POWER 265 

Czar Paul had been assassinated by his own officers, and his ^J^f" 

successor, Alexander I, was inclined to come to terms with the 

English. The members of the league compromised with Eng- 1797-I802 
land on the question of blockades, deciding that they should be 
efifective if maintained by cruising ships. Contraband was in- 
terpreted more favorably to the interests of the northern neutral, 
whose principal exports were wheat and timber. While par- 
tially successful in the north, the English received a blow in 
the south when Portugal was compelled by Spain, at the dicta- 
tion of France, to close her ports to their trade. 

The best argument for peace between England and France 
was the futility of continuing the war. Both nations had suf- rrance 
fered severely, although the English found compensation in the ^^d'^"^' 
seizure of French, Dutch, and Spanish colonies — the Cape, 
Ceylon, Malacca, and Amboyna in the East, and, in the West, 
Trinidad and several of the French West Indies., But their 
shipping suffered heavily from French privateers, to which more 
than 3,000 vessels fell a prey from 1793 to 1800. To check 
these losses, which pushed up insurance rates towards prohib- 
itive figures, the Convoy Act was passed in 1798 and vessels 
were not permitted to sail without escort. The financial burdens 
of the country were staggering, with a national debt of i537,- 
000,000, and an interest charge of £20,000,000. Within a decade 
the expenditures had risen from nineteen to sixty-one millions, 
and the new income tax took ten per cent, of all incomes over 
i200. Such a situation called for at least an experiment in the 
direction of peace. 

France equally felt the need of peace. As the year 1801 
wore on her position became more isolated. The Armed Neu- 
trality had broken down and Russia drew nearer to England. 
The army which Bonaparte had left in Egypt on his return to 
France was obliged to surrender to the English in June, as Malta 
had been forced to surrender in the previous September. Bona- 
parte had another motive — his plan to restore the French Peace of 
colonial empire. He already had the secret promise of the 
Spaniards to return Louisiana. He wished to recover the col- 
onies in the West Indies which the English held, and to reassert 
French authority in Santo Domingo. One obstacle to peace was 
removed by the retirement of Pitt, the great war minister. His 
successor Addington was inclined to try a peace, even if it proved 
to be only a truce. Actual fighting was ended by the signature 
of the Preliminaries of London in October, 1801, while the 
definitive treaty was signed at Amiens on March 27, 1802. The 
English did not insist upon any agreement in regard to the con- 



Amiens 



266 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

CHAP, tinental situation, not even in regard to the Dutch, so long their 

alUes. They acted as if the agreements of Luneville would mark 

1797-1802 the limits of French advance. They restored the French col- 
onies, retaining only the Dutch Ceylon and the Spanish Trini- 
dad. They also promised to restore Egypt to the Turks and to 
give Malta back to the Knights of St. John under a guarantee 
of the powers. The question of a commercial treaty was post- 
poned. 

Nearly ten years had passed since the diplomats of the Legis- 
lative Assembly had forced Louis XVI to declare war upon 
Austria. France had been covered with ruins as a result of 
the civil war into which the foreign war had plunged her. She 
now stood forth apparently more powerful than even under 
Louis XIV. The question was, Would she be able to consolidate 
her conquests by years of peaceful development? The answer 
was not far to seek, since the wars had also subjected her to the 
control of an ambitious military chieftain, surrounded by a body 
of restless soldiery. 



CHAPTER XVII 

A BENEFICENT DICTATORSHIP 

THE revolution of Brumaire was followed by forty-four days chap. 
of provisional government, giving place on December 25 

to the Consulate. In no sense had the Republic been overthrown, 1799-180 
although the constitutional system which was adopted offered an 
opportunity to one man to gather the reins of power into his 
hands. His success both in the reorganization of the country 
and in the solution of French financial, industrial, and social 
problems, as well as in the defense of national interests abroad, 
was so great that within two years similar and increased powers 
were conferred upon him for life, with the right to name his 
successor. His " beneficent dictatorship " became a monarchy 
thinly veiled. Two years more and the soldier who had " saved 
the Republic from anarchy " in 1799 was in name as in fact both 
princeps and imperator. 

To commissions of the councils had been assigned the task of 
proposing the modifications which should be made in the consti- The 
tution of 1795. As Sieyes was the originator of the scheme of ^j'°^®*=*^ 
revision, the commissioners turned to him for definite sugges- sieyis 
tions. They discovered that he had not committed his views to 
writing; indeed, he seems to have expounded two projects, vary- 
ing in detail, but resting on the same fundamental principle,^ 
which he regarded as the necessary corrective of the democratic 
ideal. The voters, he argued, should designate those eligible to 
office, but should not appoint them. The principle was expressed 
in the apothegm, " confidence should come from below, authority 
from above." Both projects provided for a communal Hst of 
eligibles, a tenth of the voting population and chosen by it. From 
this list a tenth, or departmental list, should be selected either by 
the communal eligibles or by electoral assemblies chosen by the 
voters. A national list should be formed in similar fashion, and 
would contain about 6,000 names, from which appointments to 
offices national in scope might be made. The head of the gov- 
ernment according to one plan was an " Elector-Proclaimer," 

1 For further information in regard to these projects and their origin, 
see Aulard, IV. 158-159; Vandal, L'Avenement de Bonaparte, I. 495 f.; 
A. Neton, L'Abbe Sieyes, 393-407; J. H. Clapham, L'Abbe Sieyes, 240-248. 

267 



268 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

*^^^- whose principal business was the appointment of officials, gov- 

ernmental policy and actual administration being entrusted to a 

1799-1801 council of state and to the ministers. According to the other 
plan the head of the government was a " Grand Elector," a mere 
ceremonial chief magistrate, while affairs were managed by two 
consuls, one for war and one for peace (that is, foreign affairs 
and domestic administration), and appointments were made by 
a " College of Conservators," or " Conservative Senate." Leg- 
islation should be proposed by a council of state and discussed 
by a tribunate, councilors and tribunes arguing the matter before 
a " constitutional jury," or legislative body, which should accept 
or reject without debate or amendment. It was suggested that 
Bonaparte should be content with the position of grand elec- 
tor, a palace at Versailles, and an income of six millions ; but 
Bonaparte had no intention of being, as he expressed it, put out 
to fatten like a pig. The suggestion of placing the government 
in the hands of two consuls was equally unsatisfactory to him, 
although the committees named to report on a constitution ap- 
peared to favor it. After one or two further attempts Bona- 
parte practically dictated a project, using fragments from various 
schemes which had been proposed. It was not discussed for- 
mally in the commissions, although individual members agreed 
to it, but was submitted to a popular vote, or plebiscite, and was 
declared in force as soon as the results in the nearer departments 
showed that it would be accepted. The vote in its favor was 
overwhelming — 3,011,007 against 1,562. 

^ In the new constitution the substance of power belonged to 
General Bonaparte as First Consul, for he could appoint all 
constitu- officials except justices of the peace and judges of the supreme 
1799°^ court of appeals. Through the Council of State, the members 
of which he selected, he had the initiative in legislation, includ- 
ing appropriation bills. In many matters of governmental policy 
he was assisted by the second and third consuls, but in all cases 
the decision rested with him. He was not expected to command 
the armies in the field, but their direction belonged to him as 
head of the board of consuls. 

Projects of law originated with the Council of State, and were 
transmitted to the Legislative Corps, which referred them immedi- 
ately to the Tribunate for discussion, naming a time for report. 
After the Tribunate had reached its conclusion, it deputed three 
of its members, who, with three members of the Council 
of State, discussed the measure before the Legislative Corps. 
This body could not amend, but only accept or reject. Opposition 
might, however, lead the government to withdraw the measure 



A BENEFICE:NT dictatorship 269 

and submit it again in amended form.^' The Senate had the power ^^f' 

to pronounce decrees inconsistent with the constitution, but this 

was utiHzed by Bonaparte to modify rather than safeguard that 1799-1804 
instrument. The most important function of the Senate was the 
choice of tribunes, legislators, supreme judges, and consuls, al- 
though it never actually chose consuls, for the original consuls 
were named in the constitution and the Republic ceased to exist 
before their ten-year term was over. The constitution pro- 
claimed the suffrage universal, but, except for the choice of minor 
local officials, only gave the voters the privilege of choosing, as 
Sieyes had suggested, a tenth of their number as a communal 
list of the notabilities. This tenth in turn was to reduce itself 
to a tenth, or a departmental list, and this to a tenth, which should 
be the national list. From these lists appointments were made 
by the consuls and elections by the Senate for local, departmental, 
and national offices. 

To set the new machinery of government in motion, the con- 
stitution not only named the consuls, but also provided that the 
second and third consuls, with Sieyes and Ducos, who were ap- The New 
pointed senators, should select a majority of the sixty original Officials 
senators, this majority to name the rest. As the list of notabili- 
ties was yet to be created, the first choices of tribunes and legis- 
lators were made from lists drawn up by Sieyes and his friends. 
So many ex-members of the Council of Elders and of the Coun- 
cil of Five Hundred were chosen — 65 out of 100 tribunes, and 
230 out of 300 legislators — that the Parisians were reminded of 
the efforts of the Convention to perpetuate itself, and the journals 
protested ; one of them praying, after the manner of the litany, 
" From the eternal Conventional, Good Lord deliver us ! " The 
consequence was that when the Tribunate took an attitude of 
opposition to the consular policy its criticisms counted for little, 
recalling disagreeably the strife of factions during the whole 
course of the Revolution. The Senate was composed more wisely 
of men who had rendered noteworthy services at different periods 
since 1789. Bonaparte's choice of councilors of state illustrated 
a still broader principle, because he named men of tried experi- 
ence in their various fields, whether they had served the old 
monarchy or the new repubhc. He also selected his ministers 
well, maintaining Talleyrand at the foreign office and Gaudin 
at the ministry of finance, appointments made during the Pro- 
visional Consulate, and a little later choosing Chaptal minister 
of the interior and Decres minister of the navy. 

The Council of State, which was the working body in the 
new constitutional system, was composed of from forty to forty- 



270 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XVII 



Policy 
of the 
Con- 
sulate 



five members, divided into five sections — civil and criminal 
legislation, domestic aflfairs, finance, war, and admiralty. Mat- 
ters matured in the sections were discussed in general sessions^ 
often under the presidency of the First Consul, who favored 
great freedom of opinion, as the proceedings were not publicly 
reported. Besides the preparation of consular decrees and proj- 
ects of law, the Council of State drew up ordinances touching 
public administration, decisions in administrative disputes, and 
official interpretations of statutes. Until 1802 the ministers had 
no seats in the Council, although they could give advice. Even- 
tually it was the only council of ministers, for outside its cham- 
ber Bonaparte dealt with the ministers individually and not as 
a cabinet. It was, therefore, the center of government, as Sieyes 
had intended, but it served the will of the master who appointed 
its members. 

The policy of the Consulate was foreshadowed during the 
Provisional Consulate. Three days after the coup d'etat the 
law of hostages was abrogated, and a little later a war tax of 
twenty-five centimes in the franc was substituted for the obnox- 
ious forced loan, while provision was made for restitution in 
cases where the loan had been paid. It is not surprising that 
the bankers came to the rescue of such a government, which 
sorely needed temporary assistance, for there were only 167,000 
francs in the treasury. That the government might not be com- 
pelled to live continually from hand to mouth, like the Directory, 
the minister of finance, supported by a law which centralized 
responsibility for the preparation of local tax rolls, attacked 
at once the gigantic evil of arrears in the payment of direct 
taxes. 

Towards the emigrants the government took a conciliatory 
attitude, authorizing the return of all exiles who had been pro- 
scribed by legislative act without trial, and ordering the release 
of priests imprisoned in consequence of the ordinances issued 
after the i8th Fructidor. As soon as the adoption of the con- 
stitution was announced, the Council of State, organized imme- 
diately, declared that the laws which deprived relatives of emi- 
grants and ex-nobles of all share in the political and administrative 
life of the country were inconsistent with the terms of the con- 
stitution and hence null and void. This decision opened the 
offices under the Consulate to men whom the radical revolution- 
aries had treated as political suspects. 

In the new constitution certain omissions were significant; 
especially the absence of all reference to the liberty of the press, 
of conscience, and of meeting. There were evidences of haste. 



A BENEFICENT DICTATORSHIP 271 



The judicial system was only sketched and the machinery of ^^j* 

local government barely mentioned. One of the first and most 

important tasks of the consular legislators was, therefore, a 1799-1804 
local government law. They broke with the theories of de- Local 
centralization cherished by the Constituent Assembly and en- ^^^^' 
trusted the administration of the department exclusively to a 
prefect appointed by the First Consul. This was a feature of 
the plan of Sieyes, and grew out of the need everywhere felt 
for order. In a sense the prefect was the successor of the 
intendant, but his task was much simpler, for the Revolution 
had swept away a mass of privileges which prevented the in- 
tendants from achieving the highest success. With the prefect 
sat a council of prefecture, as a tribunal to consider questions 
arising between the administration and the icitizen, and this 
gave the individual a measure of assurance that he would be 
dealt with fairly. The law, disregarding what was implied in 
article 59 of the constitution, abandoned the idea of cantonal 
municipalities and restored the communes, large and small, the 
ex-Constituents in the Council preferring to return in this re- 
spect to the system of 1789. The appointment of mayors by 
the First Consul or by the prefects meant the destruction of 
local independence in administrative matters and at the same 
time deprived the citizens of any vital share in the management 
of their affairs. Paris was divided into twelve districts, each 
with a mayor, but the city was ruled by the prefect of police, 
successor of the lieutenant-general of the police under the old 
regime. This local government law was a triumph of the idea 
of extreme centralization, according to which the will of the 
master should be communicated to the prefects, through them 
to the sub-prefects, and through these to the mayors. It had 
the advantage of curbing arbitrariness in petty officials, while 
the tyranny of the State was distant and felt by comparatively 
few. Pasquier says that the people were glad to see the last 
of the multitude of mediocrities whom the Revolution had in- 
troduced into local administration and who were delighted to 
display their authority. 

The reorganization of colonial government was inspired by The 
similar impulses towards centralization of authority, but with co^o^iies 
less happy results. Several of the most important colonies were 
in possession of the English in 1800, and it was necessary to 
wait until the Peace of Amiens before creating a colonial sys- 
tem. The situation in Santo Domingo, formerly the richest of 
the West India colonies, was not much better. Out of the con- 
fusion of the slave insurrections in the Revolution had emerged 



272 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^^^' a unique figure, Toussaint Louverture, a negro, who had en- 
tered the service of France in 1794 as a brigadier-general, and 

1799-1804 ^j-j^ saved the island from falling completely under control of 
the Spaniards and English. In the year following Spain ceded 
the eastern part of the island to the French, but they could do 
nothing to secure possession until Toussaint overran it and 
entered the capital in January, 1801. Meantime he had begun 
a course of independent action, expelling commissioners sent to 
assert French authority, and making a commercial agreement 
with the United States, in order to preserve a trade necessary 
to Santo Domingo at a time when France and the United States 
were temporarily involved in hostilities, A statesman, as well 
as a soldier, he saw that the prosperity of Santo Domingo could 
only be restored if the planters were persuaded to return and 
if they were assured of a supply of black laborers. This could 
not be accomplished, if the negroes were permitted to acquire 
land and were not obliged to find employment with the planters. 
His supporters, white as well as black, drew up a constitution, 
making him governor for life with the right to name his suc- 
cessor. As he did not intend Santo Domingo to be independent, 
he sent an officer with this constitution to Paris in July, 1801, 
to obtain governmental approval. Such a plan of local autonomy, 
going beyond anything conceded even by the Constituent As- 
sembly, with a negro ruler whose powers exceeded those of the 
First Consul, was utterly abhorrent to Bonaparte, and in 1802 
the organization of a colonial regime was by law left solely to 
the government. The system created by the Council of State 
did not provide for a local legislature, but placed administration 
in the hands of officials who under other names reproduced 
the machinery of colonial government before the Revolution — ■ 
a captain-general, a colonial prefect, and a commissioner of jus- 
tice. As if these reactionary measures were not enough, a 
decree in May, 1802, reestablished slaver)^ and the slave trade. 
Such a policy had to reckon with obstacles more serious than 
the existence of Toussaint Louverture and foredoomed to 
failure the great schemes of colonial restoration which French 
statesmen had not ceased to ponder. 

The successors of Genet had called renewed attention to the 
strategic value of New Orleans in controlling the fate of the 

Louisiana Mississippi Valley. At the peace of 1795 the French negotia- 
tors tried to recover Louisiana, and French statesmen condemned 
the privileges of deposit granted by Spain to the Americans 
that same year. When Talleyrand became minister of foreign 
affairs he schemed to bar the progress of the Americans beyond 



A BENEFICENT DICTATORSHIP 273 

the Alleghanies. The triumph of Bonaparte at Marengo intim- ^3^" 

idated the Spaniards, and they agreed to restore Louisiana on 

the understanding that France should transform Tuscany into 1799-1804 
a Kingdom of Etruria for the Duke of Parma and his wife, the 
Infanta of Spain. Of this secret agreement the American gov- 
ernment had no authentic information until May, 1802, although 
rumors had reached President Jefferson the year previous, and 
had provoked from him these memorable v^ords sent to the 
American minister at Paris : " It completely reverses all the 
political relations of the United States. . . . There is on the 
globe one single spot, the possessor of which is our natural and 
political enemy. It is New Orleans. . . . The day that France 
takes possession of New Orleans fixes the sentence which is to 
restrain her within her low-water mark. . . . From that time 
we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation." 

The stepping-stone to Louisiana was Santo Domingo and 
Bonaparte's reply to Toussaint's appeal for recognition was an Bona- 
expedition of 35,000 men, under General Leclerc, Bonaparte's pi^^laiis 
brother-in-law. The expedition started as soon as the Prelimi- 
naries of London made the sailing of a French fleet possible, and 
early in 1802 crushed opposition in Santo Domingo with apparent 
ease. Trusting to promises of Leclerc, Toussaint surrendered 
in May, and was sent to France to die a prisoner in the fortress 
of Joux on the chilly heights of the Jura. But another enemy 
awaited the French : yellow fever, which by September left only 
4,000 men fit for duty. Leclerc died two months later. This 
prevented an expedition which had been planned for New Or- 
leans, because the troops were needed in Santo Domingo. The 
decree restoring slavery led to a negro revolt, although the 
government intended to preserve slavery only in the Spanish part 
of the island. The consequence of all these disastrous events 
was that before the King of Spain issued orders for the effective 
transfer of Louisiana, Bonaparte was weary of his futile enter- 
prise and sold Louisiana to the United States for $15,000,000. 
Its transfer to France in November, 1803, was therefore merely a 
formality. 

The most serious difficulty which confronted the consular 
administration at the outset was the lack of money. The new consular 
central agency created to supervise the collection of taxes found 
that not only the current lists, but those for the years V, VI, 
and VII, were still to be prepared. Bonaparte sought to teach 
the people that payment of taxes was a public duty in the per- 
formance of which different parts of the country should vie 
with each other, oifering to name a Paris square for the depart- 



Finances 



274 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^3f^- ment which should pay most promptly. The lists or rolls in 



XVII 



arrears were made out, those of the current year completed, i 



1799-1804 ^j^(j those of the next year prepared, so that the work of collec 
tion for the year IX might commence at its beginning in Sep- 
tember, 1800. The budget had been estimated at 800 millions, 
but was cut down to 600, while only 563 were actually expended. 
As the navy could be of no present service, Bonaparte did not 
hesitate to strike 90 millions from its credit. In place of ex- 
travagance and corruption, characteristic of the Directory, there 
were severe economy and rigid inspection. Although the gov- 
ernment was at first compelled to resort to financial expedients 
not unlike the practices of its predecessors, it succeeded better, 
because of the air of order and honesty which pervaded the 
administration. Gaudin believed that the indirect taxes which 
the Revolution had abolished should be restored in part, but 
Bonaparte refused to commence by introducing new taxes, and 
he also refused to countenance a loan, contenting himself with 
what temporary assistance he could get from favored bankers. 
The treasury was embarrassed by a mass of State obligations 
of all sorts, issued in previous years, which might appear in 
tax collections, and some of which enjoyed a privileged claim 
on the coin which was collected. Among the latter were sixty- 
five million francs in " delegations," which authorized the hold- 
ers to levy on the coin obtained by the receivers of taxes. After 
some hesitation, and upon Gaudin's advice, the government sus- 
pended this privilege, with the excuse that the " delegations " 
had often been given in payment for supplies never delivered, 
but finally agreed to recognize such debts after the contractors 
consented to furnish in coin a loan of equivalent amount. Other 
state paper of the directorial period was exchanged for an- 
nuities, but on the basis of a revaluation, while the bons given 
in 1797 for two-thirds of the national debt were converted into 
annuities with a capital value of five per cent, of their nominal 
value, or about twice their current valuation. 

The news of Marengo enhanced the credit of a government 
Restora- Still trembling on the verge of financial ruin, and by the middle 
Credit^ of the summer it was able to announce that holders of annuities 
or pensions should be paid in coin. The announcement was at 
first received with skepticism, and creditors who had so often 
been defrauded wondered if this was the prelude to another 
bankruptcy. All the greater were their surprise and gratitude 
when the promise of the government was kept strictly. So 
successful was the financial policy of the Consulate that the 
budget of the year X (1801-2) showed a slight surplus. The 



A BENEFICENT DICTATORSHIP 275 

only unfavorable symptom was that annuities rose no higher ^^^' 

than 53, and this was due to the precariousness of a situation 

which seemed dependent upon a single life and upon a will ^'^^a-iso* 
uncontrolled by representatives of the nation. 

The payments of annuities were made over the counter of the 
Bank of France, founded by consular decree in January, 1800, 
replacing a prosperous institution known as the Bank of Cur- 
rent Accounts. The new bank was intended to do for France 
what the Bank of England had long accomplished for England. 
The First Consul, members of his family, and other high offi- 
cials subscribed to shares of its stock. Its success was imme- 
diate, and in a short time its shares doubled in value. In 1803 
it received the exclusive privilege of issuing bank notes. As 
the government did not repeat the mistake of subordinating its 
management to the financial necessities of the administration, 
it had a happier fate than the former Bank of Discount. 

The chief obstacle to the pacification of France was the open 
or secret antagonism of the ancient Church. The affections of 
the rural population turned generally towards the priests who 
had repudiated the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, and they The 
looked for guidance to their old bishops, eighty-one of whom Q'^ss'i''^ 
were still living, most of them abroad, particularly in London Religion 
and Germany, under influences hostile to the Republic. Bishops 
and people acknowledged the supremacy of the Pope, who recog- 
nized Louis XVIII as King of France. The majority of the 
dissident priests who had returned did not care to mingle in 
politics, but they could not avoid being affected by such influ- 
ences. To Bonaparte, therefore, it seemed wise, if not abso- 
lutely necessary, to break the connection between the priest- 
hood and an emigrant and hostile episcopate, and to separate the 
interests of the Church from the claims of the Bourbons. 

No sooner was the new government organized than a consular 
decree ordered that only a declaration of submission should be 
demanded of the clergy, and soon afterward another order per- 
mitted the opening of churches on other than the official decadis. 
Fouche attempted to distort Bonaparte's intentions by inter- 
preting the decree to mean that the promise of submission should 
be made by those who had already taken the prescribed oaths. 
Bonaparte corrected this interpretation in his conversations, but 
he did not feel strong enough until after Marengo to ignore the 
anti-Catholic ministers and councilors by whom he was sur- 
rounded. He took immediate advantage of the prestige of vic- 
tory, issuing a decree which made the ceremonies of decadi 
obligatory only for office-holders, and which deprived these cere- 



276 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XVII 



The Non- 
Jurors 



The Con- 
cordat 



monies of their special attraction by allowing civil marriages 
to take place elsewhere.- This resulted in a revival of the 
observance of Sunday and a desertion of the decadi ceremonies. 
A still more important step was the ruling that the laws against 
the emigrants did not apply to the dissident priests — a ruling 
which made their return legal. 

Such measures of pacification did not put an end to the prin- 
cipal difficulties, because the majority of the returned priests 
would not make a declaration of submission, feeling that they 
would thereby condone the confiscation of church property and 
other acts of the Revolution. In dealing with the religious ques- 
tion the policy of the government varied with the region. In 
the West complete liberty was granted in order to prevent fresh 
Vendean outbreaks, but even there the priests preferred not to 
enter the churches and frequently celebrated the offices of re- 
ligion in fields or barns or private houses, being encouraged in 
this attitude by the emigrant bishops. In so doing they mani- 
fested publicly the desire not to be compromised by the favors 
of the Republic. 

The victory of Marengo enabled General Bonaparte to open 
negotiations for a settlement which transformed the French 
Church from a hostile political force into a well-disciplined army, 
willing to support the consular government, and especially the 
First Consul. He broke immediately with Revolutionary tradi- 
tion by attending a Te Deum in the cathedral of Milan and by 
publishing in one of his bulletins the fact of his splendid recep- 
tion by the clergy. He sent word to Pius VII that the situa- 
tion required a new episcopate, appointed by the First Consul 
and receiving its bulls of institution from the Pope. He was 
willing that the Church should be dominant, if it was loyal to 
his government. . But the Pope and the Roman clergy hoped 
that a turn in the tide of victory might enable them to negotiate 
to better advantage, and so the aflfair dragged on through the 
winter, until peace with Austria and Naples left papal territory 
at the discretion of the French. A few months later, on July 
15, 1801, the papal consent was given by Cardinal Consalvi to 
a Convention, or Concordat. 

The Pope and his advisers were unwilling to concede the 
resignation of the bishops who had remained faithful to the 

2 By a law of the 13th Fructidor, year VI, local officials, as well as 
representatives of the central government, must attend these ceremonies 
in costume. Laws and public acts of the preceding ten days should be 
read, along with a bulletin giving information of events or heroic deeds. 
Civil (that is, legal) marriages must take place on such occasions. 



A BENEFICENT DICTATORSHIP 277 

Church unless the Roman Catholic religion was declared the ct-av. 

religion of France, dominant therefore in a sense which Bona- 

parte did not intend, and unless the Church should receive 1799-1804 
again its property, at least that which remained unsold. Such 
concessions were politically impossible, even if Bonaparte had 
wished to make them, and the papal negotiators were obliged 
to yield. They also permitted the insertion in one of the articles 
of an agreement that the Catholic worship should " conform to 
the police regulations which the government should deem neces- 
sary for public tranquillity," enabling Bonaparte under cover 
of this vague phraseology to mature the details of a scheme 
for the further subjection of the clergy. The Pope undertook, 
in case any of the non-juring bishops refused to resign, to de- 
prive them of jurisdiction, and consented, in return for a salary 
list for the clergy, and for the sake of peace, to abandon the 
claim to the confiscated lands, accepting the use of cathedrals 
and other church buildings needed for worship. A new dis- 
tribution of bishoprics should be made, and the incumbents were 
to be named by the First Consul and instituted by the Pope. 
The parish priests were appointed by the bishops with the 
approval of the government in every case. Cathedral chapters 
were restored, and seminaries organized, but nothing was said 
about monastic orders. It was agreed that public prayers should 
be recited for the Republic and the consuls, and that the clergy 
should take the oaths customary under the old regime. 

Although the Concordat was signed in July, it was not pro- 
claimed until April, 1802. This was due to difficulties on both Reorgani- 
sides. After repeated efforts the Pope obtained the resignation ^^*^^°^ 
of only forty-five of the dissident bishops. A group residing in church 
London, foUov/ed by others in Germany, refused, encouraged 
in this attitude by the pretender, Louis XVIII, but they were 
forbidden by the Pope to exercise any jurisdiction within their 
ancient dioceses. All the constitutional bishops, with one or two 
exceptions, handed their resignations to the government. Bona- 
parte, to make the treaty palatable to French public opinion, 
drew up in the Council of State the " police regulations " under 
the name " Organic Articles," embodying an interpretation of 
the treaty repugnant to its terms and more in harmony with 
militant Gallicanism. He also planned to proclaim on the day 
the Concordat was promulgated Organic Articles of the Prot- 
estant Religions, in order to show that the Concordat would 
not interfere with liberty of worship. When he first read the 
text of the Concordat to his Council, it was received in silence. 
He anticipated opposition in the Tribunate and in the Legislative 



278 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 

XVII 



Chateau- 
briand 



Lycees 



Corps, but it was disorganized by the Senate's shrewd assumption 
of the right to designate the individuals whose two years' term 
of service was just expiring, using the right to include in the 
list every prominent person who had appeared lukewarm towards 
the consular policy. After a summary discussion the Concordat 
was accepted and the two sets of Organic Articles adopted. 

A new difficulty arose in the refusal of the papal representa- 
tive to institute any of the ex-constitutional clergy who should 
not confess penitence for the sin of schism, but the obstacle was 
overcome through a well-conceived series of misunderstandings.^ 
Of the sixty bishops and archbishops nearly five-sixths came 
from the dissident clergy. The most of the constitutional clergy 
were received again into the Church and became parish priests. 
At the Te Deum celebrating the return of peace in 1802 the re- 
constituted Church appeared with all its ancient ceremonial. The 
official world expressed its dissatisfaction in bitter sarcasms, but 
the mass of the French people rejoiced that the decade of strife 
was over. The Church officially hailed the First Consul as a 
new Constantine, a restorer of religion. 

The religious history of France since 1795 illustrated the 
futility of the efforts of the Jacobin rulers during the Reign 
of Terror to destroy what they were pleased to call fanaticism. 
The most that they had accomplished was to cure the middle 
class and the nobility of Voltairianism. The new attitude of 
thoughtful France was eloquently set forth in the year of the 
Concordat by Chateaubriand, a returned emigrant, in his Genius 
of Christianity. Chateaubriand sought to prove that Christian- 
ity, far from being the enemy of literature, art, and liberty, was 
the most " poetic, the most human, the most favorable to lib- 
erty, to the arts, and to letters, of all the religions that have 
ever existed." The book was the sensation of th>2 day. Not 
only was its religious influence profound, but its appearance 
marked a new tendency in literature, which culminated a few 
years later in the Romantic movement. 

In 1802 also a beginning was made of the reorganization of 
the system of public instruction. The Central Schools decreed 
by the Convention gave way to Lycees, which were government 
boarding schools, with rigid discipline, and with a course of 
study which embodied more of the older classical training and 
gave less attention to natural science. Several thousand scholar- 
ships were provided, part of which were reserved for the sons 

3 The Abbe Bernier, made bishop and afterwards cardinal, declared that 
the ex-constitutionals had retracted in his presence. His statement was 
accepted, although the individuals in question denied having done so. 



A BENEFICENT DICTATORSHIP 279 

of civil or military officers. The creation of primary schools ^^j" 

was left to the care of the communes. Nothing was done until 

after the Consulate to reorganize the universities. The surviv- 1799-I804 
ing members of the ancient French Academy hoped that it 
would now be reestablished in its former position and privileges, 
but the most that Bonaparte and his advisers would concede 
was the reorganization of the Institute, in which the second of 
the four classes was devoted to the " French Language and 
Literature " and contained forty members, the number fixed for 
the membership of the old academy. The survivors of the three 
academies were then given seats in the Institute. 

In the year of the Concordat still another wound of the Revo- 
lution received healing treatment. This was the affair of the Return of 
emigrants. Bonaparte first attempted to deal with cases in- g^^t™^" 
dividually by a commission in the ministry of justice, but when 
he returned from Marengo he found that the commission had 
become a center of intrigue and corruption, so great were the 
temptations offered by the intense desire of emigrants or their 
friends to obtain favorable decisions. Fouche believed that the 
best method was to reduce the list arbitrarily by removing from 
it whole classes of names belonging to persons who had been 
driven from the country by fear, and who were not emigrants 
in any true sense, much less enemies. It was obviously impos- 
sible to consider each case separately for they numbered more 
than 100,000. The first concession to Fouche's system was a 
consular decree of September, 1800, which struck about 50,000 
from the list, including names of relatives of emigrants, of their 
servants, and of others, which had been inserted in order to 
facilitate seizure of property. A final settlement of the ques- 
tion was made by senatus consulted in April, 1802, in accord- 
ance with which all emigrants, except about 1,000 militant roy- 
alists, received the legal right to return, provided they availed 
themselves of the privilege within five months. If their estates 
had not been sold, they were restored. 

Beside the old nobility of birth Bonaparte sought to place a 
new aristocracy of achievement. In May, 1802, he created a Legion 
Legion of Honor, and became like the ancient kings a dispenser °* ^°^°^ 
of rewards and distinctions. According to the original plan the 
Legion was to number about 6,000 members, chosen by a coun- 
cil over which the First Consul should preside. The grounds 
of choice were distinguished services, civil as well as military. 
Bonaparte had been accustomed to reward his soldiers with 

*A decision of the Senate in interpretation of the constitution.. 



28o THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

CHAP. " arms of honor," and the plan of the Legion embodied the 
same idea in a more developed form. At first the scheme was 

1799-1804 regarded as un-republican and was opposed more vigorously 
than most of Bonaparte's projects. Perhaps the size of the 
hostile vote in the legislative bodies measures the real opposi- 
tion to the ambitious plans to secure greater personal power 
which he was pushing forward at the same time. The project 
passed the Council of State by a vote of 14 to 10; the Tribunate 
by 56 to 38, and the Legislative Corps by 166 to no. 

The Consulate not only reestablished the national credit, it 
opened an era of industrial progress and prosperity. In 1800 

Industry French industries had not recovered the position they occupied 
before the Revolution. Another decade was to elapse before 
the statistics were decidedly favorable to the new rather than 
to the old regime. Chaptal, the minister of the interior, was a 
distinguished chemist, and what was more, an administrator with 
a broad interest in every branch of industrial development. With 
Berthollet, Monge, and some others, he founded in 1801 a So- 
ciety for the Encouragement of National Industry. He recog- 
nized the enormous advantage which mechanical inventions had 
given to the English and concluded that success in competition 
with them could be obtained only by introducing similar ma- 
chinery.^ He invited to Paris Douglas, an expert English con- 
structer, assigned to him a large building on an island in the 
Seine, lent him money, and promised an annual subsidy. The 
experiment was a success, for within a year fifty complete equip- 
ments were introduced. It was at this time also that the flying 
shuttle was first used by French weavers. The printing of mus- 
lins by means of engraved copper cylinders was begun. A dis- 
tinctly French contribution was the improvement by Jacquart 
of the machinery for the production of silks. The progress in 
^the application of the new machinery to manufacturing was, 
however, slow. Natural conservatism is the partial explanation 
of this. Another reason was the failure to introduce the steam 
engine, although it had been in successful use in English mills 
for more than ten years. Not until 1810 was a French spinning 
mill equipped with a steam engine. 

It is an interesting fact that Robert Fulton's first success in 
propelling a boat by means of steam was gained at Paris in 
April, 1803. His boat moved up the river at the rate of six 
kilometers an hour. Bonaparte and his advisers were appar- 
ently not impressed by the importance of the invention, although 

5 Mes Souvenirs sur Napoleon, 99. 



A BENEFICENT DICTATORSHIP 281 

at a later time when he was planning a descent upon the Eng- *^^t" 

lish coast he asked for a report from the Institute upon it. In 

his letter he declared that such an invention might " change the 1799-1804 
face of the world." But nothing came of this spasmodic inter- 
est. 

The progress of manufacture by machinery was also depend- 
ent, as it had been in England, upon the development of the 
iron industry. In this the French were nearly half a century 
behind the English. Only tentative beginnings were made of the 
use of mined coal in smelting iron, and it was not until'iSio 
that the process of puddling was used at the Creusot works. 

In order to stimulate public interest in the efforts made by 
French manufacturers, Chaptal organized an exposition late in 
the summer of 1801. It was so successful that another was 
organized in 1802, and the number of exhibiters was increased 
from 220 to 540. The First Consul took a keen interest in the 
display and examined with minute attention the goods which 
were on exhibition. What he saw increased his determination '^ 
to apply a rigorously protectionist policy and enforce the Revo- 
lutionary laws against the importation of British products. One 
of the greatest benefits conferred by the new regime upon manu- 
facturing and trade was internal peace and the improvement of 
the roads, which in many places had become almost impassable. 

Some of the French manufacturers and tradesmen would have 
been glad to see the ancient guild system reestablished, but the 
First Consul permitted this only in the meat and bread trades, 
where regulation by the State seemed necessary to the public 
health. The legislation against strikes or even unions of em- 
ployees or employers was strengthened. The law also sought 
to secure on the part of workmen the fulfilment of their agree- 
ments by requiring them to present to a new employer a livret 
signed by the former employer showing that the previous con- 
tract had been completed. In spite of this legislation Bonaparte 
was popular among the Paris workmen. Employment was steady 
and wages were good, and the workmen were weary of being 
used as pawns in the political game. They were intensely 
French in their sympathies and were proud of the national pol- 
icy that the First Consul seemed to pursue. Their desire for 
peace was far less earnest than that of the middle class. 

Every legislature of the Revolution had planned to embody 
in a code the new principles of law which had been established, civii 
adjusting them to whatever of the old still remained. Imme- ^°*® 
diately after the overthrow of the Directory a committee had 
undertaken to prepare such a code, but its work was inferior 



282 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

CHAP, and was not considered. The first serious step, in August, 1800, 

was the appointment of a committee of four eminent lawyers, 

1799-1804 ^i^Q ^gj-g expected to have a project ready in three months. 
This draft was printed in January, 1801, sent to the law courts 
for criticism, revised in the legislative section of the Council 
of State, and finally discussed in full council under the presi- 
dency of Bonaparte. Of eighty-seven general sessions he pre- 
sided at thirty-five, and although his knowledge of law was lim- 
ited to what he had picked up in desultory reading and in 
conversations with Portalis, Tronchet, and other councilors, he 
contributed not a little to the success of the discussions by rea- 
son of his capacity to go straight to the heart of a question. 
Thibaudeau, one of the ablest of his councilors, says that " he 
spoke without any preparation, embarrassment, or aflfectation; 
using the freedom of an ordinary conversation. ... He was 
never inferior in tone or knowledge of the subject to any mem- 
ber of the Council ; he usually equalled the most experienced of 
them in the facility with which he got at the root of a question, 
in the justice of his ideas, and in the force of his arguments. 
He often surpassed them all by the turn of his sentences and 
the originality of his expressions." ® 

The civil code was not completed during the first period of 
the Consulate, because its first " titles " were rejected by the 
Tribunate and the Legislative Corps. In April, 1802, Bonaparte 
put an end to the general discussion of successive titles in the 
Tribunate, ordering them submitted to the legislative section, 
which should send its criticisms to the Council. They were then 
presented to the Legislative Corps without further action of the 
Tribunate, being explained by councilors chosen for this pur- 
pose. It was, however, two years before the project was car- 
ried to completion. 

The civil code, like most other achievements of the Consulate, 
Changes was a work of reconciliation and compromise, although it em- 
m French bodied somc ideas decidedly reactionary. The legislation of the 
Revolution had seriously menaced the stability of the family, 
which the code sought to strengthen by depriving natural chil- 
dren of the favors conferred by the Convention, surrounding 
even adoption with restrictions, and by enhancing paternal au- 
thority. The father could now dispose freely by will of from 
one-fourth to one-half of his property. He was given the right 
of disciplinary arrest, a revival of the practice of issuing lettres 
de cachet to protect family honor or to compel obedience. In 

6 Bonaparte and the Consulate, 168, 



A BENEFICENT DICTATORSHIP 283 

such cases he had only to apply to the district judge for the *^i" 

order, which must be made without inquiry. The position of 

woman was weakened. She had no share in the family prop- 1799-1804 
erty and must obey as a child. Divorce was preserved, but 
mutual consent was necessary unless grave specific reasons of- 
fered ground for an action in court. For the sake of Catholic 
consciences, judicial separation was reestablished. The code was 
not free from defects, due in some instances to haste and to 
lack of exact knowledge, but Bonaparte justly regarded it as 
one of the great achievements of his government. At a later 
period of his career, when French influence was dominant in 
Western Europe, it was an effective instrument for the spread 
of the principles of the Revolution applied to civil order. 

Neither the program nor the ambitions of the First Consul 
were subjected to control by the press. As the Parisian jour- The 
nals during the Provisional Consulate had shown tendencies 
towards frank independent criticism, no sooner was the Con- 
sulate organized than the Moniteur, the principal newspaper, was 
bridled by making it the official journal, and all others except 
thirteen designated by name were suppressed on the ground that 
they served the interests of the enemy rather than those of 
France. Bonaparte regarded a journal and its subscribers as 
forming a species of club, and, as clubs were not tolerated, he 
saw no reason for preserving journals. Among those permitted 
to exist were, however, one or two belonging to the opposition. 
All were warned in vague terms, recalling the worst legislation 
of the Jacobins, against printing articles contrary to the sov- 
ereignty of the people or the glory of the armies, or which might 
disturb public opinion and trouble commerce, and were ordered 
more specifically to publish no military news or references to 
religion. Outside of Paris it became the policy to have a single 
newspaper in each department, carefully supervised by the pre- 
fect. Bonaparte wished the newspapers to preserve an air of 
liberty, but he rigorously repressed any tendencies towards in- 
dependence. By 1803 only eight newspapers, besides the Moni- 
teur, were published in Paris, and their subscription list con- 
tained 18,680 names. 

The general feeling of gratitude, created by the achievements 
of the Consulate, and especially by the successful negotiation ^j'^JJ^^'® 
of the Treaty of Amiens, was skilfully utilized by Bonaparte and 
his supporters to make his power virtually monarchical. Many 
professed to see in the permanence of his control the only effective 
barrier agai:ist the return of the anarchy of the Directory. His 
admirers were so ardent that their schemes often outran his most 



284 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XVII 



Changes 
in the 
Constitu- 
tion 



venturesome resolutions and gave to these an air of moderation. 
On May 6, the day the Peace of Amiens was formally an- 
nounced, the Tribunate, prompted by the second consul, Cam- 
baceres, spoke in favor of according to General Bonaparte a 
" signal pledge of national gratitude." Individual members of 
the Senate were asked to give this the form of an election as 
Consul for Life. The proposal was brought up at a session 
of the Senate, but the majority tried to head off the demand by 
voting to reelect Bonaparte for a second term, prolonging his 
tenure of office until 1819. In a letter to the Senate he pre- 
tended that he could not consider the burdens of a second term 
(whose beginnings were still seven years distant) unless the 
people should impose such a sacrifice. 

When the terms of a referendum or plebiscite were discussed 
by the Council of State, his partisans argued that it would not 
be right to restrict the question to the confirmation or rejection 
of the Senate's vote, and that the people should have an oppor- 
tunity to decide the larger question. Under guise of offering 
such an opportunity the Council decided that the voters should 
be asked to vote " Yes " or " No " on the question, " Shall Na- 
poleon Bonaparte become Consul for Life ? " The question was 
embodied in a consular decree and the votes were recorded on 
open registers. There was some talk that the Senate would 
intervene, but timidity soon got the better of the impulse to 
safeguard the republican constitution. The plebiscite was an 
immense success for the Bonapartists — if the group which en- 
gineered the enterprise may be so named — for, out of 3,577,259 
persons voting, only 8,374 voted " No." Among these was 
Lafayette, who owed his return from prison and exile to Bona- 
parte, but who wrote the First Consul that he would vote for 
the Consulship for Life when the First Consul should add to 
the benefits of his " reparatory " dictatorship the greater benefit 
of the reestablishment of political liberty. 

Bonaparte took advantage of the overwhelming vote in his 
favor to revise the constitution in such a way as to leave no 
effective obstacle to the realization of his will. He inserted a 
right to designate his successor, although he had stricken this 
out of the question submitted to the voters. He secured con- 
trol of the Senate through the privilege of naming for each of 
the fourteen vacancies still remaining two candidates, of whom 
the Senate should choose one, and the further privilege of ap- 
pointing forty other senators. The possibility of o])position in 
the Council was lessened by the creation of a Pri/y Council, 
whose personnel should be chosen for each session by Bonaparte 



A BENEFICENT DICTATORSHIP 285 

from the ministers and councilors. Treaties were to be referred ^^J' 

to this body for confirmation, instead of being subject to the 

chances of ordinary legislative measures as before. The new 1799-1804 
council also received the right to lay before the Senate projects 
for the interpretation of the constitution and the regulation of 
matters not provided for in its text. Such projects, if accepted 
by the Senate, were promulgated as senatus consultes and en- 
joyed the same authority as other parts of the constitution. 

In the new constitutional arrangements an attempt was made 
.to conciliate or hoodwink public opinion by adding to the duties 
of the voter. A hierarchy of electoral assemblies was organ- 
ized, beginning with primary assemblies made up of all voters 
in each canton. But the electoral assemblies received only 
rights of nomination, the appointing power resting as before with 
the First Consul. Indeed, his power of appointment was in- 
creased, for he named even the justices of the peace, who had 
been elected up to this time. Moreover, the original electoral 
assemblies were chosen by the notables on the communal list and 
held their positions for life, with the consequence that the primary 
assemblies organized two years later could only fill vacancies, 
and not even these until two-thirds of the places were vacant. 

The change in the constitution was accompanied by a return 
to monarchical manners, requiring an expenditure correspond- 
ingly royal. The civil list of the First Consul was increased 
from 500,000 francs to 6,000,000. Henceforward the Republia 
existed only in name. The Empire was not far off. 



CHAPTER XVIII 



BEGINNINGS OF REVOLUTION IN GERMANY 



CHAP. 

xvm 



Attitude 
toward the 
Eevolu- 



A New 

Periclean 

Age 



AFTER the signature of the Treaty of Luneville a revolution 
in German affairs was inevitable. The only question was, 
How far would it go? Would it mean simply the shifting of 
a few boundary lines, a slight modification of the constitution of 
the empire, or would it lead to changes which in the end would 
bring into being a new Germany, capable of assuming a greater 
role? The answer to these questions is to be found in the 
tendencies of German life and thought in the decade which fol- 
lowed the Peace of Basel quite as much as in any conclusions 
reached by the diplomats to whom the problems presented by 
the Treaty of Luneville were referred. 

In outward appearance the Germany of 1801 was altogether 
similar to the Germany of 1763. The old regime had been mod- 
ified in no essential particular. Some changes had been made, 
but they were not profound enough to affect the general situa- 
tion. Were it not for the reforms which were to follow, these 
changes might be regarded as belated efforts of " Enlightened 
Despotism " rather than as precursors of a reorganization far 
more radical. The moral influence of the French Revolution in 
Germany had not been great or lasting. Public opinion was 
confused by the spectacle of Jacobin violence, and early enthusi- 
asms were chilled by the miseries of a war which involved nearly 
all Western Europe. The philosopher Kant, it is true, still re- 
tained his conviction that the Revolution was essentially sound 
and declared that the acts of the Jacobins were no worse than 
the misdeeds of many tyrannical rulers. The direct influence 
of the movement did not, however, penetrate far beyond the 
Rhine, and even in that region the conduct of French generals 
and civil commissioners did not serve the cause of the propa- 
ganda. 

The principal reason why Revolutionary ideas found so lit- 
tle lodgment in German minds was that Germany had won her 
intellectual and moral independence. She had ceased to look to 
France for leadership in literature or in philosophy. By 1795 
it was Kant's teaching that controlled the reflections of the most 
thoughtful minds. The achievements of Goethe and Schiller 

286 



BEGINNINGS OF REVOLUTION IN GERMANY 287 

were fast giving Germany the right to claim for her literature xvm 

a place beside the literatures of France and England. The 

period from 1794 to 1805 was a new Periclean Age, with Weimar I'^^^-isoa 
as the modern Athens. Of the older poets Wieland was still 
there. Goethe had been there for twenty years and Schiller 
for nearly ten. Herder was also there until his death in 1803. The 
intimate association of Goethe and Schiller began in 1794, three 
years after Goethe had been made director of the court theater. 
In rapid succession came Schiller's greatest plays — Wallenstein, 
Maria Stuart, Die Jungfrau von Orleans, and Wilhelm Tell, the 
last the year before Schiller died. In 1796 Goethe had published 
Wilhelm Meister's Lehrjahre and the next year Hermann und 
Dorothea. He did not complete the second version of Faust 
until three years after Schiller's death. 

It is not without significance that at a time when Germany 
was about to sink to the depths of humiliation politically the 
German language reached its full maturity as an instrument for 
the expression of lofty ideals and the interpretation of experi- 
ence. This meant that the disunion of the German people was 
only apparent and temporary. The power for a moral renaissance 
and a political reconstruction was simply waiting to be roused. 
Schiller and Goethe, and Lessing and Herder, who preceded 
them, were " the true representatives of public life," " the true 
upholders of national honor," and the creators of the soul which 
in the nineteenth century " at last wrought for itself a body." ^ 

The German poets and philosophers of this period have been 
accused of being too much concerned with the problems of the Tenden- 
individual and indifferent to dangers which threatened their German 
land with political enslavement. It is true that for a long time Literature 
they had seemed to be content with a social order which left 
them at leisure to cultivate poetry and the arts or to study sci- 
entific problems, dwelling serene on the far slopes of thought 
or feeling, while below plodded peasant and townsman, the one 
with the task of furnishing recruits to the army and servants 
to the nobles, the other with the duty of enriching the State 
by industry and trade. This is not a surprising attitude con- 
sidering the rigid political framework of German society under 
the old regime. The most thoughtful minds, hedged in on every 
side by barriers upon which neither caustic satire nor vigorous 
criticism made much impression, were naturally thrown back 
upon questions of individual experience. Some great impact 
from without was apparently needed to wreck and discredit the 

1 Francke, History of German Literature, 397, 398. 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XVIII 



Romantic 
Movement 



old system before a broader and more healthful public spirit 
could find room to live and breathe. To furnish that impact 
was Napoleon's function. Meanwhile, however, there were Ger- 
man thinkers who were disgusted with their isolation from pub- 
lic life and the concerns of the common people. In the Mono- 
logues which Schleiermacher published in 1800 he asked, " Where 
is the devotion which would rather sacrifice the narrow conscious- 
ness of personality . , , which would rather risk the individual 
life than that the fatherland should perish ? " And he added, 
" So far removed is this age from even the dimmest conception 
of what the highest form of human life means, that they think 
that State the best which is felt the least. . . ." ^ 

That tendency in German literature which has been described 
as the Romantic Movement was also beginning to make itself 
felt in the first years of the new century. One of its conse- 
quences was to interest Germans in their early folk songs and 
tales and in their earlier history. In 1805 two writers of this 
Romantic School published a collection of folk songs called Des 
Knaben Wunderhorn, the predecessor of the more famous Kin- 
der- und Hausmdrchen published by the brothers Grimm seven 
years later. As has been remarked : " Naturally the common 
folk who had created all this began to appear in a new light. 
The plain man had suddenly become as the hero of a long- 
neglected romance." ^ A new German patriotism was nourished 
by such poems and tales, since the people gained a stronger feel- 
ing for their land and its associations. 

As the leaders of the Romantic School turned to the Middle 
Ages for their inspiration, their writings quickened the interest 
in the history of medieval Germany. Herder's teaching that the 
literature of a people at any epoch is an expression of the 
national development exercised an influence in the same direc- 
tion. The idea which the Romanticists had formed of medieval 
life was often sentimental and fanciful, but it was corrected 
with the progress of historical studies. The main thing at the 
time was the creation of a genuine interest. Already in F. A. 
Wolf's discussion of the Homeric question an excellent example 
had been presented of the application of the historical method 
to a literary problem. Young German scholars were being 
trained in the Greek seminaries of Beck and Hermann at Leip- 
zig to use the same exact method. It was only a question of a 
few years before some of these students would apply it in inves- 
tigations of the earlier history of Germany. 

2 Francke, 431. 

3 Thomas, German Literature, 341. 



BEGINNINGS OF REVOLUTION IN GERMANY 289 

The old regime was undermined in another direction by the xvm 

spread of sound ideas upon economic conditions. A new trans- 

lation of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, published in 1794, 1795-I803 
exercised a wide influence. Its doctrines were championed es- Reformers 
pecially by Professor Kraus, a colleague of Kant at Konigsberg, 
who had turned from philosophy to economics. In 1796 he 
declared that " since the time of the New Testament no work 
has had more beneficial effects than this will have if it should 
be more . , . deeply impressed upon the minds of all who have 
to do with public affairs." * Kraus made it his business to 
" possess some excellent heads with it," a very important achieve- 
ment indeed because these very men were to have a share in the 
reorganization of Prussia a few years later. 

The men who were soon to lead in the revival of German 
public spirit and to undertake definite tasks of reform were 
already in the service of various German States, particularly of 
Prussia. The most notable example was Baron vom Stein, an 
imperial knight, who had been a Prussian official since the 
closing years of Frederick's reign. From 1796 to 1804 he was 
provincial governor of Westphalia. Hardenberg, who had ne- stein 
gotiated the Treaty of Basel, and who was also to have an 
important share in the regeneration of Prussia, was originally 
from Hanover. Scharnhorst, to whom the army of the Wars 
of Liberation was to owe its organization, was another Han- 
overian, and he did not become a Prussian officer until 1801. 
Schon, one of the authors of the Emancipation Edict of 1807, 
had begun his administrative career in 1793. His father had 
been a friend of Kant and he had been influenced by Kraus at 
the University of Konigsberg. This official class, recruited often 
from young men of ideas and capacity, was an important center 
of public opinion, partly making up for the lack of an organ- 
ized " third estate." 

Moreover, serious attempts to remove the obstacles to a 
healthier social and industrial life were made. If they did not 
save Germany from disaster, it was that they were belated, were 
not radical enough, were not wide enough in scope, and did not 
always receive the hearty support of the administration. Dur- neform in 
ing the reign of Frederick William II, Prussia suffered from a ^^^^^^^ 
natural reaction against the severe system of Frederick the 
Great as well as from the blighting influence of royal favorites 
and mistresses. Frederick William III, who became King in 
1797, was a prince of attractive private virtues, but timid and 

* Seeley, Life and Times of Stein, L 409. 



290 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XVIU 



hesitant, to whom men of greater energy of character and orig- 
inality of mind were uncongenial. From the beginning, how- 
ever, he showed an anxious desire to improve the condition of 
the peasantry, regarding the French Revolution as a warning to 
unjust princes. His apparent zeal aroused enthusiasm in Berlin, 
and men looked for a revolution from above which in beneficent 
results should put to shame the Jacobin upheaval. One of the 
most serious obstacles to reform was the burden of Polish ter- 
ritory, the spoil of the second and third partitions of Poland, 
since the German element in the Hohenzollern States was not 
strong enough to render easy the assimilation of so large a 
Slavic population. The seizure of these lands had also opened 
opportunities for the enrichment of officials, bringing scandal 
and disorganization into the Prussian service. Fortunately a 
Napoleonic amputation soon relieved the Prussian State of the 
incubus. 

The peasant reforms attempted by Frederick William III were 
the logical continuation of efforts begun in the reigns of Fred- 
erick William I and Frederick the Great. The condition of 
the peasants was, on the whole, pitiful, although the burdens 
differed in different provinces. Even in some western provinces, 
where more rapid progress might have been looked for, the peas- 
ants were still serfs, subject to dues like the heriot, which per- 
mitted the lord at the peasant's death to take half his personal 
property. The law was more severe than the practice, but the 
nobles were loath to abandon any of their rights without a com- 
pensation which government officials thought excessive. In the 
last year of the reign of Frederick William II a reform had 
been begun in Westphalia, transforming labor dues into money 
payments on the lands of the royal domain and encouraging the 
peasants to become proprietors of their farms. Frederick Wil- 
liam III pursued this policy in other parts of the domain, not 
everywhere with the same success. In Silesia the redemption 
of obligatory services went on slowly, while in Prussia proper 
little progress was made in the creation of peasant properties. 
The peasants were more eager to be rid of the burdens of com- 
pulsory labor than to acquire proprietorship, since with pro- 
prietorship would cease the assistance which the State as ulti- 
mate owner was wont to grant in times of war, famine, and 
pestilence. The King's advisers were anxious to avoid the dan- 
ger that the freedom of the peasants would result in their aban- 
doning the soil. In Pomerania and the central Marks the crea- 
tion of peasant properties was more successful. The conviction 



BEGINNINGS OF REVOLUTION IN GERMANY 291 

that a thoroughgoing reform was needed was not strong enough ^^j{ 
to enable the King to impose similar plans upon the nobles. 

This period saw also the beginnings of administrative reform 1795-1803 
in Prussia. Stein was one of the leaders in the movement. The 
early sphere of his activity was in Westphalia, where the excise 
system of the eastern provinces, with its rigid distinction between 
town and open country, had never been fully introduced. His 
most useful work was the readjustment of the tax system in 
order to harmonize the interests of peasants and townsmen. 
Among other things, the tariff was rearranged, freeing raw ma- 
terial, and taxing merchants who dealt in foreign manufactured 
articles. In the county of Mark he abolished internal customs 
barriers, collecting the tariff at the frontiers, a first step toward 
the complete reorganization of the Prussian customs system 
which was made long afterwards in 1818. Such changes were 
excellent, but slight in amount compared with the need. The 
forces of conservatism and privilege were still too strong. It 
was the rude hand of the spoiler, rather than the projects of 
enlightened reformers, which pushed Germany on toward funda- 
mental changes. 

The reform movement was not limited to Prussia, In south- 
ern Germany its most significant incidents occurred in Bavaria. Bavaria 
The Elector's principal minister, the Count de Montgelas, an 
illuminist of Savoyard extraction, was inclined to reforms of 
the type attempted by Joseph II, and was especially eager to 
attack the supremacy of the Church, which had held undisputed 
sway in Bavaria since the days of the Catholic Reformation. 
The clerical order numbered, one for every 166 inhabitants, and 
half of the number were monks or nuns. In a series of edicts 
from 1800 to 1803, the Bavarian Protestants were granted tolera- 
tion and the right to acquire landed property. The protests of 
the aristocracy were met with the reminder that the example of 
Prussia and Hanover proved that prosperity was not dependent 
upon unity of faith. Two years later followed an attack on the 
monastic orders; some were dissolved, others consolidated in 
fewer cloisters, none were permitted to receive novices. The 
aim was mainly fiscal, but much of the property was dissipated 
because the work was entrusted to unskilful or dishonest hands. 

Germany had long been the principal battle-ground of Europe 
and had been frequently sacrificed at treaties of peace. This 
hard fate was the consequence of political disintegration. There Holy 
was a " Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation," and yet ^^"^ 
Germany had ceased to be much more than a geographical ex- 



292 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 

xvm 



1795-1803 



Peace of 
Luneville 



pression. The Empire was composed of more than three hun- 
dred and fifty States, ranging in size from the electorate of 
Brandenburg, ruled by the Prussian king, and the Austrian 
duchies, possessed by the Hapsburgs, to lordships or counties 
a few miles square. A day's journey " might take a traveler 
through the territories of a free city, a sovereign abbot, a vil- 
lage belonging to an imperial knight, and the dominions of a 
landgrave, a duke, a prince, and a king, so small, so numerous, 
and so diverse were the principalities." ^ If the imperial baronies, 
situated in Swabia, Franconia, and the Rhine country, be counted 
the number of German sovereign States was over twelve hun- 
dred. These States recognized no master except the distant Em- 
peror, who had succeeded in preserving only a shadow of his 
former prerogatives. Their only means of common action was 
the imperial diet, at which many of them no longer took the 
trouble to be represented. It was nominally made up of a college 
of electors, a college of princes, and a college of free cities. If 
these colleges reached a common conclusion, this must receive 
the approval of the Emperor. The rivalries of Prussia and 
Austria, which had been especially keen since the accession of 
Frederick II in 1740, had still further weakened the crumbling 
structure of imperial government. They exposed Germany to 
exactly that kind of meddling on the part of outside powers 
which followed the Treaty of Luneville. 

The Emperor Francis had agreed in the treaty that the princes 
dispossessed by the cession of the left bank of the Rhine should 
be indemnified according to the plan adopted tentatively at the 
Congress of Rastadt. The situation offered France an opportu- 
nity to intervene in regulating the indemnities and to work for the 
organization of a group of minor States dependent upon her. 
This danger could be lessened only by hastening a settlement of 
the question before the French should have their hands freed 
by peace with England. The imperial diet ratified the Treaty 
of Luneville promptly, but there unanimity ceased and conflict- 
ing interests made themselves felt. 

The German ecclesiastical princes — archbishops, bishops, and 
abbots — menaced by the plan of seizing their territories in order 
to furnish compensation for the dispossessed, argued that the 
losses should be distributed among all classes of States. They 
hoped for the support of the Emperor, because they had been 
the bulwark of Hapsburg power. His inclination was to insist 
that only enoug-h ecclesiastical territory should be secularized 

5 Bryce, Holy Roman Empire, 2n(i ed., 405, n. 



BEGINNINGS OF REVOLUTION IN GERMANY 293 

to meet actual losses. He was also in favor of preserving the ^^^J.- 

electorates of Mainz, Treves, and Cologne, endowing them with 

territory belonging to minor ecclesiastical rulers. 1795-1803 

The policy of the Austrians, however, went beyond the project 
of indemnities for losses incurred by the cession to France of 
a part of the Empire. In the first place they sought compensa- 
tion for the Hapsburg grand duke who had been deprived of 
Tuscany. They also were intent upon reviving earlier schemes 
of aggrandizement. They wished particularly to push their Kivai 
frontiers westward at the expense of Bavaria, and suggested schemes 
that the Elector take in exchange enough baronies, cities, and 
other petty States along the upper Danube and the Neckar. 
Such schemes, emanating from their historic enemy, were un- 
palatable to the Bavarians, and hinted, moreover, that other 
classes of weak States besides ecclesiastical principalities were 
threatened with ruin. A chief element in the Austrian policy 
was the desire to prevent the enlargement of Prussia. 

The Hohenzollerns abandoned their attitude as guardians of 
Germany more completely than the Hapsburgs, and they were 
so intent upon gaining the utmost which the occasion afforded 
that they appeared mainly as beneficiaries of French partiality. 
Bonaparte, like his predecessors in the Committee of Public 
Safety and the Directory, pursued the policy of a Prussian alli- 
ance, which he was ready to purchase by large concessions of 
territory. This did not prevent his attempting to bring to an 
end Prussian interests in South Germany by arranging an ex- 
change by which they should give up Ansbach and Baireuth and 
receive Mecklenburg, together with some Westphalian bishoprics 
or abbeys. This would facilitate his plan of constructing a 
" Third Germany," composed of the minor southern States jeal- 
ous of both Prussia and Austria. But the Prussians had a plan 
of their own altogether contrary to this, proposing to receive 
part of their indemnities in Bamberg and Wiirzburg, which with 
Ansbach and Baireuth would form a large block of territory in 
the heart of southern Germany. Since the German powers were 
hopelessly divided and given over to selfish aims, the solution 
of the problem of conflicting covetousness belonged to Bonaparte 
and to France. 

The rivalry of Austria and Prussia was illustrated during the 
summer of 1801 in the affair of the archbishopric of Cologne, to 
which was also attached the bishopric of Miinster. The arch- 
bishop died on July 27, and Austria immediately took steps to 
promote the election of a successor, hoping to throw an obstacle 
in the way of secularization. As a part of the Miinster lands 



294 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XVIII 



Imperial 
Deputa- 
tion 



had been promised to Prussia as indemnity, the Prussians pro- 
tested that no election should take place until the question of 
1795-1803 indemnities was settled. The members of both cathedral chap- 
ters naturally took the Austrian view of the matter and elected 
to the vacant see the Archduke Anton, the brother of the Em- 
peror. The Prussians declared that they would not recognize 
the election, whereupon the Austrians, not wishing the matter 
to assume too serious an aspect, conceded that the election should 
have no bearing upon the question of indemnities. 

After the diet had confirmed the treaty it was necessary to 
find a basis for the detailed settlement of indemnities. The 
secular princes, particularly Prussia and Bavaria, were ready to 
abandon to the Emperor the odious responsibility of proposing 
a definite plan of despoiling the victims. This he declined to 
do, although he was willing to arrange the indemnities if his 
decisions should be accepted as final, for he would thus become 
the dispenser of enormous patronage. The matter dragged on 
through the summer, and in September the Emperor proposed 
that a deputation of eight members should undertake the task. 
The Reichsdeputation, or Imperial Deputation, as finally consti- 
tuted, was made up of four electoral States — Mainz, Saxony, 
Brandenburg (representing Prussia), and Bohemia (represent- 
ing Austria) — and four members of the college of princes — 
Bavaria, Hesse-Cassel, Wiirttemberg, and the Grand Master of 
the Teutonic Order. Only two of these, Bohemia and the Grand 
Master, were likely to accept the Hapsburg view of the situa- 
tion, although Mainz and Saxony were not ready to go so far 
as the remaining four. But the deputation accomplished noth- 
ing, serving merely as the instrument which French diplomacy 
used to work its will. 

As it became apparent that the question of indemnities was to 
be settled in Paris the German princes who had something to 
gain or lose hastened to the capital of France or sent their rep- 
resentatives. Rumor declared that French officials had their 
price and were ready to utilize a unique opportunity to establish 
their fortunes. The salon of Talleyrand, Bonaparte's minister 
of foreign affairs, was the center of these manceuvers. " Princes 
and dukes, princesses and duchesses, paid huge sums to be com- 
prehended in the indemnities. Some of the money was inter- 
cepted by swindling agents : much found its way into the long 
purse of Talleyrand, whose enormous fortune was largely built 
out of the complimentary gifts which he received for his services 
upon this occasion."^ In August, 1801, Bonaparte signed a 

« Fisher, Napoleonic Statesmanship in Germany, 41. 



The 

French 

Plan 



BEGINNINGS OF REVOLUTION IN GERMANY 295 

treaty with Bavaria, promising compensation for losses on the Tvin 

left bank of the Rhine as well as for all other losses, and thus 

guaranteeing the Elector against Austrian schemes. The terms 1795-1803 
of the treaty showed also that the question of indemnity was 
becoming merged in the larger question of the territorial re- 
organization of Germany. Before the year was over France was 
freer to take the initiative in German matters, because the signa- 
ture of the Preliminaries of London had ended the war with 
England, and especially because a treaty of peace with Russia 
pledged the Czar to act in agreement with the French on the 
German question. In May, 1802, the French plan was embodied 
in separate treaties with Prussia, Bavaria, Baden, Wiirttemberg, 
and Hesse-Cassel, and was accepted by Russia as a basis for 
joint mediation. 

Although half of the States in the Imperial Deputation were 
now bound by treaty to support the French plan, months passed 
before the business was completed. As soon as the Emperor 
Francis heard of the proceedings he issued a rescript declaring The 
that the integrity of the empire must be preserved and that the gj^^,'^*'^'^' 
usual mode of procedure must be followed. The Prussians, 
however, regarded the matter as so far settled that they de- 
spatched troops to occupy the lands allotted to them, including 
Miinster, The Bavarians attempted to occupy Passau, but the 
bishop appealed to the Austrians, and they reached the city first. 
When the deputation reassembled, the Emperor insisted that 
each claim for indemnity be examined separately, denying that 
the preservation of a balance of interests between the various 
States was the principal question. At this juncture the repre- 
sentatives of France and Russia at Regensburg (Ratisbon), the 
seat of the diet, notified the deputation that a final decision must 
be reached within two months. The princes were satisfied with 
their own prospects and anxious to accept the Franco-Russian 
plan as a basis, but the Emperor still resisted, evidently hold- 
ing out for better terms. These the French conceded, increas- 
ing the compensation of the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the 
Duke of Modena, and giving Austria the bishoprics of Trent 
and Brixen. The Emperor now consented to bring the " Con- 
clusion " of the " Imperial Deputation " before the diet. New 
delays would have ensued had the victims been permitted a 
voice in the question of their own destruction, but it was de- 
cided to call the names of the spiritual princes and declare them 
absent. In this way the " Conclusion " was adopted in March, 
1803, and, a month later, was ratified by the Emperor — with 



296 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XVIII 



Gains 

and 

Losses 



reservations, touching particularly the distribution of votes in 
the reorganized college of princes. 

From the details of the settlement it is clear that the necessity 
of indemnifying the dispossessed princes had served as an occa- 
sion for a new distribution of power amounting to a veritable 
revolution. Prussia had lost only 127,000 inhabitants by her 
cession of territory on the left bank, and she received in com- 
pensation 500,000. Bavaria's gain was not relatively as large, 
but Baden and Wiirttemberg were given ten times as much as 
they lost, partly because of Bonaparte's scheme of a " Third 
Germany," and partly because their ruling princes were rela- 
tives of the Czar. So much territory was assigned to the larger 
States that not enough could be found to indemnify dispossessed 
counts and barons, and many lost both their property and their 
status in the empire. They and the ecclesiastical princes were 
not the only victims. Of over fifty free cities only six remained : 
Hamburg, Augsburg, Nuremberg, Liibeck, Bremen, and Frank- 
fort — two or three of these receiving slight territorial gains. 

The settlement influenced the fortunes of individual States, 
the constitution of the empire, and the position of the Church. 
The most obvious result was the simplification of the map of 
Germany, Two classes of States, one with a single exception, 
the other with only six, disappeared. The ecclesiastical States 
had been especially extensive in the south and west, where the 
tide of the Lutheran Reformation had been stayed. They now 
vanished from the map. The Archbishop-Elector of Mainz was 
indemnified with the principality and bishopric of Regensburg, 
besides other ecclesiastical and secular lands, and was made 
Elector of Regensburg, Archbishop of Regensburg and Prince- 
Primate of Germany. The largest of the destroyed ecclesiastical 
States were Salzburg, Wiirzburg, and Miinster. The suppres- 
sion of most of the free cities affected the map less obviously 
because their rule did not extend far beyond their walls. The 
States which received ecclesiastical lands and free cities acquired 
continuity of territory and ceased to be a puzzhng patchwork 
of color. In the case of Miinster the complexity was increased, 
for it was divided between six or seven States besides Prussia. 
The annexations to Prussia still left the map of western Ger- 
many intricate, and many Berliners declared that Prussia had 
received merely a few more " islands " in Westphalia. 

The future of Bavaria was affected by annexation of the 
better part of Wiirzburg, part of Bamberg, of Passau, and of 
Freising, besides many towns and abbeys. Her territory was 
extended northward toward the center of Germany, and she 






GERMANY drentJj/^;? Kioppen. 

BEFORE Koevo ./ 

THE REVOLUTION 

Scale of Mil es ' ^^', 

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BEGINNINGS OF REVOLUTION IN GERMANY 297 

gained a population more progressive and cultured. The Prus- ^vm' 

sian gains were not to be despised, for they were large rela- 

tively to the losses, but the chief advantage was a population 1795-1803 
purely German, which in its influence upon the development of 
this group of States would offset the addition of a large Slavic 
population from the partitions of Poland. The acquisition of 
Miinster was especially valuable, because under the rule of the 
later bishops it had become a center of civilization in the best 
sense. With other annexed territory — the bishopric of Pader- 
born and the abbeys of Essen and Werden — it was so situated 
as to facilitate communication between provinces already pos- 
sessed. 

The settlement of 1803 meant the ruin of the Holy Roman 
Empire. The disappearance of 112 States affected the organiza- 
tion of the diet, of the imperial court, and of the circles. The Effect 
college of free cities, one of the constituent elements of the diet, Empir?^ 
was practically annihilated. The most serious consequence was 
the destruction of the alliance with the Church, upon which in 
theory the empire rested. Two ecclesiastical electors, Treves 
and Cologne, were suppressed, and four lay electorates added — 
Baden, Wiirttemberg, Hesse-Cassel, and Salzburg. Moreover, a 
Catholic majority was changed into a Protestant majority of six 
to four, making the succession of another Hapsburg on the 
throne of the empire doubtful. The majority in the college of 
princes was also changed; the total number being reduced from 
100 to 82, of which the Protestants controlled 52 or 53 and the 
Catholics 29 or 30. The Emperor, insisting that it was neces- 
sary to preserve the parity between the religions, desired to 
increase the number of Catholic votes; but the empire disap- 
peared before the question was settled. The Pope now referred 
to it as Imperium Germanicum, rather than as Imperium Ro- 
manum, and turned to the First Consul for a protector of Cath- 
olic interests in Germany. 

The results to the Catholic Church in Germany were hardly 
less revolutionary. The property of the monasteries, not only me 
of those deprived of sovereignty by the " Conclusion," but also chu^S*' 
of those lying within the States of indemnified princes, was 
placed at the disposition of rulers for educational, religious, or 
even ordinary governmental expenditures. The property of con- 
vents for women could, however, be touched only with the con- 
sent of the local bishop. Universities were sometimes affected, 
a part of their revenues coming from religious foundations. 
Several had already lost similar property situated west of the 
Rhine. The foundations for the support of the clergy of the 



298 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XVIII 



cathedral chapters, over 700 in number, were confiscated, de- 
priving Catholic noblemen of an opportunity of obtaining lucra- 
tive prebends for younger sons. Henceforward the priesthood 
was recruited more largely from the middle class and the peas- 
antry; during the remainder of this period no nobleman of 
ancient family entered the German priesthood. The position 
of bishop was less attractive, now that it was divorced from 
sovereignty, and the change affected the attitude as well as the 
interests of the clergy. The higher church dignitaries, no longer 
rulers, responsible for interests purely German, became in policy 
ultramontane, papal, like the French clergy whom the Revolu- 
tion had despoiled. 

The old imperial constitution had been the bulwark of weak 
States as well as the safeguard of the Catholic Church. The 
glamour which had hitherto protected privileges possessed for 
centuries had received as rude a blow as that inflicted by the 
Lutheran movement in the sixteenth century, and the dynastic 
ambitions of a few houses had become the dominant element in 
the situation. More than ever before Germany was open to 
those who desired to add to their territories or to create new 
States. In southern Germany a group of secondary States had 
been formed, which were to serve as a make-weight against both 
Hapsburg and Hohenzollern ambitions. At the same time the 
trend of the Hapsburg power eastward was emphasized by the 
loss of its westernmost territories, pointing to a time when 
Germany would be organized without Austria. 

After the work of division ended the task of assimilation be- 
gan. For Prussia the treatment of Miinster, its most import- 
ant acquisition, may be considered as typical. The adminis- 
tration was entrusted to Stein, whose attitude was conciliatory. 
He wished to preserve the old organization as far as possible 
in order to give opportunity for the growth of a spirit of co- 
operation. Already distrustful of the work of uncontrolled 
bureaucracies, he believed that the administration would need 
the counsel and the criticism of the local estates. His Prussian 
superiors, however, only promised that the Miinster estates 
should be treated like those of the older provinces, which meant 
that they would have little to do. The monastic and other 
foundations devoted to educational work, to the care of hos- 
pitals, or to the training of nurses and teachers were maintained, 
although much of the property was used for ordinary govern- 
mental expenditure. The problem of taxation was perplexing, 
for, evidently, the usual excise system could not be introduced 
in complete form. In most of the territories west of the Weser 



BEGINNINGS OF REVOLUTION IN GERMANY 299 

a moderate tariff system was established, on the understanding xvm 
that the merchants would purchase part of their stock in regions 

1 ^, • • r 1795-1803 

where the excise was in lorce. 

In South Germany the changes were more radical and were 
shaped consciously upon French models. The general aim was 
to substitute the machinery of a centralized State for the con- south 
fusion of numberless jurisdictions and antiquated privileges, ^""^"y 
The instrument was an efficient bureaucracy. One consequence 
was higher taxation to meet the expenses of the new system 
and to put an army on foot. In Bavaria an interesting attempt 
was made to improve the tenant right of the peasantry, but 
neither there nor in Baden did such efforts lead to much more 
than changes in terminology descriptive of peasant obligations 
and burdens.'^ The Elector of Wurttemberg regarded the time 
as opportune for the consolidation of his personal power; but 
his methods displayed the vices as well as the benefits of cen- 
tralized administration, and gained him the bad repute of a 
tyrant. 

Among the questions which were not settled in 1803 was the 
status of the Imperial Knights. Bavaria had already begun to 
encroach upon the rights of the Franconian Knights, on the 
theory that the knights had once been simply nobles, and that imperial 
they should now be reduced to that position. In October, 1803, ^'"siits 
a patent was issued embodying this view, and it was followed 
by a forcible occupation of many knightly lands. Other States 
were more than ready to imitate so profitable an example. Even 
petty princes, with territories only a little larger than those of 
the knights, seized the opportunity to round out their posses- 
sions. One seizure proved more historic than the rest. On the 
last day of 1803 the Duke of Nassau-Usingen sent officials and 
soldiers to occupy two villages belonging to the Baron vom Stein. 
Stein immediately summoned him to the bar of German opinion, 
declaring in an open letter, apropos of the duke's published 
reasons, " Germany's independence will be little helped through 
the absorption of the knightly possessions by the small lands 
which surround them. If a great and advantageous end is to 
be accomplished, these small States must be united to the two 
great monarchies upon whose existence depends the fate of 
the German name." And he added a prayer that he might live 
to see this done. The action of Bavaria and her imitators was 
premature. The Emperor for the last time vigorously asserted 
his powers and through the imperial court annulled the annexa- 

7 For a more favorable view of changes in Bavaria, see Doeberl, 
Entwickelungsgeschichte Bayerns, II, 396. 



300 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XVIII 



tioiis. This was decisive because France was unwilling to inter- 
vene actively in the affair, and Prussia, although jealous of 
Austria's attitude, did not support Bavaria. 

Meanwhile the German question had been reopened in another 
form by the French occupation of Hanover, situated in north- 
ern Germany beyond the demarcation line drawn in 1795. This 
was an incident in a larger struggle eommenced in 1803. 



B 



CHAPTER XIX 

FROM CONSULATE TO EMPIRE 

EFORE the Treaty of Amiens was signed the First Consul chap. 

entered upon a course of conduct which made the long con- 

tinuance of peace improbable. To what extent he was carrying I803-04 
out with greater intelligence policies which had been adopted by 
the Directory, and to what extent he gave them a more aggres- 
sive turn and a new character, is not easy to determine. In his 
attempt to recover the earlier French colonial empire it was not 
his fault if the projected transfer of Louisiana aroused the fears 
of the United States and threatened to turn the peace-loving 
Jefferson into a resolute and irreconcilable enemy, for the scheme 
was well under way before he became master of the destinies 
of France. This is less true of the ideas which guided him in 
dealing with the European situation, although his acts may 
be considered as only a successful application of the prin- 
ciples which had directed French foreign policy since 1795. 
He flattered the conviction of the French that they were the 
" grande nation" and convinced them that their version of their 
own rights or of the rights of their neighbors was not subject 
to protest or revision ; but, at the same time, he prepared a cruel 
disappointment of their genuine desire for peace. Moreover, 
while he strengthened the control of France beyond her borders, 
he associated it with his personal supremacy. He became an 
imperial figure long before the Republic was transformed into 
the Empire. 

Bonaparte's policy, its benefits as well as its dangers, is well 
illustrated in the history of Italy from 1800 to 1805. The Treatmen 
French were welcomed in 1800, although the year before they °^ i*^'y 
had been so unpopular that some Italian republicans fought on 
the side of the Allies. The Austrians had proved to be masters 
as harsh as the French in their exactions and more detestable in 
their policy, imprisoning all identified with French rule. New 
victories did not change the character of the French, whose 
army of occupation was commanded by Murat, now Bonaparte's 
brother-in-law. The country was levied on without compunc- 
tion by generals and by civil agents, and, while spoliation was 

301 



302 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

CHAP, less irregular, the result was a more complete exhaustion. The 

Cisalpine Republic was at once restored, with a provisional ad- 

1803-04 ministration, assisted by an assembly of notables. It was not 
proposed to put in force the former constitution, but to draw 
up another, on the lines of the new French constitution, and to 
place at the head of the government a president and a vice- 
president. Bonaparte's original intention was to make his 
brother Joseph president, but Joseph had no relish for the role 
of puppet, and demanded as conditions of his acceptance that the 
army of occupation be withdrawn and that the territory of the 
repubUc be enlarged by the addition of Piedmont. Bonaparte 
concluded to take the presidency himself. A " Consulta," com- 
posed of 454 Italian delegates, was brought together at Lyons in 
December and January, 1801-1802, and Talleyrand was sent 
from Paris to win over a majority for Bonaparte's plan before 
the assembly was formally convened. A committee was ap- 
pointed to consider the draft of the new constitution and to 
prepare a list of officials. When the question of the presi- 
dency arose, the members voted first for Count Melzi, a dis- 
tinguished Lombard noble, but, upon a hint from Talleyrand, 
elected Bonaparte, choosing Melzi as vice-president. Bonaparte 
then proceeded to Lyons for the formal session. He addressed 
the delegates in Italian, and before reading the text of the con- 
stitution inquired whether they wished to inscribe at the head 
" Cisalpine " or " Italian." When some cried out " Italian," he 
decided that this should be the name of the new republic. The 
national hopes of the delegates were flattered, and they looked 
forward to the Italy dreamed of by Alfieri, an " Italia virtuosa, 
magnanima, libera ed una." 

Bonaparte was determined to secure French supremacy in 
The Italy, and kept an army of occupation in the new republic at its 

Republic expense, but he meant to make an end of the injustice and rob- 
bery from which the Itahans had suffered. The two men whom 
he chose to inaugurate his policies were Melzi, the vice-president, 
and Prina, a former councilor of the King of Sardinia. Melzi 
was a serious student of public affairs, as well as a man of an- 
cient family and great wealth. The only class which he found 
it difficult to conciliate were politicians of the Jacobin type, who 
had pushed their way up to prominence during the anarchy of 
the series of revolutions. He also had to contend against the 
particularist tendencies of the region south of the Po, which did 
not wish to remain under the domination of Milan. The con- 
stant presence of a French army, under an officer like Murat, 
with the airs of a conqueror and a leader of faction, was a source 



FROM CONSULATE TO EMPIRE 303 

of irritation to the sensitive Italian population, which was hos- °xk' 
tile to dependence upon France. 

Count Melzi, with the aid of Prina, commenced an important ^^os-oi 
work of reorganization. Universal military service was intro- 
duced, and the army increased from about 8,000 irregulars to 
20,000 citizen soldiers. Military schools were established. A 
gendarmerie was created to put down brigandage. In spite of 
the heavy cost of such changes, order was restored in the 
finances and the budget of 1804 saw an end of the deficit. The 
question of the Church was treated much as it was in France. 
The old calendar was restored and liberty of worship was con- 
ceded. Count Melzi was present at public worship. The 
difficulties of his position as mediator between French demands 
and Italian sentiment wearied him of his position and before 
his term ended he urged Bonaparte to accept his resignation. 

Bonaparte's treatment of the question of Piedmont influenced 
the course of European politics more immediately than did his Piedmont 
control of the Italian Republic. As long as the Czar Paul lived 
he had not ventured to decide the fate of this land, because Paul 
took a deep interest in the fair treatment of the King of Sar- 
dinia. With Paul's death Piedmont apparently lost its diplo- 
matic importance and Bonaparte determined to annex it to 
France. To minimize the alarm which the step would certainly 
arouse, he contented himself in April, 1801, with dividing it into 
military districts of the size of departments, introducing French 
machinery for the collection of taxes and the administration of 
justice. The general commanding the army of occupation was 
made administrator-general. Final annexation was delayed un- 
til September, 1802, several months after the Peace of Amiens. 
Bonaparte also changed the government of the Ligurian Repub- 
lic, imposing a new constitution, with a doge chosen by him, 
controlling in this way the port of Genoa, the natural outlet of 
Piedmont, and doubly valuable in case of new difficulties with 
the English. At the same time his hold upon northern Italy was 
facilitated through a firmer control of the Simplon road, se- 
cured by forcing the separation of the canton Valais from Switz- 
erland and placing it under the protection of the French and 
Italian repubUcs. Further south the French exercised a con- 
trolling influence in the new kingdom of Etruria, using it to 
keep the English out of Leghorn. 

Bonaparte determined, as the Directory had done, that Switz- 
erland should form one of the barrier States which should safe- switzer- 
guard the frontiers of France. The Treaty of Luneville had ^^^* 
guaranteed the independence of the Swiss, but it had not fore- 



304 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

CH^. stalled intervention to restore political peace. The constitution 

imposed by the Directors on the Helvetic Republic " one and in- 

1803-04 divisible " had never been acceptable to a majority of the peo- 
ple. The partisans of the older aristocratic constitution, with 
its variety of traditional local privileges, had not abandoned 
hope of a restoration. But there was an increasing number 
ready for compromise, desiring to preserve the advantageous 
reforms which the revolution had brought in, and yet anxious to 
restore those elements of the ancient order closely associated 
with local habits. This group was borne into power in January, 
1800, partly through the influence of the Brumaire revolution in 
France. Bonaparte favored their aims, but he was unwilling 
that the Swiss should settle their controversies independently of 
France; and, when the new party attempted to prepare a con- 
stitution, he imposed the " constitution of Malmaison," in some 
respects an excellent solution of the problem, but unacceptable 
to the Swiss without revision. The consequence was a period 
of turmoil, ending in civil war, skilfully fomented in order to 
justify a thorough-going French intervention. In October, 1802, 
a " mediation " was announced, delegates were summoned to 
Paris, and a commission, drawn equally from the two principal 
factions, prepared the draft of another constitution, which was 
Act of embodied in an Act of Mediation, February 19, 1803, and signed 
Mediation ]^y ^^^ commission in the " name of the Swiss nation." The 
compromise was adjusted so shrewdly to the habits and aspira- 
tions of the Swiss that turmoil ceased and the cantons had an 
opportunity to develop in peace the sources of their prosperity. 
Bonaparte regarded this as one of the most successful strokes 
of his career; his popularity was assured and the dependence of 
Switzerland was put beyond all question. 

The Helvetic Republic now became the Swiss Confederation, 
with nineteen equal, sovereign cantons and three types of local 
organization: one for rural cantons, which recovered their dem- 
ocratic organization, with popular assemblies voting on projects 
submitted by a grand council ; another, more aristocratic, for 
urban cantons; and still another, politically between the two, 
for cantons which were formerly dependent districts. The com- 
mon afifairs of the federation were administered by a landam- 
mann and a diet, but there was no army and only a small common 
fund, and no means of guarding the national independence. 
Later in the year the Swiss were compelled to sign a treaty of 
alliance with France, promising to furnish 16,000 men. 

On the left flank of advancing French dominion lay the Dutch 
Republic, the control of which was as important to the schemes 



FROM CONSULATE TO EMPIRE 305 

of the First Consul as that of Switzerland or Italy, if England's ''^ix 

influence on the Continent was to be held in check. Some 

change in the government was required, because, patterned after 1803-04 
the fallen Directory, it had been discredited by the levy of a The 
forced loan necessitated by the heavy financial demands of the Dutch 
French. Bonaparte, aided by the Dutch delegate in Paris, drew ®^^ 
up a new constitution, in which the functions of the legislature 
were restricted as carefully as under the consular system, and 
a Council of State, instead of a single individual, was placed at 
the head of the government. When the Dutch chambers re- 
jected the scheme, they were dissolved by French troops under 
General Augereau, whose first lessons in managing legislatures 
had been taken in Paris on the i8th Fructidor. After the 
French manner also a plebiscite was ordered, at which 68,988 
out of 416,419 voters took part, only 16,771 voting for the con- 
stitution; but this did not confuse the purposes of the First 
Consul, who announced that the constitution was accepted, as 
the great majority had not opposed it. One of the tasks of the 
new government was to collect sixty-five million florins, the bal- 
ance of the indemnity due France, and to furnish supplies to the 
French army of occupation, which was not withdrawn after the 
Peace of Amiens, as had been agreed with the Dutch. 

The continental powers watched with increasing alarm the 
Bonapartist interpretations of the eleventh article of the Treaty 
of Luneville, which guaranteed the independence of the Dutch, Attitude 
Swiss, and Italian republics. The situation was especially vexa- 3^^^^^* 
tious to the English, for every extension of French influence 
meant the withdrawal of another region from English trade. 
They had expected that the Treaty of Amiens would be followed 
by a commercial agreement, but Bonaparte took no serious steps 
in that direction, while he enforced the decrees on the statute 
books which excluded from France goods of British origin. A 
similar policy was pursued in lands under French control, includ- 
ing Spanish and Dutch colonies, which the English gave up when 
peace was made. This made itself felt by a marked falling off in 
the volume of British exports, and the merchants concluded that 
peace was more disastrous than war. Every diplomatic ques- 
tion between the two countries was discussed in a spirit of increas- 
ing bitterness. 

In the fall of 1802 the growth of French influence on the 
Continent seemed so dangerous that the English began to make 
difficulties about the evacuation of Malta. One after another 
came Bonaparte's agreement with the Czar Alexander upon the Malta 
German question, the annexation of Piedmont, and the media- 



3o6 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^xix ^^°" '^^ Switzerland. Although in each case the affair went 

back to the period before the Preliminaries of London, so that 

1803-04 ^^^ English had ample warning, the cumulative effect of these 
assertions of influence appeared to violate the tacit understand- 
ing upon which the terms of the peace were based. General 
Bonaparte insisted upon the letter of the document, asking the 
English to point out where mention was made of Switzerland, 
or Germany, or Holland. Lord Whitworth, the English am- 
bassador at Paris, was ordered to declare that George III would 
" never forego his right of interfering in the affairs of the Con- 
tinent on any occasion in which the interests of his own domin- 
ions or those of Europe in general may appear to him to require 
it." ^ The English took the attitude that the annexation of 
Piedmont had so strengthened French influence in the Mediter- 
ranean that they would be justified in retaining Malta as an offset. 
The return of the Cape to the Dutch was equivalent, they saw, 
to its control by France, since the French army was not with- 
drawn from the Batavian Republic, and this rendered the Cape 
route to the Indies precarious, and thereby made necessary some 
provision for the safety of the overland routes from the Medi- 
terranean, which could hardly be done if they abandoned both 
Malta and Egypt. The English availed themselves of the ex- 
cuse that the terms of the guarantee of the independence of 
Malta agreed upon in the treaty had not yet been carried out. 
The Czar Alexander was so indignant at the annexation of Pied- 
mont without any compensation to the King of Sardinia, that 
he intimated to the English the wisdom of keeping hold of 
Malta. An act of the First Consul made the situation still 
graver. In September, 1802, he sent Colonel Sebastiani to Egypt 
to study the condition of the country, the state of the Turkish 
and British garrisons, and the attitude of the inhabitants towards 
the French. Sebastiani returned in January, 1803, and in his 
report, pubUshed in the official Moniteur, he accused the com- 
mander of the British garrison of provoking the natives to mur- 
der him. He also gave the numbers of the British force, de- 
scribing the Turkish army as beneath contempt, and following 
this by the statement that " 6,000 Frenchmen would suffice to- 
day to conquer Egypt." ^ The English now refused to discuss 

1 Quoted by Rose, J. H., Life of Napoleon, I, 373. 

- The reason ordinarily ascribed to Bonaparte for raising the Egyptian 
question so abruptly was the desire to cover his retreat from the disas- 
trous venture in Santo Domingo, for in January came also the news of 
General Leclerc's death and the decimation of his troops by disease. 



FROM CONSULATE TO EMPIRE 307 

the question of Malta until Bonaparte should offer a satisfactory ''xix' 

explanation of the report, although they withdrew their troops 

from Alexandria two months later. The menacing tone of the ^sos-oi 
First Consul's communications with Whitworth led the English 
to arm. News of this angered Bonaparte, who declared before 
a group of assembled diplomats that no compromise could be Outbreak 
made on the question of Malta, crying out as he left the room, °' ^^' 
" Malta or war, woe to those who break treaties ! " He too 
began preparations for war, but the final rupture did not come 
until May. He signalized his rage at British truculence by or- 
dering the arrest of all British subjects traveling in France, al- 
leging in justification that the English had seized two French 
ships before the outbreak of war, although the capture had been 
made four days after war was declared.^ Such an act only 
popularized the war in England. 

If the sudden outbreak of war with Great Britain in a measure 
forestalled Bonaparte's expectations and disconcerted him, it 
was a serious disappointment to the French people, to whom 
the Treaty of Amiens had brought the peace which the leaders 
of the Republic had always declared they were fighting for. 
Their hopes were now exchanged for the anxieties of a war, 
the scope of which might be extended until the perilous situation 
of 1799 or even 1793 reappeared. The hatreds sprung from 
many long conflicts were all that awakened enthusiasm for the 
struggle, but these could not be felt by the more discerning per- 
sons who saw that the First Consul's aggressive policy was partly 
responsible for the failure of the peace. In England all those 
interested in foreign trade and high prices were eager for a re- 
newal of war as the only means of obtaining profitable markets. 
Political leaders who did not think the terms arranged at Amiens 
had sufficiently protected British interests were glad when that 
peace broke down. 

With the exception of Fox and a few others, the small group 
of liberals, who had sympathized with the earlier Revolution, English 
never learned to admire Bonaparte, and regarded him as a despot ^^^^^^e 
rather than as a reformer and restorer. During the Peace of 
Amiens when many Englishmen hastened to Paris full of curi- 
osity about the new ruler of French destinies, Wordsworth also 
crossed the Channel, but lingered on the coast. The eagerness 
of his fellow-countrymen to see Bonaparte provoked in him the 
scornful question: 

3 These ships, however, had received no notice of the declaration of war. 



3o8 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XIX 



1803-01 



Is it a reed that 's shaken by the wind, 

Or what is it that ye go forth to see? 

Lords, lawyers, statesmen, squires of low degree, 

Men known, and men unknown, sick, lame, and blind, 

Post forward all, like creatures of one kind, 

With first-fruit offerings crowd to bend the knee 

In France before the new-born Majesty." 



And he added: 



Seizure 
of Han- 
over 



" When truth, when sense, when liberty were flown, 
What hardship had it been to wait an hour ? " 

Romilly was one of the Englishmen to visit Paris in 1802, but 
he was so " disgusted at the eagerness with which the English 
crowded to do homage at the new court of a usurper and a 
tyrant," as he explains in his diary, that when Talleyrand offered 
to present him to the First Consul, he " made an excuse." If 
men who sympathized with France felt this way, it is not sur- 
prising that the outbreak of war was greeted by most English- 
men with a fierce joy, and that Bonaparte's order for the arrest 
of travelers roused public sentiment to fury. 

The contest at first appeared like a struggle between an ele- 
phant and a whale. Although Bonaparte assembled a large army 
on the coast, particularly at Boulogne, the marked inferiority of 
the French navy made immediate invasion impossible. If the 
war was to come to an issue, it would be through English at- 
tacks on the French and Dutch colonies and by the organization 
of a new coalition, or by French attempts to ruin the English 
market on the Continent. One of the consequences was the re- 
turn of Pitt, the great war minister, to the helm of state in Eng- 
land.* He alone was regarded as able to marshal the energies 
of the English against the desperate assaults of Bonaparte. 

As soon as war began Napoleon strengthened the laws against 
English trade by ordering that colonial products or merchandise 
coming from British ports, of whatever origin, or covered by 
whatever flag, should be excluded from the ports of France and 
of her allies. He sought further to embarrass England by oc- 
cupying Hanover, of which George III was Elector, but the Brit- 
ish government did not consider the protection of this principality 
one of its duties. The Prussians made an ineffective protest, 
Hanover lying north of the line fixed by the Treaty of Basel. 
The resistance of the Hanoverians could be only formal, and 
they were soon forced to place the resources of the electorate at 
the disposition of the French. The free cities of Hamburg and 

* In 1804. 



FROM CONSULATE TO EMPIRE 309 

Bremen were also subjected to French control. The exclusion ^'J^- 

of British commerce from the Elbe and the Weser, and the 

blockade which the English established in retaliation, affected ^^o^.o^ 
the Hanoverian income disastrously and within three years the 
debt was increased by 22,000,000 francs. Meanwhile 67,000,000 
were paid into the French military chest and 25,000 or 30,000 
troops were quartered on the country. The Hanoverians were 
docile, but even the commanders of the army of occupation re- 
aUzed that the burden was too great. 

Soon after the invasion of Hanover, Bonaparte ordered the 
Neapolitan ports of Brindisi, Otranto, and Taranto to be occu- rrench 
pied, alleging as an excuse the unjustifiable retention of Malta of°Neu-°^ 
by the English. It was at this time that the Swiss were forced trauty 
to sign a treaty promising auxiliary troops, and that the Dutch 
signed a new agreement, promising to support 18,000 French 
troops besides 16,000 of their own. By a proceeding akin to 
blackmail, Godoy, the powerful Spanish minister, was compelled 
to persuade his master, Charles IV, to pay into the French treas- 
ury six milUon francs a month, instead of furnishing the less 
valuable forms of aid promised in the Treaty of San Ildefonso. 
Portugal purchased neutrality at an expense of sixteen millions 
more. The Spanish subsidies offered the English an excuse a 
few months later for the seizure of a Spanish treasure fleet, and 
this brought on open war between Spain and England. Bona- 
parte had begun the conquest of Europe in order to coerce the 
British. 

It is not surprising that States just beyond the line of danger 
should consider new alliances, anxious to guard themselves from 
attack, if not to reduce the overgrown power of the French. 
The principal difficulties in organizing a coalition against France 
were Austria's financial weakness and Prussia's conviction that 
neutrality was more profitable. The Czar Alexander, who at 
first desired to signalize his reign by domestic reforms and 
economy, had concluded that an assertion of Russian influence 
abroad would find in Russia fewer enemies. The failure of a 
half-hearted offer to mediate between the English and the 
French had left him among the opponents of France, although 
not yet openly hostile. 

By the occupation of Hanover and of the Neapolitan ports, 
as well as by the coercion of Holland, Spain, and Portugal, Na- Project 
poleon had closed the European coast line from the Elbe to invasion 
Taranto, but he could not hope by such means alone to compel of Eng- 
England to make terms, and he was anxious to push forward 
preparations for a descent upon the Enghsh coast. The Chan- 



3IO 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XIX 



Conspira- 
cies 
against 
Bonaparte 



nel was the most serious barrier to success, because of the in- 
feriority of the French fleet, even if combined with the fleets 
of Holland and Spain. Bonaparte's first plan set the passage of 
the Channel for the late fall or winter of 1803, and proposed to 
embark 100,000 men on fishing vessels, escorted by light gun- 
boats which could be rowed. A few days of fog or calm would 
eliminate the fighting value of the English fleet and " the ditch 
might be leaped." Bonaparte thought that the English could not 
check him if he made a landing, and that a rapid march on Lon- 
don must lead to immediate peace on his terms. He was influ- 
enced by the notion, held a decade earlier by the Revolutionists, 
that an English rebellion would support an invader, failing to 
comprehend the lesson of the Prussian invasion of 1792. More- 
over, it was not sure that he could overcome the English forces. 
Everything was done to render certain a stubborn defense. 
Martello towers were built, and a semaphore system of tele- 
graphing installed, along the threatened coast. Preparations 
were made to remove food and other supplies, and to transfer 
the state treasure and the contents of Woolwich arsenal to Wor- 
cester. But, although the English were really alarmed, and 
were put to great expense, the danger was slight. Their power- 
ful fleets would have destroyed the expedition, if it had started. 
Moreover, no such expedition could start ; actual experiment re- 
vealed the fact that six days were required to take the whole 
flotilla outside the harbor of Boulogne, while no period of six 
days of favorable weather occurred during the years 1803 and 
1804. When Bonaparte understood these practical difficulties 
he considered the plan of assembling a fleet sufficiently powerful 
to control the Channel for a few days, only to discover a new 
set of difficulties ; so that the scheme of a descent on the English 
coast fell into the background and the Boulogne camp was util- 
ized to train a large army for instant service in case a new coali- 
tion were formed against France. 

If anything were required to strengthen Bonaparte's power, 
it would be either the perils of a war which should emphasize 
the value of his military leadership, or a dangerous conspiracy 
which should threaten to destroy him and his policies together. 
His dictatorship since the i8th Brumaire had been beneficial in 
so many ways that he was regarded as indispensable. Promi- 
nent office holders, and a multitude of persons whose property 
was of Revolutionary origin, feared that the destruction of the 
system would be their own ruin. 

The conspiracies during the Consulate are difficult to disen- 
tangle, because mixed with genuine plots were operations of a 



FROM CONSULATE TO EMPIRE 311 

secret police seeking to obtain credit with the government by ^^ix*' 

serving up plots spiced to the taste of their patrons. The most 

serious attempt on the First Consul's life had, however, surprised I803-04 
the police as well as the government. The means selected was 
the explosion of an infernal machine on Christmas Eve, 1800, 
in a narrow street through which the carriage of the First Con- 
sul was to pass on the way to the opera. The explosion was 
mistimed and did not injure Bonaparte, although it killed several 
others. The police pretended that it was the work of the Ja- 
cobins, and, by order of the Senate, 130 were proscribed, and 50 
of these deported to the colonies. The real conspirators were 
obscure royalists, two of whom were afterwards caught and ex- 
ecuted. A second affair, the " libel plot," or conspiracy of 
Rennes, which grew out of the discontent of many army officers 
at Bonaparte's policy, especially after the Peace of Amiens, 
aimed to replace the Consulate by a government of republican 
generals, or, perhaps, to bring back some of the conditions ex- 
isting prior to Brumaire. The denouement was a fiasco, and 
came at the time when Bonaparte was made Consul for Life. 
He wisely concluded that, if the affair gained too much noto- 
riety, it would blur his glory, and it was permitted to sink into 
deeper obscurity. A year later another plot, in its form due 
partly to operations of police, became politically profitable. 

Georges Cadoudal, one of the Chouan leaders, had fled to 
England in 1800. He and the members of the emigrant group in 
London believed that the elimination of Bonaparte would bring The 
the revolutionary system to destruction and open the way to a p^^^""**^ 
restoration. This was a new version of an old theory, held dur- 
ing the Revolution by the emigrants, and shared by foreign offi- 
cials, and the only change was the substitution of Bonaparte for 
the Jacobins. Before the outbreak of war in 1803 made the 
English eager to foment insurrection in France, a police agent 
named Mehee appeared in London, giving out that he was one 
of the irreconcilable repubUcans, anxious to bring about co- 
operation with the exiles in London for the overthrow of the 
" tyrant." In France he was still classified as a Jacobin and a 
" septemhriseur," and had been expelled after the conspiracy 
of the infernal machine, but was apparently employed by Fouche, 
not now titular minister of police, though provided with secret 
funds by Bonaparte. Mehee convinced the emigrants and the 
English officials that the Jacobins were eager to join forces with 
them. Encouraged by this prospect, Cadoudal and other royal- 
ist plotters built large designs of insurrection in Normandy and 
Brittany, and planned also the abduction of Bonaparte, intend- 



312 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XIX 



Pichegru 



The Duke 
d'Enghien 



ing to surprise him some day on the road from Paris to Maknai- 
son. If Bonaparte or his escort resisted, a fight would ensue, 
and if Bonaparte were killed, the ends of the enterprise would 
be secured. Nothing was said to English government officials 
about assassination, but the assassins were on their pay roll. 
After Mehee had done what was possible in London, he went to 
Munich, where he furnished Drake, the English diplomatic agent, 
with manufactured secrets and in return obtained his confi- 
dences. The English agent at Stuttgart also dabbled in con- 
spiracy. 

In August, 1803, Cadoudal crossed over to France in an Eng- 
lish government cutter. He was supplied with a million francs in 
drafts. Accompanying him was a man named Querel, probably 
also an agent of Fouche. The royalist General Pichegru fol- 
lowed Cadoudal in January, 1804, hoping to influence General 
Moreau, the hero of Hohenlinden, to join in attempting Bona- 
parte's overthrow, Moreau was ready to assist in making an 
end of Bonaparte's personal power, but he would have nothing 
to do with the royalist plotters. Meanwhile the regular police 
discovered some of the threads of the plot, and Bonaparte, who 
through Fouche knew more about it than they, jeered at their 
lack of skill. But neither he nor Fouche knew all that was 
planned, for a conspirator like Cadoudal did not reveal the de- 
tails of his designs to men like Mehee and Querel. As the at- 
mosphere of conspiracy thickened, Bonaparte's irritation, if not 
his alarm, became intense. The police arrested Querel, who 
told what he knew — among other things, that Cadoudal was in 
Paris and that a prince of the House of Bourbon was soon to 
appear in France. Evidence of Moreau's complicity was found 
and he was arrested. A little later followed the arrest of Piche- 
gru and the capture of Cadoudal. 

It was first expected that the " prince " would land in Nor- 
mandy, but when this did not happen news came that at Etten- 
heim, just across the frontier of France in Baden, resided the 
Duke d'Enghien, grandson of the Prince of Conde, and that he 
was plotting with Dumouriez and other emigrants. The news 
was incorrect, for Dumouriez was in England, and the duke was 
not a conspirator, but, before the government discovered the ac- 
tual situation, it had decided upon the serious step of abducting 
the duke. This was done on the night of March 14. His papers 
showed the falsity of the police reports, but Bonaparte and his 
advisers concluded to transfer the duke to Vincennes and try 
him before a military court on the charge of being an emigrant 
who had fought against France. His grave was dug before he 



FROM CONSULATE TO EMPIRE 313 

arrived, his trial was hurried through, and early on the morning ^^ix* 

of March 21 he was shot. This deed warned the Bourbons and 

their followers that the game of abduction and assassination was I803-04 
not one of the divine rights of kings, but the resource of any 
disciple of Machiavelli who might be armed with power. And 
the radical Revolutionists were reassured, for what difference 
was discernible between men who had voted the execution of 
Louis XVI and him who ordered the judicial murder of the 
Duke d'Enghien, of the same sacred Bourbon blood? 

Soon after the sinister tragedy at Vincennes, Pichegru was 
found strangled in prison, and Moreau was brought to trial for 
treason. A record of English intrigues was also laid before the 
Senate. Public indignation was aroused against the government 
which made itself officially responsible for attacks on the life 
of the chosen head of the Republic. From all sides came ad- 
dresses of citizens and declarations of civic bodies, congratu- 
lating the First Consul upon his escape and condemning the dia- 
bolical manoeuvers of the English and of the exiled princes. 

A group of men, among them Fouche, promoters of Bona- 
parte's fortunes, resolved to seize the occasion and consolidate 
the Bonapartist regime. Schemes which the First Consul had 
been revolving in his mind since 1802 now became politically creation 
practical. A week after the execution of the Duke d'Enghien Empire 
the Senate was persuaded to petition him in vague terms to " com- 
plete his work by making it, like his glory, immortal." But 
there was opposition ; even men like Talleyrand, minister of for- 
eign affairs, and Cambaceres, the second consul, expressed fears 
and reservations, and several weeks were required to give the 
movement the appearance of a general demand, irrespective of 
the factions which had divided France since 1792. When all 
was arranged, an ex-member of the Convention was selected to 
introduce in the Tribunate a motion that " Napoleon Bonaparte 
be declared Emperor of the French, and that this dignity be de- 
clared hereditary in his family." This motion was seconded by 
an ex-councilor proscribed as a royalist on the i8th Fructidor. 
After a conference in the Privy Council, Bonaparte asked the 
Senate for a full expression of the thought suggested in the pe- 
tition of March 27. The senators, consulted individually, con- 
sented, for the most part, to what the Tribunate should recom- 
mend. The Tribunate then passed the motion, Carnot alone vot- 
ing against it. On May 18 the Senate adopted a decree trans- 
forming the consular constitution into the constitution of a 
Napoleonic empire. 

The Republic did not cease to exist in name, for the first 



314 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^xix*' clause of the new constitution declared that the " government of 

the Republic is entrusted to an Emperor," and the last vestige 

1803-04 q£ ^j^g name survived until 1809, when the word " empire " re- 
The placed it on the coinage. The principal changes in the machinery 

E6gfmo oi government concerned the work of legislation. The Tribu- 
nate, divided into three sections, deliberating behind closed doors, 
could no longer subject the proposals of the government to public 
criticism. The Legislative Body was authorized to discuss meas- 
ures, but the discussions were not public unless the government 
so ordered. In practice the legislative process took the course 
of decrees rendered in the Council of State and embodied in 
senatus consultes. The Senate was completely in the Emperor's 
hands, for he could appoint new members at pleasure. Although 
the constitution included clauses wearing the guise of liberal 
checks upon arbitrary power, they were either illusory or ineffec- 
tive. 

The imperial republic speedily took on the aspects of monarchy. 
General Bonaparte, known henceforth as Napoleon I, was sur- 
rounded by " Grand Dignitaries " and " Grand Officers," " Grand 
Marshals," and a host of minor title bearers. His brother Joseph 
was " Grand Elector " ; his brother Louis, " Constable " ; his 
brother-in-law Murat, " Grand Admiral." His uncle Fesch, now 
cardinal, was not forgotten, and became " Grand Almoner." 
The second consul, Cambaceres, was " Mon cousin " the " Arch- 
Chancellor " of the Empire, and the third consul, Lebrun, was 
" Arch-Treasurer." Among the " officers " were names distin- 
guished in the old court — Talleyrand, " Grand Chamberlain," 
and Segur, " Grand Master of Ceremonies." The principal gen- 
erals became " Marshals of the Empire." And this was merely 
a beginning. 

The Empire needed two consecrations — one by plebiscite, the 
The Cor- other by unction of the Church. The constitution as a whole 
was not submitted to popular approval, but only the question 
whether the people wished " the imperial dignity to be hereditary 
in the line of descent, direct, natural, legitimate, or adoptive, of 
Napoleon Bonaparte, and in the direct, natural, and legitimate 
descent of Joseph Bonaparte and of Louis Bonaparte." The 
" yeas " numbered a few thousand more than in 1802, while the 
" noes " were reduced to the ridiculous proportions of 2,569, 
The Empire seemed popular even among the workmen of Paris, 
who had furnished recruits for all the uprisings of the Revolu- 
tion, wages being good and work abundant. Long negotiations 
were necessary to persuade Pope Pius VII to grace with his 
presence the ceremony of coronation, which took place in De- 



onatiou 



FROM CONSULATE TO EMPIRE 315 

cember. He desired that his compliance should mean substan- ^J^' 

tial concessions to the Church, the withdrawal of the obnoxious 

Organic Articles, the restoration of the Church to a " dominant " 1803-04 
position, or the return of the Legations. The only concession 
which Napoleon made was the restoration of the Gregorian cal- 
endar. The Pope was not even permitted to place the crown 
upon the Emperor's head : it was arranged expressly that Na- 
poleon should crown himself and then crown Josephine as Em- 
press. But the holy oil was poured on his head : he ceased to be 
a parvenu of genius, raised to power by the will of the sover- 
eign people, and became the " anointed of the Lord." 

Napoleon did not find entry into the brotherhood of European 
monarchs a mere formality. Diplomatic relations with the Czar 
Alexander had become strained before the close of 1803 and in Napo- 
the fall of 1804 they ceased. No recognition was expected from R°^ogui. 
Great Britain, although Bonaparte made a personal appeal to tion 
George III for peace, as he had done after Brumaire. Of the 
German powers, Prussia was obsequious, pursuing the policy of 
profitable neutraUty, with the hope that some way might be found 
of obtaining Hanover. The Hapsburg Francis II took the pre- 
caution of proclaiming himself " Hereditary Emperor of Aus- 
tria," and made the recognition of this title the condition of 
recognizing Napoleon as Emperor, with the further understand- 
ing that the title " Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire," should 
retain its honorary precedence. Napoleon consented, but re- 
quired the recognition of the French Empire to be made while 
he was at Aachen, the ancient capital of Charlemagne. There 
also he received the homage of the south German princes, whose 
dominions were so close to the French frontier that they could 
hardly choose their line of conduct. To them in return he hinted 
of promotions and crowns. 

In the background of European politics were ominous signs 
that this empire would not mean peace. Not a week after it was 
proclaimed, even Prussia agreed by a " declaration," which was Origin of 
a defensive treaty in everything but in name, that further en- jhird 
croachments of France in northern Germany would be resisted coalition 
by the two powers Prussia and Austria. This agreement barely 
missed becoming effective in October, when by Napoleon's orders 
French soldiers seized Sir George Rumbold, the British diplo- 
matic agent at Hamburg, accredited also to the Lower Saxon 
Circle, of which Frederick WiUiam was " director." At Fred- 
erick William's request, couched in terms of embarrassed friend- 
ship, Rumbold was released. Meanwhile Austria was alarmed at 
the negotiations in Italy to transform the Italian Republic into a 



3i6 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

CHAP. Napoleonic monarchy. A month before the coronation at Notre 

Dame, Russia signed a defensive alHance with Austria, pledging 

1803-04 ^jjg |-^Q States to resist encroachments either in Italy or in Ger- 
many. It was difficult for the ancient rivals of France to accept 
a system of interpreting treaties which set no barriers to French 
expansion, no limits to the ambitions of Napoleon. 



CHAPTER XX 

THE NEW CHARLEMAGNE 

AS Emperor, Napoleon gave new proofs of his military genius chap. 
and his capacity for organization, but he did not increase ^^ 
his reputation for statesmanship. In his conduct of foreign af- 1804-07 
fairs he exaggerated the worst policies of the Convention or the 
Directory, besides identifying the interests of France with his 
personal or family ambitions. His administrative successes and 
the glories he brought to French arms formed a sort of " Treas- 
ury of Merit," drawn upon to cover sins of reckless pride, ambi- 
tion, and tyranny, of which he was repeatedly guilty. His career 
from 1805 to 1815 showed what could be accomplished by 
transcendent ability directing tremendous forces, but unrestrained 
by a sense of measure or by an adequate conception of the perma- 
nent welfare of European peoples. He asserted constantly that ' 
he was struggling for peace, and that it was either British gold, 
Austrian perfidy, or Prussian folly which deferred the day of 
its attainment; but his conception of a reasonable peace could 
be accepted by other nations only at the point of the sword. 
Many years of moderate and conciliatory conduct were required 
to render acceptable to them the settlements of Luneville and 
Amiens, which were contrary to the historic position of two such 
States as Great Britain and Austria ; but Napoleon's policy never 
allowed the experiment to be tried on its merits. The conse- 
quence was that even while his French Empire was being organ- 
ized, a new coalition against France was coming into existence. 

A new coalition was desired anxiously by the English, to draw 
pressure away from the threatened southern coast and end the The Em- 
nightmare of invasion, Russia was inclined to it partly on ac- ^^^^^^ 
count of Napoleon's attitude towards the affairs of the Turkish 
Empire, his occupation of Neapolitan ports on the Adriatic indi- 
cating a definite eastern policy. Austria, though crippled by the 
losses of the preceding war, might be driven to fight by peril on 
the side of Italy. Austrian leaders had not finally abandoned 
the intention to recover the predominance in Italian afifairs which 
the campaigns of 1796 and 1797 had destroyed and which had 
been restored for a few months by the victories of 1799. Since 
November, 1804, Alexander and Pitt had been endeavoring to 

317 



31^ 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 



Alarm in 
Aastria 



England 

and 

Bussia 



reach an agreement, but it was delayed by England's refusal to 
withdraw from Malta and to abate her extravagant claims in re- 
gard to the treatment of neutral property at sea. Such differ- 
ences were Napoleon's opportunity, but he made no serious at- 
tempt to utilize them. The first public intimation that a new 
coalition was imminent was made at the opening of parliament, 
on January 15, 1805, when the King's speech declared that the 
French offers of peace could not be considered except after com- 
munication with the continental powers, and especially with the 
Emperor of Russia, to whom King George was united in a con- 
fidential manner. 

Napoleon's treatment of the Italian question meanwhile 
alarmed Austria. The positions of President of the Italian Re- 
public and Emperor of the French seemed incongruous, and, ac- 
cordingly, he planned to transform the republic into a kingdom, 
and place his brother Joseph on the throne, allaying the fears of 
Austria by exacting a renunciation of Joseph's rights of succes- 
sion in France. Joseph consented, but afterwards withdrew his 
consent, insisting on his rights in the French empire. Louis 
Bonaparte refused the crown for his son, and Napoleon, after 
considering Eugene de Beauhamais, Josephine's son, whom he 
adopted, decided to take the crown himself as a temporary meas- 
ure of settlement. Austria, informed of these plans, did not stir 
at once, because the Archduke Charles argued the impossibility 
of reopening the struggle with fair prospects of success, but ber 
fore Napoleon proceeded to Italy for his coronation the archduke 
lost his influence, and Austria watched the progress of events 
with increasing hostility. 

England and Russia came to terms by the treaty of April 11, 
1805. This treaty possesses a double interest, showing the per- 
manent hostility of the leading European States to the settlement 
of 1801 and 1802, and bringing forward at least two character- 
istic features of the settlement of 1814-1815 — a Holland en- 
larged by most of the former Austrian Netherlands, to serve as 
a barrier against France on the north, and an enlarged kingdom 
of Sardinia, to furnish a barrier on the side of Italy. According 
to the plan Prussia might expect to gain much of the territory on 
the left bank of the Rhine, in addition to what she lost by the 
Treaty of Basel. If Prussia and Austria acceded to the treaty 
of April II, they were to receive, like Russia, an annual subsidy 
of £1,250,000 from the English for every 100,000 men they put 
in the field. In the meantime Napoleon seemed intent upon his 
project of a direct attack upon England. 

This project now involved the sudden concentration of a su- 



THE NEW CHARLEMAGNE 319 

perior force of fighting ships, which should give command of ^%^' 

the Channel for a few days. Such a superiority could be gained 

only if the British naval authorities were deluded into dispersing 1804-07 
their forces in order to guard against expected attacks in the Napo- 
Mediterranean, and in the East and West Indies. The scheme ^^l^'J^ 
assumed that squadrons blockaded at Toulon, Ferrol, Rochefort, scheme 
and Brest, could escape, could unite with the Spanish fleet, out- 
manoeuver the tried seamen of England, and appear in the Chan- 
nel at the time appointed. Napoleon issued orders and wrote 
letters as if he believed that such a series of fortunate strokes 
was possible. At the close of 1804 there were in European 
waters about the same number of ships belonging to Napoleon 
and his allies as to the English, but his naval officials reckoned 
that French ships were only two-thirds as efficient as English 
ships. The expedition to the West Indies, in which he hoped to 
concentrate the Toulon, Rochefort, and Brest squadrons, had as 
a first object injury to the British colonies and trade, but it would 
naturally compel the English to dispatch a fleet to the rescue, and 
if this weakened seriously their home stations the combined 
French and Spanish fleet would seize the opportunity to occupy 
the Channel. But had Napoleon considered this more than a re- 
mote possibility, he would have pursued a less aggressive policy 
in Europe. It seems more likely that he meant to do all the 
damage he could to the English incidentally, and to find in a suc- 
cessful campaign on the Continent a brilliant alternative to al- 
most certain failure with the Boulogne project. 

Whatever may have been Napoleon's conception of his " im- 
mense project," the manner in which it failed gave a dramatic Manoeu 
setting to the opening of the war against the Third Coalition. 
Admiral Villeneuve, in command at Toulon, escaped on March 
30, 1805, while Nelson was temporarily off the station. He 
passed the straits of Gibraltar on April 9, united with the Spanish 
squadron at Cadiz, and sailed for the West Indies. Not until he 
was on his way did Nelson know that he had passed the straits, 
and he had been gone a month before Nelson learned his destina- 
tion. But Nelson made a quick voyage to the islands and arrived 
before Villeneuve had done much damage. British shipping had 
suffered from the operations of the Rochefort squadron, which 
had escaped the English blockaders in January, but which, 
through a misunderstanding, returned to Rochefort without wait- 
ing for Villeneuve. 

When Villeneuve heard that Nelson was in the West Indies, 
he sailed for Europe, regarding his fleet as inferior in equipment 
and quality, although superior in numbers. Not many days 



vers of 
Villeneuve 



320 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 



1804-07 



Fate of 
the "Im- 
mense 
Project" 



Austria 
Joins the 
Coalition 



elapsed before Nelson was in his wake, sending ahead a swift 
brig to advise the admiralty of the movements of the allied fleet. 
The brig overhauled Villeneuve's fleet, noted its direction, and 
went on to Plymouth, arriving on July 7. The admiralty imme- 
diately concentrated a fleet off Cape Finistere to check Villeneuve. 
Nelson was on the coast of Spain on July 18, but found it neces- 
sary to sail to Gibraltar for water and provisions. Four days 
later an inconclusive battle was fought off Cape Finistere by the 
alHed fleet and the English. Villeneuve now formed a junction 
with the Ferrol squadron at the neighboring port of Corunna, 
while the English fleet, not feeling strong enough to blockade 
him, retired to Brest. Nelson joined them on August 15, but 
soon returned to England for a brief rest. 

At this juncture the commander of the English fleet off Brest 
made the tactical error of dividing his forces, sending twenty 
ships southward to meet Villeneuve and thus giving Villeneuve 
a chance to elude him and to crush between two fires the rest of 
the ships blockading Brest. However, this was only a chance; 
it presumed too much English blundering, and too many succes- 
sive gifts of good fortune to the French. Villeneuve had re- 
ceived orders to proceed to the Channel, but they permitted him 
to go first to Cadiz for reinforcements. He made an attempt to 
sail northward, until strong head winds and rumors of an ap- 
proaching English fleet led him to use his discretionary powers 
and turn (August 15) toward Cadiz. Seven days later Na- 
poleon, perhaps on the supposition that Villenueve was approach- 
ing Brest, sent a message by semaphore, commanding him not 
to " lose a moment . . . [but] enter the Channel. England is 
ours! We are ready, everything is embarked. Appear for 
twenty-four hours, and all is finished ! " This telegram was an 
effective manner of bringing on the dramatic climax, but proba- 
bly nothing more. Had Villeneuve reached the Channel without 
a fight, and Napoleon embarked his army for the shores of Great 
Britain, the consequences would have been a disaster in com- 
parison with which the Battle of the Nile and the enforced stay 
in Egypt would have sunk into insignificance.^ 

While Nelson and Villeneuve were playing a game of hide and 
seek in the Mediterranean and on the ocean, events in Italy had 
reached a crisis. On May 26 Napoleon placed the iron crown 

1 For the controversy upon Napoleon's intentions, see A. Fournier, 
Napoleon I (German ed.), II. 74 f., especially note p. 86. Cf. A. Sorel, 
L'Europe et la Revolution Frangaise, VI. 448-459. The principal au- 
thority is E. Desbriere, Pro jets et Tentatives de Debarquement aux lies 
Britanniques, 1 793-1805, vol. IV. 



THE NEW CHARLEMAGNE 



of Lombardy on his head, and followed this a few days later by ^^^' 

the annexation of Genoa to the French empire, alleging as a rea- 

son the need of redressing the balance of power disturbed by the i804-07 
two partitions of Poland, Russian advance at the expense of 
Turkey, and English seizures in the colonies. Such explanations 
were unlikely to reassure Austria, especially as the coat of arms 
and the scepter of the new Italian kingdom included the Venetian 
lion. On July 7 the Emperor Francis gave orders to mobilize 
his army and a month later formally entered the coalition. As 
soon as Napoleon's agents told him of the movements of Aus- 
trian troops in Tyrol he hastened back to Paris. On August 2 
he was informed that Nelson had returned and that the British 
possessed a naval superiority in European waters. Napoleon's 
next move is significant. In three successive notes, with intervals 
carefully timed, and with increasing sharpness, he demanded that 
Austria disarm, although he was aware that the consequence 
must be war, since the peace party had lost its influence at 
Vienna. At the same time he attempted to win an alliance from 
Prussia by the offer of Hanover, and his agents exerted pressure 
on the South German courts to obtain offensive and defensive 
alliances. He declared privately that his army was on the march 
against Austria before he was informed that Villeneuve had 
turned southward toward Cadiz. Even if Villeneuve had pro- 
ceeded to Boulogne, he would have found on his arrival only the 
rear guard of the Army of England, now transformed into the 
Grand Army. 

In the War of the Third Coalition, Napoleon had the advantage 
of an army highly trained and ready to march at a moment's 
notice. It was organized into corps, each corps composed of capture 
several divisions and commanded by a marshal. As an instru- °^ ^^ 
ment of warfare adaptable to the requirements of a strategy 
which was bold in conception and wide in its field of operation, 
the French army had reached the highest development. Na- 
poleon resolved to concentrate this magnificent force for a stroke 
at the heart of Austria, forestalling the Allies, who entertained 
a cumbrous scheme of separate attacks upon his corps, scattered, 
as they supposed, from southern Italy to Hanover. The Aus- 
trian plan of campaign assigned to an army commanded by Gen- 
eral Mack the task of saving the resources of southern Germany 
for the Allies, while the principal operation was directed by the 
Archduke Charles against the new kingdom of Italy. It was not 
expected that Mack would do any lighting before the Russians 
reached the River Inn about the middle of October. The folly 
of Mack and the astounding quickness of the French concentra- 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

CHAP, tion along the Danube, a large part of the army marching 200 

miles in 14 days, resulted in a great Austrian disaster. As Mack 

1804-07 did not penetrate into Bavaria soon enough to prevent an alli- 
ance with Napoleon, he should have retired to the Inn and waited 
for the Russians ; but, instead, he advanced to Ulm, near the con- 
fluence of the Iller and the Danube, planning to defend the passes 
of the Black Forest. Napoleon's army turned these, seized the 
line of the Lech below Ulm, and was on the point of cutting 
Mack's communications with Austria. When the French sol- 
diers were already marching southeastward to complete the op- 
eration. Mack supposed they were flying in disorder toward the 
Rhine, and made no attempt to break through to the north while 
a chance still remained. The result was the surrender of his 
army on October 20, and the destruction of the only force which 
covered the approach to Vienna. 

On the day after the capture of the Austrian army the French 
effort to recover control of the sea came to a disastrous close off 
Trafalgar Cape Trafalgar. As soon as Villeneuve had entered Cadiz, the 
English estabhshed a blockade, at first with a few ships, after- 
ward with a large force. Late in September Nelson arrived in 
the Victory and assumed command. To lure Villeneuve from 
Cadiz, he withdrew to the open sea, leaving only a few ships off 
the port. Villeneuve, goaded by the contemptuous reproaches of 
Napoleon, who publicly blamed him for the failure of the " im- 
mense project," resolved to make the Mediterranean, as fresh 
orders directed, and to fight if the British fleet was not pre- 
ponderant. Nelson, warned by his guard ships on October 19, 
prepared for battle, which he expected on the 21st. When Ville- 
neuve on that day saw the British bearing down upon him, he 
turned northward, in order to have the port of Cadiz on his lea. 
His line, composed of thirty-three ships, was bent into an obtuse 
angle, with the Spanish ships interspersed, because he was afraid 
of their conduct. According to Nelson's plan the British fleet 
of twenty-seven ships came on in two columns ; the right under 
ColUnwood steering toward the allied rear division, while Nel- 
son, with the left, undertook to hold off their van and pierce the 
center. Nelson's plan was skilfully covered until the final on- 
slaught, each column, as it approached, sailing almost parallel to 
the enemy's line. By sharp turns to right and left both columns 
pierced the line, Collinwood behind the thirteenth ship from the 
rear, and Nelson behind the tenth ship from the van. A ship to 
ship action followed. The French and Spaniards fought until 
they were decimated, but surrenders began at one o'clock, an hour 
after the battle opened. Early in the fight Nelson was mortally 



THE NEW CHARLEMAGNE 323 

wounded by a French sharpshooter, although he lived long ^^^' 

enough to know that a great victory had been won. More than 

half the allied fleet were captured, but the important result was ^^oi-o? 
the ruin of French sea power and the undisputed supremacy of 
the British on the ocean for more than two generations. 

The surrender of Mack compelled the Austrians to withdraw 
from Italy and Tyrol, but these armies were too remote to Danger 
save Vienna. In one respect the Austrian situation seemed for gfanTnter- 
a time to improve. In the advance upon the Danube one of the vention 
French corps had marched across the Hohenzollern territory of 
Ansbach. This did not occur without warning, for Napoleon 
had sent Duroc to Berlin with an offer of Hanover as the price 
of an alliance, at the same time requesting permission for the 
passage of troops. But Frederick William did not wish to 
abandon the much vaunted neutrality, and he had already declined 
a request of the Russians for similar privileges. Napoleon had 
not waited for a reply, and had ordered his troops to cross Ans- 
bach. The news of this outrage threw the Berliners into a pas- 
sion, and Frederick William seemed ready for war. He opened 
his frontiers to the Russian troops, and on November 3, at a 
personal interview with Alexander at Potsdam, signed an agree- 
ment to impose armed mediation upon Napoleon, with the treaty 
of Luneville as a basis, promising to join the Allies if Napoleon 
did not accept his proposals within a month. He also discussed 
with the British the terms of a subsidy treaty. Their refusal to 
listen to any plan of territorial exchange by which Prussia could 
obtain Hanover, together with continued French successes, cooled 
Frederick William's warlike ardor, and when Haugwitz, his 
minister of foreign affairs, set out with the ultimatum for Na- 
poleon's headquarters, the King told him privately to preserve 
peace between Prussia and France. 

Napoleon hoped to defeat the Russian army, which had ad- 
vanced to form a junction with Mack, and, entering Vienna in Napo- 
triumph, to dictate a peace in the Austrian capital. The Rus- Vienna 
sians, however, retired skilfully before him, resolved to unite with 
a second Russian army in Moravia, and await the coming of the 
Archduke Charles from Italy. Napoleon entered Vienna unop- 
posed, and the same day Murat by a dubious ruse gained posses- 
sion of the Tabor bridge leading to the northern bank of the 
Danube, although he was unable to prevent the union of the two 
Russian armies. 

Napoleon's position was fast becoming precarious. By follow- 
ing the Russians into Moravia his line of communications was 
dangerously long, especially if Frederick William persisted in 



324 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP, the policy to which he was pledged at Potsdam. But Haugwitz 

proceeded slowly toward the French headquarters, and, when 

1804-07 admitted to Napoleon's presence, spoke only of friendly media- 
tion, a guarantee that neither side would be overreached during 
the negotiations. He agreed that if the Prussian project was ac- 
cepted the Allies should not attack Holland. Such conduct may 
have suited the King's secret purposes, but Prussian statesmen 
like Stein and Hardenberg did not so understand the responsibili- 
ties of the occasion. Whether the menace of Prussian interven- 
tion was serious or not, Napoleon was soon rescued from a deli- 
cate situation by the blunders of the Czar Alexander's military 
advisers. 

Alexander, instead of listening to the veteran Kutusoff, who 
counseled delay until all the allied forces were concentrated, 
The Cam- yielded to the persuasions of younger officers, who thought that 
Moravia ^^^ French numbered only 50,000 and could easily be cut off 
from Vienna. Accordingly he ordered an advance upon Briinn, 
Napoleon's headquarters. As soon as Napoleon heard of this, 
he divined the blunder his enemies were making and prepared a 
trap for them, meanwhile summoning two of his lieutenants, in 
order to bring the numbers of his army to the size of the allied 
forces. One division of these reinforcements marched seventy 
miles in forty-four hours in order to reach the field in time. To 
draw the enemy on. Napoleon withdrew his lines from Auster- 
litz, and abandoned even the heights of Pratzen. For the same 
reason he left his right wing in an isolated and exposed position, 
which encouraged the Allies in their design of outflanking him 
and induced them to weaken their center. Their movements on 
December i showed that the ruse was successful, and Napoleon 
prepared to crush their weakened center the following day when 
the mancEuver was fully developed. So confident was he of suc- 
cess that in the evening he went from camp-fire to camp-fire and 
explained to his soldiers what the course of the battle would be. 
The battle of Austerlitz was fought on the first anniversary of 
Napoleon's coronation. It has always been regarded as pe- 
Auster- culiarly his battle, for although success was due to the excellent 
utz fighting qualities of his soldiers and the skilful leadership of 

corps commanders, it was fought as he planned and the decisive 
character of the victory is accounted for by the nature of the 
plan. The battle also illustrated more than Napoleon's previous 
battles a method of handling armies which became an essential 
feature of the art of war as practiced in the nineteenth century. 
The line which the French occupied was about seven miles long. 
It was Napoleon's plan to hazard his right wing — if necessary 



THE NEW CHARLEMAGNE 325 

permitting it to be driven back — in order to lead the enemy to chap. 

weaken the position against which he proposed to launch his 

heaviest masses. If he succeeded in breaking their line at that I804-07 
point, which was their center on the plateau of Pratzen, the fact 
that they had extended their line in pursuing his right wing, 
would be an advantage because he could now fall upon the pur- 
suers, isolated from the rest of their troops, and destroy them. 
Such is the story of the battle on that December day when the 
sun of Austerlitz finally broke through the wintry mists of the 
morning. The Russians fought well, but eventually their center 
was pierced, their army thrown into confusion, and their left 
wing, over 30,000 strong, utterly crushed, dispersed, or captured 
amidst the frozen marshes where it was fighting.^ Napoleon's 
situation ceased to be dangerous and became glorious. And he 
meant to sign a glorious peace. But his use of the power brought 
by victory was no more likely to satisfy the permanent interests 
of rival States than did his policy after Luneville and Amiens, 
and so this victory was merely one of a series of brilliant rescues 
from perils which were of his own creation. 

Austerlitz opened the way for the formation of what is called 
the " Grand Empire," which was a fresh Bonapartist interpreta- The 
tion of the Jacobin scheme of surrounding the Republic with a ^^p^g 
barrier of dependent States. As the Jacobins collected indem- 
nities in return for the blessings of liberty. Napoleon exacted 
tribute for the benefits of improved administration. They can- 
toned French soldiers in these States, and so did he, but he also 
sought to bind them closely to his personal fortunes by erecting 
thrones for the members of his family and constituting fiefs 
for his chief civil and military officers. Incidentally, changes 
were made in Italy and Germany which were to become perma- 
nent, and significant turns were given to the fortunes of power$ 
like Austria and Prussia. 

The immediate consequences of Austerlitz were the withdrawal 
of the Russian army from Austrian territory, the transformation 
of the armed mediation of Prussia into alliance with France, and 
terms of peace more disastrous to Austria than had ever been ac- 
cepted by her Hapsburg rulers. When the Emperor Francis 
learned that the Czar Alexander was unwilling to try the further 
chances of war near the scene of his recent overthrow, he was 
obliged to sign an armistice with Napoleon, in accordance with conduct 
which all foreign troops should be excluded from his lands, a °fa,^'"^" 
provision aimed primarily at Prussia. Haugwitz, cowed by Na- 

2 For the legend of the drowning of thousands of Russians in the Lake 
of Tellnitz, see Fournier (Ger. ed.), II. no. 



326 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



Treaty 
of Press- 
burg 



poleon, now denied the agreements of Potsdam, and signed, on 
December 15, a treaty which pledged Prussia to an alHance with 
France, and brought her the coveted Hanover, but which re- 
quired the cession of Neuchatel to France, Ansbach to Bavaria, 
and Cleves to a prince to be named by Napoleon. The terms also 
pledged Prussia to guarantee the changes which he proposed to 
make in Italy and Germany, The Austrians could not wait to 
learn whether Frederick William would ratify this treaty, the 
terms of which they did not know, because Napoleon's appetite, 
as Talleyrand told them, " increased with eating," and his condi- 
tions grew harder every day. The result was the Treaty of 
Pressburg which cost Austria all the Venetian territory gained 
at Campo Formio and Luneville, leaving her on the Adriatic only 
the port of Trieste. The Hapsburg lands in South Germany 
were abandoned to the rulers of Bavaria, Wiirttemberg, and 
Baden, who were freed from imperial suzerainty, and two of 
whom were recognized by Napoleon as kings. 

Talleyrand had proposed a plan to end the ancient rivalries of 
France and Austria. He had advised that Austria receive com- 
pensation in the Balkan peninsula for her losses in Italy and 
Germany, and that her cessions to France be formed into buffer 
States, so that the frontiers of the two powers should be sepa- 
rated. Napoleon, however, refused to listen to counsels of mod- 
eration. The most important consequence of the settlement at 
Pressburg was the expulsion of the Hapsburg power from south- 
ern Germany, emphasizing once more its trend eastward. For 
the first time Venice formed part of a great Italian kingdom, a 
prophecy of her eventual destiny. The acquisition of the Dalma- 
tian coast, temporarily annexed to the kingdom of Italy, pointed 
once more to Napoleon's desire to obtain an influence in the 
affairs of the Turkish empire. He also intended to seize Mon- 
tenegro and was enraged when the Austrians surrendered Cattaro 
to a Russian force. 

Haugwitz was received with indignation when he returned to 
Berlin with his treaty, but the King, instead of rejecting it, at- 
tempted to change it into an agreement for a defensive alliance, 
and to make the occupation of Hanover provisional until a gen- 
eral peace. Before he knew whether Napoleon would accept 
such modifications, he made the fatal blunder of reducing his 
army to a peace basis, in spite of the fact that over 200,000 
French troops were still quartered in South Germany, ready to 
move on Berhn. Napoleon had explained their presence, alleg- 
ing Austria's surrender of Cattaro to the Russians. It had the 
additional advantage of throwing the principal burden of sup- 



I 



The Prus- 
sian AUi- 
ance 



THE NEW CHARLEMAGNE 327 

porting the French army on the Germans. Frederick William ^%^' 

sent Haugwitz to Paris with the revised draft of the treaty, and 

meanwhile marched his troops into Hanover. It is not surpris- I804-07 
ing that Haugwitz brought back a new edition of the Vienna 
agreement, with the terms rendered harsher, pledging Prussia to 
annex Hanover and close the rivers of northern Germany, to- 
gether with the Hanseatic port of Liibeck, against English trade. 
Under menace of immediate attack Frederick William signed the 
treaty. This led to British reprisals, seizure of Prussian ships, 
blockade of German rivers, and (April 20) a declaration of war, 
bringing to a grim and costly conclusion Prussia's decade of 
profitable neutrality. 

The collapse of the Third Coalition and the defection of Prus- 
sia had already given the death blow to England's great minister, Death 
William Pitt. There is a story that when he heard of the battle °' ^"* 
of Austerlitz he asked for a map of Europe to see where the 
place was, and then said sadly : " Roll up that map : it will not 
be wanted these ten years." But it was the situation to which 
Austerlitz led, and which imperiled the British empire, that has- 
tened the ravages of a fatal disease. The end came on January 
23, 1806. 

As soon as the Treaty of Pressburg was signed, Napoleon, by 
a simple order addressed to his soldiers, deposed Ferdinand IV 
and Marie Caroline of Naples, and soon despatched his brother Napoleon 
Joseph to take the kingdom. This was the punishment inflicted ^^^ 
upon the sister of Marie Antoinette, aunt of the Austrian em- 
peror, for breaking a promise of neutrality and admitting Brit- 
ish and Russian troops to Neapolitan harbors when Napoleon 
was deeply involved in the Austrian campaign. On March 30, 
1806, he sent a decree to the French Senate, declaring that Joseph 
was made King of Naples and Sicily, and providing that while 
the crowns of France and Naples were to be separate Joseph was 
to remain a grand dignitary of the French empire and a member 
of his family, subject, therefore, to his control as its head. In 
his proclamation he had said with the pictorial eloquence upon 
which he fed the imaginations of his soldiers and his subjects, 
" Go ! Hurl into the waves, if, indeed, they await you, the feeble 
battalions of the tyrants of the sea." Joseph occupied Naples, 
but he could become king of Sicily only " in partibus," for the 
tyrants of the sea held the island. Moreover, they crossed into 
Calabria, and the first French force which came into conflict with 
them " was defeated and broken up in a few minutes." 

Joseph was not the first Bonaparte whom Napoleon raised to 
the throne, for he had made his sister Elise Princess of Piom- 



328 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XX 

1804-07 

Principal- 
ities for 
the Bona- 
partes 



The New 
Charle- 
magne 



bino in 1805. He now hurried forward the task of throne mak- 
ing. Elise became Princess of Lucca, Massa, and Carrara. His 
brother Louis, who had married his step-daughter Hortense, he 
appointed to a throne in Holland, persuading the reluctant Dutch 
that otherwise they could not hope at the coming peace with 
England to receive again their lost colonies. His step-son Eugene 
was already his viceroy in the kingdom of Italy.*f His brother- 
in-law Murat became Grand Duke of Berg, a Rhenish territory, 
part of the heritage of Cleves which in the seventeenth century 
had been divided between the Hohenzollerns and the Wittels- 
bachs, and his sister Pauline, Princess Borghese, was made 
Duchess of Guastalla. Bernadotte, who had married the sister 
of Joseph's wife, received the principality of Ponte Corvo. Nor 
were officials and generals forgotten. Berthier, chief of staff, 
became Prince of Neuchatel, and Talleyrand, minister of foreign 
affairs. Prince of Benevento. One-fifteenth of the income of a 
multitude of domain lands in the kingdom of Italy, of Naples, 
Lucca, Parma, and Piacenza, went to endow twenty dukedoms, 
held as fiefs of the empire by favored officers. To enrich his 
extraordinary fund from which future benefits might be drawn, 
he reserved i,200,(X)0 francs on the revenue of the kingdom of 
Italy and a million on that of Naples. 

His brothers Lucien and Jerome remained unprovided for. 
Lucien was shut out from imperial favor by a marriage which 
for a time seemed to compromise the succession. He was eventu- 
ally made Prince of Canino, but by favor of the Pope, his 
brother's enemy. Jerome must wait for the next turn in the 
European kaleidoscope. As a stay to the new dynasties, dynastic 
marriages were ordered: the marriage of Eugene to a Bavarian 
princess, the marriage of Josephine's niece to the heir of Baden, 
while a princess of Wiirttemberg was destined for Jerome as soon 
as he could be separated from his American wife.^ 

Napoleon now frequently referred to himself as, a second 
Charlemagne, a pose which had no element of humor for those 
within marching distance of his French battalions. The Papacy 
and the Holy Roman Empire were both the designated victims of 
this curious historical analogy. Napoleon was already on bad 
terms with Pius VII because the Pope had protested vigorously 
against the occupation of Ancona in November, 1805. Napoleon 
took this step, he said, to protect the city against a landing of the 
English or the Russians. He upbraided the Pope for listening to 
evil counselors and declared that " God has revealed by the suc- 

3 Elizabeth Patterson of Baltimore. 



THE NEW CHARLEMAGNE 329 

cess with which he has favored my arms the protection he has ^^^' 

accorded to my cause. ... I consider myself, hke my predeces- 

sors of the second and third races, the eldest son of the Church." I804-07 
Writing to his uncle, Cardinal Fesch, his ambassador at Rome, 
he threatened to appoint a senator to command there in his name, 
and added, " For the Pope I am Charlemagne, since as Charle- 
magne I unite the crown of France and the crown of Italy." 
The medieval phraseology of royal controversy with the Papacy 
now offered him no greater difficulty than did the stylistic pe- 
culiarities of Moslem piety in 1798. But theories and menaces 
alike were lost on Pius VH, who changed merely his secretary of 
state. Napoleon began to reduce theory to practice by sending 
troops to occupy Civita Vecchia. 

Charlemagne had been master in southern and western Ger- 
many, and this mastery was Napoleon's next aim, influenced not 
so much by the Charlemagne illusion as by a policy which had 
attracted French statesmen since the days of Richelieu. A 
" Third Germany " had been one of the projects of 1802 and 
1803, and Napoleon spoke of his " Confederation " in 1805. Remaking 
When Austerlitz destroyed the effective power of Austria and ^^^(^^^ 
Prussia over German affairs, the only obstacle to the creation many 
of such a confederation was Napoleon's uncertainty as to the form 
it should take. His German clients were not likely to object, for 
he could hold out to them a prospect of annexations as profitable 
as those of 1803. One of the most subservient, Dalberg, arch- 
chancellor of the Holy Roman Empire, whose archiepiscopal see 
was now formally transferred from Mainz to Regensburg, dis- 
covered that in Napoleon the Germans had the possibility 
of the revival of the Western Empire of Charlemagne. He 
agreed that Cardinal Fesch should be made his coadjutor, 
although remaining archbishop of Lyons and primate of the 
Gauls. As in 1802, Paris was the center of bargaining for 
States which hoped to gain territory and for those which were 
afraid of being handed over to others. Napoleon did not wish 
the scheme to raise new difficulties on the side of Prus- 
sia and Austria, and threw an air of mystery about the negotia- 
tions, but the series of treaties was finally ready and on July 
17 the sixteen States admitted to the Confederation of the Rhine 
were given the alternative of signing or running the risk of being 
absorbed, or at least of losing all chance of territorial gain. Sev- 
eral of the fortunate States were large, like Bavaria and Wiirt- 
temberg, while others were so small that they must have pos- 
sessed a magical formula for conjuring away a fate reserved for 
thei' neighbors. The annexations absorbed sixty-seven States, 



330 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 



Confeder- 
ation of 
the Bhine 



the Holy 

Roman 

Empire 



Quarrel 

with 

Prussia 



including three cities, all the countships, and many petty prin- 
cipalities. In addition, all the imperial knights were deprived of 
sovereign rights. The process was called mediatization, because 
the annexed States lost their immediate relation to the suzerain 
authority, which had been the Emperor, and became subjects. 
The loss of sovereignty did not, however, entail the loss of prop- 
erty or of aristocratic and social privileges. To their 1,200,000 
subjects the change was a benefit, ridding them of many petty, 
expensive, and pretentious courts. It was also another step in 
the simplification of the German state system, with unification 
as the goal. But the immediate result was to subject the States 
of the Confederation to the will of Napoleon, who was declared 
its protector, and whom they promised to follow in his wars, 
furnishing a contingent of 63,000. 

The creation of the Rhenish Confederation gave the coup de 
grace to the agonizing Holy Roman Empire. The States that 
belonged to it formally withdrew from the empire, and neither 
they nor Napoleon any longer recognized its existence. This 
compelled the Emperor Francis to renounce his titles and preroga- 
tives as its head and to be henceforward simply Francis I of 
Austria. So perished an empire a thousand years old, but one 
which had ceased to do more than give occupation to lawyers 
and themes to political philosophers. Its place was taken by a 
real empire resting on military success rather than upon tradi- 
tions or ideals. 

Before the negotiations for the establishment of the Confed- 
eration were completed, futile attempts were made to patch up a 
peace with Great Britain and with Russia. The only interest 
that attaches to the negotiations with Russia arises from the 
Czar's evident desire to persuade the French to withdraw from 
Dalmatia, a position which threatened his sphere of action in the 
Balkan peninsula. Napoleon frightened the Czar's diplomatic 
agent into signing a draft treaty which left the French in Dalma- 
tia. The negotiations with the English were important because 
they helped to precipitate war between France and Prussia. In 
order to reach a basis of settlement he showed no hesitation in 
promising to return Hanover, although it was already occupied by 
Prussia, planning to oflfer Prussia an equivalent at the expense of 
the minor German States. Nevertheless, while the negotiations 
were proceeding, he assured the Prussians that his insistence upon 
their retention of Hanover was the only obstacle standing in the 
way of peace. They heard of his duplicity through an after- 
dinner confidence of an English diplomatist to the Prussian min- 
ister at Paris. Frederick William had already been alarmec by 



THE NEW CHARLEMAGNE 331 

the organization of the Rhenish Confederation, and he was only ^^x^' 

partially reassured by Napoleon's suggestion that he organize a 

North German Confederation and take the title of Emperor, for, I804-07 
when he made overtures to Hesse-Cassel, Saxony, the Mecklen- 
burgs, and the Hanseatic towns, he discovered that French 
diplomacy was stirring up a feeling of jealous opposition. The 
news of the contemptuous treatment of Prussia in the affair of 
Hanover brought on a climax, and Frederick William put his 
army on a war footing, alleging in explanation the movements of 
French troops in southern and western Germany. The fear that 
restrained him for a time was the chance that the Czar might 
ratify the treaty which his agent had signed. Late in August he 
was informed that Alexander had rejected the treaty, and war 
became inevitable. 

Not all the voices of Germany echoed the sentiments of Arch- 
chancellor Dalberg. The feeling of nationality was fast becom- 
ing a moving force, stimulated by the preaching of Schleier- National 
macher at Berlin, and influenced also by Arndt's The Spirit of ^^many 
the Age, which argued for the freedom and brotherhood of Ger- 
mans. From Vienna came a book of Gentz on the recent revolu- 
tion in Germany, which condemned in unmeasured terms the 
subservient friends of France. In South Germany, upon which 
rested the burden of supporting the French soldiery, were circu- 
lated many pamphlets full of criticism and complaint. When 
information of this rising tide of sentiment reached Napoleon, 
who thought peoples had no sacred right except that of being 
well administered, he determined to terrify it into silence, de- 
claring that the publications imperiled his army. A bookseller 
named Palm, who lived in Nuremberg, recently annexed to the 
dominions of the newly crowned King of Bavaria, was responsi- 
ble for the circulation of a pamphlet which was milder than its 
title might suggest — Deiitschland in seiner tiefen. Erniedrigung. 
He was selected as an example, was arrested, taken to Braunau, 
an Austrian fortress still occupied by the French, and executed 
on August 25. This act was a pendant to the deed of 1804, when 
Napoleon showed that he could execute a prince with less com- 
punction than the members of the Convention in their first mood. 
It proved that he was like them in their second mood and 
could judicially murder ordinary men also. The act produced a 
profound impression throughout Germany, and became one of 
the principal causes of the intense hatred later felt against the 
French. Even at the time Gentz remarked that a single defeat 
of the French armies would bring on another Sicilian Vespers. 

Prussia was not a match for France. It is true Prussia might 



of Prus- 
sia 



332 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^^x' "°^ ^^ obliged to meet the French single-handed, for the Czar 

was her ally, and as the conflict with England could be brought 

1804-07 ^Q ^j^ ^^^^ England might also become an ally. The principal dis- 
strength advantages under which Prussia suffered were due to her own 
faulty organization. To all outward appearance the State which 
Frederick II had raised to the position of a great power was still 
unchanged in its characteristic features. The chief solicitude 
of her rulers was that there should be peasants enough to meet 
the requirements of the recruiting system and enough nobles to 
command them. This concern prevented Frederick William and 
his advisers from radically modifying the condition of the peas- 
ants or from reducing the privileges of the nobles. Men of the 
citizen class were not expected to serve in the army, and they 
viewed its fate with comparative indifference. Nor could the 
peasant soldier, often ill-treated in his native village by his noble 
master, be expected to follow another noble enthusiastically into 
battle. The consequences of defeat were certain to be disastrous, 
because there was little unity of feeling between the provinces, 
and no national uprising, like that of France in 1792, would fol- 
low the news that the enemy's army had crossed the frontiers. 

There were reasons more specific why Prussia's chances were 
few. Frederick William's army was nominally 250,000 strong; 
equal, therefore, to that of Napoleon, but he could put only half 
the number into the field. Most of his generals were old, without 
sufficient energy or initiative. The chief command was entrusted 
to the Duke of Brunswick, who had led the Prussians in the ill- 
fated Valmy campaign. He was an advocate of peace, was 
afraid of losing his duchy, and was overawed by Napoleon's mili- 
tary prestige. 

The management of Prussian policy since Haugwitz signed 
the Treaty of Vienna * had convinced a group of Prussian offi- 
cials, among them the Baron vom Stein, that the way of safety 
and honor was through a radical change of men and system, 
stein Stein had been a minister since 1804, without being in any sense 

mnistry responsible for the policy of the government, for the ministers, 
with the exception of the minister of foreign affairs, were ad- 
ministrators, entrusted with specific tasks and brought rarely into 
direct contact with the King. It was the " cabinet-ministry," 
composed of cabinet councilors and often including the minister 
of foreign affairs, which determined with the King questions of 
general policy. To this ministry belonged especially Haugwitz, 
Lombard, and Beyme, all partisans of Frederick William's policy 

4 Also called the Treaty of Schonbrunn, from the palace where it was 
signed. 



THE NEW CHARLEMAGNE 333 

of peace with profit. In April, 1806, Stein prepared a memorial, ^ ^^ ' 

urging the substitution of a ministerial council, between which 

and the King should stand no cabinet councilors. His memorial i804-07 
was couched in such passionate language that his friends thought 
it would do more harm than good. In this opinion Queen Louise, 
to whom it was shown, concurred. Nevertheless, in August, 
when it appeared necessary to give a firmer direction to affairs, 
before disaster should overwhelm, the group united in a petition 
for the removal of Haugwitz, Lombard, and Beyme, only to be 
severely rebuked by the King. Nothing remained but to await 
the lessons of defeat. 

Late in September Frederick William sent an ultimatum to 
Napoleon, demanding that as a condition of peace he should 
withdraw French troops across the Rhine and acknowledge in 
principle the formation of a North German Confederation. But Advance 
Napoleon's army was already in motion, with the heads of col- ^1^^^^°' 
umns ready to advance towards Berlin. Believing that he was 
in the presence of a combination similar to the one which he had 
broken up a year before, and learning that the Prussians, without 
waiting for the Russian army, were marching into Thuringia, ap- 
parently to cut him off from the Rhine, he decided to repeat the 
strategy of the Ulm campaign. He concentrated his army about 
Bamberg, in the upper valley of the Main, about eighty miles 
east of Frankfort. He could afford to ignore the advance of 
the Prussians toward the Rhine Valley, for if he threatened their 
line of communications with Berlin, they would be obliged to 
turn back and fight. In the inevitable battle he proposed to out- 
number them two to one. Before he knew where that battle- 
field was to be, he wrote Marshal Soult : " You may well be- 
lieve what a fine thing it would be to reach the neighborhood of 
Dresden in a battalion square of 200,000 men. Nevertheless, all 
that requires a little art." Between his position and the Prus- 
sian line of communications, however, was the watershed sepa- 
rating the upper Main and the upper Saale. This mountainous 
region is called the Franconian Wood, and is a prolongation east- 
wards of the Thuringian Forest. To cross it would require three 
marches. The danger was that a vigilant enemy might attack 
and destroy isolated corps, strung out along the mountain roads. 
To decrease the risks Napoleon formed his army into three great 
columns, each column composed of two or three corps, separated 
from one another by a distance of half a day's or a day's march. 
The columns were to take parallel roads and at the end of three 
days were to stream out into the plains of Saxony with a front 
of thirty-eight miles. The army could then be concentrated in 



334 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XX 



1804-07 



Jena and 
Auerstadt 



Collapse 
of Prus- 
sia 



forty-eight or at most seventy-two hours. The manoeuver was 
successfully completed, and as soon as the three columns were 
again in the open country the whole army swung around toward 
the left, as on a pivot, and marched directly toward the Prussian 
lines. 

The movements of the Prussian army offered a pitiable con- 
trast. Frederick William felt that honor required his presence 
with the troops, but as soon as he arrived the Duke of Brunswick 
no longer acted as full commander-in-chief. Prince Hohenlohe 
did not wish to serve under Brunswick, and a separate army was 
constituted for him. The plans of campaign were repeatedly 
changed, and the soldiers were wearied by frequent counter- 
marches or by long delays while councils of war debated. The 
rapid advance of the French took the Prussian leaders completely 
by surprise, but instead of concentrating for battle or ordering 
a retreat they debated once more. They finally adopted the plan 
of retreating upon Magdeburg, and Hohenlohe was given the 
task of protecting the movement by taking up a defensive posi- 
tion on the plateau west of Jena. On October 14 Napoleon at- 
tacked Hohenlohe and crushed his army by the weight of num- 
bers. Twelve miles away to the north, as the main army was 
pursuing its retreat, its columns stumbled upon a heavy French 
corps at Auerstadt commanded by Marshal Davout. There the 
odds were reversed, the Prussians outnumbering the French two 
to one, and yet they were unable to drive back the French, who 
fought skilfully and stubbornly. Early in the action Brunswick 
was fatally wounded, after which neither the King nor any one 
else seemed capable of giving unity to the struggle. Davout 
finally took the offensive and the Prussians fell back. They had 
not gone far before they came upon a stream of fugitives from 
the field of Jena, and the whole army, panic-stricken, was hope- 
lessly disorganized. Many soldiers threw away their guns and 
went home, and no large body of them came together again. 

The defeat of the Prussians at Jena and Auerstadt would not 
have been so memorable, had it not been followed by the total 
collapse of the national defense. The remnants of the army at- 
tempted to retreat upon Magdeburg, closely pursued by the re- 
lentless French marshals. Berlin was left defenseless and was 
occupied by Napoleon's troops on October 25. Frederick Wil- 
liam retired first to Kiistrin, then to Graudenz. Fortress after 
fortress, badly prepared to stand siege, and commanded by old 
men without energy, surrendered — Stettin to a brigade of hus- 
sars which was simply reconnoitering, and Magdeburg, with a 
garrison of 24,000, to Marshal Ney, whose corps numbered only 



THE NEW CHARLEMAGNE 335 

16,000. Soon the seat of war was transferred to the region be- ^^^' 

tween the Oder and the Vistula, and even east of the Vistula, 

while the Court took refuge in Memel, on the extreme eastern i804-07 
limits of the Prussian kingdom. 

Napoleon believed that he had overthrown the monarchy of 
Frederick the Great, and prepared the draft of a decree of depo- 
sition, awaiting merely the psychological moment to proclaim this 
new decision of fate. The sword and insignia of Frederick were 
removed from the tomb at Potsdam and sent to the Hotel des 
Invalides at Paris. Napoleon also signalized his presence in Ber- 
lin by declaring the British Isles in a state of blockade, and mak- 
ing all communication with the British unlawful within his do- 
minions and the dominions of his allies.^ Even before the seizure 
of the capital, he treated the Prussian territories west of the 
Elbe as stuff from which to carve new principaUties, or, per- 
haps, a kingdom for Jerome ; and he had laid a war contribution 
of 160,000,000 francs on Prussia and her German allies. Saxony, 
one of these, was soon detached, the Elector raised to royal dig- 
nity, and admitted to the Confederation of the Rhine. Mean- 
while Napoleon had deposed the Elector of Hesse-Cassel and the 
Duke of Brunswick. 

Although Napoleon dallied with the idea of dethroning Fred- 
erick William, he was ready to treat with him, if the Prussians 
would submit to his terms, which included the cession of the 
western provinces, the dismissal of the Russian allies, ^nd the 
pledge to join in war upon Alexander if he attempted to seize 
any Turkish territory. With each new display of Prussian weak- 
ness the French terms grew harsher, until Frederick William 
abandoned hope of peace and threw himself fully upon Russian 
support. 

In the midst of the crisis the controversy over the organization Crisis in 
of the royal government came to a climax. Haugwitz and Lom- 
bard had retired, driven out by public opinion, and the King, al- 
though unwilling to adopt the plan of a cabinet council, tried to 
induce Stein to enter a council of three ministers in which Beyme 
should control the distribution of business and the final reports. 
Stein refused to have anything to do with a scheme which em- 
bodied the most vicious feature of the old system, the interposi- 
tion of such a councilor between the King and his ministerial ad- 
visers. His manner of giving his refusal offended the King, 
who angrily accepted his resignation from the Prussian service. 
Governmental affairs drifted for a time, but gradually passed 
under the control of Hardenberg. 

^ See next chapter, The Continental System. 



Prussian 
Affairs 



336 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XX 



The 

Winter 

Campaign 



Napo- 
leon's 
Triumph 



As soon as the French armies approached the Pohsh provinces 
of Prussia, the spoil of the partitions of 1793 and 1795, the 
hopes of the Poles for the recovery of independence were stirred. 
Murat entered Warsaw on November 28 amid the plaudits of the 
inhabitants. But the only answer Napoleon would give to the 
appeals of the Poles was that they must first show themselves 
worthy of independence by forming an army capable of defend- 
ing it. He needed troops for the inevitable struggle with the 
Russians, and yet it was by no means clear that he could satisfy 
the aspirations of the Poles without gaining the enmity of Aus- 
tria, which had Polish provinces to lose, and this would menace 
a line of communications as long as his line a year before on the 
eve of Austerlitz. The danger increased as he attempted to march 
late in December along the fathomless roads and over the deso- 
late plains of Poland. The soldiers, suffering from hunger and 
"disease, began to grumble because they were used to support 
schemes which had no real relation to the interests of France. 
In February, Napoleon received a serious check at Eylau, not far 
from Konigsberg, and, had the Russians followed up their ad- 
vantage, he would have been obliged to withdraw west of the 
Vistula. He now renewed his efforts to persuade the Turks to 
attack the Russians, and negotiated a treaty with the Persians, 
both to secure aid for the Turks, and to prepare for an eventual 
attack upon India. 

Napoleon's enemies gave him time to conjure the peril as they 
had done in 1805. Austria did not stir, resolved to husband her 
resources for a better day ; and England was exasperatingly slow, 
given to small expeditions, chiefly in regions which would 
strengthen her maritime power. In 1806 she seized the Cape, 
but failed at Buenos Ayres. A temporary success in southern 
Italy had been followed by futile expeditions to Constantinople 
and Egypt. A change of ministry in March, 1807, with George 
Canning at the ministry of foreign affairs, raised the hopes of the 
Russians and Prussians ; but three more months were allowed to 
pass, and then it was too late. 

In April Alexander and Frederick William signed the Treaty 
of Bartenstein, to which Austria, England, and the minor powers 
were asked to give adhesion. The treaty stated the aims of the 
alliance to be the deliverance of both Germany and Italy from 
French control, without meaning, necessarily, that Napoleonic 
dynasties should cease to rule in Naples, in the kingdom of Italy, 
and in Holland. Napoleon used the late winter and spring to 
organize an army which should outnumber the Russian troops 
and the small Prussian contingent nearly two to one, with a re- 



THE NEW CHARLEMAGNE 337 

serve army in central Germany to keep the Austrians from inter- *'5x*' 

fering. To accomplish this he was obliged to demand of the 

French 80,000 conscripts of the year 1808. By such sacrifices I804.07 
victory was assured, and at Friedland, June 14, it was made 
crushing through the bad strategy of the Russians, a reminiscence 
of the blunders at Austerlitz. 

The consequences of Friedland were a diplomatic revolution 
which transformed the Czar Alexander from the defender of 
Europe against the enterprises of a military upstart into his close Napoleon 
ally, proposing to divide with him the spoils of the East and the Alexander 
West. Alexander had been serious with his schemes of libera- 
tion, but he had gained no support from either Austria or Eng- 
land, and Prussia was too feeble to assist effectively in her own 
deliverance. Many Russians were bitterly opposed to what they 
regarded as a Quixotic policy, believing that Russian arms should 
be directed toward the conquest of the Danubian provinces or 
Swedish Finland. Moreover, Alexander was astonished to find 
that after his defeat Napoleon said nothing of territorial sacri- 
fices, but only of accessions, offering all the land east of the Vis- 
tula for an alliance against the English. Before Alexander's 
mind hovered visions of an Empire of the East and an Empire 
of the West which should share the control of Europe. Nego- 
tiations began formally with a conference on a raft anchored in 
the Nieman near Tilsit. It is said that Alexander's first words 
were, " I hate the English as much as you do, and I will second 
you in all your actions against them," and that Napoleon's reply 
was, " In that case all can be arranged and peace is made." 

Nevertheless obstacles were soon discovered, especially in the 
Polish and Turkish problems. Although the Czar declined to 
accept Napoleon's offer of the crown of a restored Poland, he Treaty 
was unwilling that this crown should be placed on the head of '^ 
Napoleon's brother Jerome, as Napoleon suggested. While they 
were discussing the Turkish question, Alexander placed his finger 
significantly upon Constantinople, and Napoleon instantly ex- 
claimed, " Never ! That would be the empire of the world ! " 
The Polish problem was solved provisionally by constituting out 
of New East Prussia and South Prussia — mainly the provinces 
Prussia gained in 1793 and 1795 — the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, 
which under the King of Saxony as grand duke should enter the 
Confederation of the Rhine. The solution of the Eastern ques- 
tion provided that France should mediate between Russia and 
Turkey, and that in case the mediation was unsuccessful the 
Turks should be deprived of their European lands except Rumelia 
and Constantinople ; but it did not state definitely what the Rus- 



338 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^^^' sians should get. Alexander's friendly intervention saved the 

King of Prussia from total ruin, and Napoleon promised to re- 

1804-07 store all lands east of the Elbe upon payment of an indemnity, 
the amount of which was, unfortunately, not specified. The dis- 
trict of Bialystock was, however, to be given to the Czar. Such 
were the important features of the treaty which the two emperors 
signed at Tilsit on July 7, 1807. In it Alexander also recognized 
Napoleonic creations in Germany and Italy, including a new 
kingdom of Westphalia, composed mainly of Hesse-Cassel, Bruns- 
wick, the west-Elbe provinces of Prussia and Hanover. With 
Napoleon the principal advantage was Alexander's promise to 
exclude English trade and declare war upon England in case the 
English refused to make peace. The minor courts of Stockholm, 
Lisbon, and Copenhagen were to be invited to join in the conti- 
nental crusade, and, if they refused, were to be treated as enemies. 

The chief provisions of the Treaty of Tilsit were repeated in a 
treaty which Napoleon signed with Frederick William immedi- 
ately afterward. Queen Louise sought by personal entreaties to 
save at least Magdeburg, but her efforts were unavailing. Prus- 
sia also agreed to declare war upon England in case Alexander's 
intervention did not bring about peace. 

Two or three startling incidents served as pendants to the 
Tilsit agreement. The British ministry, receiving inexact reports 
Fate of of the arrangement in regard to the minor neutrals, particularly 
Denmark, resolved to be beforehand with Napoleon. An agent 
was sent to Denmark with an offer of alliance, asking that Eng- 
land hold the Danish fleet as a pledge, and, when the Danes de- 
clined, an expedition of overwhelming force was sent to Copen- 
hagen, on the supposition that they would see that resistance was 
useless. But the Danes felt in honor bound to resist, and the 
fleet bombarded the city for three days, finally compelling the sur- 
render of the Danish ships. This high-handed proceeding di- 
verted attention from Napoleon's manner of persuading neutrals 
to accept his offers of protection. At that very time he was en- 
gaged upon plans to coerce the Portuguese, whom he had begun 
to threaten as soon as he returned from Tilsit, and in October 
he negotiated a treaty with Spain looking to the partition of 
Portugal. A French force reached Lisbon on November 30, only 
to find that the Court, with the treasure and the archives, had 
sailed for Brazil under the protection of a British fleet. The at- 
tack on Copenhagen added the Danes to the allies of Napoleon, 
but Sweden refused to abandon its alliance with the English and 
Alexander invaded Finland and drove out the Swedish troops. 
To check a rising of Finns he formally recognized the rights of 



Neutrals 



THE NEW CHARLEMAGNE 339 

the Grand Duchy and assumed the title of Grand Duke of Fin- chap. 

land. 

In the bitter controversies which preceded the outbreak of war 1804-07 
in 1803 Napoleon had declared to the English that if through 
their machinations a new coalition was formed against France 
he would be forced to conquer Europe and bring into being that 
" Empire of the Gauls " which they affected to dread. He had 
now apparently made good his threat. The question was, Would 
his triumph lead to the humiliation of the English ? 



CHAPTER XXI 



THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM 



CHAP. 
XXI 



4 4^nr^ 



HE time approaches when England shall be declared in 



Origin 
of the 
System 



serted in the army bulletin issued nine days after Jena, Napoleon 
indicated the final step which must render inevitable the ruin 
of the English. Before he published the decree which should 
make known the destiny of another presumptuous nation, he 
waited until he had entered in triumph the capital of the humili- 
ated Prussians. In a setting so dramatic appeared, on Novem- 
ber 21, 1806, the Berlin Decree, which is commonly taken as 
the formal estabhshment of the Continental System. But this 
decree, comprehensive in scope, and sententious in form, pro- 
vided for a continuation, rather than a beginning, and in its 
more violent features was a resumption of threats first used by 
the Convention and the Committee of Public Safety. Napoleon 
and his advisers were engaged in applying on a grander scale 
policies which their predecessors had tried to carry into effect 
with insufficient means. After the Treaty of Tilsit the means 
at his disposal were such that success seemed not far from his 
grasp, but he soon spoiled the plan and compassed his own ruin 
by the blunder of attempting to treat the Spaniards as clay of 
the same texture as the Neapolitans, the Dutch, and the Germans 
of the Rhenish Confederation. 

The origin of the Continental System must be sought at least 
as far back as 1793. A month after war broke out in February 
of that year the Convention proscribed English merchandise, and 
a little later ordered the arrest of all British subjects. Not only 
were importers of British goods threatened with the severest 
punishment, but those who used such goods were declared sus- 
picious persons. Under the Directory this policy was rendered 
more systematic by the law of October 31, 1796, which pro- 
hibited the entry of several classes of manufactured goods, par- 
ticularly cotton and woolen fabrics, iron and steel products, and 
refined sugar, on the ground that they were English, whatever 
certificates of origin accompanied them. England's control of 
the sea made necessary the modification of the rule regarding 
refined sugar, and in 1799 a high duty was substituted for abso- 

340 



THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM 341 



lute prohibition, but importers were obliged to pretend that the 
sugar was not English. Meanwhile, other articles, either neces- 
sary in the processes of French manufacture or demanded by- 
fashion, were obtained through the medium of the contraband 
trade, which had grown to enormous proportions. In the sum- 
mer of 1800 the prefect of police reported that Paris was full 
of English goods and that although they were openly displayed 
it was impossible to effect seizures. He estimated that within 
five months English cottons to the value of three millions of 
francs had been sold. The First Consul reproached the women 
because they wore muslins, undoubtedly made in England, in- 
stead of French silks or linens. This was the situation when 
the Peace of Amiens was signed and the proscription of English 
merchandise lost the character of a war measure. 

The theory of such war measures was that the English were 
a nation of traders, that out of the profits of trade they main- 
tained their navy, subsidized the enemies of France, and paid 
for the plots which kept her in a state of ferment, and that as 
they could not be reached directly, because the French navy was 
disorganized, the surest method of forcing them to beg for 
peace was to close their continental market. Wherever French 
armies went, therefore, one of their objects was to put an end 
to trade with England. Just before the Committee of Public 
Safety ceased to direct the policies of the Republic, it expressed 
the hope of excluding the English " from the Continent, and 
closing it to them from Gibraltar to the Texel." General Bona- 
parte's successes made it possible for the Directory to extend 
the limits of this exclusion. The development of the contra- 
band trade, however, left the plan still mainly in a state of 
theory. 

These measures had another motive, equally powerful, al- 
though it remained in the background during the war. Many 
French manufacturers beheved that the treaty of commerce of 
1786 between France and England had exposed them to a ruin- 
ous competition and they welcomed the opportunity to return to 
the policy of prohibitions, characteristic of the older commercial 
regime. They aspired to control the French market and to gain 
every new market from which the English, their most serious 
competitors, were excluded. In the Continental System, there- 
fore, it is necessary to distinguish the elements which were parts 
of the permanent commercial pohcy of France from those which 
had the more temporary aim of ruining a dangerous enemy. 

The tariff of 1791 had contained few prohibitions and these 
were of little consequence; and with good reason, for England 



CHAP. 
XXI 



342 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XXI 



French 
TariflEs 



Tariff 
of 1806 



was protected against such prohibitions until 1798, the term 
of the treaty of commerce. French manufacturers were forced 
to wait until war furnished an excuse for the abandonment of 
the treaty stipulations, and when, eight years later, peace was 
made, they did not mean to return to the regime of English 
competition. At an early stage in the negotiations the First 
Consul had offered to agree to the preparation of a treaty of 
commerce, the special prohibitions of English merchandise being 
suspended, but nothing was stipulated with regard to the matter 
in the Preliminaries of London, or in the Treaty of Amiens. 
By that time pressure had been brought to bear upon him by 
the manufacturers, increasing his own preference for strongly 
protective measures. It was intimated in the official Moniteur 
in October, 1801, that treaties of commerce were suitable to 
nations which were not rivals in the manufacture of similar 
articles. Although the merchants of Paris, whose interest was 
dilYerent from that of the manufacturers, clamored for the re- 
opening of trade, the influence of the manufacturers was greater, 
and none of the prohibitions were removed or abated. In May, 
1802, the government received authority provisionally to raise 
or lower rates, to introduce or revoke prohibitions, but the only 
use the First Consul made of the power was to place a high 
duty on certain cotton fabrics, of non-British origin, which the 
French manufacturers wanted to exclude altogether. The policy 
of the government was displayed again in the tariff law of April 
28, 1803, which made no concessions to English commerce, and 
which is regarded as one of the causes of the renewal of war 
a month later. With the war it was natural to enforce more 
rigidly the plan of prohibitions as well as to place further re- 
strictions upon neutral ships which offered facilities to the con- 
traband trade, but side by side with these extraordinary devices 
went the development of the policy of assuring to the French 
manufacturer the monopoly of the home market. The makers 
of textile goods, especially of cottons, urged the government to 
adopt the plan of absolute exclusion. 

The tariff of April 30, 1806, marks the adoption of a definite 
policy. Indeed, it remained the basis of all subsequent French 
tariffs until 1881. This excluded all manufactures of cotton 
with the exception of certain grades of thread, some of which 
could not be produced in France. These were subjected to a high 
duty. For the first time raw cotton became dutiable, but a draw- 
back was allowed in case the goods were manufactured for ex- 
port. Heavy duties were placed on all colonial products. While 
the law was under discussion Napoleon intimated to his Council 



THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM 343 

of State that he wanted to go further. He said : " Forty-eight *^S4f ' 

hours after peace with England, I shall proscribe foreign prod- 

ucts and shall promulgate an act of navigation, which will per- I8O6-12 
mit entry to our ports only to French ships. . . . There will be 
clamor, because commerce in France has a bad spirit, but six 
years afterward we shall be in the greatest prosperity." He 
was evidently determined to establish the industrial and com- 
mercial supremacy of France on the Continent. He meant not 
only to close the home market to foreigners, but through his 
political power to secure a favored position for French products 
in the markets of alHed or friendly States. Although he ap- 
peared to single out the English for attack, his measures, sooner 
or later, would afifect every industrial rival of France whether 
friend or foe. 

The warfare of commerce between Great Britain and France 
inevitably affected the trade of neutrals. Even during an ordi- position 
nary war between States it is a delicate matter to adjust the °^ ?^®"' 
rights of neutral and belligerent. As France remained weaker 
on the sea, the highway of trade, the French were at first in- 
clined to facilitate neutral commerce so far as it offered to do 
what it had become impossible for their ships to do, that is, 
provide them with their own colonial products. It was equally 
natural that England should attack such trading by neutrals. 
In the first war, to placate the United States, England finally 
permitted the " broken " voyage by which French, Spanish, or 
Dutch colonial goods could be carried by American ships to some 
port of the United States, entered for import, landed, reloaded, 
receiving as a drawback the money paid for duty, and dispatched 
on the same vessel to a port of France, Holland, or Spain. But 
England interpreted in her own interest the right of search, 
extended the list of contraband of war, and resorted to the im- 
pressment of foreign seamen. It was to abate such practices 
that the Armed Neutrality of 1801 had been formed. 

While much might be said in excuse of the practices of the 
EngHsh, their policy was not wholly defensive. The shipping 
and mercantile interests were very strong with the government, 
and as the French manufacturers seized the occasion of the war 
to estabhsh a monopoly of the home market, the English mer- 
chants used the war to strengthen the supremacy of English 
trade. In any case the neutral was narrowly watched, his rights American 
trampled on if possible, and his unique opportunity of becoming ^^ade 
enriched while most of the nations were engaged in destroying 
their neighbors and ruining themselves was seriously interfered 
with. In spite of the restriction imposed by both British and 



344 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^xxf' French, the profits of the neutral, and especially of the Amer- 

ican, who was near the French and Dutch colonies, were very 

1806-12 great. This is shown by the fact that the Americans during 
the year 1800 exported 82,000,000 pounds of sugar and 47,- 
000,000 pounds of coffee, undoubtedly the product of foreign 
colonies. When peace came and French and Dutch were able 
to take charge of their own colonial trade, American exports 
of sugar and cofTee fell to twenty and ten millions each. 

With the outbreak of war in 1803 a new golden opportunity 
opened before the neutral, and it seemed as if the bulk of the 
colonial trade with the Continent would pass into the hands 
of the Americans. In one respect the northern neutrals were 
in a still more favorable position, for they could clear from some 
port in the West Indies for a home port, and their voyage would 
carry them close to the ports of Spain, France, and Holland, so 
Seizure that they could seize a favorable opportunity to slip in. The 
American Americans, however, could use the same commercial strategy. 
Ships To protect her own mercantile and shipping interest, and to 

assist the sale of her colonial products, England reversed in 
1805 her decision about the broken voyage, and did it by the 
mouth of the same judge who had delivered the previous opin- 
ion. This was done in the case of the ship Essex, which sailed 
from Barcelona, landed her cargo at Salem, refitted, reloaded 
the cargo, which meanwhile had been regularly imported, re- 
ceived the drawback on the duties paid, and sailed for Havana. 
The judge held that in deciding whether the rule of 1756 had 
been infringed the intention of the shippers must be examined. 
Under the new ruhng many ships were seized, the owners of 
which were acting on the understanding that the previous de- 
cisions were still authoritative. Even before this decision 
struck a severe blow at the American trade with the West Indies, 
it had suffered from the rapacity of the British prize courts, 
which had a pecuniary interest in condemning all prizes brought 
in. The situation was modified again in the spring of 1806, 
when the trouble with Prussia led the English to proclaim a 
blockade of the Continent from the river Elbe to the port of 
Brest 

The treatment of the American neutral was peculiarly ob- 
noxious, the American coast was closely watched, and some har- 
bors practically blockaded by British ships of war or privateers. 
In 1806 the British ship Leander oK Sandy Hook fired a shot 
across the bows of a vessel which her commander wished to 
search, and the shot ricochetting across the waters killed the 
steersman of a coasting schooner. When British ships were 



THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM 345 

not about, French ships were likely to appear. It was unfortu- ^^^f' 

nately true that the United States was not strong enough to 

enforce respect for her rights as a neutral, and that in a struggle 1806-12 
so fierce the officials of neither France nor England were likely 
to be over punctilious in dealing with the weak who got in the 
way. Jefferson's administration attempted to procure better 
treatment by the threat of a non-importation act in accordance 
with which certain classes of goods of British origin might be 
prohibited.^ 

One of the most serious grievances of the American neutral 
arose from the Enghsh practice of impressing seamen. Condi- The im- 
tions in the navy had not been markedly improved since the Q^gs^tTon'* 
great mutinies of 1797. The discipline was harsh, the wages 
low, and no reliance was placed upon voluntary enlistment, be- 
cause the service was unpopular. In the ports the press gang 
swept up sailors loitering in their usual resorts, while on the sea 
ships of war stopped merchant vessels and took off the men 
they wanted, without being over curious about the question of 
nationality. As the English conception of the indefeasibihty of 
allegiance did not recognize the right of naturalization, English- 
men who had become American citizens were still regarded as 
liable to impressment. In this the English were not ideally con- 
sistent, for parliamentary legislation during the colonial period 
was the basis of the American system of naturalization, but 
they were not ready to see these principles applied to their dis- 
advantage. They found excuse in the fact that deserters from 
the English marine could often obtain naturalization papers 
without the requirement of the ordinary term of residence. As 
the profits of neutral commerce grew the demand for sailors in- 
creased, and wages on American ships rose from nine to forty- 
two dollars a month. The English believed that 30,000 or 40,- 
000 seamen of British birth were on American ships, engaged 
in building up a trade which was bound to cripple their own. 
It seemed intolerable to them that deserters even from their navy 
should be received on board American vessels. Their exaspera- 
tion was increased by a feehng of contempt for the Americans. 
For this reason a question which could have been adjusted by 
calm negotiation became hopelessly involved, and not merely 
acted as a cause of war, but also remained an irritating recollec- 
tion in the American national tradition. The English also were 
angry because the Americans appeared to be the alUes of Na- 
poleon in his attempts to force them to submission. 

Such was the general situation when by the Berlin Decree, 
1 Made effective in November, 1806, and again in December, 1807. 



346 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XXI 



The Ber- 
lin Decree 



Orders in 
Council 



Napoleon sought to make as wide as the Continent his attack 
upon the EngHsh manufacturer, planter, merchant, and shipper. 
In the " considerations " which prefaced the decree he enum- 
erated England's offenses against international law in order to 
justify his pose as champion of the liberty of the seas. There 
were, indeed, enough of these offenses, but by adding several 
articles to the international code of practice he increased their 
number. For example, he pretended to regard it as extraordi- 
nary that England should blockade any but strong places and 
claimed for private property at sea an immunity which he had 
not granted to private property on land. If the neutrals had 
been inclined to accept seriously his championship of their rights, 
they were soon disillusioned, for the decree practically ordered 
them to cease trading with the British Isles, and made British 
goods wherever found liable to seizure. This was a more seri- 
ous menace to the few neutrals still within reach of Napoleon's 
armies than to those, like the Americans, who were guarded 
from his attacks by a vast expanse of ocean. The declaration 
that the British Isles were in a state of blockade, however, was 
not even mere stage thunder, for it exposed neutral ships to 
capture by French privateers or wandering cruisers. The Amer- 
ican minister at Paris was assured that the decree did not apply 
to his fellow-countrymen. Its principal immediate consequence 
was to bring a rejoinder from the British, cutting off neutrals 
from the coasting trade between ports from which British ships 
were excluded. Napoleon was for several months deeply ab- 
sorbed in the winter and spring campaign in Poland and Prussia, 
and he could give little attention to the enforcement of his Conti- 
nental System. He merely illustrated the method by confiscat- 
ing vast quantities of British goods in the Hanseatic cities. 

The Treaty of Tilsit set Napoleon's hands free and added to 
the number of England's enemies. Soon Russia, Prussia, and, 
through her own violent conduct, Denmark, were allied with the 
French against her. In order to defend her market against so 
formidable a combination, her ministers resolved that if Napoleon 
meant to prevent English wares from entering the markets of the 
Continent, they would see to it that the much-desired colonial 
goods — especially sugar, coffee, and cotton — should reach the 
Continent only through the medium of the English shipper or after 
paying duty at an English port. The method was embodied in 
the famous Orders in Council of November ii, 1807. These left 
to the neutral the direct trade between his own ports and the 
enemy's colonies, but no ship was to be permitted to sail to a 
European port without first entering a British port and paying 



THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM 347 

charges on its cargo amounting practically to an import duty, ^^^f' 

The news of these orders found Napoleon in Italy, and his reply 

was the Milan Decree, which declared denationalized and fair 18O6-12 
prize any ship which should comply with the British require- 
ments. It is obvious that a situation had now been created which 
theoretically isolated Napoleon and his alHes from all contact 
with neutrals by way of the sea, and isolated the British from all 
except their own colonies. In practice the French decrees added 
only sHghtly to the risks of trade with the English, but the Brit- 
ish regulations threatened honest neutral trade with ruin. Both 
orders and decrees were, however, subject to exceptions. 

The resentment in the United States against the English policy 
toward neutrals had meanwhile been much heightened by the at- The Em- 
tack of the British frigate Leopard on the American frigate *"^° 
Chesapeake in July, 1807, in order to force the surrender of de- 
serters who were said to have been accepted as part of the crew 
of the Chesapeake. After a brief and unequal conflict four men 
were taken from the Chesapeake, three of whom were native 
Americans previously impressed into the British service. One, 
who was an Englishman, was carried to Halifax and hanged. The 
ineffectiveness of Jefferson's retaliatory measures did not improve 
the situation. In the fall came news that Napoleon was begin- 
ning to enforce the Berlin Decree against American vessels, and 
a little while later arrived newspapers forecasting the contents 
of the new orders in council of November 11. Jefferson was con- 
vinced that America's only defense was an embargo which should 
keep her ships in port. Congress responded promptly to the 
President's request and in December the embargo went into effect. 
This prevented American ships from leaving port and permitted 
European ships to carry with them only the amount of cargo on 
board at the time of the passage of the act. It did not prevent 
foreign ships from entering American ports, and the consequences 
were therefore more serious to the American than to the British 
shipper. The Americans attempted to avoid the effects of the 
law by keeping their ships away from the ports of the United 
States or by transforming them into coasters, which once clear of 
port sailed for the West Indies or Europe. Supplementary acts 
and finally a Force Bill made such evasions increasingly difficult 
and threatened to involve the coast and river trade in the ruin 
of the foreign trade. Grass began to grow in the streets of the 
seaports, sailors were in distress, and even the farmer in remote 
valleys felt the effects of the falling off of the exports, because his 
market for grain and lumber was destroyed. 

The fate of the ships that kept the seas or evaded the law and 



348 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



Conse- 
quences of 
the Sys- 



CHAP. sailed for Europe was hardly better. Napoleon replied to the 

embargo by ordering the seizure of all American ships, on the 

1806-12 ground that they were either English ships under American col- 
ors or American ships which had complied with the British orders. 
As the seas were covered with British cruisers it was perilous 
not to comply with these orders, and yet they put a heavy charge 
upon the profits of the voyage. The supporters of the embargo 
estimated that a ship with 400,000 pounds of tobacco, bound for 
Holland, and returning with six hundred pipes of gin, would pay 
$31,000 to the English in duties, charges, and license fees.^ 

The Continental System meant that the French manufacturer 
enjoyed the monopoly of the home market and that in nearly all 
European markets he was protected from English competition. 
Had it been possible to suppress smuggling, this protection would 
have been absolute. Although the Napoleonic decrees made the 
introduction of English goods expensive, their relative cheapness 
rendered such transactions profitable. The rapid development of 
the factory system in England since the beginning of the Revo- 
lutionary period accounts for this ; machinery, for example, hav- 
ing reduced the cost of weaving a piece of cloth from 39s. gd. in 
1795 to fifteen shillings in 1810. As the French were still where 
the English were prior to 1795, the expenses and risks of the 
smuggling were covered by the large margin of profit. Moreover, 
the French could not obtain raw cotton and certain kinds of cot- 
ton fabrics except from England or through neutral commerce 
which had paid for English toleration. The prices of sugar and 
coffee in Paris at this time were so high that many could not buy 
them at all, but the desire of the Parisians for these articles was 
no less keen than before the development of Napoleon's grandiose 
schemes. The smuggler's profits were generally from forty to 
fifty per cent. 

It was through Holland and western Germany that the most 
active trade went on. Napoleon constantly found fault with his 
smuggung brother Louis for winking at such transactions, but Louis sym- 
pathized with the sufiferings of a maritime people Hke the Dutch. 
Jersey, Sardinia, Sicily, and Malta served also as points from 
which smugglers could start for the European coast; but the 
history of Heligoland, a small island thirty miles from the mouth 
of the Weser, offers the most starthng illustration of the extent 
of smuggling operations. When the English occupied it in Sep- 
tember, 1807, so many merchants made it their headquarters that 
a chamber of commerce was formed. Within the space of three 

~ Summarized by MacMaster, History of the People of the United 
States, III, 308. 



THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM 349 

months in 1808, 120 vessels were said to have discharged cargoes ^^xf 

there, and the annual volume of business amounted to eight mil- 

Hon pounds sterling. " When the French government prohibited I8O6-12 
refined sugar, the traders of Heligoland deluged the Continent 
with eau sucre. Coffee passed as horse beans, sugar as starch, 
the aliases of pepper were legion." ^ It is said that citizens of 
Hamburg crossed the Danish border to Altona, and walked back 
with all the sugar, coffee, and indigo they could carry concealed. 
" Mock funerals were organized in which consignments of colon- 
ial goods played the role of corpse." More roundabout routes 
were also attempted. Goods were landed at Salonica and car- 
ried overland into Hungary, from whence they found their way 
up the Danube to the markets of central Europe. The French, 
in order to obtain raw cotton from the Levant, tried to establish 
a route from Marseilles and Genoa through Bosnia into the Bal- 
kan Peninsula, where they hoped also to sell the cloths of Langue- 
doc. 

The Continent was nominally closed to English commerce, but 
this situation was modified not merely by the operations of smug- 
glers, but by the fact that several of England's enemies were so Licenses 
only in the sense that they were bound to Napoleon's chariot 
wheels. Many Prussian, Russian, and, later, Swedish ships were 
saved from capture by English war vessels because they pos- 
sessed English licenses to trade. These licenses could, it is said, 
be purchased in blank in Europe. The States of southern Eu- 
rope were also weak spots in the System. This was true of the 
kingdom of Etruria and the States of the Church, whose annexa- 
tion was approaching. The situation in the Spanish Peninsula 
was peculiarly unsatisfactory. Portugal in 1807 was dependent 
upon England, and must. Napoleon decided, be driven into hos- 
tility to her, but this was a business of little moment compared 
with the problem of Spain. 

Napoleon had reasons for attacking the Spanish Bourbons, be- 
sides the inefficiency of their administration, which compromised 
the success of the System. He had deposed the Bourbons in 
Naples ; his Revolutionary predecessors had driven the Bourbons Spain 
from France; the work was incomplete as long as Bourbons 
reigned in Spain. He had a special grievance. Before the battle 
of Jena, when the Prussian army still enjoyed its prestige, and 
men believed that Napoleon might be defeated, Godoy, the Span- 
ish minister, had persuaded King Charles IV to issue a call to 
arms. Although the particular enemy was not designated, it was 

3 Fisher, Napoleonic Statesmanship in Germany, 339. 



350 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XXI 



Portugal 



Napoleon 

and 

Spain 



evident that Spain desired to free herself from a burdensome al- 
liance. After the Prussian defeat at Jena, Godoy gave out that 
the mobilization had been directed against Portugal, but Napo- 
leon was not deceived, for the despatches of the Prussian ministry 
at Madrid had been seized, and he knew^ their contents. Had 
Jena been another Austerlitz, he might have given a repetition 
of the last act in the Neapolitan drama. Eylau v^as still to be 
fought and Tilsit was months away, and he contented himself by 
demanding the services of a Spanish corps of 15,000 at the mouth 
of the Elbe, the union of the Spanish with the French fleet at 
Toulon, and the rigorous application of the Berlin Decree. Not 
until he was in the midst of his operation to coerce Portugal did 
he see an opportunity to hasten the fate of the Bourbons. 

The Portuguese were unable to satisfy Napoleon by breaking 
off relations with the English ; they must in some form come 
under his control. On October 27, 1807, he signed a treaty at 
Fontainebleau with Spain providing for a partition of Portugal. 
The suspicious part of it was the concession of a province to 
Godoy, who was to be made prince, a strange requital for the 
bellicose proclamation of the yeai* before. Another part of 
Portugal was assigned to the King of Etruria in exchange for 
the cession of his kingdom, the former grand duchy of Tuscany. 
While these plans were being matured a bitter family quarrel be- 
tween Charles IV and his son Ferdinand, growing out of the 
scandalous influence of Godoy, and the appeal of each to Na- 
poleon for support, offered him the opportunity to pose as judge 
of this decadent house. The terms agreed upon at Fontainebleau 
could be utilized to disarm Spain quite as much as to procure a 
partition of Portugal. An army under Junot had already set 
out for Lisbon, and it was stipulated that a Spanish corps should 
take part in the expedition, while a reserve French army should 
be gathered at Bayonne, to cross into Spain if the English landed 
a force in Portugal. The Portuguese phase of the affair was ap- 
parently terminated late the next month when Junot arrived at 
Lisbon only to find that the Portuguese Court, with the state 
treasure, had taken refuge on board ships of war protected by 
an English fleet and had sailed for Brazil. 

The Spanish phase of the affair opened before Junot reached 
Lisbon, the reserve army having crossed the Bidassoa without 
excuse or notice. In December the Spaniards were alarmed by 
rumors of invasion, and with reason, for, although Napoleon 
had not fixed the details of his solution of the Spanish problem to 
his own satisfaction, he had been persuaded by the analogy of 
Louis XIV to place a Bonaparte upon the Spanish throne. The 



THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM 351 

marriage of Ferdinand with a princess of the imperial house of- ^J^f' 

fered one method, although not as satisfactory as the substitution 

of either Louis or Joseph Bonaparte for the Bourbon monarch. 18O6-12 
Early in January another corps entered nothern Spain and in 
February a mixed army of French and Italians invaded Catalonia, 
while Murat was appointed " Lieutenant for the Emperor in 
Spain." To explain the entry of these troops Napoleon's ambas- 
sador spoke of an expedition against Gibraltar. 

When Murat was within striking distance of Madrid, Godoy 
persuaded Charles IV to emulate the example of the Portuguese 
house, but at the news of this, Spanish rage burst out against 
the man who had made Spain so long subservient to French in- 
terests. On the night of March 17, terrified by a riot, Charles 
abdicated in favor of his son Ferdinand. Murat now saw a 
chance to bring the royal family into Napoleon's power, and, 
when he reached Madrid, he refused to recognize Ferdinand, 
persuading Charles to declare that his abdication had been pro- 
cured by force. Murat had not been informed of all Napoleon's 
plans and hoped he was erecting a throne for himself. At this 
juncture it was announced that Napoleon was coming to Madrid, 
although he did not intend to leave Bayonne, and, by a sinister 
coincidence. General Savary, the executioner of the Bourbon Duke 
d'Enghien, was chosen to persuade Ferdinand to meet Napoleon 
first at Burgos and afterwards at Vittoria. At Vittoria he was 
intimidated into crossing the frontier to Bayonne, where a few 
days later his parents and Godoy appeared. At first Napoleon 
could not frighten Ferdinand into an act of renunciation, but 
early in May the news of an uprising against the French army in 
Madrid, like another " Veronese Passover " extricated Napoleon 
from the impasse, enabling him to threaten Ferdinand with a trial 
for treason if he did not abdicate. Ferdinand had no desire to have 
his name added to the fist of Bourbon martyrs and yielded. His 
father had already abandoned all his rights to Napoleon as " the 
only one," so he declared, " who could reestablish order." 
Charles IV, the Queen, and Godoy became Napoleon's pensioners, 
and Ferdinand was strictly guarded at the chateau of Valengay, 
with Talleyrand as his jailer. 

Another act had to be presented before the comedy turned to 
tragedy. Murat appointed a Junta of Regency from Madrid 
office holders with the function of requesting that Joseph Bona- Joseph 
parte be granted to them as king. When they had done this, 150 ^oJ^aparte 
notables were summoned to Bayonne in order to beg the same 
boon, and ninety-one appeared and acted the part assigned to 
them. This body also gave the semblance of national authority 



352 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^xxi *° ^ constitution proclaimed early in July. The incident ap- 

patently terminated when Joseph accepted a formal cession of 

1806-12 ^j^g rights held by Napoleon and when Murat was chosen for the 
vacated throne of Naples. Towards the close of his life Napo- 
leon characterized the whole transaction in the words, " I em- 
barked very badly on the Spanish affair, I confess : the immoral- 
ity of it was too patent, the injustice too cynical." ^ 

At the time when Napoleon was treating with brutal contempt 
Napoleon the national honor of the Spaniards, he roused their religious 
Pope* ° passions by despoiling the Pope of several of his provinces and 
by holding him practically a prisoner in his own capital. General 
Miollis had occupied Rome in February, 1808, and in April, An- 
cona, the duchies of Urbino, Macerata, and Camerino were an- 
nexed to the kingdom of Italy. Pope Pius VII forbade the in- 
habitants to take the oath to their new sovereign under penalty 
of jeopardizing their eternal salvation, and for this the papal sec- 
retary of state was expelled. In May, Tuscany was transformed 
into French departments. All Italy was now under Bonapartes, 
although the formal annexation of Rome to the French empire 
did not come until a year later. 

Long before Joseph could set out for his capital, insurrection 
had broken out in all parts of Spain. The people and the priests 
refused to believe that they had been voluntarily abandoned 
by their princes, and they looked upon Napoleon with horror as 
insurrec- the jailer of king and pope. The movements in the different 
provinces were isolated, and under control of local juntas or com- 
mittees, which displayed no zeal for union, so that it was not 
until the latter part of September that a central junta was or- 
ganized. Even then no single commander was appointed, and 
the junta attempted to direct the operations of troops in regions 
widely separated. At first few competent leaders came forward. 
Many of the notables had concluded that submission was inevit- 
able and had taken the oath to the new regime. The absence of 
responsible leadership gave to resistance too often the character 
of sanguinary insurrection. Mobs attacked not merely small 
bodies of French soldiers, but defenseless merchants, and even 
Spanish officials who thought resistance to Napoleon futile. 
The patriotic party contained many impelled by a self-sacrificing 
and enlightened spirit of national independence, and many oth- 
ers who detested the French mainly because for two decades they 
had represented liberty and progress. Smugglers and bandits 
joined in the fray as soon as the fighting began. When the reach 

4 Quoted by Rose, II. 153. 



tion in 
Spain 



THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM 



353 



and strength of the movement was perceived, those who had ^^f' 

tamely submitted to the decisions of Bayonne began to rally to 

the popular cause. I8O6.12 

From the beginning Napoleon made the mistake of underesti- 
mating the strength and persistence of the forces with which he 
had to contend. He was so anxious to keep the Grand Army 
cantoned in Germany, at the expense of the Prussians and his 
German allies, and for the sake of the influence its presence might 
have upon the politics of central and northern Europe, that he capituia- 
sent into Spain an army made up chiefly of the raw conscripts Bayie°n 
of 1807. The result was disastrous. A column of 20,000 under 
General Dupont pushed southward from Madrid towards Seville, 
but was checked by a larger number of Spanish troops and was 
soon afterwards compelled to surrender. This incident at Bay- 
len, on July 23, stirred not only Spain, but Europe. A still greater 
feat was the repulse after weeks of fighting of a French army 
from the streets of Saragossa, practically by the exertions of the 
inhabitants, for few regular Spanish troops were present. Na- 
poleon was beside himself with rage, and, although he was quite 
as responsible as Dupont, exacted vengeance upon the hapless 
officer by keeping him in prison as long as the empire lasted. 

The uprising in Spain gave England for the first time a sat- 
isfactory opportunity to place a large army on European soil. 
Early in June deputies from the Asturias were enthusiastically 
welcomed in London, and Spain was at once stricken from the 
list of England's enemies. Help was promised, the more gladly conveu- 
because the resistance of the Spaniards was not an affair of pro- ^j^^i °^ 

r . . ,. , , , . . , . Cintra 

fessional diplomacy, but was due to a genume national aversion, 
like the aversion which the English had felt since 1793, and par- 
ticularly since 1803. The enterprise bade fair also to be profit- 
able, for it might rob the French and the Continental System of 
the Iberian Peninsula. Indeed, the exports from France to Spain 
sank in one year from sixty-five to thirty-three million francs. 
This loss brought corresponding gains to the Enghsh. The 
friendship of the Spaniards might also open to them the ports 
of the Spanish colonies far better than naval expeditions had suc- 
ceeded in doing. The English instinctively perceived the magni- 
tude of Napoleon's error, and resolved to profit by it. The first 
consequence was the landing in Portugal in August of an expe- 
ditionary force under Sir Arthur Wellesley, a general already 
distinguished for his services in India, and brother of a gover- 
nor-general. This force repulsed Junot decisively, and but for 
the appearance on the scene of superior officers, dispatched thither 
by factional jealousy, Wellesley would probably have compelled 



354 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

CHAP. Junot to surrender unconditionally. Wellesley's successor signed 

a convention at Cintra, granting Junot the privilege of a return 

1806-12 ^ith his army to France on British ships. Public opinion in 
England condemned the convention, but this did not render it 
more palatable to Napoleon, especially as the English about the 
same time rescued most of the Spanish soldiers whom he was re- 
taining in Northern Germany. 

Joseph Bonaparte entered his capital on July 20, but the news 
of Baylen caused him to withdraw ten days later. By the end 
of August the French held nothing of importance south of the 
Ebro and had lost control of Portugal. Joseph feelingly wrote 
to his brother, " Your Majesty can form no idea of the hatred 
felt here for your name. Two hundred thousand Frenchmen 
would be necessary to conquer Spain, and one hundred thousand 
scaffolds would also be needed to maintain here the prince con- 
demned to reign over it." Napoleon was ready to sacrifice more 
than two hundred thousand in the effort to complete the task 
undertaken, but he was to discover that even this was not enough. 
Before he undertook the conquest he must see that the System 
did not totter and collapse at the other end of Europe. 

The agreements at Tilsit had left certain questions for the 
Napoleon future to answer. One of these concerned Turkey. The Czar 
still had his eyes upon Constantinople, and was anxious to annex 
at least the Danubian principalities. Before Napoleon went to 
Bayonne he desired a personal interview with the Czar, in order 
to bind him more closely to the Continental System, and to divert 
his mind from immediate gains along the Danube by the prospect 
of a joint expedition against the Indies. Meantime Alexander 
would serve as policeman for central Europe while Napoleon 
attacked the Spanish problem. But Alexander refused an inter- 
view without a previous understanding about the partition of 
Turkey. Napoleon started for Bayonne with the expectation 
that the seizure of Spain and the annexation of Tuscany and of 
the Papal States would give him control of the Mediterranean, 
bringing the Eastern question within the sphere of influence of 
the Grand Empire, and reducing Alexander to the position of a 
suppliant for favors. The sinister termination of the Spanish 
affair upset these calculations and in a measure reversed the 
roles. An interview became necessary to Napoleon to overawe 
the restive Austrians and put an end to agitation in Germany 
prompted by the news from Spain. Alexander consented to meet 
Napoleon at Erfurt, although many of his advisers warned him 
against a closer alliance with the French Emperor. He thought 
that the time had not yet come to overthrow the colossus, and 



and 
Alexander 



THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM 



355 



that Russia, Prussia, and Austria must wait until it had begun 
to crumble of its own weight. 

The two Emperors met on September 27 and remained together 
two weeks. Napoleon tried to dazzle Europe by the spectacle of 
kings and princes forming a magnificent court of which he was 
the center. Before a theater filled with princes and monarchs 
the members of the Comedie Frangaise played the classical pieces. 
Goethe and Wieland paid their homage to the conqueror and ad- 
ministrator of half the world. In the midst of these festivities 
there were many interviews between Napoleon and Alex- 
ander. Napoleon wished Russia to unite with him in 
compelling Austria to cease her military preparations, or 
in forcing her to join in the war against England. When 
arguments did not succeed, he tried exhibitions of rage. 
He threw his hat on the floor and stamped on it, but the Czar 
quietly declared, " Let us talk, let us reason, or I go." The result 
was a secret convention upon terms of a possible peace with 
Great Britain, with the basis uti possidetis, meaning that the 
Russians were to gain Finland and the Danubian principalities 
and that the new situation in Spain was to be recognized. France 
was to withdraw her mediation between Russia and Turkey and 
intervene only in case the Austrians took sides with the Sultan. 
In the event that Austria should attack France, Russia should 
come to her assistance. 

A few weeks before, on September 8, the Prussians had signed 
a treaty which seemed to bind them to the Napoleonic system 
still more effectively, although most of the Grand Army was 
withdrawn from Prussia to fight in Spain. Several fortresses 
on the Oder were still to be garrisoned by French troops and 
the Prussian army was limited for ten years to 42,000 men, a 
number which was not to be increased by " any extraordinary 
levy of militia or of citizen guards, nor any mustering that tends 
to augment the forces specified." In case of war with Austria 
in 1809 Prussia was to furnish 12,000 men. One of the reasons 
why the Prussians consented to these hard terms was the seizure 
of a letter from the King's principal minister Stein, in which he 
rejoiced in the success of the Spanish party of resistance and 
urged that the same spirit be everywhere stimulated in Germany. 

Napoleon after his return from Erfurt hurried south into 
Spain, where already an army, composed mainly of veterans of 
the Grand Army, had been concentrated. The Spaniards did 
not have more than half that number and were unskilfully 
handled. The result was a foregone conclusion; defeats disor- 
ganized each of their principal armies and by December Napoleon 



CHAP. 
XXI 



Spanish 
Campaign 



356 



THE REVOLUTIONARY TERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XXI 



WeUIng- 
ton's De- 
fense of 
Portugal 



was in Madrid. He took the attitude of a conqueror, as if the 
determinations of Bayonne had been destroyed by the war that 
had followed ; hoping, perhaps, to make the acceptance of Joseph 
appear to the Spaniards their only means of escaping annexation. 
During his stay in Madrid he issued a series of decrees abolish- 
ing the Inquisition, sweeping away the remains of feudalism, re- 
moving provincial customs boundaries, and reducing the num- 
ber of monasteries by two-thirds. To most Spaniards this was 
another instance of the " Greeks bearing gifts," aggravated by 
the fact that the gifts were detestable, reminding them of revolu- 
tionary and atheistic France. Napoleon intended to send columns 
to attack Seville and Lisbon, but, hearing that Sir John Moore 
with a British army was within striking distance, set off in De- 
cember to capture him. The British made good their retreat on 
Corunna, and Napoleon gave over the pursuit to Marshal Soult, 
while he returned to Paris. Soult attempted to attack Corunna 
while the British were embarking, but was repulsed. It was in 
this fight that Sir John Moore was killed. 

For the next two years the struggle in Spain went on with 
varying fortunes. In 1809 Napoleon was too much absorbed in 
a new conflict with Austria to give it much attention, relying on 
his marshals to effect the capture of Lisbon and to occupy south- 
ern Spain. In Portugal, Soult got no further than Oporto, when 
he was attacked by Wellesley, who in April had returned with 
supreme command of the British forces. Soult was glad to escape 
across the mountains into Galicia with the sacrifice of his baggage 
and artillery. Through the faulty cooperation of his Spanish 
colleagues Wellesley was less successful against Victor, who had 
Seville as his objective point. He won the bloody battle of Tala- 
vera in July, but was soon obliged to retreat into Portugal to 
escape a large army sent under Soult to cut his line of communi- 
cations. When the Austrian campaign was over heavy reinforce- 
ments were despatched to Spain by Napoleon, and early in 1810 
the French successfully occupied Andalusia and drove the Span- 
iards back upon Cadiz, In August a French army under Massena 
began a march upon Lisbon, to defend which Wellesley, now 
Viscount Wellington, devised a remarkable plan. He constructed 
three lines from the Tagus to the sea, the first of which was 29 
miles long, and which, altogether, included 126 closed redoubts, 
mounting 427 guns. The inhabitants of the region through which 
the French army would advance were required to remove or 
destroy their food supplies, and withdraw to Lisbon or Oporto, 
possibly to the mountains. While the Anglo-Portuguese army 
should man the " Lines of Torres Vedras," as the fortifications 



THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM 357 

were called, bodies of militia should hang on the flanks and rear ^^^f ' 

of the French force, cut off their communications, seize foragers 

or stragglers, and prevent their control of any except the ground I8O6-12 
on which they stood. Massena reached Wellington's lines on 
October 12, after suffering a smart repulse at Busaco on Septem- 
ber 27. He speedily realized that assault was futile, and, after 
lingering about Santarem until his army was in a starving con- 
dition, in March, 181 1, he began his retreat into Spain. 

In Austria, as well as in Germany, every phase of the tragedy 
of 1808 had been watched with intense interest. The loyal sub- 
jects of the House of Hapsburg could not regard as final a sit- rears of 
nation which had excluded Austria from her traditional position ^^^^^^^^ 
in Europe. Events had followed one another in a series which 
also awakened forebodings. Pressburg had been supplemented 
by the agreements with the States of the Rhenish Confederation, 
and these by Tilsit. In the negotiations for the settlement of the 
question of the Turkish empire Austria had not been consulted, 
although early in 1808 she was forced to adhere to the Conti- 
nental System. Still more ominous seemed the overthrow of the 
Bourbons in Spain, especially because this had been accomplished 
without protest from Russia, the only great independent power 
besides Austria left on the Continent. Austrian statesmen looked 
upon their empire as peculiarly open to a new Napoleonic ven- 
ture, because the French federative system might be extended by 
breaking up their own federation. It is not surprising, there- 
fore, that rumors that Austria was arming reached Paris early 
in the summer. In June the Emperor Francis had initiated the 
reorganization of the army by creating a Ictndwehr in which all 
men from eighteen to twenty-five should be enrolled, and the 
Archduke Charles addressed himself to the task of improving 
the different branches of the service. What Francis would at- 
tempt depended upon the attitude of other States, but it was cer- 
tain that he would not be ready for a struggle until 1809, and 
consequently Metternich, his ambassador at Paris, denied em- 
phatically the reports of hostility. 

During the winter the war party at Vienna gained the as- 
cendant, arguing that the stubborn resistance of the Spaniards 
and the presence of the English in Portugal would cripple Na- 
poleon so that he could not place more than 200,000 men on the 
Austrian frontier. They hoped that if war broke out the Prus- 
sians would rise and they did not despair even of the Russians, 
being confidentially informed of the misunderstandings at Erfurt 
between Napoleon and Alexander. They also counted on finan- 
cial aid from the English and a possible diversion made by the 



358 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

CHAP, landing of English troops in northwestern Germany. These hopes 

were quickened by the fear that Napoleon would attack them 

1806-12 anyway, for financial reasons if for no other. Spain was prov- 
ing a heavy drain upon his resources, and some means had to 
be found to fill his treasury. He would not abandon the profit- 
able principle which he had learned from the Revolutionists, that 
war must pay for war. The Austrians found that they could 
expect no assistance from either Prussia or Russia, and yet in 
February, 1809, they decided to fight. Unfortunately for them 
they had also miscalculated the ability of Napoleon to raise troops 
for the campaign. He summoned the conscripts of 1810 in Sep- 
tember, 1808, and in 1809 he called to the colors all who had not 
served in the classes from 1806 to 1809. By such means the 
number of soldiers was forced up to 800,000, including 200,000 
German auxiliaries. Of these 300,000 were kept in Spain. The 
quality of the troops was, however, beginning to deteriorate, be- 
cause of the youth fulness of the conscripts, called a year or a 
year and a half before the regular age. 

The campaign opened with the Austrian invasion of Bavaria 
in April. In a proclamation to his soldiers the Archduke Charles 
The Aus- declared, " The freedom of Europe has taken refuge under your 
Campaign banners, your victories will loose her chains, and your German 
brethren, now in the enemy's ranks, await their deliverance." At 
the outset the Austrians had the advantage of earlier concentra- 
tion, for Napoleon had misjudged the time at which the war would 
begin, but the disorganization of their commissariat, resulting in 
movements unusually slow, cost them this advantage, and a few 
days after Napoleon's arrival they were driven in full retreat into 
the Bohemian mountains. Napoleon pressed on to Vienna, believ- 
ing that the possession of the capital would enable him to dic- 
tate terms of peace, but the Austrians were not ready to yield. 
He used his presence in the enemy's capital, however, to announce 
the annexation of Rome to the French empire, revoking the gift 
made by his " august predecessor," " Charlemagne, Emperor of 
the French." A few days later when he attempted to cross the 
northern bank of the Danube and attack the Archduke Charles, 
he was awakened rudely to actualities. Before the movement 
was completed, he was attacked by the Austrians at Aspern-Ess- 
ling and his bridge of boats, over which reinforcements must be 
brought, was broken by masses of material which they floated 
down upon it. After a day of the most stubborn fighting he was 
forced back to the island of Lobau. This defeat deprived him 
of the glamour of invincibility, but six weeks later he was more 
successful in establishing a position on the northern bank, and 



vrtth Aus- 
tria 



THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM 359 

defeated the Austrians at Wagram, almost on the same field, ^xxf 

Francis I was ready to abandon the struggle, and on October 14, 

after waiting several weeks in the hope of English or Prussian 18O6-12 
intervention, signed the Treaty of Schonbrunn.^ His loyal sub- 
jects in Tyrol carried on a desperate struggle against the French 
and Bavarians until December. Their leader, Andreas Hofer, 
was finally betrayed, taken to Mantua and shot. The hope of 
assistance from the Germans had seemed at one time not alto- 
gether illusory. Colonel Schill led his cavalry regiment out of 
Berlin in April to give the signal, but the people did not stir and 
he was killed a few weeks later at Stralsund. In the summer the 
young Duke of Brunswick startled Germany by a raid from 
Bohemia across Saxony to Brunswick, eventually taking refuge 
on board the English fleet. 

The terms of peace embodied in the Treaty of Schonbrunn were Peace 
hard. They did not constitute a settlement, but, rather, reasons 
for another war a few years later. The Austrians were obliged 
to cede Austrian Galicia to the grand duchy of Warsaw, a portion 
of East Galicia to Alexander, and certain western districts to 
Bavaria. The greatest blow was the creation of the Illyrian 
Provinces out of Carniola, a part of Carinthia and Croatia, with 
the coast about Trieste. Nor was money forgotten. In addition 
to the contribution levied during the war, 85,000,000 in coin were 
now required. Austria also agreed to reduce her active army to 
150,000. 

The question of the succession had perplexed Napoleon ever 
since the possibility of imperial power first appealed to his im- Marriage 
agination. It troubled his adherents also, for upon its proper 
solution depended the stability of the regime to which they owed 
titles, incomes, and worldly influence. Even Napoleon's settle- 
ment of the controversies inherited from the Revolution, and 
his work of reorganization, appeared to depend too much on 
the chances of his life. The solution of the problem seemed 
to lie in a dynastic marriage, which might also serve as a pledge of 
peace after the long struggle of France against the world. This 
accounts for the rumors that Napoleon intended to divorce Jose- 
phine, who had borne him no children. At Erfurt he spoke 
vaguely to Alexander about a marriage alliance. After he re- 
turned from Vienna in 1809 he intimated to Josephine the neces- 
sity of divorce. Negotiations were opened once more with 
Russia for a sister of the Czar, and with Austria for an archduch- 
ess. Alexander's answer was bound to be unfavorable, because 

•5 Also called the Treaty of Vienna. 



Alliance 



36o THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^x^" ^^ referred the matter to his mother, who hated Napoleon bitterly. 

Napoleon's advisers, therefore, favored an Austrian marriage, and 

1806-12 Francis was ready to sacrifice his daughter Maria Louisa to pre- 
serve the remnants of his empire. The ever convenient instru- 
ment of a senatus consulte freed Napoleon from the civil bond 
and the metropolitan of Paris declared that the religious ceremony, 
performed in 1804, had been irregular and was, therefore, invahd. 
Josephine retired to Malmaison, followed by public sympathy, 
while Maria Louisa reigned in her stead. Already a place and 
title were prepared for an heir who was to be called " The Prince 
Imperial " and to " bear the title and receive the honors of King 
of Rome." 

In 1810, when the Continental System had broken down in 
Annexa- Spain and Portugal, Napoleon attempted to strengthen it along 
HoUand ^he coast of the North Sea by annexing Holland and northwestern 
Germany. King Louis Bonaparte had not enforced the system 
to the satisfaction of his brother, and he was plainly told that he 
could retain his crown only if he kept English goods out of Hol- 
land. American ships had begun to visit Dutch ports again, 
since the Non-Intercourse Act had replaced the embargo. As 
these ships had complied with the requirements of the British 
Orders in, Council he demanded that Louis order their confisca- 
tion. Louis regarded the situation as intolerable, and, abdicat- 
ing the throne on July i, fled to the dominions of the Emperor 
Francis. Annexation followed in a few days. The first punish- 
ment visited upon the Dutch was the exaction of a tax of fifty 
per cent, on the colonial products discovered in their warehouses. 
Northwestern Germany, another sphere for the operations of 
smugglers, was annexed in December, and this carried the French 
frontier up to the shores of the Baltic just beyond Liibeck. With 
the exception of the Iberian Peninsula, the coast of Europe from 
the borders of Denmark to the kingdom of Naples was now in 
the hands of Napoleon's officials. The consequences for Great 
Britain must have been serious except for the outcome of the 
Spanish adventure and the results of the French license system. 
As soon as Great Britain undertook to aid the Spanish party 
The of resistance English ships were welcome wherever the French 

coronies were not actually in possession. Portugal was also under British 
control almost continuously from the summer of 1808. England 
regained the trade with Brazil after the reestablishment of 
friendly relations with the exiled royal house. In the Spanish 
colonies she had long profited by a large contraband trade. When 
she was involved in war with Spain the only way to control these 
colonial markets was through conquest. In i8c6 Buenos Ayres 



THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM 361 

had been captured, but it was recaptured by the inhabitants within ^^^' 

six weeks. Montevideo was seized and held for several months, 

while English ships flocked to the harbors and English merchants I8O6-12 
enjoyed a thriving trade in goods of which the inhabitants had 
long been deprived. It is said that people came from the slopes 
of the Andes attracted by the new market. This was merely a 
temporary advantage, but when Napoleon deposed the Bourbon 
monarchs the Spanish colonies revolted. The Spanish Central 
Junta and the Regency that succeeded could not expect to main- 
tain the old commercial monopoly in its rigor and one after an- 
other the Spanish colonial ports were opened to British and 
neutral commerce. This gave the British the opportunity to sell 
part of their accumulated stocks of merchandise, and British ex- 
ports rose from £37,275,000 in 1808 to £48,438,000 in 1810. The 
principal element in this increase appeared to have been the pro- 
scribed cottons, the exports of which were £18,616,000 in 1810, 
and only £9,846,000 in 1808. 

In the United States the policy of the embargo had proved so Repeal 
ineffective and unpopular that just before Jefferson's second term Embargo 
closed the act was repealed. It was replaced by a Non-Inter- 
course Act, forbidding trade with the offending States until their 
obnoxious decrees and orders should be withdrawn. This pro- 
voked reprisals from Napoleon, and by the Rambouillet decree 
in March, 1810, he ordered the seizure of American ships, al- 
though he did not publish the decree for two months after its 
adoption. He utilized the opportunity to seize many American 
ships which meanwhile entered Dutch, Neapolitan, and Spanish 
ports in good faith. The Non-Intercourse Act gave way in turn 
to a bill authorizing the President by proclamation to impose non- 
intercourse with one of the two powers, should the other agree 
to withdraw its decrees. As soon as Napoleon heard this he con- 
fronted the Americans with a dilemma, for he promised to revoke 
the Berlin and Milan decrees, so far as they were concerned, if 
England withdrew her orders or the Americans caused her to 
respect their rights as neutrals. When the English took no steps 
towards this, Madison imposed non-intercourse with them, after 
reopening trade with France. 

While Napoleon was urging his allies to enforce the Continental 
System against the English, he prepared to share with the English 
the profits of the monopoly they continued to enjoy in colonial Napo- 
goods. His practice of issuing licenses, regularized in 1806 and j^cense 
developed in 181 o, permitted the entry of most English goods 
with the exception of cottons. The question had early been 
raised, What should be done with prize cargoes? and in Jan- 



362 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^xxf' "^^y' 1810, the government authorized the sale of such cargoes, 

even if the goods belonged to the prohibited classes, provided that 

1806-12 ^ gg^j ^^g appended indicating that they were " prize-goods " 
and that a duty amounting to forty per cent, was paid. From this 
source the government hoped to increase its income substantially, 
and as not enough prizes were taken to assure the estimated in- 
come, the officials winked at the introduction of prohibited arti- 
cles, labeling them " prize-goods." Cottons, however, were de- 
stroyed, the government indemnifying the captors. The extra- 
legal trade was increased by the issue of licenses, effective for 
limited periods, permitting the importation of prohibited goods 
in case the merchant should export an equivalent amount of 
French products. As these products were excluded from Eng- 
land the merchants sometimes turned their exports over to smug- 
glers, or loaded boxes of sand marked with deceptive labels, and 
threw them overboard when the ships were out of sight of land. 
The license system incidentally opened the way to the corruption 
of officials, and provoked vehement protests from manufacturers 
and traders who could not enjoy its expensive privileges. 

When Napoleon was convinced that the colonial trade was com- 
pletely under the control of the English, and that smugglers were 
System obtaining the profits of the demand which still existed, he sought 
and^^e- by the Trianon tariff of August 5, 1810, to add these profits to 
crees the government revenue. This tariff charged about fifty per cent, 

on coffee, cocoa, sugar, and raw cotton. In the case of cotton 
the duty varied with the place of origin, that is, Levant cotton 
was charged two francs a pound and American cotton twice as 
much. This was a heavy blow for the cotton manufacturers and 
threatened their business with ruin. It also increased the diffi- 
culties of the dealers in colonial products, and on both accounts 
is to be regarded as one of the causes of the terrible panic from 
which France suffered from the fall of 1810 to the summer of 
181 1. The situation was rendered still worse by the Fontaine- 
bleau decree of October 18, 1810, in which he ordered the de- 
struction of all products of British manufacture, except such as 
had been admitted under his licenses. Seizures were especially 
frequent in Germany, upon the pretext that goods accumulated 
within four days' march of the imperial frontier were des- 
tined to the contraband trade. Some of these goods were taken 
to Antwerp and sold, but the cottons were publicly burnt. Na- 
poleon urged the Czar to imitate this action and to seize the 
neutral vessels, chiefly American, in the Baltic ports, on the 
ground that they were carrying British goods. He wrote to 
Alexander that such a blow would be decisive and would bring 



THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM 363 

the English to terms at once. Alexander, however, would not ^^^xf" 

listen to these proposals which were contrary not only to the 

stand Russia had taken ten years before on the rights of neutrals I8O6-12 
but also to the interests of Russian merchants. 

About the time when Napoleon's license system assumed large 
proportions the English began to restrict the issue of licenses, 
especially as they discovered that he thought it necessary to re- 
open trade to this extent. They had also resorted to other de- 
vices to keep open trade with the Continent. One was to send 
out American vessels which had never seen America, and " whose 
papers were manufactured in London." ^ Napoleon's willing- 
ness to permit French exports to England relieved the English in 
a notable crisis. The grain crop of 1809 was a partial failure, 
and that of 1810 an almost total failure, with the result that the 
average price of wheat in August, 1810, was 116 shilHngs a quar- 
ter. There would have been actual famine had not quantities 
of grain been obtained from France and her dependencies. 

The consequences of such a vast system of government in- French 
terference with the ordinary currents of trade were serious. Exports 
There was much suffering, principally beyond the borders of 
France, but also in those French towns which depended on mari- 
time commerce. For example, the number of ships fitted out 
in Bordeaux in 1802 had been 224, and in 181 o it was only 29. 
A German traveler wrote in his journal in September, 1809, that 
La Rochelle was as still as death. " You may go up and down 
the streets," he added, " without seeing a living soul. The grass 
in the streets is as undisturbed as in the fields. The population 
has fallen to a half." ^ This did not mean a decrease in exports, 
because the continental market was steadily widening. Trade 
found new land routes or reopened old ones. In 1806 the ex- 
ports were 143 millions more than they had been in 1802, the 
year of maritime peace. On this trade Strasbourg in France, 
and Frankfort and Leipzig in Germany, where great fairs were 
held, were rapidly growing rich. But when the rigors of the 
Continental System were fully developed, there followed a sharp 
decline in trade, and exports and imports fell from 933 millions 
in 1806 to 621 in 1809. A slight recovery took place in 1810, 
but was not lasting. Napoleon's policy of wars, military contri- 
butions, heavy taxes, commercial discrimination, was bound to 
cripple the continental market. The consequence would be the 

« Quoted by W. E. Lingelbach, from a report of an American Consul, 
American Historical Review, XIX, 269-270. 

7 Quoted by Paul Darmstadter, Studien zur napoleonischen Wirtschafts- 
politik, in Vierteljahrschaft fur Social-und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, II. 577. 



364 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^xxf' **^^" °^ ^^^^ industrial supremacy which it had been his purpose 

to give to France. 

1806-12 PoHtical association with the French empire did not carry with 
it the reduction of French tariffs. Only by annexation to France 
The sys- was the area of freedom of trade on the Continent extended, and 
Dependent ^^en in this case the change was not immediate. The industrial 
states fortunes of the grand duchy of Berg may illustrate the situation 
of allied States. It was there that the famous Remscheid steel 
was manufactured. The exports of the region before the war 
had amounted to 60,000,000 francs, but by 181 1 they had fallen 
to 18,000,000. Cotton goods were affected by the tariff of 1806, 
made to protect French cottons, although, after Murat was 
moved to Naples, Berg was ruled by Napoleon. When Holland 
was annexed the coal miners on the Ruhr expected to find a 
market for their coal, but it was practically prohibited by a rate 
established in January, 181 1. The final blow was the confisca- 
tion of all colonial goods found in the grand duchy, which was, 
on Napoleon's part, an act of mad self-consistency, if the date — 
1813 — be noted, for this was when his empire beyond the Rhine 
was collapsing. 

A more striking illustration of the treatment of an aUied State 
is to be found in the case of the kingdom of Italy, over which 
Napoleon himself ruled. Shortly after his coronation he issued 
a decree prohibiting the importation of British goods. This was 
followed a year later by a decree declaring certain kinds of cot- 
tons and woolens, together with buttons and pottery, to be Eng- 
lish. As Italy manufactured few such goods, the decree con- 
ferred a monopoly upon France, and deprived several friendly 
States, notably Switzerland and Saxony, of a good market. In 
1807 Napoleon learned that Swiss calicoes were sold in large 
quantities in Italy, and in December he issued a decree which 
barred all cottons not of French origin. The next year as King 
of Italy he negotiated a commercial treaty with himself as Em- 
peror of the French, according to which the Italians conceded 
to France substantial advantages in return for benefits which 
looked better in the treaty than anywhere else. Two years later 
he subjected Italian silk to a high export duty if it was sent to 
any other country than France. This injured the Itahan manu- 
facturer, while it secured to the manufacturer of Lyons an ade- 
quate supply of raw silk. Napoleon's motto was " France first," 
as he said to the Viceroy Eugene. His measures immensely in- 
creased the French exports to the kingdom of Italy, forcing them 
up from 12,900,000 francs in 1802 to 40,000,000 in 1806 and 
51,600,000 in 1 8 10. 



THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM 



365 



1806-12 

Growth of 
French 
Manufac- 
tures 



For a few years French manufacturers had the benefit of an 
extraordinary expansion of their market, while they were pro- 
tected from Enghsh competition. Certain industries, especially 
the manufacture of hardware and of cotton goods, received such 
a stimulus that the Continental System marks an epoch in their 
development. The woolen manufactures also profited. In the 
case of silk, an article of luxury, the expansion of the business 
was so rapid until the fall of 1810 that the manufacturers could 
not keep pace with the demand. The number of looms was 
nearly double that under the old regime, although the silk in- 
dustry had been reduced to ruin by the Revolution. In 1808 it 
was reported that were there looms enough 10,000 more persons 
could be profitably employed. The panic of 1810, however, put 
an end to this prosperity. 

It should not be forgotten that some districts beyond the fron- 
tiers of France profited, as did many French cities, by the tem- 
porary cessation of British competition. England was equipped, 
as they were not, with the new machinery. In their case, there- 
fore, the Continental System acted like a highly protective tariflf. 
Behind such a wall ventures in manufacturing might be safely 
attempted. The cotton industry made rapid progress, especially 
in Saxony, where so many spinning machines were set up that 
the number of spindles rose from 13,200 in 1806 to 210,150 in 
1812. 

It was a part of the irony of the situation that the British 
orders, which were designed to safeguard British trade, should 
in America have resulted in bringing into being strong rival in- 
dustries. The capital which had been invested in the shipping 
business was diverted by the operation of the embargo and the 
Non-Intercourse Acts into the new manufactures of cotton, wool, 
and steel. From 1807 to 181 1 the number of cotton mills in- 
creased from fifteen to eighty-seven, while during the next four 
years the rate of increase was still greater. The progress with 
woolens was slower, but the foundations of this important in- 
dustry were laid. 

One of the most curious incidents of the struggle between 
Napoleon and England was the French effort to find substitutes 
for cane sugar and colonial dyewoods. By 1810 sugar was four 
francs a pound in Paris. It happened that a decade earlier a 
Berlin chemist had succeeded in producing a few lumps of sugar 
from the treatment of the beet root, and that a report on the 
subject had been read before the French Institute. The high 
price of sugar tempted manufacturers to carry the processes to 
perfection so that the product might become commercially profit- 



American 

Manufac- 
tures 



SHgar 



366 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

CHAP. able. By 1811 a French chemist produced certain lumps which 

Napoleon could not distinguish from lumps made of cane sugar. 

1806-12 ^ yg^j. ja^gj. |.j^g success of Benjamin Delessert, a manufacturer 
of Passy, seemed so undoubted that Napoleon visited his fac- 
tory and decorated him with the cross of the Legion of Honor. 
A decree had already been issued declaring that after January 
I, 1813, the importation of cane sugar should be prohibited. As 
sugar of this kind could then not be made at a cost less than 
four francs a pound, it was evident that the industry would 
collapse if the stringency of the Continental System was re- 
laxed. Similar efforts were made to substitute woad, madder, 
and saffron for colonial dyewoods. Even the experiment of 
raising cotton in Corsica and Italy was attempted. 

The fires fed by confiscated British merchandise in 1810 ap- 
peared to signalize the triumph of the Napoleonic policy. The 
French manufacturers hastened to congratulate the Emperor be- 
cause he had delivered a " fatal blow at English commerce." 
They were mistaken. Most of the goods destroyed had al- 
ready been paid for by French or continental merchants. A 
financial and industrial panic, the consequence of the Napoleonic 
policy, had begun to sweep over France. Events were at the 
door which were to add to the defection of Spain the far more 
serious defection of Russia. The annexation of the northwest- 
em coast of Germany, which was intended to strengthen the 
Continental System, prepared its final ruin. Among the States 
annexed was the duchy of Oldenburg, the ruler of which was a 
relative of the Czar Alexander. 



CHAPTER XXII 

THE REORGANIZATION OF PRUSSIA 

''"VTEVER were sowing and reaping, spinning and weaving, 
X^ buying and selling, so much a patriotic duty." Such 
is the comment of a German historian upon the desperate situa- 1807-12 
tion of Prussia after the Peace of Tilsit. For the Hohenzollern 
monarchy it was a hard fate to lose half its territories. The 
sacrifice of the lands west of the Elbe was the serious part of 
the loss, since the Polish provinces, out of which the grand 
duchy of Warsaw was formed, had proved difficult to assimilate. 
But the menace of the situation lay not in the size or the meaning 
of these losses; it lay in the fact that the royal administration 
did not for months recover control of the larger portion of what 
was left. Nor was this all. With inconceivable carelessness 
Field Marshal Kalckreuth had signed a convention (July 12, 
1807), according to which the withdrawal of the French was 
contingent upon the payment of a war contribution, but which 
did not specify its size or the basis for reckoning it. Nor could 
the King collect his revenue within the region occupied by French 
troops until the contribution was paid. The Prussian monarchy 
was apparently caught on the horns of a cruel dilemma. One 
of the King's officials declared that a man who could sign such 
an agreement should be sent to the madhouse or the gallows. 

The ambiguities of the Convention of Konigsberg were not conse- 
due to the indifference of a generous victor in matters of de- of^ifigit 
tail. Napoleon meant to complete the ruin of Prussia as a great 
power in Europe. In his later life he regretted that he had not 
destroyed the kingdom altogether. That Frederick William was 
spared was due to the importance of the Russian alliance in the 
development of the Continental System. At the same time the 
distrust that Napoleon felt in regard to Alexander's real attitude 
and policy made it convenient for him to have an army in a posi- 
tion which menaced both Russia and Austria, especially if that 
army were supported at the expense of the defeated Prussians. 
In case Alexander showed an intention to act in good faith, he 
might be repaid in favors to his friend Frederick William, by 
reducing the war contribution or by withdrawing the army a 
little further westward. Similar concessions might also be of- 

367 



368 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

*':^a' ^6^^d i" reply to embarrassing Russian requests. As the months 

passed Alexander showed no disposition to withdraw his troops 

1807-12 from the Danubian principalities. Napoleon offered to accept 
the situation if he received Silesia as compensation; but this 
Alexander refused. 

Whether the Prussian monarchy should survive depended upon 
the character of the intelligence and courage which was to pre- 
Recau of side Over its counsels. Hardenberg, as the negotiator at Barten- 
stein of that intimate union with Russia before the battle of 
Friedland, had become impossible, and he advised the King to 
recall Stein, to whom the reform party among the officials had 
begun to look as the person fitted by his clearness of vision, by 
his energy and independence, and by his long administrative ex- 
perience, to carry the State through the present crisis. The selec- 
tion was disagreeable to the King, but he yielded and dispatched 
the summons to Stein, who was living in retirement on his es- 
tates in Nassau. It was the close of September before he 
reached Memel, where the Court was then living. Up to that 
time, except for foreign affairs, the administration had been en- 
trusted to an Intermediate Commission, composed of Harden- 
berg's associates. Their jurisdiction was not extensive, for not 
until the following December did the French army withdraw even 
to the Vistula. Within the occupied provinces the journals were 
not permitted to publish royal ordinances, officials were obliged 
to take an oath of fidelity to the French Emperor, and the reve- 
nues were collected for the current requirements of administra- 
tion and the support of the French army. The kingdom of 
Frederick William was reduced to the province of East Prussia 
and a small part of West Prussia. 

When negotiations were opened to fix the amount of the war 
contribution, it was discovered how far apart Napoleon and the 
Prussians were in their reckoning, although, to deceive the Czar, 
Financial Napolcon asserted that he asked simply for the amounts levied 
before the close of the war. The Prussians claimed that the 
contributions already made in the provinces should be sub- 
tracted and that only 19,800,000 francs remained due, while the 
French estimated the balance at 154,500,000. The French claim 
was one and one-half times the annual income, assuming that 
Frederick William could dispose of the revenue of the territories 
left to him at Tilsit. But how could it be paid from the reve- 
nues of a single province; one, moreover, which had felt the 
full weight of war? 

For the months of November and December, 1807, only ten 
per cent, of the Prussian income came from revenue receipts, the 



THE REORGANIZATION OF PRUSSIA 369 

remainder being drawn from existing funds, among them what ^^^' 

was left of an English subsidy. Every element of expenditure, 

from that of the Court to that of the most obscure branch of I807.12 
the service, was severely scrutinized, to discover possible econo- 
mies. Strong percentages were taken off the higher official sal- 
aries and appropriations for the army were cut again and again ; 
but ruin seemed inevitable unless the French could be persuaded 
to evacuate other provinces, so that all sources of revenue would 
become available. The desperate situation accounts for the 
strange willingness of Stein to sign a treaty of alliance with France 
which should place a large Prussian corps at Napoleon's service, 
and to agree that Prussia should enter the Confederation of the 
Rhine. The King's brother was despatched to Paris with the 
hope that Napoleon might be moved to leniency by such pro- 
posals, but Napoleon had given the Prussians so many reasons 
to detest him that these hollow overtures were made in vain. 

Among the resources considered by Stein the most important 
was the royal domain, the value of which was estimated at 68,- The 
000,000 thalers. If a portion could be sold, it might be possible ^l^^^ 
to pay the contribution and be rid of the French. Napoleon was 
willing to take domains to the amount of 45,000,000 francs, but 
Stein had no desire to find among the troublesome vassals of the 
King a group of French paladins. He was ready to sell a part 
of the domain to ordinary purchasers, but the difficulty was to 
obtain a satisfactory price under the circumstances. There was 
another possibility. To save noblemen whose fortunes had 
been compromised in the wars of the eighteenth century, Fred- 
erick the Great had founded credit societies, of which the noble 
landowners of a province were members, and which lent money 
to individual nobles to enable them to restore their estates. The 
notes of these societies, secured by vast masses of property, easily 
found purchasers, so that there was no trouble in obtaining 
money.^ It was now proposed that the royal domains in the 
several provinces should enter these associations, and that a part 
of the debt should be paid with the new notes which might then 
be marketed. The opposition of the nobles, who feared for the 
effect upon their associations and their own property, was finally 
overcome by the insistence of the administration, and the do- 
mains entered the credit societies. By this means Stein was 
able to obtain 71,000,000 francs towards the payment of the debt. 

Stein's efforts to reach a settlement in regard to the amount 
of the war contribution were unavailing until the treaty of Sep- 

1 See page 51. 



370 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

CHAP, tember 8, 1808, fixed it at 140,000,000 francs. This was only a 

, small portion of the sums extracted from the hapless kingdom 

1807-12 £qj. ^j^g support of the army of occupation, the replenishment 
of Napoleon's extraordinary fund, and the enrichment of French 
officials. Napoleon acknowledged that he obtained a thousand 
millions, and German historians estimate the amount at two hun- 
dred millions more. After Napoleon's army was needed for the 
war in Spain the evil was abated, for the French soldiers re- 
mained only in Berlin and a few fortress towns, so that the ex- 
pense of maintenance as well as opportunities of oppression were 
greatly decreased. 

Something more was necessary than the payment of the 
French war contribution. The old monarchy and the old social 
Projects order had been pitilessly condemned at Jena. Had it been pro- 
of Re- posed after Tilsit to continue in the beaten paths, few officials 
would have had the courage to order the sacrifices necessitated 
by the payment of the contribution. Even before the Peace of 
Tilsit was signed, Frederick William had asked of Hardenberg 
a memoir upon the reorganization of the Prussian State. As the 
weeks passed the need for action became imperative, for in the 
Polish provinces of Prussia incorporated in the grand duchy of 
Warsaw a new constitution abolished serfdom. The same step 
was soon to be taken in Westphalia, which also contained former 
Hohenzollern lands. Towards these States it was likely that a 
tide of discontented peasants would turn, if the Prussian states- 
men proved incapable of vigorous action. And there were other 
things besides serfdom to be swept away. All except drowsy or 
stubborn reactionaries realized that the rigid classification of the 
inhabitants as peasants, citizens, or nobles, must be abolished, 
implying, as it did, a similarly rigid classification of work and 
of land and a sharp distinction between town and open country. 
If independence was to be reconquered it would be by a new 
Prussia, freed from the trammels of antiquated law and custom, 
and with plenty of elbow room for hard work. 

When Stein reached Memel he found a reform decree ready 
for his approval or for any revision which he might see fit to 
introduce. The scheme had been drawn up by the Intermediate 
Commission, and its terms were mainly the work of Schon, a 
councilor who, as already remarked, was an ardent disciple of 
the English Adam Smith. The principal change which Stein 
made was to extend its application to all the lands that remained 
to the King, the commission having in view only the provinces 
of East and West Prussia. The ideas of the project were ac- 
ceptable to the King, who declared, in regard to serfdom, that 



THE REORGANIZATION OF PRUSSIA 371 

he had been working towards its abolition throughout his reign, ^xxu 

The fundamental aim of the plan was, in Hardenberg's words, 

to embody " democratic ideas in a monarchical state " ; that is, I807-12 
revolution from above. The part Stein was to play is sug- 
gested in Hardenberg's remark that " the principal question of 
all is to what chief the execution [of the plan] is committed, and 
that unlimited scope . . . should be given to such a leading mind, 
if only it is equal to the great task." ^ The chance of success 
would be increased by the prestige of a leader who would not 
listen to counsels of timidity. A more hesitant statesmanship 
would invite obstruction from every single interest bound up in 
the defense of the existing order of things. 

The great edict was signed October 9, 1807. The first two 
articles removed the restrictions upon the holding of land and 
upon the choice of occupation. Although safeguards were The 
thrown about the acquisition of peasant land, the general prin- ^^°"^*' 
ciple was laid down that any man, peasant, citizen, or noble, may 
acquire, without special authorization, any land hitherto called 
noble, or citizen, or peasant. Work, too, ceased to be classified. 
The noble might engage in citizen occupations, and the peasant 
and the citizen might exchange places. It is obvious that in 
these provisions the newer spirit of economic enterprise burst 
through the bonds that long had obstructed its action. One of 
the aims of the commission was to attract capital towards agri- 
culture. Noble estates, whose owners had become impoverished, 
and which were unproductive, could now pass into the hands of 
enterprising burghers or peasants or of other nobles who had 
money to develop them. Similarly good results must be pro- 
duced by the freedom of all occupations from social stigma. The 
nobleman who had strong business instincts might utilize them 
to the enrichment not merely of himself but of his province. The 
citizen need not dawdle in some traditional city employment, if 
he was inclined to be a farmer, but he might acquire peasant land 
and live among the other peasant farmers. 

These provisions, however, have not attracted so much atten- 
tion to the edict as the articles abolishing serfdom, which de- 
clared that serfs with hereditary claims to their lands were free, 
and that all others would be in November, 1810. This applied 
especially to peasants on the estates of the nobles, for little was 
left of serfdom on the domains of the State. The edict did not 
specify the obligations from which the peasants were freed. 
They were not freed from what were called feudal dues; that 

2 Seeley, Stein, I. 410. 



372 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

CHAP, is, payments in work, in products, or in money, which were con- 

nected with their tenure of land ; for it was stated expressly that 

1807-12 ^j^gy -^ere still subject "to all the obligations which bind them 
Difficult as free persons by virtue of the possession of an estate or by 
Queationa virtue of a special contract." On the other hand, they retained 
some of the safeguards which the State had previously thrown 
about them, and as its wards they could not be coerced or even 
induced to sell their holdings to their landlords except under 
conditions defined in instructions sent to the provincial au- 
thorities. 

The obscurities of the situation were increased by the con- 
fusion in several provinces between dues paid to a lord as mas- 
ter and similar dues paid to him as magistrate. Stein, in a 
memoir which he had prepared before he became a minister, had 
urged the withdrawal from the nobility of their functions as 
magistrates; that is, their control of manorial justice, and the 
performance of such duties by state officials ; but the edict of 
October 9 did not raise the question. The terms upon which 
nobles might acquire land of former serfs afifected the ancient 
policy of preserving peasant holdings in order that the peasant 
population might not be decreased and that the army might not 
lack recruits. Several officials felt that it would be contrary to 
the spirit of the edict, which had introduced freedom in the 
purchase and sale of land, to place special restrictions upon 
the acquisition of peasant land, and argued that the peasant 
as a free man was a better judge as to whether he would 
gain or lose by selling his rights to his former landlord. When 
the question of population was raised, they replied that the 
population was Hkely to increase with better methods of 
cultivation, but they were willing to concede that, for every 
peasant-holding the landlord purchased, he be required to 
establish a cottager provided with three acres. On the mar- 
gin of this proposition Stein wrote " cessat in totum." His 
own impulse was to protect all peasant-holdings against pur- 
chase by former landlords, except in cases where the lords, on 
account of the devastations of the war, were unable to restore 
the buildings and restock the farms, or where the holdings were 
very small. He finally accepted a compromise, which protected 
long-established tenures, and provided that, in case the newer 
tenures were consolidated or added to the lord's domain, the 
lord was to create a peasant farm of equal size, free from all 
feudal services. Unfortunately this excluded from protection 
most of the holdings created by the peasant colonizing work of 
Frederick 11. 



THE REORGANIZATION OF PRUSSIA 373 



CHAP. 
XXII 



1807-12 



If the provisions of the October edict be compared with the 
work of the Constituent Assembly embodied in the laws of 
March and May, 1790, it is apparent that their consequences 
ended where the work of the French reformers began. The prin- Compara- 
cipal aim of the French legislation was to extinguish the feudal ^^ts of 
dues as well as to remove every trace of feudal superiority and Prussian 
substitute state for manorial courts. Even Louis the Sixteenth's ® °^™ 
declaration of June 23 had promised that the remnants of serf- 
dom should be destroyed. It should, however, be remembered 
that Stein did not intend to pause with the work of October, 
1807, although he was more deeply interested in administrative 
or constitutional reform than in social reorganization and the re- 
hef of the peasants. 

An important outgrowth of the October reform was an edict 
doing for the peasants on the domain in East and West Prussia 
what had in the earlier part of the reign been attempted for the Peasant 
peasants of Pomerania and the Marks. In this case the State tors'"^ 
did not ask the peasant to decide whether he would become a 
proprietor, nor did it demand any payment in return for its aban- 
donment of its superior property right. Its profit was found in 
a release from the obligations previously resting upon the ad- 
ministration of the domain as a proprietor. The peasant would 
henceforth be obliged to stand on his own feet. As for the 
feudal dues, three-quarters were to be paid off by installments, 
leaving one-quarter as a land tax. Schon wanted those who 
could not go on without state aid to be evicted, but Stein, remem- 
bering how the peasants had been impoverished by the war, de- 
cided that the State should continue its help for two years. The 
final result of this legislation was the creation of over 45,000 
peasant proprietors in East and West Prussia and Lithuania. If 
Stein contemplated similar reforms on the estates of the lords, 
he did not have time to propose definite plans. 

The decree of October 9 had improved the situation of the 
citizens of the towns, destroying their isolation from the other 
classes, conceding the right to purchase noble or peasant land, 
and permitting a wider range of choice of occupation. Before 
complete industrial freedom was established the distinction be- 
tween town and country, commercial monopolies, and the system 
of guilds must be removed. Stein made a beginning of these 
changes, but left their fuller accomplishment to his successors. 
His most important work for the towns was the restoration of 
the right of self-government, secured by the decree of November 
19, 1808, a few days before his second removal from office. 

In this municipal corporations act Stein's share was greater 



374 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XXII 



Prussian 
Cities 



Govern- 
ment Con- 
trol 



than in the Emancipation Edict, but he owed the development 
of the project especially to the work of a Konigsberg official 
named Frey. Like other enlightened Konigsbergers, Frey had 
been led by Kant to admire the work of the Constituent Assem- 
bly and his project bears upon it marks of the study of the 
French municipal code of December 14, 1789. Stein's latest bi- 
ographer, Professor Lehmann, says that it was a " combination 
of the ideas of the Constituent Assembly with legal relationships 
which either still existed or had existed in Prussia." ^ 

The most remarkable thing about the law was that in a group 
of territories, with different historical origins and differing sys- 
tems of administration, it applied a uniform method of organiza- 
tion to all towns having more than 800 inhabitants. Elements of 
continuity were not lacking and yet the break with the past in 
many a locality was sharp. The project had at first been de- 
vised for East and West Prussia, but Stein decided that it was 
to apply to all the provinces of the King. The details of gov- 
ernmental machinery were determined by extent of population 
rather than by the character of special privileges. The towns 
were divided into great, middle, and small, with a population of 
10,000, 3,500, and 800 as the lower limit of the different classes. 
The inhabitants were to be of two kinds, citizens and residents, 
although the distinction here was not exactly like that between 
" active " and " passive " citizens in France. Any one owning 
a house in town or quahfied to pursue a trade was necessarily 
a citizen, and even non-residents who paid taxes of a certain 
amount possessed the privilege of voting. Women could be ad- 
mitted to citizenship, but not qualified to vote. The citizen's con- 
trol of municipal affairs must be through a wise use of his vote, 
for he was not permitted to instruct his representatives in the 
council, the framers of the law also sharing the prejudice of the 
Constituent Assembly against instructions to deputies. But the 
citizen could take a direct part in administrative work, and it 
was intended that such matters as education, care of the poor, 
prisons, sanitation, and public buildings should be managed by 
deputations made up partly of councilors and partly of citizens. 

The only matter of local administration reserved for more im- 
mediate state supervision or control was the police. The royal 
government might appoint a special magistrate to exercise this 
function or it might delegate the power to the burgomaster. The 
amount of expenditures for police and justice were also fixed by 
the State, while other expenditures were to be determined by 

3 II. 462. 



THE REORGANIZATION OF PRUSSIA 



375 



the councilors as a representative assembly. The chief official, 
the " burgomaster," was in a measure a state appointee, for in 
the " middle " and " small " towns the choice of the representa- 
tives was to be confirmed by the provincial administration, while 
in the case of the *' great " towns the representatives were to 
name three candidates from which the King was to select. It 
was the management of the police power that opened the door 
to state interference on a large scale. If the burgomaster repre- 
sented the State in the matter, he acquired a double relation dif- 
ficult to manage. The men who framed this law were not of 
the opinion that the State should be deprived of effective control 
over local administration. The State retained the power to con- 
firm new statutes adopted by the council and to inspect the ac- 
counts of the municipality. 

The aim of Stein to train the citizens for public affairs and to 
quicken their sense of responsibihty is seen not merely in the 
provision that citizens may be appointed on commissions, but 
also in the fact that there were two kinds of councilors, paid and 
unpaid, only those being paid who devoted their whole time to 
the business of administration. It was expected that every pub- 
lic-spirited citizen would willingly undertake such honorable 
duties, with permission to retire at the close of three years. 
Paid councilors were chosen for periods of six, and, in some 
cases, twelve years. 

For over forty years this law provided the only semblance of 
popular government in an absolute State, and, modified by the 
laws of 1831 and 1853, it still lies at the basis of Prussian munici- 
pal rule. The reform of municipal administration should have 
been accompanied by reform for villages, but there Stein would 
have encountered formidable opposition, because the structure 
of the rural communities was affected by the jealously guarded 
police and governmental powers of the nobility. He intended to 
create provincial estates, and to place at the head of a hierarchy 
of self-governing bodies an assembly representing the varied in- 
terests of all communities and authorized to advise in matters 
of administration, in the levy of taxes, and upon projects of 
law. 

According to Stein's own view the most immediate need was 
a reorganization of the central administration and of the cham- 
bers or boards which were its agents in the circles or districts. 
He was particularly anxious to rid the administration of the ills 
characteristic of bureaucratic government, the interminable cor- 
respondence between departments, the accumulation of reports, 
and of official red tape of every sort. His remedy was discussion 



CHAP. 
XXII 



Permar 
nence of 
the Be- 
form 



376 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XXII 



A Royal 
Council 



among ministers and responsible chiefs of administrative services 
in an organized cabinet or council. Another crying need was the 
redistribution of work according to its character, rather than 
by provinces. The details of the scheme were ready by the close 
of 1807, but the negotiations about the war contribution absorbed 
so much of Stein's attention that the plan was not completed 
before his retirement in November, 1808. His successors, how- 
ever, put its main features into efifect. 

The most important change was the creation of a real re- 
sponsibility on the part of individual ministers, and, especially, 
of the head of the ministry. This was accomplished by estab- 
lishing the principle that business was to be laid before the min- 
isters by the First Minister and that councilors were not to be 
the agents through whom the King was to act. The importance 
of the ministers was also increased by abandoning the practice 
of appointing several men to a single ministry. 

Stein planned a royal council made up of princes, ministers, 
and other high officials, meeting under the presidency of the 
King, which should receive projects of policy or legislation, 
should discuss them and receive the decision of the King. But 
Frederick William had an unconquerable aversion to such a 
method of work, and Stein did not get beyond a " general con- 
ference," over which he presided and in which were convened 
heads of departments as well as ministers. The final outcome, 
after Stein had ceased to be minister, was a ministerial council, 
nominally under the presidency of the King, although during 
the ministry of Hardenberg this council played a secondary part. 

Among the specific reforms which Stein introduced was the 
separation of justice from administration, a change demanded by 
public opinion since the days of Montesquieu. The citizen was 
protected against abuse of power through an appeal to the ordi- 
nary courts. Another reform was the consolidation of the vari- 
ous treasuries, which numbered eleven towards the end of the 
old regime, into a single central treasury. It was no longer the 
rule, as in the days of Frederick the Great, that no one except 
the King and, perhaps, a confidential cabinet councilor, under- 
stood the financial situation of the government. 

The reform of the local government turned the circles into dis- 
tricts and the chambers into administrations, which again were 
divided into sections corresponding to the ministries or parts of 
ministries. Stein introduced into these administrations small 
groups of proprietors, chosen by the local estates. Between 
these administrations and the central government were the " Su- 



THE REORGANIZATION OF PRUSSIA 377 

perior-presidents," who would have general duties as inspectors ^^^' 
over one or two provinces. 

The reorganization of the army was one of the most impor- 1807-12 
tant reforms begun during Stein's ministry. Two tasks were The 
undertaken: first, the punishment of the officers responsible for ^^^ 
the disgraceful collapse of Prussian resistance in 1806; and, sec- 
ond, the recasting of the army in a national mold. For the first 
the King showed more persistence of purpose than for the sec- 
ond. He appointed a commission of inquiry which pitilessly 
struck off the army Hst the old, the incompetent, and the dis- 
graced. Seven officers were condemned to death by military 
tribunals, although the King did not permit the penalties to be 
inflicted. Out of 143 generals in 1806 only eight remained on 
the list six years later and only two commanded in the Wars of 
Liberation. The significance of this work can be understood if 
it is remembered that the disgraced officers were nobles and had 
many relatives and friends among the nobility. Unfortunately 
the King showed little zeal or comprehension when it came to 
radical reform, and the first commission on the reorganization 
of the army contained three conservative members over against 
the reformers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. 

Both Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had grasped the lesson taught 
by the success of the French Revolutionary armies. They saw 
that forces of unsuspected magnitude had lain dormant in the 
life of nations, and that the day was past for an army like that 
of Frederick, recruited in part from the vagabonds of Europe. 
With these reformers the King refused to go to the extent of in- 
troducing universal service, but he gave up the practice of hiring 
mercenaries and relied upon the cantonal system. The new at- 
titude toward the Prussian peasant had as its corollary the aboli- 
tion of cruel and humiliating punishments, and for the majority 
of the soldiers corporal punishment gave place to imprisonment. 
A still more important measure was the withdrawal of the ex- 
clusive privilege of the nobles to be officers in the army. Up 
till this time the appointment of citizens as officers had been ex- 
ceptional and irregular. The bulk of the officers were still 
nobles, but sons of the citizen class could hope for appointment 
by passing the examinations. Furthermore, the officers ceased 
to be purveyors for their troops. It was also decided that in 
time of war the army should live by requisitions and should not 
be delayed by heavy baggage trains and by the necessity of es- 
tablishing supply stations. 

Such was the penury of the government during 1807 and 1808 



378 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XXII 

1807-12 

Tbe 

Kilimper 

System 



Kesigna- 
tion of 
Stein 



that the reduction of the army could not be avoided, and only 
1,638 out of 7,000 officers remained on the active list, some of 
these being obliged to accept half pay. In September, 1808, 
Bonaparte compelled Prussia to sign a treaty limiting the army 
for ten years to 42,000 and forbidding the organization of a 
militia. As the reformers cherished the idea of a national up- 
rising, it was obvious that an army of this size would be too 
weak to begin the conflict. Scharnhorst solved the problem by 
devising the Krumper system, in accordance with which the ef- 
fectives of the regiments were severely reduced and the canton- 
ists were called to the colors for a month's hard training and then 
sent home. During festival days officers found them again in 
their cantons and gave them additional training. In this way 
before the crisis came Prussia had 150,000 fairly trained soldiers. 
The remark has been made that, when it was necessary to hood- 
wink the French, Scharnhorst had as many wrinkles in his con- 
science as upon his simple face. 

Stein's ministry closed November 24, 1808. Three times be- 
fore he finally withdrew he had offered his resignation. He thor- 
oughly disapproved the policy of the King, illustrated in the ac- 
ceptance of the Convention of September 8, unless it was done 
to gain time, because he believed Prussia should make ready to 
strike when Austria and France should be at war. Indeed, he 
had felt that the first successes of the Spanish insurrection were 
the signal for all Prussians to be prepared to rise. Late in the 
summer his position in the ministry was fatally undermined by 
the publication of a letter, which the French had intercepted, 
and in which he said that Spanish affairs were making a Hvely 
impression in Germany and that it would be useful to spread the 
news prudently. He expressed the hope that connections could 
be made in Hesse and Westphalia and added that at Konigsberg 
war between Austria and France was considered inevitable, and 
that upon its issue rested the fate of Europe, and, particularly, 
of Prussia. Napoleon caused the letter to be published in the 
Moniteur of September 8, with the commentary that the King 
of Prussia was to be pitied for having such unskilful and per- 
verse ministers, but he did not demand Stein's dismissal, for his 
situation at the time was too precarious to run the risk of a re- 
fusal or of an uprising in northern Germany. He simply util- 
ized the incident to force the September convention upon the 
Prussians. The publication of the letter strengthened the ene- 
mies of Stein, those who looked upon him as a dangerous revo- 
lutionist, as well as those who disbelieved in the policy of re- 
sistance. Even Hardenberg advised his dismissal. As these 



THE REORGANIZATION OF PRUSSIA 379 



withdraw feeling that he retained the King's confidence.* 

Hardenberg did not follow Stein as principal minister until 1807-12 
June, 1810. The crushing burden of the French war contribu- 
tion kept the intervening ministry from accomplishing anything uniyer- 
comparable to the work which Stein had undertaken before and ^^\°^ 
which Hardenberg was to resume afterwards. Scharnhorst was 
in this ministry, and he continued his work for the army. The 
most notable achievement was the foundation of the University 
of Berlin, the result of the effort of William von Humboldt, an- 
other of the group of ministers. One consequence of the de- 
feats of 1806 had been the loss of Halle, the seat of one of the 
three older universities of the King's dominions, and public opin- 
ion turned towards Berlin, already an intellectual center, as the 
place in which the work of Halle should be carried on. It was 
there that in the winter of 1807-8 the philosopher Fichte de- 
livered his " Addresses to the German Nation," which have been 
regarded as the prophetic call to the sacrifices of the Wars of 
Liberation. They were couched in academic language, and 
therefore escaped the rigors of French censorship, although 
many feared that Fichte would meet the fate of Palm. Fichte 
asked why the ancient Germans had resisted Rome, and replied 
that " To them freedom meant just remaining Germans, con- 
tinuing to settle their own affairs independently and spontane- 
ously, according to their own disposition . . . ; while slavery to 
them meant all the advantages the Romans offered, because they 
would force them to be something different from German, to be- 
come half Romans." ^ If the French censor had remembered 
the use Camille Desmoulins made of Tacitus, he might have con- 
ceived a suspicion of this philosopher turned historian. In a 
still plainer passage Fichte declared that " A nation that is cap- 
able of fixing its eyes firmly on the vision from the spiritual 
world. Independence, and of being possessed with the love of it, 
like our earliest ancestors, will assuredly prevail over a nation 
that is used only as the tool of foreign aggressiveness and for 
the subjugation of independent nations, like the Roman armies." 
Humboldt's plans were matured by 1809 and a royal order an- 
nounced the creation of the university. It is significant that, at 
a time when the State was too poor to pay in full the salaries 
of its officers, 150,000 thalers a year were appropriated for the 
new university. On the teaching staff were men already dis- 

* Napoleon now issued a decree of proscription against Stein, who took 
refuge in the Austrian dominions. 
Seeley, II. 33-34- 



38o THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

S^?" tinguished, Schleiermacher, Fichte, Savigny, Wolf, and Niebuhr. 

The University of Breslau was created at the same period out of 

1807-12 |-j^g older University of Frankfort-on-the-Oder and a college at 
Breslau. In building up a newer Prussia the teacher and the 
investigator were to labor beside the statesman and the soldier. 
During this period the Court moved back to Berlin, because its 
continued stay at Konigsberg, on the eastern border of the 
Hohenzollern dominions, seemed to Napoleon a plain manifesta- 
tion of distrust and a disagreeable protest against his policy. A 
few months afterwards Queen Louise, whom Napoleon's insults 
had made a national heroine, died, broken by the misfortunes of 
her house and the sufferings of her people. 

Hardenberg's ministry opened in June, 1810, with large pros- 
pects of reform. Like Stein he believed that the Prussian State 
Harden- needed a complete regeneration, but he did not seek as much as 
Ministry Stein the cooperation of the citizens, desiring to reorganize the 
administration in such a way as to strengthen the action of the 
State. He ventured to attack the local governing powers of the 
nobles by his gendarmerie edict, which placed in the circles or dis- 
tricts a director with some of the powers of a French prefect, 
but in the face of the opposition of the nobles he was obliged 
to recede. His treatment of the question of a national parlia- 
ment illustrated his attitude towards one of the ultimate aims 
of Stein. The first body in any sense representative was a small 
assembly composed mainly of crown nominees, officials, nobles, 
townsmen, and peasants, which sat for several months in 181 1. 
A second body, meeting a year later, was equally small, but was 
chosen in the provinces. Each was regarded simply as an in- 
termediary between the government and the people, although the 
first assembly was permitted to modify Hardenberg's plans of 
peasant reform. 

The financial question was of immediate importance, and in 
dealing with this Hardenberg took a long step towards the de- 
struction of the privileges and exemptions characteristic of the 
old regime and which hindered an effective increase in the gov- 
ernmental income. He did not venture to touch the exemption 
of noble land from the old land tax or " contribution," but he 
abolished exemptions from the operation of the excise and the 
tariff laws. The excise was extended from the towns to the 
country, and, while it increased the already heavy burdens of the 
peasants, it rendered possible the development of manufactures 
outside the town limits and broke down the old barrier between 
town and open country. He also removed restrictions from in- 
ternal trade and established industrial freedom in place of the 



form 



THE REORGANIZATION OF PRUSSIA 381 

old guild system. As in France, this was accomplished by sub- ^^jj' 

stituting the payment of a tax called a patent for the previous 

conditions of entry into trade or the mechanic arts. The need I807-12 
of a larger revenue led him to institute an oppressive milHng 
tax, and forbid the use of handmills, with the consequence that 
in some places the peasants could not afiford to eat bread; but 
after a few months the tax was modified and he adopted the 
plan of income taxes, which he had once opposed. 

His most interesting effort undertook to solve the problem 
which Stein had indicated in the edict of October, 1807, although, 
as in the case of taxation, what he accomplished was far smaller a New 
than either his principles or his proposals called for. The peas- o/*peas- 
ants had been freed from serfdom by the October edict, but, ^^^^®- 
except on the royal domain, nothing had been done about the 
dues by which they were still burdened. It was now proposed, 
first, to concede to the peasants who held land by an hereditary 
or life tenure the proprietorship of their holdings, and, second, 
to determine whether the lord or the peasant was the loser 
through the complete abandonment of the old system. The lord 
lost services, but was relieved of duties, and in some cases might 
gain more than he would lose by the change. If so, he should 
pay the peasant the difference. In most cases the peasant would 
be the gainer and must pay the lord an indemnity. This project 
did not contemplate any change in the relations of the lord and 
of those peasants who did not possess at least hf e tenure, although 
the lord might give such a peasant half his holding free from 
dues and annex the rest. Where indemnity was due, the peas- 
ants could pay in money or in land ; that is, they might abandon 
a portion of the holding in order to retain the remainder in full 
property and free from burdensome dues. 

This project suffered material transformation through the in- 
fluence of the assembly of notables, before which it was laid in 
181 1. In the first place, the most numerous class of peasants, 
who enjoyed simply a life tenure, was grouped with simple rent- 
ers. Secondly, the right of proprietorship was not conceded 
until the balance of gain and loss had been determined. The 
most important change was the assumption that the peasants in 
all cases owed the lords an indemnity amounting to one-third of 
the holding. If an arrangement was reached between the peas- 
ants of the second class and the lords, the peasants were to give 
up half of the holding. Even in this form, embodied in the edict 
of September 14, 181 1, the revolution might be hailed as the end 
of an outworn and oppressive system ; but the publication of the 
edict did not close the affair. Little was done in the months that 



382 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XXII 



Attitude 
of the 



People 



followed, on account of the outbreak of the French war with 
Russia. As the years went on the lords steadily recovered the 
influence of which the calamities of 1806 and 1807 had deprived 
them and pressed for a declaration which should restrict the 
number of holdings affected by the plan. They were suc- 
cessful in 1816, when a declaration restricted the application 
of the edict to the larger holdings, and, even in their case, to 
those only about which Stein had placed special safeguards. At 
the same time those safeguards were withdrawn and the peasant 
was left to deal as best he could with his former master, who 
retained the powers of a magistrate. The consequence was that 
the lords utilized the coveted opportunity to enlarge their estates 
and that many peasants were made landless. 

The effort for reform of which the Prussian peoples and lead- 
ers were capable in the hour of defeat and under the burden 
of foreign military occupation showed that the moral strength 
of these north Germans should not be estimated by the ease with 
which Napoleon's armies overran the country in 1806. Side by 
side with this effort developed a passionate desire to drive out 
the oppressor. Stein was the real interpreter of the nation's 
aspirations in 1808, and the luckless Colonel Schill was not re- 
garded as a traitor, but as a hero who had died gloriously. 
Brunswick's ride across Germany, and the joy with which he was 
hailed in his old domains, had revealed the sentiments of the 
people. The poems and letters of the day make them still clearer. 
Napoleon's influence had waned and his control would be gone 
as soon as a great disaster should render him less terrifying. 



CHAPTER XXIII 

THE SCOPE OF REFORM IN EUROPE 

THE influence of France during the Napoleonic era cannot chap. 
be grasped fully without a study of its more permanent 

social and political consequences for the countries lying beyond I800-12 
the borders of the old Bourbon kingdom. Peoples whose main 
concern was defense against the aggressions of the new Charle- 
magne were unable to undertake long series of important re- 
forms, even if to them the very name of reform was not dis- 
credited by its association with the deeds of the French 
revolutionists and their imperial continuator. The story of re- 
form during this period in Austria, Russia, and Great Britain 
may therefore soon be told. In countries more immediately 
under the influence of the French the reforms were well nigh 
as thorough-going as in France herself, although effected in a 
different manner. In none was the work equal in far reaching 
results to what was accomplished in Prussia by Stein, Harden- 
berg, and their friends. 

Upon the lands of the Hapsburgs during the whole period fell 
the weight of French attack. The English were more persistent Austria 
enemies, but, except indirectly through Hanover, they could not 
be reached by French armies. The territorial losses of Austria 
would have been disastrous for a less loosely organized group 
of lands, and the financial strain might have overwhelmed an 
industrial State in similar circumstances. For Austria the con- 
sequences were greater poverty and a closer dependence upon 
English subsidies. The principal political change was the as- 
sumption by Francis I of the title of Hereditary Emperor of 
Austria two years before he was obliged by Napoleon to give up 
his imperial title in Germany. 

The Emperor Francis was an industrious plodder. The ad- 
ministration was so badly organized that affairs which minor 
officials should have decided were referred to him, and it is said 
that at one time two thousand reports were piled on his table 
awaiting attention. His policy may be " summed up in the word 
immobility." It is not astonishing that the nephew of Marie 
Antoinette should fear popular movements. Count Stadion, his 
principal minister from 1805 to 1809, seemed likely to lend a 

383 



384 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^m revolutionary color to the acts of the government. He was 

friendly to Stein and the Prussian reformers, and did what he 

1800-12 could to give the campaign of 1809 the attitude of a national 
uprising. The collapse of that movement caused his withdrawal 
and in his place was appointed Count Metternich, a man of great 
diplomatic talents, who could discover and formulate excellent 
reasons for the policy which Francis instinctively followed. The 
work for the serfs which Joseph II had begun, and which Leo- 
pold had been inchned to pursue, was not resumed, and the con- 
dition of the peasantry was not materially changed until the 
Revolution of 1848. The fear of peasant revolts led the Hun- 
garian nobles to be submissively loyal and to consent to increases 
in the army and in the revenues of the Crown. They fought with 
genuine national enthusiasm at Essling and Wagram. 

Alexander I, Czar of Russia, in his early years had admired 
Russia the French' Revolution, and even after he became emperor he 
called the four confidential advisers who counseled him to under- 
take fundamental reforms his '* Committee of Public Safety." 
One of these friends remarked afterwards, when illusions had 
vanished, that the Emperor " loved the forms of liberty as one 
loves the theater," and that " he would have consented willingly 
that everybody should be free on the condition that everybody 
should voluntarily do his will alone." The consequence was that 
the only serious reform during these years was a much-needed 
reorganization of the central administration, the substitution of 
a ministry divided into eight departments for boards and for 
officials with the powers of satraps. The new department of 
" public instruction," created at a time when not even France 
possessed one, accomplished important results in the establish- 
ment of three new universities, including the University of St. 
Petersburg. The Emperor entertained the project of transform- 
ing the senate, a body of officials clothed with mixed adminis- 
trative and judicial powers, into a council sharing with him the 
work of legislation, but when it ventured to protest against one 
of his measures it was promptly rebuked for meddling. He also 
seriously considered the question of freeing the serfs, without, 
however, planning to concede to them the proprietorship of the 
land they cultivated, but he only issued a decree forbidding peas- 
ants to be sold separately from the estates and limiting the num- 
ber of blows which might be inflicted upon them in punishment. 
Even these measures were not carried into effect. Alexander 
later came under the influence of an able administrator named 
Speranski, the son of a parish priest, who hoped not merely to 
free the serfs but also to give Russia a hierarchy of deliberative 



THE SCOPE OF REFORM IN EUROPE 385 



CHAP. 
XXTTI 



assemblies or dumas, each composed of delegates from the body 
next below, but he was driven from office by an opposition of 
nobles. The blame for the lack of progress in a reign which *'*""'^' 
opened with such promise must fall mainly upon this opposition, 
which Alexander had to reckon with, if he would avoid the fate 
of his father. 

One of the strange consequences of the Peace of Tilsit was 
a change of dynasty in Sweden. The Swedes refused to accede Sweden 
to Napoleon's Continental System without a struggle and Alex- 
ander declared war upon them, compelling them to surrender 
Finland as well as to join the combination against Great Britain. 
They vented their rage upon King Gustavus IV, who had proved 
unequal to his task, and a military insurrection in March, 1809, 
led to his deposition. His successor had no direct heir and the 
Swedes took the novel course of proposing the adoption of Mar- 
shal Bernadotte, who had made a favorable impression upon 
them while he commanded in northern Germany. Napoleon 
gave a reluctant consent and in 1810 Bernadotte became Prince 
Royal of Sweden. 

Upon England the effect of the desperate struggle with Na- 
poleon was to strengthen the conservative reaction which had England 
been originally provoked by Jacobin violence. Even attempts to 
reform the cruel penal code with its long list of death penalties 
were regarded as showing a dangerous spirit of innovation. In 
1810 when Sir Samuel Romilly's bill to " abolish capital pun- 
ishment for the crime of stealing privately to the amount of five 
shillings in a shop " was before the House of Lords, he was re- 
proached with having been the " author of the act, passed two 
years ago, to abolish the punishment of death for the crime of 
picking pockets. . . .'* ^ The political situation is illustrated by 
the fact that the Tories were in control of parliament not only 
during the war, with the exception of one year, but also for fif- 
teen years afterward. Beyond the walls of parliament liberal 
ideas seemed to be gaining new adherents. In 1802 Sidney 
Smith, Jeffrey, and Brougham founded the Edinburgh Review, 
which became the great champion of liberalism. William Cob- 
bett in his Political Register appealed to a more democratic con- 
stituency. Jeremy Bentham, the political philosopher, lent his 
prestige in the unequal contest against triumphant Toryism. 

The period did not pass without some important laws. One 
of the most significant was the abolition of the slave trade in 
1807, for it prophesied the abolition of slavery also. Its pas- 

1 Memoirs of Sir Samuel Romilly, II, 332, 



386 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XZIII 



sage indicated that the planters no longer wielded the influence 
they once possessed. The first of the long series of Factory 
Acts was equally significant. It aimed to prevent slavery of a 
new kind from becoming established in England as one of the 
incidental results of the introduction of the factory system. Mill 
owners, who often had difficulty in obtaining enough hands from 
the neighborhood, hit upon the plan of taking children from the 
poorhouses of the large cities. They agreed to feed, clothe, and 
educate the children, but they often shamefully neglected these 
wards. The hours of labor were long — in many cases four- 
teen — and the children were frequently forced to work on night 
shifts. It was such abuses that the Act sought to check. 

The high cost of living, which was one of the consequences 
of the war, caused great suffering among the common people. 
From 1809 to 18 13 the price of wheat averaged 107 shillings a 
quarter. This was in spite of the fact that five million acres 
were added to the cultivated land of England and Wales before 
the war was over. Indeed, the increase in the amount of land 
put under the plow was indirectly a cause of suffering, for it 
frequently meant the loss by the poorer villagers of rights of 
pasturage which they had hitherto possessed. If they received 
a small sum of money in compensation, this was soon exhausted. 
Their misfortunes did not come singly, since spinning and weav- 
ing and other village industries were being transferred to the 
towns or at least to villages which possessed good water-power. 

The burden of taxation which all classes had to bear became 
almost intolerable. The finance minister declared in 181 1: 
" There is not an article of dress — boots, shoes, leather, breeches, 
etc., — not an article in the house — locks, keys, bells, etc., — 
which has not been recommended to him as objects of taxation." 
The public debt rose to the stupendous figure of £800,000,000, 
with an annual interest charge of £30,000,000, Bank notes fell 
to a discount of nearly fourteen per cent. The leaders who real- 
ized the cost of the struggle with Napoleon may, perhaps, be 
pardoned because they declined to increase the number of un- 
certain factors by entering upon a series of reforms. Their mo- 
tives, however, were not always unselfish nor do they seem to 
have used much boldness of conception in determining what 
might, and what would not, add to the dangers and confusion 
of the situation. 

In striking contrast to the laggard steps of Austria and Rus- 
sia, and even of England, was the feverish activity of those sub- 
ject to Napoleon's authority, or within his sphere of influence, 
although measurably independent in the management of their 



THE SCOPE OF REFORM IN EUROPE 387 

internal affairs. It is true that several members of the Rhenish ^j^' 

Confederation successfully guarded their borders from the in- 

roads of change, but they lay in central and northern Germany I800-12 
and not directly under the master's eye. To obtain a clear un- 
derstanding of the situation it is necessary to recall the political 
geography of Europe at the close of 1810, when the Napoleonic 
process of state-building reached its climax. 

In Napoleonic Europe lay everything from the borders of 
Russia and Austria to the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean 
Sea. The limits of the French empire had recently been pushed Napo- 
both northward and southward. In the north the annexation of Europe 
Holland, after the abdication of Napoleon's brother Louis, had 
been followed by the seizure of the northwestern coast of Ger- 
many, made up of the Hanseatic towns, the duchy of Oldenburg, 
the northern part of the electorate of Hanover, and a portion 
of those Prussian provinces which had originally gone to the 
creation of the kingdom of Westphalia. Their historic past was 
hardly suggested by new departmental names like " Western 
Ems," " Upper Ems," and " Mouths of the Elbe." In the south, 
beyond Piedmont, annexed in the days of the Republic, Genoa 
had been added in 1805, Parma, Piacenza and Tuscany three 
years later, and the Patrimony of St. Peter in 1809. Parma be- 
came the department of the Taro, Tuscany the departments of 
the Arno, Ombrone, and Mediterranee, and the remnant of the 
papal state the departments of Trasimene and of Rome. At this 
time Napoleon also ruled directly over the kingdom of Italy, to 
which, since its establishment in 1805, had been added Venetia, 
Italian Tyrol, and the northern part of the Papal states. Be- 
yond the Adriatic he administered the Illyrian Provinces, includ- 
ing Dalmatia and parts of Carinthia, Carniola, and Croatia. 
When Murat was transferred to Naples Napoleon became ruler 
of Berg. The States he controlled through members of his im- 
perial family were Spain, Naples, and Westphalia. As the crea- 
tor of the grand duchy of Warsaw, and because its most power- 
ful official was his " Resident," his will there also was law, 
although the nominal ruler was the new King of Saxony. He 
was Mediator in Switzerland, and Protector in the Rhenish Con- 
federation. The Confederation contained all the princes of Ger- 
many except the King of Prussia, but the number was small as 
a result of the secularizations of 1803, of the mediatizations of 
1806, and of the readjustments of 1807. Within the Confedera- 
tion there was some territory which like Erfurt was occupied by 
French troops for military purposes and never received a civil 
organization. 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XXIII 



In the lands annexed to France it is natural to look for a more 
complete realization of the Napoleonic program. Even there a 
distinction should be made between regions like the left bank of 
the Rhine, which had been occupied since 1794, and of which the 
departmental organization had been complete since September, 
1802, and Northwestern Germany, annexed in December, 1810, 
where the intermediate commission completed the work of re- 
organization only a few months before the collapse of the empire 
began. The process of assimilation was necessarily slow, and, 
in the case of the latest annexations, the changes were slight and 
temporary, and the period one of confusion rather than of prog- 
ress. It seemed a simple matter to declare that the feudal sys- 
tem was abolished, but to determine the legal consequences and 
to adjust conflicting claims was another affair. In the Rhine 
country ten years elapsed after the first occupation before the 
mode of dealing with these questions was determined clearly. 
In Italy connection with the empire had most chance of justi- 
fying itself in Piedmont, annexed in 1802. 

The benefits of annexation were mixed, even from the point 
of view of those who regarded the French system of civil equality 
as far superior to the debris of historic rights, privileges, and 
oppressions which it swept away. On the one hand there were 
the French codes and new judicial organization, the admirable 
system of public works, the stimulus which came from connec- 
tion with a great State, the center of European action; on the 
other hand were the conscription, or blood tax, a heavier burden 
of taxation, and the more rigid enforcement of the Continental 
System. Annexation did not always bring immediate access to 
the French market. Moreover, habits of trade are not readily 
established, so that no large amount of trade developed between 
the Rhenish departments and the interior of France, and the 
customs frontier along the Rhine served mainly as an obstacle 
in the trade with Germany which they still continued to carry 
on, while their commerce down the Rhine was ruined by the 
Continental System. 

No magic in the formulae of annexation could make over Ger- 
mans, Dutchmen, and Italians into Frenchmen, and the practical 
problem of adjusting the new system to the old always remained. 
^ In dealing with the Piedmontese, the Tuscans, and the Romans, a 
special effort \!vas made to conciliate their pride as peoples with 
a separate history. This Napoleon could do and at the same 
time provide a splendid position for two of his sisters and as- 
sociate his son's name with that medieval empire of which he 
declared his to be the successor. Camillo Borghese, husband to 



THE SCOPE OF REFORM IN EUROPE 389 

Pauline Bonaparte, was made governor-general of the depart- ^^fj 

ments beyond the Alps, with actual jurisdiction over Piedmont 

and Genoa and with a capital at Turin. A similar government I800-12 
was set up in Florence for Elise Bonaparte, who had married 
Pascal Bacciocchi, and who now styled herself Grand Duchess 
of Tuscany. After his second marriage, Napoleon caused the 
promulgation of a senatus consulte declaring that the future 
prince imperial should be called King of Rome and providing 
that Rome should be the second city of the empire. Rome was 
also to have a senate of 60 members, nominally in charge of the 
business of the city. Neither this arrangement nor the provision 
for his sisters prevented the strict administration of the Italian 
departments like other departments of France. 

The question of language was also important. In the Hanse- 
atic departments the solution was a version of the codes in both 
languages and the simultaneous use of both in court proceedings 
and important administrative documents. In Piedmont French 
was official. The governmental newspaper, the Courier de Turin, 
was published in both languages. In Tuscany and Rome Italian 
continued to be authorized. Indeed, in Rome the government 
affected to encourage the cultivation of Italian by the offer of 
prizes for the best productions in prose or verse. 

The fate of Holland was harder than that of any other an- 
nexed territory. Although the Dutch tongue was not driven Holland 
from official usage, and Amsterdam was declared the third city 
of the empire, almost everything that might recall the ancient 
constitution and local peculiarities of the United Netherlands was 
changed. The two most important departments, with capitals 
at Amsterdam and Rotterdam, were administered by Belgians. 
The conscription was enforced rigorously. The rate of taxa- 
tion was pushed up until it equaled thirty florins per inhabi- 
tant, and the income of sixty millions was expended principally 
on dockyards, ships, and soldiers. Books were subjected to a 
rigid censorship. It was small compensation for such a regime 
that Dutchmen were to sit in the French Senate, Legislative Body, 
and Council of State; but it did not last long, for within three 
years French control was ended. 

In the countries outside the empire but governed by Napoleon 
or by members of his family the program of reform was not 
essentially different. Whether the history of Naples or of West- Dependent 
phalia, of the grand duchy of Berg or of the lUyrian Provinces 
or of the kingdom of Italy be considered, there are certain con- 
stant features, although the success with which they were intro- 
duced varied with the circumstances and the previous condition 



states 



190 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

CHAP, of the people. The dependent relation of these lands was also 

made evident, occasionally in ways that were painful. 

1800-12 All such allied peoples were obliged to endure the presence and 
provide for the support of bodies of French troops. The French 
army in the kingdom of Italy cost the budget of that State 30,- 
000,000 francs a year. In Westphalia, a smaller kingdom, 
12,500 French troops were maintained at a cost of ten millions, 
and it was also stipulated that 6,000 other Frenchmen should 
serve in the Westphalian army. Even in Naples, under the rule 
of Napoleon's ablest cavalry leader, Joachim Murat, where the 
finances could ill support the burden, a large French contingent 
was stationed. Naples and the other Napoleonic states were also 
obliged to furnish expeditionary forces to take part at their own 
expense in Napoleon's campaigns. 

The presence of a French army might be defended on the 
ground that the local troops were not strong enough to give sta- 
bility to their governments, but another form of tribute had even 
less color of right or reason. Napoleon continued the practice 
of reserving in newly created states a part, sometimes a half, 
sometimes even a larger amount, of the princely domains from 
the revenues of which he replenished his extraordinary fund 
kept in the Tuileries, or endowed his generals. In the case of 
Hanover, he took practically all the domains, but in Westphalia 
one-half. Even the little grand duchy of Frankfort paid him 
annually 600,000 francs on domains in Fulda and Hanau and 
provided an endowment for the dukes of Eckmiihl and Wagram, 
made illustrious in the campaign of 1809. WestphaHa was un- 
fortunate enough also to have charged against it a heavy war 
contribution, because it had been once territory of the king of 
Prussia and the elector of Hesse-Cassel. Napoleon also levied 
contributions in works of art, according to the practice which he 
learned from Revolutionary France. From the galleries at Cas- 
sel, for example, he took no fewer than 299 pictures, one of 
which, by Leonardo da Vinci, did not have the good fortune 
to be safely guarded in the Louvre until a better day should re- 
store it to its place. 

Against these darker aspects of French domination must be 
placed the undoubted benefits of constructive reform. Wherever 
French control was undisputed the remnants of the feudal 
regime and its oppressions were swept away. No country 
needed reform more than the kingdom of Naples, in which lin- 
gered over a thousand kinds of feudal dues. The Neapolitan 
lords took little interest in the peasants, abandoning their estates 
to the management of stewards. Not only was feudalism abol- 



THE SCOPE OF REFORM IN EUROPE 



ished when Joseph Bonaparte became King, but steps were taken 
to sell the royal domains, divide communal property, and break 
up large private estates by annulling the right of primogeniture 
and the right of entail. Although this work was hardly begun 
when Joseph was transferred to Spain, it was pushed forward 
under Murat by a commission, directed by Giuseppe Zurlo, the 
minister of the interior. The case of Westphalia illustrates a 
different application of the same principles. The German depu- 
ties who were summoned to Paris to behold King Jerome, their 
new monarch, and state their wishes, feared that noble rights 
would be treated as they had been in France by the Convention, 
and petitioned that the lords should receive compensation for 
the loss of agricultural services. Their wishes were respected, 
and, although the new constitution of Westphalia abolished serf- 
dom, later laws provided that only such dues were abolished 
without indemnity as were neither defined by contract nor re- 
corded on the rolls of the estate, besides marriage-dues and 
heriots, and the obligation of domestic service. Others were 
made redeemable, but the peasants were too poor to purchase 
reUef from services, and the legislation did little to decrease the 
power of the lords. 

A still greater benefit was the introduction of the French 
codes and of French judicial procedure. It is true that laws 
are an outgrowth of the needs of a people, the result of a large The 
body of local experience, and that it is not generally advisable 
to force the legal customs of one people upon another ; but, when 
custom loses its flexibility and becomes a heavy yoke, any 
event which weakens it even temporarily may be looked upon 
as progress. In some cases the French system, once introduced, 
lasted for many years and became the basis for a permanent 
settlement of law and procedure. It survived the Napoleonic 
regime in Naples and was extended to Sicily. In Holland, the 
later Belgium, in Baden, in part of Switzerland, and in Russian 
Poland its main features were also preserved. This meant not 
only civil equality, but also a just recognition of the rights of 
persons accused of crime, and an abolition of cruel punishments. 
The Westphalian deputies petitioned that the civil code should 
not be introduced for three years, but their prayer was not 
granted, and within three years the code was working as smoothly 
as if it had been made expressly for Westphalians, so skilful was 
the French administrator Simeon in establishing the new order 
of affairs. 

Although French control increased the burden of expenditure, 
it brought with it a reorganization of financial systems, so that 



CHAP, 
XXIII 



1800-12 



French 
Codes 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XXIII 



the heavier burden was more evenly distributed and could be 
carried. In Westphalia the system " displayed for the first 
time in Germany the leading principles of enlightened finance." 
With the disappearance of the guild system came the tax called 
in France the " patent." The land tax v^as heavy, but it v^^as 
free from the ancient abuse of exemptions. The tariff was low, 
and, except in the case of iron and copper, was designed to raise 
a revenue and not to protect local industries. The attempt to 
introduce the French plan of personal property taxes did not 
succeed as well. In the kingdom of Italy, Prina displayed as- 
tonishing energy in raising unprecedented sums of money, the 
budget being nearly doubled in the seven years from 1805 to 
1812. Some of his expedients, like the milling tax, were bur- 
densome, not to say oppressive, but his work had the merit of 
bringing order out of confusion and establishing an equilibrium 
between receipts and expenditures without resort to loans. In 
Naples Roederer had similar success in more than balancing a 
heavy budget. The public debt was reduced out of the proceeds 
of the sale of monastic property. For over a hundred kinds of 
direct taxes, resting almost wholly upon the poor, he substituted 
a single land tax, from the payment of which none was exempt. 
The work accomplished by such men as Simeon in Westphaha, 
Beugnot in Berg, Prina in Italy, and Roederer in Naples, should 
soften the memory of the exactions which were always incidents 
of French rule. 

The kingdom of Italy was the most successful of Napoleon's 
creations beyond the confines of France. Its name embodied an 
aspiration of the enlightened Italians, and they were filled with 
enthusiasm when its borders were enlarged by the addition in 
1806 of the territory of Venetia. Even the burdens laid upon 
the country had incidental advantages. It is said that, although 
the Lombards were taxed more heavily than under the mild rule 
of Maria Theresa and her sons, they learned to practise economy 
and emerged from the experience richer than before. The young 
men were at first disinclined to bear arms, but became excellent 
soldiers after they had been subjected to discipline and proved 
their courage and skill on many a battlefield. They never for- 
got the days of triumph under the star of their emperor-king, 
and men are still living who have seen the aged veterans of those 
wars weep at the very mention of the great leader's name. The 
opposition of the middle class to the conscription was weakened 
by the concession that substitutes could be furnished. The sons 
of the richer men were expected to join the royal guard or some 
other select corps. By 1812 Italy had an army of 80,000, with 



THE SCOPE OF REFORM IN EUROPE 393 

a highly trained body of officers. Through this comradeship in ^j^" 

arms men from Lombardy, Venetia, Modena, or the March of 

Ancona, learned a common sentiment of loyalty to Italy. Local I800-12 
feeling with its narrow fidelities was fast disappearing. 

The completion of important roads also rendered easier com- 
munication between different parts of Italy and between Italy and 
France. After five years' labor the Simplon road was finished. 
In commemoration of the event a triumphal arch was erected 
in Milan, the termination of the route. The harbor of Venice 
was improved and more securely fortified. The attempt was 
made to develop agriculture through training in special schools. 
Furthermore, an example was given of a well ordered state, en- 
dowed with a highly developed administrative system, drawing 
upon all the resources of its scattered communities, and dealing 
with its citizens according to clearly defined principles of law, 
the same for the noble as for the peasant who had once been 
his serf, and holding out to all the promise of equal access to 
the offices of the State. All this was valuable preparation for 
the movement later in the century which was to bring about the 
unification of Italy. 

In this and other ways Napoleon's government showed the 
better qualities of enlightened despotism. But criticism was not 
tolerated. An editor who gave untimely announcement of the 
seizure of Tuscany was thrust into an insane asylum, and the 
new legislature which ventured to criticize the first budget was 
dismissed, never to be summoned again. In the government 
Napoleon was represented by his step-son, Eugene de Beauhar- 
nais, as viceroy. Prince Eugene was an able general, a man of 
attractive personality, full of excellent aims, but he labored in 
everything to serve his master, and the welfare of the Italians 
was a secondary consideration. 

The work of reform in Naples would have been more thor- 
ough had not Bonapartist rule remained from the first precarious. Naples 
When Joseph entered Naples in February, 1806, the principal 
solicitude of the inhabitants was lest his rule might be as brief 
as that of the Parthenopean Republic in 1799 and might offer 
the Bourbon monarchs another chance to exact a bloodthirsty 
vengeance. It was several months before the fortress of Gaeta 
surrendered, and in July the French army in Calabria was de- 
feated by an English force brought over from Sicily. The Eng- 
lish had also seized the island of Capri, just outside the Bay of 
Naples, and held this until October, 1808, when Murat captured 
it by a brilliant feat of arms. In 1809 again a large force of 
British, while the French were weakened by the campaign about 



394 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XXIII 



Spain 



The 

Illyrian 

Provinces 



Vienna, moved up the coast from Sicily, ostensibly to overthrow 
the kingdom, and captured the island of Ischia. The news 
of Austrian defeat at Wagram prompted the retreat of the expe- 
dition before any serious attack had been made upon Naples. 

Joseph's reign at Madrid was not as productive of good results, 
for its history is principally recorded in the series of victories 
and defeats beginning with the capitulation of Baylen and ending 
five years later with the disastrous overthrow at Vittoria. Na- 
poleon had not forgotten to promulgate a constitution at the out- 
set, the first that modern Spain received ; but, even if this con- 
stitution had been more liberal, it would not have suited the 
Spaniards, because it came from the hands of the man who had 
basely tricked them as well as their princes. Joseph's reign was 
of consequence only in the national movement which it provoked. 
One feature of this movement, much heard of in the later his- 
tory of Spain and Italy, was the Constitution of 1812. The 
loyal Spaniards had been obliged to take refuge in Cadiz, where 
their cause was nominally under the control of a central junta 
and later of a "committee of regency." In 1810 an extraordi- 
nary cortes was elected, delegates coming even from parts of 
Spain overrun by the French armies. After two years this cor- 
tes promulgated a constitution, which was liberal except in its 
refusal to tolerate any religion other than the Roman Catholic. 
A legislature, or ordinary cortes, was chosen in 1813, and at the 
beginning of the next year took up its work in Madrid which 
had been evacuated by the French. From these events date the 
struggle for liberal institutions in Spain. 

Another Mediterranean land, the Illyrian Provinces, felt the 
effects of Bonapartist rule, since after 1809 they were imperial 
territory, although not formally annexed to France. Most of 
them — Croatia, Carniola, Carinthia, and Istria — had long been 
parts of the Hapsburg dominions, Dalmatia had belonged to 
Venice, and Ragusa had been a republic. Marmont, one of Na- 
poleon's ablest marshals, became governor-general, and the 
French system was introduced with discrimination, the princi- 
ples of August 4th being hardly appHcable to Military Croatia. 
The chief benefits of French control were the suppression of 
brigandage, the construction of roads, like the coast road between 
Zara and Spalatro, and the organization of public education. 
Marmont's name is still remembered in the region and many a 
town has named a street or square for him. Unfortunately 
along with benefits went heavy taxation and the oppressions of 
the Continental System. 

Germany did not escape being treated as a part of the Bona- 



THE SCOPE OF REFORM IN EUROPE 395 

parte family domain. The first example had been the grant of ^^„ 

the duchies of Cleves and Berg in 1806 to Murat, Napoleon's 

brother-in-law. This State soon became a grand duchy, and re- I800-12 
ceived after Tilsit a portion of Prussia's lands west of the Elbe. Berg 
After Murat was transferred to Naples, it remained vacant for 
a year and was then ruled in the name of King Louis Napoleon's 
son, Napoleon Louis. From this time forward it was practically 
a part of the Napoleonic Empire in the narrower sense of the 
term, but without the advantages which generally came from an- 
nexation, especially access to the French market. A second ex- 
ample was Westphalia, made up at first of the remainder of west- 
the Prussian Westphalian provinces, the duchy of Brunswick, p^^"* 
and the electorate of Hesse-Cassel. The King of Westphalia was 
Napoleon's youngest brother, Jerome, who received his appoint- 
ment immediately after the signature of the Treaty of Tilsit. 
Hardly less dependent upon Napoleon was the grand duchy of 
Frankfort, composed of Frankfort, the county of Hanau and 
the former bishopric of Fulda, finally constituted in 1810 for 
Dalberg, Prince Primate of the Rhenish Confederation. There 
were also marriage alliances which signalized the influence of 
Napoleon over other States — the marriage of Prince Eugene 
and the daughter of the King of Bavaria, of King Jerome and the 
daughter of the King of Wiirttemberg, of the heir of the grand 
duke of Baden and the niece of the Empress Josephine. 

A French program of reform was not the only thing that gave 
to the kingdom of Westphalia the character of a dependency of 
Napoleonic France. Another illustration was the concurrent use 
of the French language in official procedure. The delegates of 
the new kingdom, who visited Paris in August, 1807, had peti- 
tioned Napoleon for the exclusive use of German, but they had 
to be satisfied with a mixed system. The official text of decrees 
was French, although the text of the civil code was German. 
In each case it was accompanied by a translation. Debates in 
the Council of State were in French, but German was used in 
the courts and in the legislature. Certain ministries used 
French, others German. German officials on the whole occupied 
the offices, although several important posts were held by French- 
men. The crowds of adventurers who descended upon the cap- 
ital of the kingdom were soon discontented and went away. 

The constitution was an adaptation of the constitution of the 
French empire. There was no tribunate, for this body had al- oonstitu- 
ready disappeared from the French constitution, and in its place ^^^°_^ 
a commission of the legislators with a delegation of the Council phaiia 
of State discussed measures. The legislature, or " estates," was 



396 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^^f j not constituted as in France; of the loo members, 70 were to 

be landed proprietors, 15 merchants or manufacturers, and 15 

1800-12 j^gj^ distinguished by learning or practical achievement. Dis- 
trust of democracy was shown by the fact that the electors who 
chose the legislators were appointed by the King for life. In 
spite of such an origin the Westphalian estates at the first ses- 
sion ventured to throw out a bill in order to compel a modifica- 
tion of an obnoxious article. Under the advice of the judicious 
Simeon the Council of State showed itself ready to introduce the 
necessary amendments and the bill was passed by 83 to 7. The 
local government was patterned after the French system, with 
departments and prefects. Little lasting opposition was shown 
to the new regime, although the change of government had been 
resented in the Prussian provinces and in Hesse. If the experi- 
ment cannot be regarded as a success, it was due to the personal 
qualities of the King, who dissipated the public resources, and 
to the heavy demands made upon the kingdom by Napoleon, its 
real ruler. By 1812 it was necessary to resort to practices that 
savored of the methods of the French Directory, the repudiation 
of two-thirds of the old debt and the levy of a forced loan. The 
benefits of the French regime had less chance in Westphalia than 
elsewhere of being permanent, because the State was an artificial 
creation, which would fall apart into its former elements as soon 
as the power of Napoleon, the external compelling force of union, 
should be destroyed. 

Napoleon's principal interest in the other lands of the Rhen- 
ish Confederation was in their ability to contribute men to his 
armies, and he did not regard the Confederation as a State, but 
rather as a group of states, acting together in foreign affairs, 
Ehenish and independently in the administration of local affairs. This 
aH^***^" ^^^ "°^ prevent occasional meddling on his part. The rulers 
utilized the support he was ready to give as an opportunity to 
reorganize their administrative systems and to sweep away the 
inequalities and oppressions which hindered the work of a mod- 
ern government. None of the larger northern states conceded 
much to French influence, although the King of Saxony as grand 
duke of Warsaw countenanced the application of the French 
program among his Polish subjects. In Baden, Wiirttemberg, 
and Bavaria the policies adopted after the annexations of 1803 
were carried out more thoroughly. The result was accomplished 
in Baden with some respect for historic rights, but with brutal 
severity in Wurttemberg. The story is told of King Freder- 
ick of Wiirttemberg that when he complained to Napoleon 
that the local estates raised all sorts of difficulties in his way, the 



ation 



THE SCOPE OF REFORM IN EUROPE 397 

general of Brumaire exclaimed, " Drive the stupid creatures chap. 

away." Frederick took the hint, and the loss to the kingdom 

was not serious, because the South German diets were hardly i8oo-i2 
better than coteries of privileged persons. 

The work accomplished in Bavaria was in scope and impor- 
tance hardly second to that done in Prussia. This was due 
mainly to the clear-sighted and forceful leadership of Montgelas. 
The problem before the Bavarians was complex. The older Bavaria 
Bavaria had been hardly more than a group of lordships and 
cities united by a common bond of allegiance to the Elector, 
whose sovereignty was not complete, for he in turn owed duties 
to the Emperor, the head of the Holy Roman Empire. The power 
of the Elector was also hedged in by the prerogatives of the 
Church, whose supremacy in Bavaria had been unquestioned 
since the sixteenth century. To this situation, already sufficiently 
complicated, were added new elements by the annexations of 
1803 and 1806. By that time, however, the government had 
made some progress in the direction of reform. The exclusive 
privileges of the Church had been taken away, but the plan of 
transforming the Bavarian Catholic Church into a national 
Church, no part of which should be subject to outside bishops 
or archbishops, had not been carried out. The negotiations with 
the Pope for a special concordat dragged on without result all 
through the period. 

In the reorganization of the State Montgelas was more suc- 
cessful, aided by the fact that in 1805 the Elector became a king 
and that in 1806 he was relieved of his relation of vassalage to Montgelas 
the empire. A year later Montgelas issued an edict affirming 
the principle of equality of taxation and depriving the provincial 
estates of all right to meddle with the assessment or collection 
of taxes. In 1808 a new constitution, modeled on that of West- 
phalia, was proclaimed, which among other things promised a 
national assembly. The promise remained without perform- 
ance, and yet the seed was sown and the fruit might appear at 
some future time. For the older provinces were substituted cir- 
cles, marked out, as the French departments, to satisfy geo- 
graphical considerations. Although the system of taxation was 
wisely arranged, and an appraisement of landed property was 
completed, the finances of the new State were never equal to 
the burdens imposed by the connection with France. The ex- 
penses were about four times the receipts. This was one reason 
why the government was obliged to give up the policy of a low 
tariff introduced in 1799. The main reason was, however, Na- 
poleon's Continental System, to which Bavaria was obliged to 



398 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

9^f{ adhere. In connection with this part of the financial adminis- 

tration the most significant change was the abolition of pro- 

1800-12 vincial customs frontiers and the substitution of a single system 
for the whole country, a reform accomplished earlier than in any 
other German State. Montgelas did not aboHsh feudal dues, 
nor manorial courts, nor guilds, but he succeeded in correcting 
the arbitrariness of both landlords and guild-masters, besides de- 
priving them of their most injurious privileges. He also re- 
organized education, making it compulsory and freeing it from 
the control of the Church. The universities were consolidated 
and the principle was laid down that investigation should be un- 
hampered. The defect in the work of reform was the tendency 
to excessive centralization, which treated local institutions simply 
as parts of a great machine instead of instruments to facilitate 
vigorous local activities. The success of Montgelas and his ad- 
visers excited the envy of the Austrian statesman Metternich, 
who wrote that Bavaria's religious, civil, political and military 
revolution, accomplished with such boldness and persistence, 
would bear imitating by other states. It was indeed a revolu- 
tion, not as far-reaching in social changes as that of France, 
but in other respects as thorough. And it was accomplished 
without turmoil and bloodshed. 

The grand duchy of Warsaw cannot be compared with the 
older Poland in extent of territory or size of population, for 
Grand even after the treaty of Schonbrunn added to it a portion of 
wTr^w' Galicia, the population numbered only four million ; and yet the 
duchy had the advantage that the people were purely Polish. 
They cherished the illusion that Napoleon would one day re- 
establish the ancient kingdom, in spite of the fact that at Tilsit 
he had given the province of Bialystock to Alexander. Fate 
had in store for them a cruel disillusionment, for the creation 
of the state was eventually to result in the absorption of almost 
all of its lands by Russia rather than the recovery from Russia 
of those lost in the three partitions. The constitution of the 
grand duchy was significant, carrying far into the northeast the 
French program of equality. The reforms of 1791 had not ven- 
tured to touch the social structure of Poland, while the new con- 
stitution revolutionized this at least in theory, proclaiming that 
serfdom was abolished. As no provision was made for the re- 
demption of agricultural services and similar dues, the position 
of the peasant was not changed materially. He had the right 
to leave his holding, but in that case he became landless. His 
new position had more favorable consequences in the army, 
• where he was treated as a free man and where he might win 



THE SCOPE OF REFORM IN EUROPE 399 

the cross of honor. The economic situation of the grand duchy ^^ff 

was unfortunate, because Danzig was occupied by French sol- 

diers and the Continental System hindered the export of Polish i8°°-i2 
lumber and wheat. At the same time the war between Russia 
and Turkey cut off trade with the Turkish empire. It is not 
surprising that the financiers of Warsaw were never able to 
balance receipts and expenditures. The situation was not im- 
proved by the necessity of paying to French generals revenues 
of estates which amounted to over twenty-six million francs. 
After all, the chief meaning of the establishment of the grand 
duchy was that Napoleon might possess a march on the borders 
of Russia. He had not divided Europe with Alexander at Til- 
sit ; he had secured a position from which he might control the 
politics of eastern as well as western Europe. 

Much that Napoleon attempted beyond the ancient frontiers 
of France was lost by his overthrow ; much, however, remained. 
Only through a careful analysis of the progress of institutions 
after 181 5 would it be possible to estimate the permanent influ- 
ence of his efforts. His deficiencies as a reformer sprang from 
a systematic, intolerant spirit, only slightly conscious of the value 
of historical forces in the growth of peoples. The redeeming 
feature of his policy was his ideal of ordered, reasonable admin- 
istration and of civil equality. 



CHAPTER XXIV 

THE FRENCH EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT 

xxlv "^OTHING that Napoleon did within France after he be- 

X^ came Emperor was comparable in lasting effect with what 

1807-12 YiQ accomplished beyond the ancient frontiers in the larger em- 
pire which his triumph at Austerlitz enabled him to create. 
Much that he undertook was a continuation of reforms begun 
under the Consulate. He displayed the same governing energy, 
the same sense for the value of administrative efficiency, but the 
account in promises of reform opened by the Revolution was 
nearly closed before the four years of the Consulate were over. 
His time was also absorbed for many consecutive months in 
struggles with European states anxious to check the growth of 
French supremacy. From September, 1805, to January, 1806, 
he was absent in Austria. In September, 1806, he left Paris 
again for the campaign against Prussia and Russia, and did 'not 
return until August, 1807. He was in Spain during the fall of 
1808 and in Austria once more in the spring and summer of 1809. 
After the war with Austria was over he resided in Paris or in 
the different imperial palaces until the Russian campaign of 1812. 
During this period his restless eagerness for work seemed to 
slacken. The marriage alliance with the ancient House of Haps- 
burg and the birth of an heir increased his pride, while they 
dulled his perception of what had been the actual sources of his 
prodigious fortune. Nevertheless, important work for France 
was accomplished during the empire. 

In Napoleon, France possessed a real king, a center whence 
impulses to activity radiated in all directions, a force the lack 
Napo- of which had been the ruin of the old monarchy. His powers of 

Real attention, of memory, of pertinent suggestion or command, 

^°8 seemed inexhaustible. He understood the influence which comes 

from a knowledge of each situation and an acquaintance with all 
its personal factors. In order that his officials might believe that 
nothing could escape him, he examined constantly details of ad- 
ministration and was not sorry when blunders enabled him to 
bring even a minister to book. He fashioned the machinery of 
memory with such skill that his performances astonished his 
contemporaries, many of whom could not discover the hidden 

400 



THE FRENCH EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT 401 

wires in motion. Twice a month there were laid before him ^^^' 

livrets or reports, volumes in octavo or quarto, containing perti- 

nent facts about each government service, classified according to I807-12 
his directions, so that he could instantly lay his finger upon in- 
formation which he desired. Eighteen of these volumes were 
prepared concerning the army alone, with the record of each 
regiment, brought down to date, telling not merely the numbers 
ready for duty, but mentioning the region from which the regi- 
ment was recruited, and recalling every important affair in which 
it had taken part. "If he reviewed a body of troops," wrote 
Baron Fain, one of his secretaries, " he knew where to find things 
to address to the general or colonel. If he paused before old 
soldiers, he knew of what battles or what campaigns to speak to 
them ; if he wished to bring a smile to the faces of young con- 
scripts, there sprang to his lips at once the name of the region 
where they were born." One of the livrets concerned the strength 
and movements of foreign armies, and it was composed of items 
brought together from every quarter, from reports of his am- 
bassadors, of his agents civil or military, from hints of travel- 
ers or deserters. He sometimes amused himself by casually 
mentioning to a foreign minister a particular movement of his 
monarch's armies of which the puzzled diplomat had not heard 
and the meaning of which he was left to surmise. The Emperor 
also watched closely the variations of the price of wheat, and 
for this purpose a map was constructed, upon which in little 
squares representing each department the local price was writ- 
ten, with a device indicating the average price over whole re- 
gions, and a statement of the place of lowest and highest prices. 
His interest in this was due to his conviction that there was a 
close connection between the cost of bread and public peace. 
His sense for realities made his conversation interesting even to 
those who had patriotic reasons to dislike and fear him. Prince 
Metternich said he always seized " the essential points of sub- 
jects, stripping them of useless accessories, developing his thought 
and never ceasing to elaborate it till he had made it perfectly 
clear and conclusive, always finding the fitting word for the 
thing." 

In his methods of work Napoleon was orderly. Every paper 
or petition of importance found its way to his table. More seri- 
ous matters were reserved for the quiet hours of the night, and 
he frequently rose at two o'clock in the morning and worked with 
his secretary until five, when he went to bed again. A secretary ms 
was always at hand in his workroom to write at his dictation. ^®^°j^ 
He dictated so hurriedly that it was impossible for the most 



402 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^^^- rapid writer to keep up with him and when his letters were writ- 

ten in full it was often necessary to guess what he had actually 

1807-12 s2Lid. Even when he was absent from France on distant cam- 
paigns he sought to govern the country after the same methodical 
fashion. Despatch-bearers were continually on the road. Each 
rider carried the bag of despatches one post and handed it to an- 
other ready to push forward at full speed to the next post. " A 
courier stops from time to time to drink or to eat, or when the 
journey is long to sleep. The estafette neither drank nor ate 
nor slept, but always rushed on." This was as true when Na- 
poleon was in the depths of Russia as when he was not far from 
the French border. At headquarters a workroom was speedily 
arranged, and leather portfoHos containing official papers, the 
livrets, his library, transported in boxes of acacia, which might 
be used as shelving, were placed on improvised tables or planks. 
If he was at a chateau or some palace of an ally or a conquered 
enemy, matters took on the appearance of a Parisian imperial 
administration. His aim was partly to satisfy his own restless 
desire to organize work effectively, and partly to convince France 
that her interests were not suffering when he was far away on 
errands which seemed remote from her real interests. 

Napoleon was conscious that his hold upon France was pre- 
His sys- carious, and he sought to bind the leaders of the nation to his 
Eewa°rd causc through their self-interest, not only his generals and sol- 
diers but also the directing classes of the country. Several of 
the fiefs which his generals received in Italy and Germany were 
endowed with enormous incomes. Twelve millions were distrib- 
uted among the soldiers. After 1808 the holders of fiefs outside 
the empire were in some cases authorized to sell them and pur- 
chase estates in France producing similar incomes. Permission 
was usually not given, because Napoleon feared that the zeal of 
his generals to preserve French control, especially over Germany, 
would be lessened if the collapse of the great structure would not 
jeopardize seriously their private fortunes. In 1808 titles were 
attached to certain official positions, and .these titles could be 
made hereditary if the holder connected with them estates pro- 
ducing an income sufficiently large to maintain the dignity. In 
this way, for example, senators and archbishops became counts, 
and bishops and mayors of the " good towns " were made barons. 
During the later empire Napoleon showed an increasing eager- 
ness to attract members of the old nobility to Court as officials. 
His two ablest officials, Talleyrand and Fouche, no longer served 
him. Fouche had been dismissed as an intriguer and Talleyrand 
had become a " grand dignitary," yielding his place in the minis- 



THE FRENCH EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT 403 

try of foreign aflfairs to men of smaller capacity and less compre- ^^y 
hension of the necessities of European politics. 

The reorganization of the legal system of France begun dur- 1807-12 
ing the Consulate was not completed until toward the close of 
the Empire. The character and tendencies of the later legisla- The 
tion were seriously affected by Napoleon's growing inclination ^°^^^ 
to adopt harsh measures of repression and despotic methods of 
government. The civil code had been promulgated just before 
the Consulate disappeared. A code of civil procedure was its 
natural complement and a commission had been at work upon 
it since 1802, but it was not ready until 1806. While it preserved 
in part the plans of conciliation which the Constituent Assembly 
had associated with the work of the justice of the peace, the new 
code was mainly a revival of the procedure under the old regime. 
Napoleon took little personal interest in the matter and was pres- 
ent at only one discussion in the Council of State. Indeed, it is 
said that so many of the councilors were unfamiUar with the 
technicalities of the question that little real discussion occurred 
and the long code of 1042 articles was disposed of in twenty-three 
sittings of the council. Much deeper interest, naturally, was felt 
in the code of criminal procedure and the penal code, where the 
reaction against the liberal work of the Revolution threatened the 
system of trial by jury and succeeded in reintroducing some of the 
cruel punishments of the old regime. Napoleon finally took up 
the defense of the right of trial by jury, although he opposed the 
retention of the practice of leaving to a preliminary jury the task 
of drawing up indictments. The selection of jurors was placed 
in the hands of the prefects, who might also assume the role of 
judges for the indictment of the accused. This was entrusting a 
dangerous power to a despotic government, even if the accused 
still possessed the right of a public trial with all the ordinary safe- 
guards. Another sign of strong government was the withdrawal 
from the ordinary courts of the prosecution of counterfeiting, 
smuggling, and similar offenses, if done by armed men. No 
adequate provision was made against false imprisonment, and the 
requirements in regard to bail were so severe as to make release 
extremely difificult. The penal code applied the death penalty not 
only in cases of murder, but also of arson and of robbery where 
life was endangered. The right hand of the parricide was to be 
struck off before he was executed, and for certain offenses the 
convicted criminal was branded or his property confiscated. Dur- 
ing the Empire a commercial code also was prepared, the most 
notable feature of which was its severity toward bankrupts. 

The constitution of the Consulate had not been liberal in the 



404 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 

XXIV 

1807-12 

Changes 
In the 
Constitu- 
tion 



Financial 
Affairs 



sense of making possible effective opposition to projects of govern- 
ment, but it opened the way for wholesome criticism, which might 
compel measures to be withdrawn for modification or deferred. 
Of such criticism the Tribunate was the peculiar organ. Even as 
First Consul, Napoleon had become impatient of control and in 
the imperial constitution the Tribunate, divided into three sections, 
roughly corresponding to the sections of the Council of State, 
ceased to be a deliberative assembly. It was thus degraded to the 
position of a fifth wheel and marked for early disappearance. 
The prestige of Tilsit furnished the occasion for its elimination, 
and the Senate, the special guardian of the constitution, was used 
as the instrument. The method was the appointment of three 
commissions in the legislative body, which were to discuss before 
that body as a whole measures defended by the orators of the 
Council of State. The tribunes either became legislators or were 
provided with other offices. As the years passed Napoleon used 
the procedure of the senatus consulte or a simple decree of the 
Council of State in enacting his measures into law. In this way 
the importance of the Council of State was enhanced. Over six 
thousand questions, for example, were brought to its attention 
in 1811. 

Under the Republic the cost of great measures of reform, the 
burdens of a war against all Europe, and the inability of the 
government to establish its system of collecting taxes, had led 
to the bankruptcy of 1797. No such disaster menaced the last 
days of the Empire because it was not necessary to buy off the 
beneficiaries of an old regime while preparing the foundations 
of the new. The reforms of the Consulate had been in the direc- 
tion of efficiency and the result had been economy, while the bur- 
dens of continued war were thrown mainly upon conquered or 
dependent states. The consequence was that, although the Em- 
pire sank in the midst of financial depression, it did not leave be- 
hind new masses of public indebtedness or a credit ruined by 
repudiation. An increase of seventeen millions in the interest 
charge was the result of a reorganization of previous indebted- 
ness rather than of new loans. Indeed, the government could 
not have borrowed to advantage ; the bankruptcy of 1797 was too 
recent a memory. 

The work of reorganizing the administration of the taxes was 
pursued steadily. The most important achievement was the ap- 
praisal of real estate, begun in 1807, which by 1814 comprehended 
the lands in 9,000 communes. This was the first effective meas- 
ure against the arbitrariness of apportionment, which was one 



THE FRENCH EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT 405 

of the crying evils of the old regime. The changes in the system *^v 

of indirect taxes affected the tariff, important in connection with 

the Continental System, and included a partial reintroduction of ^^^''^'^^ 
the old and obnoxious taxes on liquors, tobacco, and salt. The 
collection of these taxes, entrusted to an administration of droits 
reunis, was accompanied by so many vexations that the term 
droits reunis became hateful throughout the country. 

The financial system of the Empire was better than the sys- 
tem which had preceded, but as yet there was nothing which could 
be termed a budget. The nominal list of receipts and expendi- 
tures does not explain the situation, because after the Austerlitz 
campaign Napoleon created a special fund, called at first " War 
Treasure " or " Army Treasure," and finally " Extraordinary 
Domain," which was fed by indemnities paid at the close of wars 
and by revenues charged permanently upon the income of de- 
pendent countries or produced by estates lying within them. The 
exact amount of the extraordinary fund is not known, because 
Napoleon guarded it as jealously as Frederick the Great his " Dis- 
positions-Kasse." It received a special organization, with an in- 
tendant-general, by a senatus consulte of 1810. Although it was 
to serve mainly as a " rainy-day " reserve, the Emperor charged 
against it expenses like the maintenance of the army in the field, 
so far as this was not provided for by direct requisitions, rewards 
to officers and pensions to soldiers, the repair of palaces, and a 
part of the expenditure for public works. When the industrial 
crisis began, he drew upon it for loans to merchants and manu- 
facturers in distress. He also used it occasionally to balance the 
ordinary budget. 

The relations of the Bank of France and of the Government Bank of 
became closer during the Empire. This was partly the result of 
a panic in 1805, which grew out of extensive loans made by the 
bank to the " Company of United Merchants." The Company, 
which dealt in government contracts, had been speculating, par- 
ticularly upon receipts from the Spanish colonies, and when war 
broke out between England and Spain it was threatened with 
ruin. The Bank of France attempted to relieve the strain by is- 
suing notes which it lent to the Company. The depreciation of 
the notes and the failures of important business houses alarmed 
Napoleon, who was absent in Austria and Moravia. The coin he 
brought back at the Peace of Pressburg enabled him to put an 
end to the panic, but he reorganized the administration of the 
bank, bringing it more directly under government control. He 
believed that the bank was an instrument of state and that not 



France 



4o6 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XXIV 



Prosper- 
ity of 
France 



even such a matter as the rate of discount should be left to the 
course of business. In 1807, for example, he arbitrarily reduced 
the rate to four per cent. 

The confidence which the imperial financial administration en- 
joyed under such men as Gaudin and Mollien is indicated by the 
steady rise in the price of government stock, which in August, 
1807, reached the figure of 93.40. This price was also due to the 
feeling of hope and confidence created by the news of the Peace 
of Tilsit. The following year in March it was 88.15, but 
from this time forward it gradually sank until with the entry 
of the Allies into Paris in the spring of 1814 it was quoted at 

45- 

For France the Empire was a period of prosperity, at least un- 
til 1810. The national industries which had not recovered at the 
close of the Consulate the ground lost during the Revolution had 
time enough to equal and in many cases to exceed the best years 
of the old regime. For over a decade, while much of Europe was 
torn by war, France was not even threatened by invasion. Suc- 
cessive annexations added to the area within which trade was un- 
restricted. To such normal causes of growth was added the ex- 
traordinary stimulus due to the favored position created by the 
Continental System. Moreover, the parvenu nobility which Na- 
poleon had richly endowed from the spoils of subject states had 
an abundance of money to expend upon luxuries. Progress in 
certain industries had more permanent causes, such as the intro- 
duction of machinery, patterned after English inventions, or the 
application to industrial needs of the results of scientific discov- 
ery, especially in chemistry. In the silk industry, with its center 
in Lyons, an ingenious loom was invented by Jacquard, which pro- 
duced the most complex and beautiful patterns. The general 
introduction of the factory system, however, belongs to a later 
period. 

Agriculture also showed marked gains. The farmer under- 
stood better the rotation of crops and gradually freed himself 
from the trammels of the ancient practice of permitting a third 
or a half of his arable land to lie fallow. Vegetables like the 
potato were more widely used. There was also a large increase 
in the total amount of land under cultivation. This progress 
was not uniform all over the country. In certain regions the 
farmers still clung to the methods their fathers had used. 

The foreign commerce of France suffered from the uncertain- 
ties of war and the Continental System. Even where the Eng- 
lish cruiser could not go, along the land frontiers of France, in- 
ternational trade did not develop rapidly. Old habits could not 



THE FRENCH EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT 407 

be easily overcome. Nor was the international trade of France chap. 

large by comparison with what it became in later decades of the 

nineteenth century. Partnerships, rather than stock companies, I807-12 
were a satisfactory form of organization considering the volume 
of business. Two achievements improved the prospects of busi- 
ness for the future. One was the establishment under the Con- 
sulate of a fixed monetary standard, and the other the rapid 
building of roads. At this time the roads were further classified 
as imperial, departmental, and vicinal, and great efforts were 
made towards the completion on a national scale of the imperial 
and departmental roads. Connections with Turin and Milan 
were made by the construction of roads across the Alps. 

The prosperity of France was gone long before the outbreak of 
war with Russia in 1812, The steady drain of campaign after 
campaign, especially of the unceasing struggle in the Spanish 
peninsula, made the situation critical in the spring of 1810. The 
trade in colonial products had become highly speculative, because 
the supply of sugar, coffee, and tobacco was uncertain. Prices panic 
were liable to sudden variations, which offered extraordinary op- °' -^^^^ 
portunities for profit, but also threatened the unwary with ruin. 
In, the month of May prices rose to such a height that purchases 
fell off and several merchants in Paris were unable to meet their 
payments. A little later there were failures in western France, 
whose prosperity had been compromised by the loss of the Span- 
ish market. The condition of the cotton industry became pre- 
carious. The protection which the Continental System had given 
to the French manufacturer had led him to act as if business 
would expand indefinitely. The result was an inflation of which 
the rapid increase in discounts after 1808 is an evidence. New 
mills had been erected at lavish expense on borrowed money. 
Credit was strained to the breaking point. Then came the tariff 
of 1810 which enhanced the price of raw material. The manu- 
facturer found it impossible to throw the whole burden of the 
increased cost upon purchasers and his own resources were un- 
equal to any added load. The Bank of France began to pursue 
a policy of caution in making loans and other banks followed its 
example. All that was necessary to tumble down the whole 
house of cards was a blow from some direction. The first great 
failure was in Liibeck in September, 1810. In October an im- 
portant Amsterdam concern failed. Both involved merchants in 
Paris. The excitement was great and a feeling of distrust be- 
came general. In January, 181 1, Richard-Lenoir, the principal 
cotton manufacturer of France, wrote : " The situation of trade 
becomes daily more critical; sales have almost ceased, and pay- 



4o8 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^^^- ments are slow and uncertain. My credit is ruined." ^ The 

panic lasted well into the summer of 1811. The number of looms 

1807-12 ^^ work in Lyons was reduced from I4,CX)0 to 5,630. The de- 
pression in the silk trade has often been attributed to a decree 
which the Czar Alexander issued in December, 181 o, excluding 
articles of luxury from Russia. But the Russian merchants had 
already ceased to purchase their usual quantities of silk because 
the enforcement of the Continental System prevented them from 
paying in exports of wheat, timber, and other bulky products. In 
this case Napoleon's policy directly compromised the prosperity 
of his own merchants and manufacturers. Although he did not 
understand the causes of the disaster, he was not indifferent to 
the situation. He attempted to restore prosperity by making 
liberal advances to embarrassed merchants and manufacturers. 
In the year 181 2 alone he lent them eighteen million francs out of 
his Extraordinary Domain. 

To the other misfortunes of 181 1 was added a partial failure 
of the wheat crop. In order to forestall a rise of the price of 
bread Napoleon appointed a Food Commission, which began to 
stock public granaries. This was noised about and led to a 
further rise in the price of grain, which the commission tried to 
correct by selling below the market rate. The market now was 
thrown into a panic and the price was nearly doubled. Na- 
poleon resorted to the remedy of 1793 and practically established 
a maximum. With many thousands out of employment the out- 
look at the close of the year was somber. 

A social order or a political system generally expects loyalty 
from the schools which it supports or tolerates. In the case of 
a long established regime this seems natural, but when a parvenu 
dynasty, like that of Napoleon, makes similar demands it causes 
surprise, irritation, or, perhaps, amusement. Never was the de- 
mand formulated with greater preciseness than in the imperial 
organization of the public schools of France. A law of the Con- 
sulate had provided for the establishment of communal colleges 
and state lycees as well as of special schools, but little was done 
until after the Peace of Tilsit, when by the law of March 17, 
1808, the University of France was created. The first article 
established what has been called the regime of monopoly, declar- 
ing that " Public instruction is entrusted exclusively to the Uni- 
versity." This did not mean that no other educational institutions 
Univer- could exist, for Napoleon was satisfied with a rigid control over 
Bity of private or church schools, but that they must be authorized by 
the Grand Master of the University and be subject to inspection 
1 Quoted by Darmstadtcr, op. cit. 



THE FRENCH EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT 409 

by state officials. For example, the religious order known as chap. 

the " Brethren of the Christian Schools " was encouraged to take 

up the work of primary instruction. The teachers and masters I807-12 
of private schools, even, were required to hold degrees from the 
University. The aim of education was to form citizens who 
would be attached to their prince, as well as to their country, 
their religion, and their family. The basis of education was to 
be the Catholic religion, and to this was added " Fidelity to the 
Emperor, to the imperial monarchy depositary of the welfare of 
peoples, and to the Napoleonic dynasty conservator of the unity 
of France and of all the liberal ideas proclaimed by the constitu- 
tions." The last qualification was suited rather to edify young 
minds than to record the Emperor's attitude in the later years of 
his reign. The instructors were to serve as a sort of moral 
police, and were expected to inform the grand master of any- 
thing in the public schools unsound from the point of view of 
imperial doctrine. Napoleon would have been glad if he could 
have built up a teaching force with a unity of command and the 
cohesion of the Jesuit Order. A military organization was im- 
posed on the pupils of the lycees, and they proceeded to the ex- 
ercises of the school at tap of drum. Those in residence were 
not to appear outside the precincts of the school except in full 
uniform. Private schools paid to the University fees amount- 
ing to a twentieth of their revenue from tuition. Even then their 
condition was precarious ; the master of an ancient " college " 
in Paris being ordered in 18 10 to send his 400 pupils to a lycee 
within a month. In spite of Napoleon's attempts to reduce the 
competition of the private schools, there were at his overthrow 
3,000 more pupils in private institutes and boarding schools than 
in the communal colleges and lycees. The organization as a 
whole was to prove, however, one of his most lasting achieve- 
ments, for in its broad outlines it still exists, although now freed 
from its dubious task of supporting a Napoleonic regime, and 
has entered upon a nobler rivalry with private schools. 

The Church was a still more potent instrument of government. 
To it Napoleon, in the language of Pope Pius VII, had been a 
second Constantine. In the official catechism the children were French 
taught that the Emperor was the " minister of God's power and ^^^^'^^ 
His image upon earth," and that those who fail in their duty to 
him would, " according to the Apostle Paul, be resisting the 
order established by God himself, and would render themselves 
worthy of eternal damnation." It is a question how much zeal 
the clergy put into the teaching of these assertions of the cate- 
chism, for in 1806, when it was imposed by law, the Emperor 



.lo THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^^?: was already involved in a serious controversy with the Pope. 
The struggle was of peculiar interest, because on the one hand 

1807-12 ^^g |.|^g master of the mightiest armies and the most subservient 
officials of Europe, and, on the other, the Pope, an individual, 
strong only in the fact that his sanctions were necessary to the 
orderly administration of the Church, upon which multitudes 
believed their salvation dependent. The issue proved that force 
must reckon with ideas, especially if these have long been inti- 
mately connected with the practices and the scruples of the re- 
ligious conscience. Napoleon had almost forgotten the lessons 
of the fate of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy. 

Not long after the Empire was created both the Pope and the 
Emperor discovered grounds of discontent with the situation. 
Napoleon wished to have in the Pope an ally in Italy, and he pre- 

lonfiict tended not to see the special obligation of the Pope to maintain 

•apacy^ a neutral position. Before Napoleon attacked his neutrality 
Pope Pius VII saw that the rights of the Church were ignored 
whenever they ran counter to Napoleonic policy. The publica- 
tion of the Organic Articles had set a good precedent for this. 
When Napoleon became King of Italy, he introduced the civil 
code, some of whose provisions were in conflict with the Con- 
cordat which he had previously negotiated for the Cisalpine Re- 
public. In France he made membership in an unauthorized re- 
ligious order ground for a criminal charge. His treatment of 
the Pope at the time of the coronation had filled Pius with 
chagrin, the Emperor appearing to regard him as a sort of 
" grand almoner." 

The controversy became acute during the war of 1805. It was 
in the course of this controversy, as already explained, that Na- 
poleon called himself " Charlemagne," since Hke Charlemagne 
he united the crowns of France and Italy. When Joseph was 
made King of Naples, the Pope refused to recognize the change 
of dynasty unless his historic rights of suzerainty were acknowl- 
edged. After the Peace of Tilsit Napoleon demanded an alli- 
ance, asking the Pope to promise that he would select a third of 
the cardinals within the French empire and that he would re- 
frain from any act likely to alarm the consciences of Frenchmen. 
As the quarrel became embittered, the Pope, confusing temporal 
and spiritual matters, ceased to institute the clergy named by 
Napoleon for vacant bishoprics. 

The controversy passed beyond the region of correspondence 
when General Miollis occupied Rome, took possession of jour- 
nals, printing presses, and the postal administration, and ex- 
pelled the cardinals who were not natives of the Papal States. 



THE FRENCH EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT 411 

This was followed by the annexation to the kingdom of Italy ^^y 

of four provinces, including Ancona. The climax came during 

the Austrian campaign of 1809, when from Vienna Napoleon 
pronounced the annexation to the empire of the last provinces 
of the Pope, including Rome. In anticipation of such an act Excom- 
Pius VII and his counselors had prepared a decree of excom- ""n'of 
munication against those who should plan or bring to pass such Napoleon 
a usurpation. Napoleon was not specifically named and all per- 
sons were warned in the bull against attacking in any manner 
either the goods or the rights of those involved in the condemna- 
tion. The bull was secretly placarded on the walls of Rome on 
the night of June 10. When the Emperor heard of the Papal de- 
cree, he wrote to Murat, who represented him in these proceed- 
ings, " No more half measures ; the Pope is a raging maniac 
whom we must lock up. Arrest Cardinal Pacca and the other 
supporters of the Pope." This was done and Pope Pius was 
taken, a close prisoner, to Savona, while Pacca, his secretary of 
state, was shut up in the fortress of Fenestrella. 

The situation was now extremely delicate. The spectacle of 
the new Constantine, the restorer of the Church, acting as the 
jailor of the Pope, was neither edifying nor free from embar- 
rassment. By causing the Pope's arrest Napoleon had given 
him an excuse for refusing to institute nominees to vacant bish- 
oprics, a refusal previously made on questionable grounds. He 
could argue the impossibility of performing his proper functions 
when deprived of his liberty and without the counsel of his offi- 
cial advisers. Although the press was silent upon the affair, the 
spectacle of the vacant sees, numbering eventually 27, was an 
effective protest against what was being done. 

Napoleon taxed the ingenuity of his lawyers to devise a way 
by which he could dispense with the aid of the Pope in filUng 
vacancies. Recourse could not be had to a general council be- 
cause such a council could not be called without the consent of 
the Pope. If a national council were summoned and the des- 
perate situation of the Church laid before it, it would probably 
refuse to ignore the terms of a solemn treaty like the Concordat 
and to put in force the method of institution provided by the 'Civil 
Constitution of the Clergy or the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges. Attempts 
The most that could be done was to ask the chapters of the va- *°^^^»- 
cant cathedrals to designate the nominated bishops as provisional with 
administrators of the diocese. But the attempt of Napoleon to Jut^Jrity 
transfer two bishops from their sees to the metropolitan sees of 
Paris and Florence brought from the Pope reprimands for the 
two ecclesiastics and bulls forbidding the chapters to obey them. 



412 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

CHAP. The bulls were delivered by members of the " Congregation," a 

secret order organized at first for the cultivation of piety and 

1807-12 i^^gj. furnishing invisible aides-de-camp to the imprisoned pontiff. 
Without waiting for a settlement of the question, Napoleon 
decreed by senatus consulte, February 17, i8iOj that Rome should 
be the second city of the Empire, that the Pope should have 
palaces there and at Paris, that he should be assigned an income 
of two millions a year, and that he should take an oath to do 
nothing contrary to the liberties of the Galilean Church set forth 
in the four articles of 1682. The quarrel became still more no- 
torious when thirteen cardinals who refused to be present at the 
religious ceremony of the marriage of Napoleon and Marie Louise 
were placed practically under arrest, forbidden to use their titles, 
and ordered to wear a black soutane. This treatment, which 
gained for the unfortunate ecclesiastics the name " black cardi- 
nals," was mild compared with that of nineteen bishops within 
the States of the Church, who were shut up in fortresses for re- 
fusing to take the oath to the Emperor. 

In 181 1 it looked as if the Pope, worn out by the strain of the 
controversy and moved by the condition of so many dioceses, 
was ready to yield. Four bishops, carefully chosen, who were 
sent to bring every possible argument to bear upon his resolution, 
finally succeeded in obtaining his consent to the proposal that he 
should grant bulls of institution to the nominated bishops and 
Chance of that hereafter, if he did not grant bulls within six months of a 
oompro- nomination, the candidate might be instituted by his metropolitan 
or by the oldest bishop in the diocese. On the strength of this 
success Napoleon convened a national council in order that it 
might embody the compromise in a decree, but he dismissed it 
angrily on account of its deference to the papal will. After the 
leaders of the opposition had returned ta their dioceses, and his 
officials had taken the precaution of obtaining the agreement of 
the others individually to the compromise, he reconvened the 
council. Even this carefully selected assembly made its consent 
subject to the approval of the Pope. Pius VII, when the decision 
was laid before him, ignorant of the circumstances surrounding 
the affair, gave a conditional approval ; but, as Napoleon rejected 
the conditions, the matter was not advanced. By this time he 
was absorbed by the approaching war with Russia. When he 
was well on his way toward the Niemen, the Pope was hurried 
across the Alps into France and was brought to Fontainebleau, 
where he was to wait until the disasters of 1812 modified the 
situation profoundly. 

The Church was not the only form of moral and intellectual 



THE FRENCH EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT 413 

activity that Napoleon sought to control. He established a rig- ^^^• 

orous censorship of literature and of the press. The theaters 

were reduced in numbers and classified. It was dangerous to I807-12 
publish or produce plays which contained lines with ambiguous 
meanings, and even plays of classical origin were expurgated. Litera- 
Chateaubriand, the greatest prose writer of the period, fell into *"" 
disfavor because of his condemnation of the judicial murder of 
the Duke d'Enghien. The most notable case of persecution for 
literary opposition was that of Mme. de Stael, a member of the 
group of " ideologists " whom Napoleon detested. In 1803 he 
had ordered her to reside at least forty leagues from Paris. She 
preferred to go to Germany, to which he consented. At Weimar 
she made the acquaintance of Goethe and Schiller and deepened 
her interest in the German intellectual movement. A few years 
later she undertook to interpret this movement to the French in 
a book entitled VAllemagne. In 1810 in order to see it through 
the press she went to Blois on the Loire. Her frank admiration 
of the German genius and her silence upon the work which Na- 
poleon had attempted to accomplish in Germany were too much 
for the imperial censors and they demanded changes. A little 
later she received the news that the edition of 10,000 copies had 
been seized. At the same time she was ordered to leave France 
within three days. It was in England three years later that she 
finally succeeded in publishing her book. 

Napoleon wished to make literature march with the same pre- 
cision which he exacted of his battalions. He demanded that the 
historians show the weakness and confusion of the Bourbon gov- 
ernment and the " benefits due to the unity of the laws, of ad- 
ministration, and of territory." In 1808 as he became involved 
in a quarrel with the Pope, he wished history to exhibit " the 
dangerous influence of a foreign priest, whose ambitions might 
destroy the repose of France." The control exercised over 
newspapers was still more rigorous, and by October, 181 1, only 
four existed in Paris. The Journal des Debats had been forced 
to adopt the less untimely name of Journal de V Empire, and later 
was confiscated. Printers were restricted in number and re- 
quired to take an oath, and no book could be published until it 
was approved by the censors, and even then its sale might be 
suspended. In the neutral territory of the fine arts and of the 
mathematical and physical sciences, rendered illustrious by the 
names of David, Laplace, and Cuvier, work of permanent value 
was accomplished, but France lacked that intellectual life which 
thrives in the invigorating atmosphere of freedom. 



CHAPTER XXV 



THE LAST GREAT VENTURE 



CHAP. 

XXV 



THE strongest single motive in the development of Bona- 
parte's later policy sprang from the requirements of the 
Continental System as an effective weapon against the English. 
Each successive step toward the accomplishment of their ruin 
seemed not only justified but inevitable ; and all were so adapted 
to the general scheme of personal domination, that Bonaparte 
saw no reason to take account of obstacles created by the local 
necessities of peoples or by the ambitions of their rulers. This 
had already involved him in a fateful struggle in the Spanish 
peninsula and had prompted acts which became the occasion of a 
still more disastrous conflict within the boundaries of the Rus- 
sian empire. 

The war with England caused Russia serious losses because her 
export trade was mainly in wheat, timber, and shipping supplies. 
The deficit in the imperial treasury by 1810 equaled the income, 
and the value of the paper ruble had fallen to twenty-five per 
cent. To the injury of this situation was added the insult of the 
annexation of Oldenburg, of which a near relative of Alexander 
was ruler. By a curious irony of fate Alexander's retort was 
made before he heard of this step. It was embodied in the tariff 
of December 31, 1810, which was designed to protect Russia 
against the consequences of the System by either prohibiting or 
levying high duties on luxuries like French wines, brandies and 
silks, while facilitating the commerce of neutrals. 

A question of scarcely less importance had been raised by Na- 
poleon's policy in Poland. It was not so much what he had done 
as the possibility that he might do more that caused the Russians 
anxiety. The administrative, legal, and social reforms in the 
grand duchy of Warsaw might render restive those subjects of 
the old kingdom of Poland now Russian, and might predispose 
them to clamor for its restoration. The addition of a million and 
a half inhabitants to the grand duchy, by the terms of peace with 
Austria, appeared to encourage their hopes. At the same time 
the obstacle of the dual alliance seemed less formidable, now that 
the Austrian marriage indicated a change in Napoleqn's foreign 
policy. He alarmed Alexander by refusing to ratify an agree- 

414 



THE LAST GREAT VENTURE 



ment drawn by his own ambassador pledging him never to permit ^^^' 

the reconstitution of the PoHsh kingdom and even agreeing that 

the name Poland shotdd not be used in public documents. isio-is 

Napoleon's attitude towards the war between the Russians and 
the Turks was also a continual source of irritation. The Rus- 
sian arms were gaining successes which opened a prospect of an 
advantageous peace, but the French agents strove to prolong 
Turkish resistance. 

Before the measures of December, 1810, started rumors of war, 
Alexander had begun to sound the Poles upon their attitude to- 
wards a proposal by him to reconstitute the old kingdom, with 
him as monarch, but otherwise independent of Russia. Early in 
181 1 he began to move troops towards his western frontier, to 
be ready to enter instantly upon a campaign against Napoleonic prepara- 
domination in Warsaw and northern Germany if this and kindred ^"^f ^°' 
negotiations should succeed. With great secrecy he proposed to 
the Austrians that they accept certain Danubian lands in exchange 
for Galicia, which was to belong to the restored kingdom. His 
apparent design was to add the lands of the old duchy of Lithu- 
ania, that is to say, the part of Russia acquired at the partitions 
of Poland in 1772, 1793, and 1795. Before the winter was over 
he found that the Austrians would give him no encouragement. 
Indeed, the proposal was one of the reasons why they were ready 
to ally themselves with Napoleon in the coming war. The great- 
est disappointment was the persistence of the Poles in their at- 
tachment to the French cause; though it was natural, for who 
except the French and Napoleon had done anything but harm to 
the cause of Poland? By the spring of 181 1, therefore, Alexan- 
der was inclined to patch up some arrangement with Napoleon 
by which the alliance might be continued. 

Napoleon had not received information of Alexander's decree - 
of December 31, 1810, when he began to reinforce his army in 
northern Germany, with the aim of tightening the joints of the 
Continental System. The news from Russia suggested that the 
new army might have a more strenuous task than keeping the 
German ports closed against the English, Still later came re- 
ports of the movement of Russian troops along the frontier of 
Warsaw. This reached Paris at a time when the troops were 
being withdrawn and when an agent of the Czar appeared with 
proposals for a settlement of the difficulties. The question of 
Poland was now involved with the question of indemnities for 
the Duke of Oldenburg. In these negotiations the agents of 
neither Napoleon nor Alexander ventured to say definitely what 
they desired or were ready to do, fearing that the proposition 



4i6 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

CHAP, would be used as a weapon against them. After all, the Polish 

question was secondary, and the important question of the policy 

1810-13 Qf Russia towards commerce was not discussed. In an interview 
with Kurakin, the Russian ambassador, on August 15, Napoleon 
chose to defy Russia as he had defied England at the famous 
Whitworth interview of 1803. In the presence of other ambas- 
sadors he warned Kurakin not " to flatter himself that he would 
indemnify the Czar on the side of Warsaw," adding, " No, though 
your armies were encamped on the heights of Montmartre, I would 
not yield an inch of Warsaw's territory." Both Napoleon and 
Alexander now expected war, but neither desired it to open be- 
fore 1812. Napoleon bent all the efforts of his diplomacy to 
prevent Alexander from carrying the war into Germany, while 
Alexander was already inclined to profit by the lesson Welling- 
ton had taught in Portugal and to lure his enemy far within the 
vast plains of Russia. 

The approach of war placed Prussia in a precarious position. 
Position On the one hand the success of Napoleon would deprive Fred- 
8ia '^ erick William of the support which had come from the friendly 

intervention of Alexander. Napoleon might seize the occasion 
to carry out the thought of destroying the Prussian monarchy 
which he had meditated since Jena ; indeed, rumors that the de- 
tails of such a scheme had already been worked out found their 
way to Berlin. On the other hand, a decisive Russian success 
might lead to the annexation of the grand duchy of Warsaw, 
made up of former Prussian Polish possessions, in which case 
Prussia would simply change masters. 

Alexander was Frederick William's natural ally, but such an 
alliance meant ruin unless Alexander, anticipating Napoleon's 
action, pushed his columns far into Germany before the Grand 
Army of France and her dependent States was assembled. One 
favorable element in the situation was the retention of many 
thousand French troops in Spain, so that it did not seem possi- 
ble to assemble another army large enough to meet a vigorous 
onslaught of the northern powers. Such men as Scharnhorst 
thought the hour to strike had come, but Frederick William hesi- 
tated and Hardenberg despatched to Paris the proposal of a 
closer alliance with France, which would ward off destruction 
and which might move Napoleon to release Prussia from a part 
of the war contribution as well as remove the limitation upon the 
size of the army. Preparations for war were at the same time 
pushed forward with the excuse that these were necessary if 
Prussia's alliance was to be valuable. Napoleon was angered by 
the Prussian preparations because he feared that they might pre- 



THE LAST GREAT VENTURE 417 



cipitate war with Russia, and, although he did not altogether 9^^- 

penetrate the poHcy of double dealing that Prussia was pursuing, 

he resolved to seize Prussia unless the preparations ceased. 
Scharnhorst had already been sent secretly to St. Petersburg to 
learn if the Czar could be counted upon in case of French at- 
tack, and in November he brought back Alexander's consent to 
an alliance and a promise to abandon his plan of awaiting the 
French attack within his own dominions. Meanwhile Prussia 
had received assurances of English subsidies. Before Frederick 
William finally decided what to do he sent Scharnhorst to Vi- 
enna, only to discover that Count Mettemich and his master had 
determined to maintain their alliance with France. Frederick 
William was now obliged to accept a settlement with Napoleon 
much severer than Hardenberg had anticipated, promising to fur- 
nish 20,000 troops, subject to the orders of Napoleon, and to 
place the remainder of the army, separated in garrisons, under 
the command of neighboring French generals. The alliance was 
offensive and defensive against all States except Spain, Italy, and 
Turkey. If the French armies marched through Prussian terri- 
tory they should issue requisitions for food, the value of which 
should be credited toward the payment of the old war debt. This 
humiliating treaty was signed February 24, 181 2, when the war 
with Russia seemed a few weeks distant. 

The attitude of Austria was prompted partly by distrust of 
Alexander's Polish policy and irritation at his territorial ambi- 
tions on the lower Danube. Metternich also hoped that the Attitude 
Prussians would ally themselves with Russia and that this would tria ^^' 
afford Napoleon the excuse for seizing Silesia and handing it 
over to his father-in-law. He had received assurances from Na- 
poleon that Austria would recover a part of the lost Illyrian prov- 
inces and the boundary of the Inn towards Bavaria in return for 
support during a war with Russia. The Austrians were confi- 
dent that France would be victorious if the struggle were begun, 
and Mettemich, wishing that Prussia might become seriously 
compromised in the affair, actually advised Prussia to unite with 
the Russians. A treaty was signed in March, 1812, pledging to 
Napoleon the support of an army of 30,000, which, however, 
should be under the orders of an Austrian general, although its 
movements were to conform to Napoleon's plans. 

The attitude of Sweden became of importance because Berna- 
dotte, ex-marshal of France, was the crown prince, and a Swedish 
army led by him might be a decisive weight in the scale. Bema- Sweden 
dotte wished to commend himself to his future subjects and de- 
manded as the price of an alliance the cession of Norway, which 



411 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XXV 



The 
Turks 



Welling- 
ton in 
Spain 



The 

American 
War 



belonged to Denmark. Napoleon could not concede this, for the 
Danes were his faithful allies. Moreover, he required of Sweden 
the rigorous enforcement of the Continental System, threatening 
to occupy Swedish Pomerania if this were not done. For the 
Swedes, as for the Russians, the Continental System was too high 
a price to pay for immunity from attack, and Bernadotte turned 
to Alexander to obtain from him what Napoleon refused. A 
treaty signed in April, 1812, promised the Russians the aid of a 
Swedish corps in making a diversion in northern Germany, and 
Bernadotte received in return the promise that at the peace 
Sweden should annex Norway. 

In May, Napoleon received another blow. This was a treaty 
of peace between Russia and the Turks, which freed a large Rus- 
sian army for the campaign against the French. Napoleon had 
demanded of the Turks an army of 100,000, promising them the 
restoration of all the territories Russia had taken away in a gen- 
eration, but the Turks distrusted his promises and gave more 
weight to the threats of the English, who declared that they would 
bombard Constantinople if the Sultan joined Napoleon. 

With a new and stupendous task confronting the French the 
necessity of keeping 300,000 soldiers in Spain was embarrassing. 
The results there were not commensurate with the effort. To 
maintain a semblance of authority the troops were scattered 
throughout the peninsula, and it was impossible to bring together 
an army large enough to crush Wellington after his expulsion of 
Massena from Portugal, Although the year did not pass without 
some successes in other parts of Spain, Wellington's hold on the 
borders of Portugal was strengthened by the capture, early in 
1812, of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, It was not of favorable 
augury to the cause of King Joseph that his brother was obliged 
to draw from Spain 30,000 veterans to form part of the great 
army which he proposed to launch against Russia. 

For the next two years the British efforts against Napoleon 
were hampered by a diversion across the Atlantic. The quarrel 
over the rights of neutral commerce and the impressment of sea- 
men had become embittered and a party in the American Con- 
gress, principally representing the interior, clamored for war. 
Although the United States had no war fleet, and only a few 
frigates and smaller vessels, and although the army contained 
only half a dozen regiments, war was declared upon Great Brit- 
ain in June, 1812. It subsequently appeared that the British had 
withdrawn their obnoxious Orders in Council two days before 
the declaration of war. As the conflict proceeded, England suf- 
fered more from the additional burden of risk to her commerce, 



THE LAST GREAT VENTURE 



liable to attack by swift-sailing American privateers, than from ^^y 

the cost of defending her colonies against the weak and ill-or- 

ganized forces of the United States. The issue of the great ^^lo-is 
struggle on the Continent was not seriously affected by the af- 
fair. 

The war of France and Russia, or rather of Napoleon and 
Russia, for France was neither consulted nor deeply interested, — 
except that her sons might return alive — began without formal 
declaration. When the French engineers were constructing the 
bridges at the Niemen they were not opposed by the Russians, 
although a few horsemen rode up and inquired what the purpose 
of the bridges might be. The break between the two emperors The Bus- 
did not occur until Napoleon was already at Wilna, fifty miles ^^^^ . 

r ^u r J.' Campaign 

from the frontier. 

The Grand Army was the largest force operating in any field 
of modern warfare. When the invasion began 450,000 effective 
troops crossed the Niemen, and 160,000 followed before its close. 
About one-half were Frenchmen, one-fourth Germans, and one- 
eighth Italians. There were 100,000 cavalry, 1,242 field pieces, 
and more than 100 siege guns. At the head of the army were 
some of the greatest paladins of the imperial period, Murat, Da- 
vout, Ney, and Eugene. Berthier was chief of staff. To have 
brought together such a body of men argued extraordinary 
genius for organization; to maintain it as an effective fighting 
machine in the vast plains of Russia surpassed the capacity of 
genius itself. Immense stores of provisions had been accumu- 
lated at Danzig and other fortresses, but it was not possible to 
forward them fast enough to provide for the needs of the sol- 
diers. Even before the army reached the Niemen the soldiers 
began to suffer for food. The machine was destined to break 
down of its own weight and complexity. 

Napoleon expected the Poles of Lithuania to hail him as a 
deliverer and he planned to turn their enthusiasm into auxiliary 
troops, and into all sorts of supplies for his advancing army. 
The movement was to start with a diet at Warsaw, and it was 
decided before he left Paris what the diet should do and what 
his attitude should be. Meanwhile he countenanced rumors of 
a restoration of the old kingdom. The diet assembled at War- The Poles 
saw and the elder Czartoryski announced the reestablishment of 
the kingdom of Poland ; but, when a delegation appeared before 
Napoleon at Wilna, he chilled their enthusiasm by declaring that 
they must show themselves strong enough to conquer and defend 
their liberties. This could be done only by supporting more vig- 
orously the expedition. He also reminded them that Austria was 



^2o THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^:^v* ^^^ ^^^^ ^"^ nothing should be undertaken which would alarm 

the Emperor Francis for the safety of Galicia. Already the en- 

1810.13 thusiasm of the Lithuanians had been changed into indifference 
or anger because the French troops, often half starved, plun- 
dered them as if they were enemies. In his proclamation to his 
soldiers Napoleon called this the " Second Polish War." The 
event hardly justified the name. 

In the Russian campaign Napoleon's advance lasted from June 
23, when his army began to cross the Niemen, until September 
rhe Eoad 14, when he entered Moscow. At the Niemen he was already 
:ow^°° more than 700 miles from the borders of France, his true base 
of operations. A large part of his line of communications was 
exposed on either side, if the formal friendship of Austria or 
Prussia should be changed into hostility. Moscow lay beyond 
the plains of Lithuania and old Russia 600 miles as the crow 
flies, about the distance from Albany to Chicago or from Wash- 
ington to St. Louis. Between were few cities of importance and 
the country was poor and sparsely populated. The campaign was 
begun late, in order that the horses might feed on the fresh 
grasses. Napoleon had not planned to go beyond the borders of 
Lithuania the first summer, expecting to follow this campaign by 
another in 1813 until the endurance of Russia was worn out. 
He was fully warned against the hazards of the enterprise be- 
cause the Czar had not concealed his intention to withdraw, if 
need be, into Asia, rather than sign a peace while his capital or 
a foot of his territory was held by the enemy. Napoleon had 
received a more sinister warning, when he insultingly asked 
Alexander's representative at Wilna which was the road to Mos- 
cow. The Russian replied : " As the French say, ' All roads 
lead to Rome,' so the Russians say, ' All roads lead to Moscow ' : 
one may choose; Charles XII took that by way of Pultowa." 

The size of Napoleon's army forced the Russians to adopt a 
more thoroughgoing policy of retreat than they had at first con- 
sidered. Their scheme of operations had included the retirement 
the of a first army upon elaborate fortifications, a Russian Torres 

sampaign Vedras, at Drissa on the Diina; and, when the enemy followed, 
a second army further south was to menace his flank and rear. 
The Russians soon discovered that Napoleon had soldiers enough 
to surround and overwhelm both armies, and that their only hope 
lay in diminishing the French army by lengthening still further 
its Hne of communications. In fact, the second army barely 
escaped destruction before it effected a union with the first army. 
From that moment, however, the size of Napoleon's army was 
a disadvantage, confirming the Russians in the policy of retreat, 



THE LAST GREAT VENTURE 421 

so that the opportunity of engaging them in a decisive battle ever °^^' 

receded before him. His soldiers were worn out and his horses 

killed by endless marches, 10,000 horses perishing before the 
army reached Wilna. Further on, a single corps reported a daily 
loss of 800 or 900 men from fatigue, disease, and starvation. 
By the end of July nearly a third of the army had disappeared, 
and still the day of a decisive battle was in the future. Napoleon 
supposed the Russians would defend Smolensk, the border city 
of " Holy " Russia, but they left only a rear guard to delay his 
entrance. He had originally intended to pause there until 181 3, 
but the hope of forcing the enemy to an issue lured him on along 
the road to Moscow. The Russians, weary at length of the 
policy of retreat carried out with such patient resolution by 
Barclay de Tolly, put the old fighting general Kutusoff in com- 
mand and barred Napoleon's advance at Borodino. The Grand 
Army now numbered about 125,000, while the Russians had a 
little over 100,000. The struggle raged all day on September 7 
and closed with the loss to the French of a fifth of their army, 
while the Russians lost still more. Although the French were 
victorious, their success was not decisive, because Napoleon re- 
fused to use the Imperial Guard with crushing effect at the critical 
moment. 

When the French entered Moscow a few days later they were 
astonished to find the ancient Russian capital deserted by its in- 
habitants. Only 15,000 out of 250,000 remained, and those were Moscow 
mostly foreigners and vagabonds. No municipal deputation 
waited upon the disappointed conqueror. What was worse, be- 
fore the day was over fires broke out in different quarters of the 
town. Who set the fires is unknown, although the Russian gov- 
ernor has been accused of ordering them. Released criminals 
or bandits and French pillagers were quite as likely the culprits. 
The flames soon held the whole city in their grasp, and lighted 
the country around so far that persons could read at midnight 
ten or twelve miles away. A large part of the city was burned 
and it was impossible to procure supplies from the surrounding 
district, and yet Napoleon lingered in Moscow for five weeks, 
deluded by the expectation that Alexander would consent to terms 
of peace. 

On October 18 Napoleon began his retreat. His army now 
counted, including reinforcements, about 100,000. As the Rus- 
sian army lay across the more southerly roads, he was obliged to The 
return through the region devastated by both armies during the Retreat 
advance. His soldiers were horrified by the spectacle of the 
thousands of dead lying still unburied on the battlefield of Boro- 



122 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^^y' dino.- On November 4 the thermometer showed that winter, the 

cruelest enemy of all, had come. By the middle of the month 

1810-13 j.j^g army reached Smolensk, but half its numbers had perished. 
Greater perils still awaited it along the river Beresina, where a 
Russian army from the south had burnt the bridge Napoleon had 
planned to use and were holding the western banks of the river. 
The remnants of the Grand Army would have been captured but 
for the skilful strategy of Marshal Oudinot, who deceived the 
Russians as to the place selected for crossing, and the self-sacri- 
ficing courage of the French engineers, who stood up to their 
necks in the icy stream while they constructed two wooden 
bridges. Nevertheless, before the crossing was accomplished the 
Russians came up and turned their guns upon the bridges. One 
broke down under the weight of the panic-stricken crowds, and a 
fierce conflict of men and horses for the other went on until the 
French rear guard set fire to it to cover their retreat, leaving on 
the other side thousands of stragglers. So many perished in the 
river that ten years afterwards islets or shallows could be seen 
made up of grewsome masses of human wreckage. What was 
left of the army struggled on past Wilna to the Niemen, which 
was crossed the middle of December. The infantry of the 
Imperial Guard numbered 400 or 500 and the cavalry 600 more, 
many of them without horses. One battalion which left Smo- 
lensk with 31 officers and 300 men was reduced to 14 officers and 
. 10 men. On December 5 Napoleon placed the army under the 
command of Murat and set out for Paris to save his empire from 
the consequences of defeat. On December 10 he was at Warsaw, 
on the 14th at Dresden, and he reached Paris on December 18 
about midnight. 

Hardly two days had passed since a cloud of anxious dread 
had settled upon the city with the appearance in the Moniteur 
of the Twenty-ninth Bulletin of the Grand Army. Its para- 
he graphs of misleading description, telling of new triumphs over 
ewsin the Russians and transforming even the crossing of the Beresina 
ranee .^^^ ^ victory, could not sufficiently veil the few lines of truth, 
which intimated the frightful extent of the disaster. " This 
army, so fine on November 6th, was very different after the 
14th," so ran the first hint, " almost without cavalry, without 
artillery, without transports." Further on the bulletin said that 
the Guard had lost so many horses that it was possible to bring 
together only four companies of cavalry of 150 men each, in 
which generals were the captains and colonels were the non- 
commissioned officers. Who had survived, was the question on 
everybody's lips. Napoleon did not allow himself to be shaken 



THE LAST GREAT VENTURE 423 

in this atmosphere heavy with universal distress ; he had lost an ^;^xv' 

army, but not his empire, and another army must be found to 

reopen the campaign, if not on the Niemen, as far on the road i^io-is 
thither as possible. In their own sorrow the sympathetic French 
felt for his misfortunes and reflected that such a trial " might 
add to his other qualities more indulgence for the faults of others, 
more prudence in his plans, more moderation in his acts, and in 
his love of glory a greater consideration for France." Although 
all classes were eager for peace, none, save in the south and in 
some parts of the west, were disloyal to the Emperor. The 
French were too closely associated with the glories of the Grand 
Empire to see it destroyed without a struggle. They consoled 
themselves also with the hope that one more effort would bring 
the peace they all desired. Napoleon had little sympathy with 
this sentiment. As soon as he saw new forces gathering about 
him and felt once more the assurance of victory, he declared that 
if France was to be worthy of him she must cast away pusillani- 
mous wishes and desire to avenge her offended glory; that the 
only suitable peace was one which she could command after vic- 
tory and which would leave her all her conquests. His language 
showed even those who had zealously cooperated in raising troops 
that he was the same Napoleon that he had been the year before 
and that the Russian campaign had taught him nothing. They 
asked themselves, " When will the war end, if he regains his 
fortune, and, if he succumbs, what will be the conditions of 
peace?" 

Even before Napoleon's preparations for the new campaign 
were well begun, his attitude showed how little he was inclined 
to compromise with his enemies. In a conversation with the Aus- 
trian ambassador, on the last day of 181 2, the only concession he Napo- 
proposed was the return of Illyria to Austria in case she sue- ^^°^^^ ^*" 
ceeded in bringing about a peace between France and England. 
It is true he said that Portugal should be restored to the House of 
Braganza, but Portugal was already irretrievably lost to him. 
As to the grand duchy of Warsaw he declared he would not 
abandon a village of it, adding that if he began by giving up prov- 
inces his enemies would soon be asking for kingdoms. His forces, 
however, were inadequate to defend this Grand Empire. The 
successes of Wellington in 1812, especially the victory of Sala- 
manca, on July 22, made it impossible to withdraw many of his 
troops in the Peninsula. On the eastern frontiers of Germany 
were the remnants of the Grand Army, about 20,000, with 20,000 
more on the way, and 17,000 in garrison. The two wings of the 
army, composed mainly of the Austrian and the Prussian con- 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 

XXV 



tingents, were still in excellent condition, having escaped the 
hardships of the campaign. They numbered 66,000, but most 
of them might soon become enemies. To preserve the Napole- 
onic hegemony in central Europe a new army must be created. 

The effect of the news from Russia upon public sentiment in 
the dependent States was not decisive. In some quarters those 
who had grown restive under the Napoleonic yoke saw an oppor- 
tunity to intrigue or to resume a portion of their lost inde- 
pendence of action. Within the limits of the Rhenish Confed- 
eration none stirred at first. The army of Wiirttemberg was re- 
duced in the retreat from 14,000 to 173 officers and 143 men, and 
when the King was reminded of the obligation to raise his con- 
tingent to the required standard he hinted to the French minister 
that the confederate states were bound only so long as Napoleon 
could protect them. He changed his tone when he saw what 
France was doing. Bavaria acted more independently and con- 
ceded only a division, retaining the remainder of her troops in 
camp near Munich. 

In Italy it looked as if the situation of 1799 had returned, 
threatening the collapse of the French power. Murat left the 
army not long after the departure of Napoleon, and hastened to 
Naples to save his crown from the disaster which appeared to 
menace every Napoleonic creation. He was ready to open ne- 
gotiations with Lord Bentinck in Sicily or with Metternich in 
Vienna, and hoped to unite all Italy under one crown and to 
place that crown on his own head. There were many Italians 
ready to take up the cry, " Italy for the Italians," and to compel 
the French officials to recross the Alps. Such sentiments found 
no expression in a popular movement, as the rapidity with which 
Napoleon reorganized his resources made action dangerous. In 
Prussia and Austria alone were the consequences of the Russian 
disaster immediate and portentous. 

The attitude of the Prussians was a most serious question, for 
should they wreak their hatred of the French upon the pitiful 
remnants of the Grand Army hardly a man would reach the Vis- 
tula. Napoleon assumed that Frederick William would remain 
a faithful ally and as he passed through Dresden on his way to 
Paris wrote to the King asking him to increase his contingent 
and hold back the advancing Russians until the French reinforce- 
ments should appear. Hardenberg refused, while outwardly 
holding to the alliance, because he could hardly do otherwise. 
Aside from the Prussian corps under Yorck, which formed a 
part of Macdonald's army, the King had no army large enough 
to attack the French garrisons in the fortresses of the Oder and 



of Bussia 



THE LAST GREAT VENTURE 425 

the Vistula or in Berlin. At all events, nothing could be done ^^^' 

without the cooperation of Austria or of Russia. If Prussia 

was eventually to join Russia, it must be when the Russians had ^^^^-^^ 
advanced to the Vistula and the Prussian forces had been in- 
creased. Meanwhile the suspicious glances of the French must 
discover only attitudes of naive and touching fidelity. For- 
tunately for Prussia, the French ambassador in Berlin deeply 
sympathized with the sufferings of Prussia under the Tilsit 
regime, and was inclined to believe the professions of Harden- 
berg and the declarations of Frederick William. 

The Prussian Court was not fully aware how complete had 
been the destruction of Napoleon's army, when events occurred 
in the old kingdom of Prussia which hastened the settlement of 
the great question. Stein, now adviser of the Czar, learned intentions 
early in November of the approaching ruin of the French army 
and he had sought to influence Alexander to adopt a European 
rather than a narrowly Russian policy. He urged that the object 
of the war had ceased to be defensive, and that it should be to wrest 
from Napoleon the resources of Germany and to dissolve the 
Confederation of the Rhine. He realized that a strong party at 
the Russian Court thought that the defeat of the Grand Army 
was enough, while another party would be glad to see a peace 
negotiated with France at the expense of Prussia and on the 
basis of gaining the Vistula as the western frontier of Russia. 
Stein's arguments were reinforced by the advice of Count Nes- 
selrode, a young diplomat who had acquired great influence with 
Alexander, and who regarded the restriction of France within 
her "natural" frontiers as the true policy of Russia, guaran- 
teeing the peace of Europe by a restoration of the balance of 
power. At the same time Alexander resumed his Polish schemes, 
which he had been obliged to lay aside in 181 1, although they 
could not be mentioned openly, because any hint that the king- 
dom of Poland was to be restored would throw Austria and 
Prussia into the arms of Napoleon. Moreover, the old Russian 
party had no sympathy with the Czar's dream of a Polish king- 
dom ruled as a constitutional monarchy. If the resources of Ger- 
many were to be taken from Napoleon, how was this to be 
brought about ? Stein was ready to make a direct appeal to peo- 
ples, ignoring, if need be, princes. Indeed, he did not mean to 
preserve the sovereignty of the minor princes if they served the 
cause of France. To one of his correspondents he declared, " I 
am sorry that your Excellency spies a Prussian in me. ... I 
have but one Fatherland, which is called Germany, and since ac- 
cording to the old constitution, I belonged to it alone, and to no 



.26 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^^y particular part of it, to it alone, and not to any part of it, I am 

devoted with my whole heart." ^ The day had not come for such 

1810-13 ^ thoroughgoing program, and yet it was the North German peo- 
ples rather than their princes who overthrew the Napoleonic 
regime. 

While Stein urged the Czar to carry the war into Germany the 
governor of Riga tried to convince General Yorck that Prussia 
should unite with Russia in the conflict with Napoleon. Yorck 
was first of all a soldier, with unbending ideas in regard to his 
duty to his King, and, although he hated the French alliance, he 
had acted loyally during the campaign, so that Napoleon com- 
mended the behavior of the Prussian troops. He replied to the 
Russian overtures that, if Prussia abandoned the French alli- 
ance, she had no assurance in regard to the terms of settlement 
she might expect from cooperation with Russia. As the days 
passed he received detailed information of the ruin of the French 
army. His army of 18,000 troops in excellent condition was a 
decisive weight in the scale, especially if the Russian army had 
suffered severely. Late in December Yorck received a letter 
from the Czar, promising in return for a treaty with Frederick 
William not to lay down his arms until he had procured for Prus- 
sia " an aggrandisement of territory such as to enable her to 
resume the place among the Powers which she had before the 
war of 1806." At the same time Yorck was informed by those 
acquainted with the situation in the Russian camp that the Czar 
might go over to the party which advised peace with France on 
the basis of the Vistula. Yorck saw that the crisis had arisen, 
provided for in a secret message sent to his corps during the 
previous summer, which ordered that in case the French were 
forced to retreat the Prussian, corps should retire to Graudenz 
and defend itself against both sides. Yorck could not do this lit- 
erally, but he signed a Convention at Tauroggen on December 30 
by which his corps was to occupy a neutralized strip of Prussian 
territory until orders arrived from the King, and which provided, 
furthermore, that under no circumstances would the Prussians 
attack the Russians before March i. This Convention was 
known at Potsdam by January 2. Young Prince William ^ viv- 
idly recalled in later years the air of satisfaction which over- 
spread the King's countenance when he announced to him and 
to his brothers the " distressing news that Yorck had capitulated 
with his corps and that they were prisoners of the Russians." 
To the French ambassador both the King and Hardenberg pre- 

iSeeley, III. 17. 

2 William I, of Prussia and Germany. 



THE LAST GREAT VENTURE 427 

tended great indignation at the conduct of Yorck and agreed to ^^y' 

deprive him of command and send him before a court-martial. 

Perhaps, after all, the King did not relish so brusque an antici- ^^^^' ^ 
pation of his proper pohcy. 

To both Napoleon and his enemies the attitude of Austria was 
of the greatest importance, not only because of the weight of 
troops which she could throw into the scale, but also because of poUcy of 
her strong central position, the mountain bastions of the Bo- ^g"®^" 
hemian border menacing either the advance of Napoleon towards 
the Niemen or rendering easy a blow at the heart of the Rhenish 
Confederation. The fact that the Emperor Francis was Na- 
poleon's father-in-law and that he had for the campaign of 1812 
become Napoleon's ally did not determine Austria's attitude 
finally. The marriage of 1810 had been conceded to save Aus- 
tria from part of the consequences of her defeat of the year be- 
fore, and the alliance of 1812 had been accepted only as the best 
of three possible lines of conduct. If now the interests of Aus- 
tria should counsel a withdrawal from the alliance, only a mis- 
taken point of honor could restrain either Metternich or the Em- 
peror, for Napoleon had given them no reason to be delicate in 
such matters. 

When in the summer of 1812 Metternich heard the news of 
the constant retreat of the Russians and the reported victories of 
Napoleon he concluded that henceforward Russia was erased 
from the map of European Powers. At the same time he began 
to fear a separate treaty between Russia and France. The only 
way to guard against this was through negotiations for a general 
pacification. The scheme of a general pacification enabled Aus- 
tria to decline Napoleon's appeal to the Emperor Francis for 
effective assistance after the news of disaster replaced the tidings 
of victory. Napoleon wished Francis to double his auxiliary 
force and check the advancing Russians in the grand duchy of 
Warsaw until he could reorganize his own forces. Instead of 
complying with this request Metternich sent Count Bubna to 
Paris to represent to Napoleon that the only way to repair the 
losses of the campaign was through a general pacification. He 
found that, while Napoleon did not object to an unarmed inter- 
vention on the part of Austria, he was wholly bent on recovering 
his lost prestige and would make no substantial concessions. 

It was the aim of Austria to regain an independent position. 
This was defined by the Emperor Francis as one of armed neu- 
trality, from which Austria might pass into a state of war, either 
as ally of Russia and Prussia or as an ally of France. The 
latter contingency he regarded as impossible. The essential char- 



428 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

'xxv* ^cter of the situation, therefore, was a passage from alliance with 

Napoleon through armed mediation to war against him. Aus- 

1810-13 |.j.j^ ^^g i^y j^Q means sure that a decisive success of Russians and 
Neutrality Prussians would be to her advantage, for a preponderance of 
tria^"° Russia would be more dangerous than a preponderance of France, 
because the preponderance of France was dependent upon the 
life of a single man of genius. Restrained from immediate ac- 
tion also by her military and financial weakness, Austria's first 
step was an armistice, on January 30, with the Russians, permit- 
ting the withdrawal of the Austrian auxiliary force from War- 
saw. To the French the excuse was given that this force must be 
safeguarded for the coming campaign, but the step was in reality 
the complement of the Convention of Tauroggen. It compelled 
the hurried retreat of the French as far as Glogau. Two months 
later a secret convention with the Russians made possible a with- 
drawal of the Austrian force to Bohemia, to cooperate with the 
army assembling there to support the policy of armed mediation. 
Napoleon had begun the war with Russia in order to maintain 
the Continental System. The terrible disaster which over- 
whelmed his army not only jeopardized the System, but also en- 
dangered the Grand Empire. If he defended this with no better 
judgment than he had shown in defending that, even the French 
empire might also be imperiled. 



CHAP. 
XXVI 



CHAPTER XXVI 

THE COLLAPSE OF THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE 

THE campaign of 1813 was in one sense a continuation of 
the campaign of 1812. A similar enthusiasm inspired the 
Russian and the German peoples to resistance. And yet there ^''^'^■'■' 
were differences. The Germans had been for years under Na- 
poleonic domination, as the Russians had not. This fact has 
given the campaign the name of " The War of Liberation," and 
has made the year 181 3 the heroic period of German history, w^r of 
Liberation from the control of Napoleon, however, was not re- tion 
stricted to Germany. His failure to defend successfully on Ger- 
man battlefields his Grand Empire led to its ruin in Holland, 
Spain, and Italy. Even before the year was over, the frontiers 
of France drawn at Luneville were menaced. And the cam- 
paign was continued without a pause until April, 1814, when 
Napoleon was forced to abdicate and the French empire ceased 
to exist. 

When it was understood at Berlin how complete was the de- 
struction of the French army, the cry " Let us free ourselves ! " 
gained increasing force. Early in January the King authorized 
overtures to Austria for union in a policy of armed mediation. 
As French troops still occupied Berlin Frederick William was in 
a precarious position. On January 22 he rode off to Breslau, 
while Hardenberg explained to the French that he had gone to 
raise his contingent for the new campaign. A few days later 
a call for volunteers was issued, without, however, explaining 
against whom the volunteers were to fight. 

Meanwhile Baron vom Stein had entered Konigsberg, the old 
Prussian capital, armed with a commission from the Emperor 
Alexander, in order to organize the resources of East and West 
Prussia. According to Stein's plan the representatives of the 
estates of the two provinces were assembled to authorize the 
organization of the Landwehr. He remained in the background, 
because he was now a Russian official, and General Yorck stood 
sponsor for a project drawn up by a disciple of Scharnhorst. 
Acting through Prussian officials at Konigsberg, Stein removed 
the regulations enforcing the Continental System and raised a 
loan for Yorck's army. After this was done he returned to the 

429 



430 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XXVI 



Treaty of 
Ealiscb 



Uprising 
of the 
Prussians 



Russian headquarters. His action was disliked by the King, 
who did not wish his hand forced or the embarrassments of the 
situation increased. 

It was not until February 28 that Frederick William, whose 
thoughts were haunted by the question of the lost Polish prov- 
inces, reached an understanding with Alexander. This was em- 
bodied in the secret treaty of Kalisch, according to the terms 
of which Prussia should be restored to a position as strong rela- 
tively as that of 1806. The King was not promised the prov- 
inces incorporated in the grand duchy of Warsaw, except a 
strip large enough to connect Silesia and West Prussia. His 
compensation, therefore, would be found within the limits of 
Germany, an arrangement far better for Prussia. It was also 
agreed in the treaty that in the coming campaign Russia should 
furnish 150,000 men and Prussia 80,000. The object of the al- 
liance, which Austria was invited to join, was to deprive France 
of control in northern Germany. After waiting two weeks the 
treaty was published, and a few days later, on March 17, Prussia 
declared war upon France. 

Frederick William now issued an appeal to his people, couched 
in the language of real feeling, telHng them that there was no 
escape, that their choice lay between an honorable peace and 
destruction. Bolder spirits, like the philosopher Fichte, cried 
out that it was not " Victory or death " which would solve the 
problem, but " Victory anyhow." Already the call for volun- 
teers had given the people an opportunity to show their feel- 
ings. The enthusiasm to enlist was astonishing. Niebuhr wrote 
from Berlin a month before war was declared that " The 
crowd of volunteers is as great to-day in front of the town hall, 
as it is before a baker's shop in a famine." The men " asked 
eagerly whether it was certain they were to be led against the 
French, and the officers dared not assure them of it except by 
hints." A Breslau professor, Heinrich Steffens, was more 
frank, declaring to his students that the war was against Na- 
poleon, and calling upon them to follow him to the place of en- 
listment. The tide of popular feeling had risen so high that 
some feared for the throne of Frederick William if he delayed 
much longer to give the signal for the national war. 

The Prussian declaration of war was followed by the organiza- 
tion of a Landwehr on the principle of universal service. The 
regular troops had already been reinforced by the addition of 
the short term men, or Kriimper, who had been trained for this 
emergency. The brunt of the fighting in the spring campaign 
fell upon the regulars, but later in the year the Landwehr fought 



THE COLLAPSE OF THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE 431 

so gallantly as to win praise from Yorck, who distrusted all im- ^^^' 

provised soldiers. The military organization was completed by 

provision for a Landstnrm, — what the French had called a levee ^^is-ii 
en masse. In case of invasion all able-bodied men were to seize 
the arms nearest at hand — ax, scythe, or pitchfork — and de- 
fend their firesides. If the foe continued to advance, they 
should not hesitate — so the orders ran — to burn their houses, 
their supplies, and even their standing grain, to destroy the wells 
and render the country uninhabitable. 

As the soldiers assembled in camps, preparing to march against 
the French, they cheered each other with old German war songs. 
The uprising also inspired its own poets, especially Ernest Moritz 
Arndt and Theodor Korner. Arndt had denounced Napoleonic 
oppression after the downfall of Prussia so violently that he had 
been obliged to go into exile. In 1812 he had been one of the 
confidential advisers of Stein. His stirring appeals were already 
familiar when the war broke out. Korner was a younger man, 
at the beginning of his career. His father was a Saxon jurist 
who had been an intimate friend of Schiller. When the call 
came for volunteers, Korner was connected with the court the- 
ater at Vienna. He gave up his position and enhsted in the 
Liitzow Free Corps. His war songs were written on the march 
and by the bivouac. One of the most famous was finished on 
the morning of the battle in which he was killed. 

No sooner had Frederick William and Alexander reached an 
agreement about their own relations than they placed the other stein in 
German princes in the dilemma of taking the popular side or Germany 
being deposed. Here again the influence of Stein, eager to 
prepare the way for a reorganization of Germany, was appar- 
ent. A central council of administration, of which he was the 
head, was formed to govern the states of the Rhenish Confed- 
eration. The states which joined in the war should be permitted 
to send delegates, but Hanover — out of deference for England 
— was exempted from the council's jurisdiction. 

In April, Napoleon once more asked the Emperor Francis to 
become his active ally, oflfering Silesia as compensation. Met- 
ternich treated the proposal as practically terminating the agree- Napoleon 
ments of 181 2 and restoring Austria to an independent position. J°d aus- 
He intimated plainly to Narbonne, the French ambassador, once 
minister of war under Louis XVI, that Napoleon should aban- 
don his recent annexations in Germany, restore the Illyrian prov- 
inces to Austria, and add the grand duchy of Warsaw to Prussia 
in order to have a strong barrier state between France and Rus- 
sia. When Narbonne asked him if he awaited a first victory 



432 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^^- of the Allies before announcing such terms, he replied : " You 

are mistaken ; be sure that the day after a victory we shall speak 

1813-14 jj^ ^ g^jjj more definite tone." Metternich now announced both 
to the Allies and to Napoleon the mediation of Austria. 

The chance that Prussia could withstand the assaults of Na- 
poleon had already been improved by the signature of a subsidy 
treaty between England and Sweden, providing that the Crown 
Prince, Bernadotte, should put 30,000 troops into the German 
campaign. The unfortunate corollary of this agreement, which 
confirmed the promise of Norway made to Bernadotte by Alex- 
ander the year before, was the adherence of Denmark to the 
cause of Napoleon, weakening the extreme right of the allied 
line of advance. The appearance of Bernadotte, an ex-marshal 
of France, was counted upon to suggest to the French that the 
coalition did not threaten them, but only the personal domination 
of Napoleon beyond their frontiers. 

All through the winter Napoleon had been working with fev- 
erish energy to replace the army which had perished in the Mos- 
Napo- cow campaign. He called into service young men who should 

New^ not have been summoned for over a year. He also recalled 
Army men who belonged to th>^ conscriptions of the past four years, 

but who had hitherto been excused from service. Besides men, 
horses had to be provided, and cannon, muskets, and equipment 
of all kinds had to be bought or manufactured. To obtain 
money he ordered the sale of the communal lands, and he even 
proposed to issue bons, or assignats under a new name, in order 
to secure an immediate supply of cash equal to the value of the 
land. By such measures Napoleon brought together at the open- 
ing of the campaign 226,000 men, a large part of them untrained 
recruits. The army lacked a strong body of cavalry, a deficiency 
which Napoleon had occasion to deplore more than once in the 
coming weeks. ^ 

Napoleon left Paris on April 15 and hastened to Mainz to 
complete the organization of his army. Neither Prussians nor 
Russians could be ready to cope with him before the end of 
May, because their new levies and their reserves were not yet 
at hand. Nevertheless, as he took the field earlier than that, 
they did not hesitate to attack him at Gross-Gorschen near the 
historic field of Liitzen. The result was a defeat for them, but 
it was not a Jena, for during the night following nine squad- 
rons of horse charged straight into the French camp and 
nearly captured Napoleon and his staff. Three weeks later, on 
The May 21, at Bautzen, on the border of Silesia, Napoleon was 

Armistice ^igsim victorious, but his lack of cavalry deprived him of the 



THE COLLAPSE OF THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE 433 

fruits of victory. His troops were in as desperate a situation ^\^' 

as those of the defeated Prussians and Russians. Thousands 

of men had fallen out of the French ranks long before Bautzen i^is-ii 
was reached. His generals were weary of the struggle and 
peace sentiment at Paris had grown to ominous proportions. 
Such considerations led him on June 4 to agree to an armistice 
which was to last until July 20. He thought that in the interval 
he could bring back Austria into the position of a beggarly de- 
pendent, grateful for the crumbs which might fall from his im- 
perial table. If diplomacy failed, his resources at the close of 
the armistice would, he believed, be so great that he could crush 
all three powers. 

During the armistice the only chance of peace was through 
Napoleon's consent to such terms as his changed circumstances 
demanded. But he felt it impossible to become simply Em- 
peror of the French. As he said afterward to Metternich, 
" Your sovereigns born upon the throne may allow themselves 
to be beaten twenty times and still return to their capitals, but 
I cannot do so, for I am a soldier parvenu. My domination 
will not survive the day I shall cease to be strong, and, conse- 
quently, to be feared." His Grand Empire, unlike the Con- 
sulate, rested primarily on force; and if force passed to his 
enemies, that Empire was doomed, unless both they and he con- 
cluded that compromise was better than a desperate and final 
struggle. 

When Russia made overtures to Austria to join the alliance 
against Napoleon, Metternich submitted a list of concessions 
which Austria was ready to demand of Napoleon — the dis- 
memberment of the grand duchy of Warsaw, the cession of Negotia- 
Danzig to Prussia, the return of Illyria to Austria, and the in- peace ^"'^ 
dependence of the Hanseatic cities in northwestern Germany. 
Two other conditions, the dissolution of the Confederation of 
the Rhine and the restoration of Prussia to the position she held 
in 1806, Austria would urge by every means short of war. 
Prussia and Russia in a memorandum drawn up on May 16 
had gone much further, agreeing upon the separation of Hol- 
land from France, the restoration of Ferdinand VII to the 
throne of Spain, and the freedom of Italy from French 
influence. Such a policy was dictated by the need of English 
subsidies, and England was unwilHng to accept a peace which 
should leave either Holland or Spain under the control of Na- 
poleon. Ten days after the beginning of the armistice both 
Prussia and Russia signed subsidy treaties with England. 
Alexander promised not to make peace without England's con- 



.34 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^^^- sent. As Prussia had already agreed with Russia not to sign 
a separate peace, England appeared to have the final word in 

1813-14 j.j^g negotiations, putting a serious obstacle in the way of Aus- 
trian mediation on the basis of the minimum communicated by 
Metternich. 

The Austrian demand would at least serve to place Napoleon 
in his true light before France and Europe. Metternich in his 
Memoirs, written many years later, put this interpretation upon 
the policy of Austria. It is summed up in the assurance he is 
said to have given Alexander, who feared that Napoleon would 
accept the Austrian terms: "If he declines," said Metternich, 
" the truce will come to an end, and you will find us among your 
allies; if he accepts, the negotiations will most certainly show 
him to be neither wise nor just, and then the result will be the 

.ims of same." But another interpretation is possible. Metternich was 

letter- g^jjj anxious to guard against a dangerous increase of Russian 
power. His desire to restore Prussia to her former boundaries 
was prompted by the need of placing a stronger barrier across 
the line of Russian advance. If a preliminary treaty were made 
on the basis of the Austrian minimum, it was unlikely that in the 
negotiations for a general pacification Napoleon alone would 
be expected to make further concessions. The pledges which 
the Allies had made to each other did not form a chain strong 
enough to resist every sorf of strain. Moreover, the English 
ministers were not incapable of accepting less than their ideal 
of a sound peace. In instructions to Lord Aberdeen, about to 
start for Vienna, they said that " a general peace, in order to 
provide adequately for the tranquillity and independence of 
Europe, ought ... to confine France at least within the Pyre- 
nees, the Alps, and the Rhine. ... If, however, the Powers 
most immediately concerned should determine, rather than en- 
counter the risks of a more protracted struggle, to trust for their 
own security to a more imperfect arrangement, it has never been 
the policy of the British Government to dictate to other States a 
perseverance in war, which they did not themselves recognize to 
be essential to their own as well as to the common safety." ^ 
It may well be, therefore, that Metternich was honest in his 
proposals. He of course desired the ruin of a Grand Empire 
constructed chiefly at the expense of the Hapsburg power. He 
was ready to take what he could get, but willing also to accept 
less than the results a fortunate war might bring, because it 
was not certain that the war would be fortunate. At all events 

1 Quoted by Rose, II, 301, note. 



THE COLLAPSE OF THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE 435 

the negotiations would afford time to complete Austria's prep- ^^^" 
arations for war. 

The Allies decided to accept Austrian mediation on the ex- 1813-14 
press understanding that Austria would declare war upon Na- Napoleon 
poleon, if at the expiration of the armistice he should not agree t°rni^^* 
to the minimum proposed.^ Metternich's next task was to 
obtain from him an acceptance of Austrian mediation. An 
interview took place at Dresden. The discussion lasted nine 
hours, and at times Napoleon became passionate and abusive. 
He hinted that Metternich had been bribed by British gold and 
blurted out that his marriage with Marie Louise had been a 
foolish blunder. When Metternich reminded him that France 
was as necessary to him as he to France, and asked what he 
would do when " this army of boys that you levied but yester- 
day should be swept away," Napoleon, his features distorted 
with rage, cried out, " You are no soldier, and you do not know 
what goes on in the mind of a soldier. I was brought up in the 
field, and a man such as I am does not concern himself much 
about the lives of a million men." With that he threw his hat 
on the floor. A year before Metternich might have courteously 
picked it up, but he merely said, " Why have you chosen to say 
this to me within these four walls ; open the doors, and let your 
words sound from one end of France to the other. The cause 
I represent will not lose thereby." Before Metternich left Dres- 
den he procured from Napoleon a formal renunciation of the 
alliance of 1812, an acceptance of Austria's mediation, and a 
verbal promise not to denounce the armistice until August 10. 
Metternich did not state the conditions upon which Austria 
would insist, leaving this for the congress which it was pro- 
posed to open at Prague for the discussion of preliminaries of 
peace. 

At this juncture the successes of Wellington in Spain, ending 
in the complete overthrow of the French at Vittoria on June 21, 
made Metternich less anxious for peace, because the chances vittoria 
of a fortunate war were improved. Wellington's campaign in 
1813 consisted of a flanking operation starting from the moun- 
tainous region of northeastern Portugal and compelling the 
French to abandon first the line of the Douro and then of the 
Ebro. King Joseph hastily left Madrid, followed by crowds of 
French dependents and countless wagons loaded with the spoils 
of the Spanish occupation. The French army, commanded by 
Jourdan, halted at Vittoria. Wellington seized the road to San 

2 A treaty was signed at Reichenbach on June 27. 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XXVI 



Sebastian, so that when the French finally gave way they had 
no escape except by a difficult path over the mountains to Pam- 
peluna. The victors captured thousands of wagons full of val- 
uables, besides a treasure chest containing about twenty-five 
million francs. The result of the battle was the loss of north- 
ern Spain, and King Joseph was ordered into retirement. The 
news of Vittoria reached Napoleon just after he had accepted 
Austria's mediation. In spite of his efforts the details were 
soon known in Dresden and were carried to Metternich and to 
the camp of the Allies. 

The Congress of Prague was simply a blind. Prussia and 
Russia waited impatiently for its' expiration in order that they 
might claim from Austria the promised assistance. Napoleon 
at first would send no one to Prague with powers to negotiate, 
and tried to reach a separate understanding with Alexander. 
The first week in August was over before he sent for Austria's 
terms. Metternich, now convinced that war was advisable, for- 
warded an ultimatum containing not only the four points of his 
minimum, but also the two others, with the statement that if 
they were not conceded by midnight of August lo, Austria 
would join the Allies. Napoleon made no formal reply until 
the eleventh, but intimated that he would concede the dissolution 
of the grand duchy of Warsaw, make Danzig a free city, and 
return Illyria without Trieste to Austria. Promptly at midnight 
orders were issued to light alarm fires on the Bohemian frontier, 
and two days later the Emperor Francis declared war. 

When the armistice ended both Napoleon and his enemies 
were far better prepared for a decisive struggle than they had 
been in the spring. Napoleon was now strong in cavalry and 
artillery, and his only lack was in officers for the immense army 
of nearly half a million which he had assembled. His plan was 
to defend the line of the Elbe until, advancing by the left, his 
troops could sweep across Prussia and relieve the garrisons on 
the Oder. Davout was at Hamburg, next to him stood the 
" Army of Berlin," thrown forward beyond the Elbe, while Ney 
and Macdonald were in Silesia. The bulk of Napoleon's troops 
lay between Dresden and Gorlitz in Silesia. 

The allied army was somewhat larger than that of the French. 
Its largest division, about 250,000 men, was assembled under 
command of Prince Schwarzenberg in Bohemia. With this 
army were the Emperor Francis, the Czar Alexander, King 
Frederick William, and their military advisers, including Gen- 
eral Moreau. Its position menaced Napoleon's communications 
with France. Another army, of about 100,000, was stationed in 



THE COLLAPSE OF THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE 437 

Silesia under Bliicher; and a third, of 127,000, under Berna- ^^" 
dotte in northern Germany. According to the plan of opera- — 
tions the army against which Napoleon's main army should ad- ^^is-ii 
vance, with him in command, should fall back, while the other Plan 
two should push forward and attack his marshals. The final camp^aign 
struggle should come only after the arrival of the Russian re- 
serves, and the concentration of the three armies, giving the 
Allies such a superiority as to make the result certain. Napo- 
leon had the advantage of operating on inner lines, but this 
would be useless if the Allies persistently avoided a decisive 
battle and allowed him to wear his soldiers out in forced marches 
from one field to another. 

The plan of the Allies proved successful. They suffered only 
one defeat — at Dresden, on August 26 — and this when they 
failed to carry out their plan and persisted in attacking the city 
although they were aware that Napoleon had returned to it. 
Their defeat, however, was offset by Napoleon's loss of a whole Dresden 
corps, which was sent to pursue them and was surrounded in the 
mountains and captured. His possession of the inner lines be- 
came a positive disadvantage, for it tempted him to lead his 
troops first in one direction and then in another, vainly seeking 
an enemy which vanished before him. On one occasion the 
Imperial Guard had to march forty leagues in forty-eight hours. 
Napoleon went from Dresden to Silesia so many times that even 
the peasants began to jeer at him, calling him the Bautzen mes- 
senger. Scarcely a month had passed and 40,000 men were in 
the hospitals. Of the 400,000 he had on August 10 only 250,000 
answered at roll call. Partisan bands began to attack his line 
of communications. His generals were incapable of stemming 
the tide of defeat, and even he seemed to have lost the power of 
decision. 

As September drew to a close, Schwarzenberg, his army 
strengthened by the Russian reserves, decided to march upon 
Leipzig, a move which would seriously threaten Napoleon's com- 
munications and force him to abandon the line of the Elbe. At 
the same time Blucher, leaving a few soldiers in front of Baut- 
zen to mask the movement, began a daring flank march across 
the front of Napoleon's lines toward the Elbe, intending to unite 
with Bernadotte and advance upon Leipzig from the north. On 
October 3 he forced the passage of the river near Wittenberg. 
The news of these movements disconcerted Napoleon. He still 
hoped that the armies which were converging upon him might 
be driven to retreat by threatening to cut them off from Berlin 
or from Bohemia. After several days of hesitation he realized 



.38 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^^^- that the decisive struggle was to take place at Leipzig. Rumors 

now reached him of the defection of Bavaria, which signed a 

1813-14 treaty with Austria on October 8, promising a contingent of 

30,000 troops, 
lattie of The battle of Leipzig was a series of battles which began on 
■eipzig October 14 and ended four days later. Napoleon had little 
chance of victory except through a failure of the Allies to use 
their forces effectively. They mustered 300,000, while at most 
he had 200,000, and many of them half starved and exhausted 
by weeks of marching over muddy roads and rainsoaked fields. 
On October 16 Bliicher's desperate struggle for the village of 
Mockern, on the northern side of Leipzig, kept Napoleon from 
concentrating an army large enough to repel the multitudes un- 
der Schwarzenberg, who was advancing from the east and south- 
east. The day was not exactly a defeat, but it rendered defeat 
inevitable. Napoleon should have retreated at once, but he re- 
solved to tempt fortune again. The battle of the eighteenth was 
merely a disastrous repetition of the struggle two days before. 
Bernadotte filled in the gap between Bliicher and Schwarzenberg. 
The Saxon contingent of Napoleon's army went over to the 
Allies on the open field. When night came on Napoleon or- 
dered the retreat, and the army streamed into Leipzig through 
three gates, only to be thrown into utter confusion in the effort 
to pour out through the single western gate and over the Elster 
bridge. A temporary bridge which had been thrown across the 
river broke down, followed by a worse misfortune when a cor- 
poral of engineers blew up the regular bridge too soon, cutting 
off the rear guard and thousands of stragglers. The pursuit was 
not pushed, although a Bavarian force, supported by Austrians, 
attempted to bar the route at Hanau. When the Rhine was 
reached, early in November, only 40,000 troops, and about as 
many stragglers, were all that were left of the half million which 
France and her dependent States had offered to stay the tottering 
structure of Napoleon's Grand Empire. 

A momentary prospect of peace came in November at Frank- 
fort, when Metternich sent through Baron Saint Aignan an in- 
formal proposal on the basis of the frontiers of the Rhine, the 
Alps, and the Pyrenees. He did this with the consent of the 
iffers of representatives of Russia and Prussia, and with no protest from 
■eace LQ^d Aberdeen, the English representative. Napoleon's only 

reply was to suggest a place for the congress; he did not men- 
tion the basis. Metternich then drew up a manifesto to the 
French people, suggesting similar terms, and declaring that " the 
Allied Powers were not at war with France, but with that 



THE COLLAPSE OF THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE 439 

haughtily announced preponderance . . . which has too long ^^^' 

been exercised without the boundaries of his [Napoleon's] Em- 

pire." Metternich's aim was to dissociate Napoleon's cause "^^'^^ 
from the cause of France and so deprive him of the support of 
public opinion. The day after his conversation with Saint 
Aignan he wrote to Caulaincourt, one of Napoleon's diplomatic 
agents, that " France will never sign a more fortunate peace 
than that which the Powers will make to-day. . . . New suc- 
cesses may extend their views." And he added, " But the Em- 
peror Napoleon will not make peace. There is my profession of 
faith, and I shall never be happier than if I am wrong." Before 
the manifesto was issued its terms were changed, because the 
new successes had come. The Dutch had risen, compelling the 
French to withdraw hastily, and that stimulated England to in- 
sist that France, on the side of Holland and Belgium at least, 
should return to her " ancient limits." England did not mean to 
give up the Dutch colonies taken during the war, and wished to 
offer Holland compensation on the Continent. She also urged 
the need of establishing a barrier state north of France strong 
enough to defend itself. Accordingly, when the manifesto was 
issued (December i), its terms were ominously ambiguous, only 
promising to " the French Empire an extent of territory which 
France never knew under her kings." 

The campaign of 1813 not merely destroyed the power of Na- 
poleon beyond the Rhine, it laid the basis for a reorganization 
of Germany satisfactory to Austria and in direct opposition to conse- 
the schemes of Stein and other Prussian leaders. In the Treaties f^r^ger- 
of Teplitz, signed on September 9, confirming the earlier treaties many 
upon which the coalition was founded, there was a clause which 
provided for the " entire and absolute independence " of the 
states which lay between the reconstituted frontiers of Austria 
and Prussia. Hardenberg understood these words to mean in- 
dependence of French control, but Metternich used them in an- 
other sense, which he made plain by guaranteeing to Bavaria 
full sovereignty over all her territories. The same promise was 
made to other German princes before the close of the year. In 
consequence, although the Holy Roman Empire could not be 
restored, even if the Hapsburgs wished it, Austrian ascendancy 
in Germany was perpetuated for another generation by strength- 
ening the particularism of the minor states, which were naturally 
opposed to Prussian schemes of unification. 

One after another the members of the Confederation of the 
Rhine made their peace with the Allies. The States which Na- 
poleon had created in Germany promptly collapsed. King Je- 



440 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^^^- rome fled from Cassel and the kingdom of Westphalia was dis- 

solved into its original elements. A similar fate overtook the 

1813-14 grand duchy of Berg and the grand duchy of Frankfort. Nor 
wtre Napoleon's misfortunes limited to Germany and Holland. 
In Italy the Austrians drove Prince Eugene behind the Adige 
and recovered control of part of Venetia and Dalmatia. After 
the battle of Leipzig Murat had hastened back to Naples not 
merely to save his throne, but to scheme for a union of Italy 
under his crown. Wellington had captured Pampeluna and San 
Sebastian and had crossed the frontier into France. The posi- 
tion was not far different from what it had been in the summer 
of 1799. 

As the news reached Paris of all these misfortunes, men 
asked whether the Emperor was capable of learning the les- 
opposi- son of his failures. They did not long remain in doubt. He 
France Seemed to have lost all sense of what was possible and refused 
to wai to believe that he must now become a mere king. He told his 
councilors of state bluntly that they talked of peace too much. 
" Do you wish," said he, " to descend from the rank where I 
have placed France and become a simple monarchy? This is 
what will happen if you lose Holland. We need the mouths of 
the rivers and this northern barrier. . . ." He found the Legis- 
lative Body still less eager to renew the adventure. In a report 
which they adopted by an overwhelming majority late in Decem- 
ber they protested against the attempt to hold in subjection 
peoples who wished to control their own destinies, and declared 
that the French were ready to sacrifice themselves to preserve 
their independence and the integrity of their territory, but for no 
other object. Such bold language enraged Napoleon and he 
closed the session. At the New Year's reception he told the 
deputies that they were simple delegates of departments, while 
he represented the nation, and asserted that they had done the 
country more harm than the loss of two battles between Paris 
and the frontier. This outburst alienated public opinion more 
than the misfortunes of 1812 and 1813. 

Desperate expedients were used to raise money and men for 
a new campaign. Half of the soldiers who had survived the 
campaign of Leipzig had perished of typhus fever in December 
and the army numbered only 50,000. The Senate was ready with 
its votes of more hundreds of thousands to be slain in other 
futile struggles. It even voted 300,000 taken from the conscrip- 
tions of the last twelve years, chiefly men of family. To sacri- 
fice these older conscripts would be to decimate a whole genera- 
tion. Fortunately not many responded to the summons. By 



THE COLLAPSE OF THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE 44 

January only 63,000 had been assembled, and Napoleon never ^J^^" 

had more than 90,000 men at any time during the campaign. 

The men he did obtain he could not equip properly, and many of I813-14 
them had to search the battlefields for muskets. 

Money was equally hard to get. The real estate tax was in- 
creased fifty per cent, and a quarter of all official salaries was 
withheld. Government bonds sank to fifty francs and a half. 
Unable to draw sufficient resources from France and without 
dependent states upon which to levy tribute, Napoleon was 
forced to use a large part of his hoarded coin, of which he had 
30,000,000 francs left. 

The Italian situation became more desperate early in January, 
when Murat signed a treaty of alliance with Austria, attempting 
to profit as Bernadotte had done in 181 2. Napoleon had already 
tried to make terms with Pope Pius VII, but the Pope insisted 
upon returning to Rome as a preliminary. Under the circum- 
stances it was doubtful if Prince Eugene could successfully de- 
fend northern Italy. 

Napoleon did not leave Paris until January 25, when the Al- 
lies had already driven his generals back beyond the Moselle and 
the Meuse. The Prussians had advanced into the region be- campaign 
tween the upper Marne and the Seine, hoping to draw after them 
the Austrians in a movement upon Paris. The Austrians had 
political reasons for not being in haste, especially the knowledge 
that Alexander cherished the design of placing Bernadotte on the 
French throne. Metternich preferred to sign a peace with Na- 
poleon rather than to see a protege of Russia profit by the com- 
mon sacrifices. The consequence was that the campaign, which 
opened on January 29 at Brienne, where Napoleon had once 
been a student, and closed on March 30 at the gates of Paris, 
was a strange mixture of warfare, diplomacy, and intrigue. The 
military operations cannot be understood without taking account 
of the changing attitudes of Alexander and Metternich upon the 
fundamental issues of the conflict, nor can the course of diplo- 
macy be followed without weighing the influence of successive 
victories and defeats. 

The brief struggle of 1814 has been called the " most glorious 
of Napoleon's campaigns," because, undaunted by his scanty 
means, he displayed a resourcefulness, an energy, and a rapidity 
of action, which more than once intimidated his opponents, al- 
though their numbers were vastly superior. But his victories, 
however brilliant, were worse than useless, for they only post- 
poned the day of ultimate defeat and encouraged him to persist 
until defeat meant deposition. The incidents of February fur- 



of 1814 



42 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^^^- nish unmistakable illustrations of this. Early in the month Na- 
poleon gave Caulaincourt, now his minister of foreign affairs, 

1813-14 carte blanche to sign a treaty of peace with the Allies at a con- 
gress at Chatillon which had grown out of the negotiations begun 
at Frankfort. This passing mood was the consequence of his 
defeat at La Rothiere, the first real battle of the campaign. 
When Caulaincourt asked for definite instructions, Napoleon re- 
fused them, for^ie had meanwhile discovered an opportunity to 
turn the tables on Bliicher, who had split up his army and was 
marching in fancied security on a road running west between the 
valleys of the Marne and the Seine. On successive days, Feb- 
ruary lo, II, 12, and 14, Napoleon attacked the different sections 
of the Prussian army, broke them up and inflicted losses of 
16,000 men. His success so alarmed the Allies that they thought 
seriously of peace, but he rejected their terms with scorn. He 
never had another offer. 

Late in March he formed the plan of moving eastward, in 

he AUies order to threaten the communications of the allied armies with 

1 Pans Germany, and compel them to retire to the frontier. Their first 
thought was to unite and crush him, but they learned that Paris 
was in a desperate situation and that the British had captured 
Bordeaux. They accordingly decided to march straight upon 
the capital. After a battle in the northern suburbs on March 30 
the Prussians gained the heights of Montmartre, which com- 
manded the city. Napoleon had discovered his blunder a day 
or two before, and made extraordinary efforts to regain Paris in 
time. Finally he drove on ahead of his army, but he only suc- 
ceeded in reaching a point on the Fontainebleau road ten miles 
south of the city when he heard the news of the surrender. On 
March 31 Alexander and Frederick William entered Paris in 
triumph, while Napoleon returned to Fontainebleau. 

Alexander was the most influential personage among the Al- 
lies, owing this position to the fact that in 1812 he had com- 
passed the overthrow of the Grand Army and in 1813 had de- 
livered Germany. He was not always able to carry through his 
schemes, but the initiative appeared to be his. When the ques- 
tion of the throne of France was raised, he was not ready to give 
the Bourbons his support. They had been proclaimed at Bor- 
deaux and at Lyons, and as the Allies marched through the 
streets of Paris a small group of royalists had raised the cry 
" Long live the Bourbons ! " But it seemed to the Allies doubt- 
ful whether the return of that family would offer guarantees of 
a stable settlement and a permanent peace. The obstinate re- 
sistance of Napoleon had, however, convinced them that it was 



THE COLLAPSE OF THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE 443 

useless to negotiate with him unless they were ready to resume ^^^' 

the struggle after a brief truce. A regency, with the King of 

Rome as titular ruler, was a possibility. Bernadotte was in i^is-ii 
Alexander's mind another possibility. It was the arguments of 
Talleyrand, Napoleon's ex-minister of foreign affairs, which 
turned the scale in favor of the Bourbons. Europe, he saw, 
wished assurance that France would not simply wait for strength 
to resume the ventures of the past twenty years, and that she 
had renounced the spirit of domination which had carried her 
armies far from her ancient frontiers. He believed that the 
presence of Louis XVIII on the throne would furnish this as- 
surance. The Bourbons were associated with the ancient boun- 
daries which Europe wished again to impose upon France. The 
spirit of revolutionary propaganda which had driven Louis XVI 
from the throne and had threatened every other monarchy in 
Europe was naturally abhorred by his brother. Moreover, 
under the old law of Europe, the right of Louis XVIII to the 
succession was complete, so that in him the principle of legiti- 
macy would receive embodiment. Talleyrand also believed that 
the presence of Louis on the throne would guarantee France 
against schemes of dismemberment, which Prussia, at least, 
might entertain, remembering the bitter experiences of 1807. 
Talleyrand assured Alexander that, if the Allies would agree not 
to negotiate with Napoleon, the constituted authorities would 
call Louis XVIII to the throne. Accordingly, a few hours later 
a proclamation of the Allies was read, declaring that they would 
not treat with Napoleon nor with any of his family. 

The way was now open for the restoration of the Bourbons. 
On April i Talleyrand, as vice-grand-elector, called together the 
Senate, which proceeded to appoint a provisional government of 
five members, including, besides Talleyrand, the Abbe de Mon- 
tesquiou, a staunch royalist who had been a distinguished deputy 
of the Constituent Assembly. On the following day the Senate 
formally deposed Napoleon and deprived his family of all rights 
to the throne, prefacing the act by a long list of accusations of 
tyranny and cruelty, a pubHc confession of their own cowardice 
in maintaining silence hitherto. The provisional government is- 
sued an appeal to the army, declaring that France had broken 
the yoke under which all had groaned for years, and releasing 
the soldiers from their oath of obedience to Napoleon. 

Napoleon, on his return to Fontainebleau, was advised by his 
marshals to retreat towards the Loire. The Empress had al- Napoleon 
ready taken refuge at Blois. But, although he had scarcely 40,- taineweau 
000 men, and desertion was reaching alarming proportions, he 



44 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

CHAP, still hoped to defeat the Allies before Paris, believing that the 

- city would rise in his favor and would render the position of the 

1813-14 allied army precarious. This plan was rejected by his marshals, 
who in sheer weariness resolved to abandon the struggle. Yield- 
ing to their arguments and appeals, he signed an abdication in 
favor of his son and the Empress Regent. 

Although the marshals did not wish to continue the struggle, 
they were unwilling to exchange the empire for a monarchy of 
the Bourbons. This left the situation obscure, notwithstanding 
the acts of the Senate and of the provisional government. Both 
Alexander and Napoleon understood this. Napoleon concluded 
therefore to send Ney, Macdonald, and Caulaincourt to Paris with 
the message of abdication, expecting either that Alexander would 
be influenced by the attitude of the army, and would withdraw 
his support from the project of restoring the Bourbons, or that 
the marshals, indignant at the turn of affairs, would return to 
Fontainebleau ready to fight. Meanwhile, Marmont, who had 
defended Paris against the Allies, and whose troops lay nearest 
Paris, had been persuaded by the provisional government to 
render further resistance impossible by marching his division 
out of Napoleon's reach and within the lines of the allied army. 
The interview with Alexander lasted far into the night of April 
4 and he seemed to waver. Talleyrand reminded him that the 
provisional government had taken its attitude because of the 
assurances of the Allies, and that it was impossible to turn back. 
Early in the morning word was brought that during the night 
Marmont's troops had marched to Versailles and were within the 
allied lines. With Alexander this settled the matter; the army 
was no longer a decisive factor. 

The next day, on the basis of a report made by the provisional 
government, the Senate adopted a constitution, declaring in its 
second article that " the French people freely calls ta the throne 
of France Louis-Stanislas-Xavier, brother of the late king* . . ." 
The principle of the Revolution was thus affirmed,' as well as Tal- 
leyrand's principle of legitimacy. Other articles provided for 
the machinery of a representative government somewhat more 
liberal than that which Louis afterward granted, and safe- 
guarded the interests of those who had profited by the Revolu- 
tion, including the possessors of nationalized lands or Napoleonic 
titles. After voting themselves into the new Senate, the sena- 
tors arranged that Louis should be proclaimed king as soon as 
he accepted the constitution. 

Nothing was left for Napoleon but to make his abdication 
unconditional; although, had his marshals been willing to follow 



THE COLLAPSE OF THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE 445 

him, he might have retired to Orleans and attempted to continue ^^^" 

the struggle. With this unconditional abdication in his hands, 

Caulaincourt negotiated a treaty with the Allies on April 11, I813-14 
according to which Napoleon was to retain his title as Emperor Abdica- 
and to receive the island of Elba in full sovereignty as a resi- Napoleon 
dence, with an income of two million francs charged on the 
French budget. The princes of his family were also provided 
for. He left Fontainebleau on April 20, after taking a pathetic 
leave of the Old Guard, and set out for Elba. 

The rapidity with which his star sank until it disappeared 
below the horizon might well astonish his contemporaries. 
When his Grand Army crossed the Niemen in June, 18 12, his 
power seemed boundless. Within two years his dominion was 
limited to Elba, an island nineteen miles long and six miles wide. 
But his fall was not so sudden as it appeared; its causes were 
already at work after the seizure of Spain in 1808, if not after 
the overthrow of Prussia the year before. Whether it was des- 
tiny or simply poor statesmanship, he so exaggerated all that was 
pernicious in the foreign policy of the Convention and the Di- 
rectory, that the permanence of his rule was impossible. 



CHAPTER XXVII 



CHAP. 
XXVII 



Return of 
the Bour- 
bons 



THE RESTORATION IN FRANCE AND IN EUROPE 

WHEN Napoleon took his departure for Elba a two-fold 
task confronted the statesmen of France and of Europe. 
In France the problem was to find a working compromise be- 
tween the principles of the Revolution and the claims of the 
Old Regime. A whole generation of Frenchmen had grown up 
in complete ignorance of the Bourbons, and with the majority 
of the people it was only weariness of the interminable wars that 
had reconciled them to the return of their ancient kings. In 
Europe also effort must be made to reconcile the old and the 
new. It was impossible to undo all that the Revolution and its 
imperial successor had accomplished, especially because too many 
countries or reigning families had profited by the changes. 

The first of the Bourbon princes to reach Paris was Charles, 
Count of Artois, who had left the country immediately after the 
fall of the Bastille and had never returned. When he entered 
the city on April 12, he was astonished, moved even to tears, by 
the enthusiasm of his reception, which at the same time puzzled 
and disconcerted the leaders of the provisional government. He 
took advantage of it to avoid committing himself in detail upon 
the senatorial constitution. His popularity was increased by a 
phrase put into his mouth by Count Beugnot, minister of the 
interior, one of Napoleon's ablest administrators — " Nothing is 
changed, except that there is one Frenchman more." The prince 
was proclaimed by the Senate lieutenant-general of the kingdom 
and was entrusted with the government. He declared that he 
had examined the constitution, and that, while his brother had 
not authorized him to accept it, he pledged his brother to main- 
tain a representative government, with two chambers, to create 
an independent judiciary, and to guarantee the liberties of the 
person, of the press, and of public worship. Louis XVIII 
would, he declared, preserve ranks and pensions, would regard 
as irrevocable the sales of public lands, and would disquiet none, 
not even the regicides, on account of their previous political 
conduct. When the King reached St. Ouen, near Paris, he is- 
sued a declaration repeating these promises, but treating the 
senatorial constitution as hastily drawn and requiring revision, 

446 



THE RESTORATION IN FRANCE AND IN EUROPE 447 

which he would give with the assistance of a commission of sen- ^xvii 
ators and members of the Legislative Body. 

When the constitution, or Constitutional Charter, was pro- I814-15 
claimed a month later, it came as a grant from Louis, " by the The 
Grace of God King of France and Navarre," and was dated " in ^^^^^" 
the nineteenth year of our reign." To deprive the concession 
of representative government of any semblance of recognizing 
revolutionary principles, precedents were sought in the " Fields 
of March " and " Fields of May " of Carolingian times or in the 
assemblies of the third estate during the Middle Ages. Such 
absurdities were, perhaps, needed to " save the face " of the re- 
stored Bourbons, and should not weigh heavily in any judgment 
passed on the new constitutional regime. 

The new regime preserved the essential conquests of the Rev- 
olution, with the exception of the democratic republic, which 
Napoleon had destroyed. The question, who granted the con- 
stitution, was not as important as whether it might serve as an 
instrument of liberal monarchical government. The event 
proved that it contained such possibilities. The credit for this, 
of course, is due primarily to Talleyrand and his associates. If 
the new government be compared with that which had existed 
in France since 1802, the Restoration, in spite of its reactionary 
tendencies, appears as a liberal revolution, for the Napoleonic 
system had degenerated into an unrestricted autocracy, al- 
though most of its acts of administration were enlightened. 
In two or three features the Charter was distinctly reac- 
tionary as compared with the senatorial project. It declared 
that the Roman Catholic religion was the religion of the State, 
although freedom of worship was guaranteed, and payment of 
stipends was promised to ministers of other Christian sects. The 
initiative in legislation was formally reserved to the King, instead 
of being shared with the Chamber of Peers and the Chamber of 
Deputies, which replaced the Senate and the Legislative Body. A 
heavy property qualification, the payment of a direct tax of 
1000 francs, reduced the number of men eligible to the position 
of deputy to about 5,000, actually excluding the president of the 
existing Legislative Body. No one could be a member of the 
electoral colleges for the selection of deputies unless he paid 
300 francs in direct taxes. The organization of electoral col- 
leges and the qualifications of voters was left to be determined 
by law. 

The new royal administration was, like the Charter, mainly 
a continuation. Of the ministers appointed on April 3 by the The New 
provisional government Baron Louis remained at the finances, ^^'^^^^^ 



448 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

CHAP. Malouet at the marine, and Dupont at the war office. Talley- 

rand passed from the provisional government to the ministry of 

1814-15 foreign affairs and the Abbe de Montesquiou to the ministry of 
the interior, while Beugnot, temporarily entrusted with this of- 
fice, became director general of the police. Dupont a little later 
yielded his place to Marshal Soult, who had commanded in the 
south against Wellington. Only about two thousand emigrants 
received appointments in the various administrative services ; 
and only 37 of them to prefectures or sub-prefectures, although 
Montesquiou appointed 45 prefects and 160 sub-prefects. The 
new government was lavish with promises, but preferred trained 
administrators to rancorous and ignorant partisans. 

The government was not so successful in dealing with the far 
more delicate problem of the army. Since 1795 the army had 
counted for something in politics, and even Napoleon had to 
reckon with its attitude. The calamities of the last three years 
had temporarily diminished its influence, but the return of peace 
brought back about 120,000 veterans, held as prisoners of war 
or retained as garrisons of German fortresses. They strength- 
The ened the Bonapartist feeling of the men who had followed Na- 

^^"^^ poleon in his last campaign and who detested the white flag of 

Bourbon France. It was said that rather than surrender their 
imperial tri-color banners they burned the staff and the silk, 
mingling the ashes with their wine, while they secreted the eagles 
in their barracks. When the army was put upon a peace 
footing, its numbers were reduced for reasons of economy to 
200,000. One consequence was the retirement of 12,000 officers 
on half pay, with little chance of being restored again to the 
active list. As the half pay of a captain was only y^ francs a 
month and a lieutenant's pay 44, these officers were in actual 
distress. The soldiers who were discharged were sent home in 
rags. Unfortunately, also, the government was not consistently 
economical, for it reconstituted the military household of the 
old regime at an expense of twenty millions, at the same time 
affronting by such a step the Imperial Guard and the National 
Guard of Paris, each of which expected to be entrusted with the 
defense of the King. Appointments in the army were demanded 
by emigrant officers, who insisted that in reckoning seniority 
their years of absence should be counted, with the result that a 
man who at the time of his emigration was a captain returned 
to the army as a brigadier-general. From July 1814 to Febru- 
ary 18 1 5, 61 generals of division, 150 brigadiers, and 2,000 supe- 
rior officers, were appointed in this way. 
In its management of the finances the new administration 



THE RESTORATION IN FRANCE AND IN EUROPE 449 

acted honorably toward the creditors of the Empire, ignoring xxvii 

the clamors of many ultras who demanded at least a partial re- 

pudiation of imperial debts. The floating debt of 500 or 600 mil- 1814-15 
lions was provided for by the issue of notes bearing interest at The 
eight per cent, and redeemable in three years, with the remainder ^^"^°°^^ 
of the national forests and common lands as security. Although 
the royalists during the final struggle had freely promised the 
abolition of the obnoxious indirect taxes, or droits reunis, the 
government was obliged to collect them. At first the discontent 
manifested itself in riotous attacks upon the collectors and not 
a few were seriously injured. The success with which the ad- 
ministration carried the country through the period of transi- 
tion caused the government securities to rise to 78. 

Still more perplexing was the problem of French industry, 
which had enjoyed a special form of protection under the Con- 
tinental System. It was impossible to enforce laws for the ex- 
clusion of English and colonial products when all the frontiers industry 
were open because of the invasion of the allied armies. The 
price of sugar in Paris fell to 38 cents a pound, although the 
tariff was 44 cents. The new administration did not sympathize 
with the aims of the Continental System and was ready to 
abandon it in spite of the advantages which many French manu- 
facturers had drawn from it. Ten days after he entered Paris 
the Count of Artois, on the advice of the Council of State, es- 
tablished moderate rates on coffee, sugar, cocoa, spices, and dye- 
stuffs, with a simple weighing charge on raw cotton. The man- 
ufacturers raised an outcry, because they had paid more for their 
supplies of cotton and saw themselves confronted by a loss. In- 
deed, the ministry was more liberal than either the administra- 
tive officers, accustomed to the meddlesome practices of the 
Continental System, or the manufacturers, who did not dare 
face competition with the English. They did not believe that a 
moderate tariff on cotton thread and cloth would be a sufficient 
protection, and demanded the maintenance of the prohibitions 
characteristic of Revolutionary and Napoleonic legislation. 
When a new tariff was adopted by the Chambers in December, 
they obliged the government to yield not only in regard to cot- 
ton, but also as to other products, Hke the manufactures of iron. 
Something was to be said on the side of manufacturers who be- 
cause of the wars of the last two decades were almost a genera- 
tion behind the English manufacturers in methods of production. 

An irritating controversy was raised in regard to the lands 
formerly owned by the Church and the emigrants. In July two Public 
lawyers published a memoir arguing that the sales could be ^^^^^ 



450 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

xxvii annulled. Although the Count of Artois, speaking for the King, 
and the King himself, both in the Declaration of St. Ouen and 

1814-15 -j^ ^Yie Constitutional Charter, had declared the titles inviolable, 
the holders were alarmed and anxious to obtain a guarantee from 
the Chamber of Deputies. The method they chose was by peti- 
tion, alleging the injury caused by the state of uncertainty. The 
plan was successful, for the chamber adopted an order of the 
day reaffirming the principle that titles were unassailable. The 
question was, however, reopened when the King desired to re- 
store certain unsold lands, notably forests, which had once be- 
longed to the nobles. The minister who proposed the measure 
appeared to argue that the emigrants had pursued the correct 
line of conduct and to hint that the King wished to restore all 
their lands. His speech raised a storm of protest. While the 
matter was before the Chamber of Peers, Marshal Macdonald 
suggested that the measure be accompanied by a grant of annui- 
ties to those whose lands could not be restored, as well as to the 
nobles of the Empire who had lost their military endowments 
with the shrinking of the frontiers of France. This would have 
anticipated the " milliard " ^ of 1825 and would have set the con- 
troversy at rest, but many of the nobles wished all or none. 
Moreover, the State was too poor to indulge in such generosity 
to the losers in the strife of the last quarter-century. The prin- 
cipal measure was adopted and restored to the nobles about 850,- 
000 acres. 

PubHc opinion was also alarmed by an ordinance of Beugnot, 
director-general of police, strictly forbidding all save the most 
necessary labors on Sunday and festal days, and requiring even 
Religious inns and restaurants to sell nothing during the hours of religious 
service. It was said that the Bourbon princes wished to intro- 
duce the quiet of the EngHsh Sabbath. But the change from the 
habits of the Empire was too brusk, and a milder set of reg- 
ulations was substituted by law. The reestablishment of the 
censorship, opposed by a strong minority in the Chamber of Dep- 
uties, threatened the newly recovered liberty of the press. The 
law permitted the director-general of publications, or any pre- 
fect, to require the examination of all except books or learned 
reports, episcopal allocutions, and the like, before they were 
printed. Journals must receive authorization. Each printer 
and publisher must also be officially authorized to pursue his 
calling, and if he violated the laws his permit could be taken 
away, a punishment tantamount to financial ruin, 

1 Added to the national debt, the interest being credited to those 
whose lands had been confiscated during the Revolution. 



Contro- 
versy 



THE RESTORATION IN FRANCE AND IN EUROPE 451 

Fewer blunders would have been made, had regular cabinet SSvii 

councils been held. As it was each minister dealt directly with 

the King, and his colleagues were often not aware of the deci- 18U-15 
sions until the affair was beyond recall. No wonder the govern- 
ment fell into a condition described by a wit of the day as " pa- 
ternal anarchy." 

The blunders of the government received a dubious coloring 
from the personal attitude of the princes and the emigrants. 
The Count of Artois maintained a separate and opposition court, personal 
openly deploring the compromises of the Charter and looking Jealousies 
forward evidently to a more complete restoration of the old 
regime. His repeated protests against the existence of the im- 
perial ornaments in the Tuileries finally exasperated his brother, 
who retorted that unless such talk ceased he would place Na- 
poleon's bust over his mantelpiece. The old nobihty had the 
air of looking upon the imperial dukes and duchesses, counts and 
countesses, as upstarts. Marie Antoinette's daughter, the 
Duchess of Angouleme, treated the Princess of Moskowa, wife 
of Marshal Ney, and daughter of a femme de chambre of the 
Queen who had committed suicide at the news of the Queen's 
execution, with a little of the condescension natural toward an 
old servant of the family. The anniversary of the death of 
Louis XVI was celebrated by transferring the remains of the 
unfortunate King and Queen to the crypt of the Basilica of St. 
Denis, the ancient royal burial-place, and the rumor spread that 
ardent royalists were planning a massacre of ex-Jacobins as a 
fitting sacrifice to the shades of the murdered monarchs. The 
plot was the creation of haunted imaginations, but the danger 
seemed so imminent that no less a personage than Carnot forti- 
fied himself in his apartments and watched all night. 

When the King first returned, men like Carnot and Ney had 
rallied sincerely to the monarchy, and a large minority of think- 
ing people considered the restoration as the most feasible solution 
of the problem. The task of the Bourbons was to win the masses 
of the population, or, at least, to refrain from uniting the ele- 
ments of an opposition and arousing it to action. In this they 
failed, and as the summer and autumn wore on their friends grew 
cold, while their enemies increased. The atmosphere became 
heavy with plots, even before the landing of Napoleon on the 
southern coast tumbled over the new regime like a house of 
cards. 

In the management of the difficult relations of France with 
her late enemies the Bourbon government was astonishingly 
successful. Louis XVIII took a deep interest in these ques- 



452 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XXVII 



Peace 
of Paris 



Congress 
of Vienna 



tions and rose to the level of the best French tradition. He did 
not act like a pretender who had stolen in with the baggage of 
the allied army. He had the advice of Talleyrand, one of the 
clearest-sighted and most skilful diplomats of the day. The 
first task was the modest one of transforming the armistice into 
a peace, which was done on May 30 by the Treaty of Paris. The 
treaty naturally included statements concerning the future of 
territories long a part of France but which the King was now 
obliged to renounce. Secret articles, accordingly, provided that 
the Belgian lands should be united to Holland and that the rest 
of the territory on the left bank of the Rhine should be used 
to compensate Prussia and other German States. Piedmont, 
Nice, and Savoy, except a small part which France retained, 
were restored to the King of Sardinia, while his relations with 
Genoa were left for later settlement. The remainder of northern 
Italy was assigned to Austria. In the open articles France aban- 
doned to Great Britain St. Lucia, Tobago, and the lie de France. 
The French frontier receded to its position on January i, 1792, 
with slight rectifications which added a few square miles to the 
country. Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin, annexed in 1791, 
also remained a part of France. All other questions were re- 
ferred to a Congress which was to meet at Vienna. Meanwhile, 
it was expected that the great Powers, which had conducted the 
war against France, would come to an understanding about the 
disposition of Saxony and Poland, the most difficult question 
of all. 

The Congress did not open until September, if, strictly speak- 
ing, it may be said to have opened at all. The diplomats of 
Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Great Britain, formed a plan ac- 
cording to which they should agree upon the solution of prob- 
lems, should communicate their decision to France and Spain, 
the other two principal Powers, for comment, should receive the 
acceptance of these Powers, which could not well be refused, 
and should then promulgate the decisions as final. Talleyrand 
did not relish the part of representative of the victim, and, with 
the King, chose a line of conduct which utilized the inevitable 
renunciations of France as a means of securing a position of 
strength and influence. If these renunciations were sincere, the 
elaborate precautions against danger from France were unneces- 
sary and the only efifective bond of union between the Powers 
was dissolved. The lesser Powers would also discover in France 
their sole disinterested supporter. Even the greater Powers, 
now that France was necessarily disinterested, might conclude 
that her advice and help were worth accepting in the scramble 



THE RESTORATION IN FRANCE AND IN EUROPE 453 

for territorial advantage. Moreover, a France which had re- ^xvii 

nounced conquest could with plausibility champion the cause of 

legal claims against a too brutal assertion of the rights of the I814.15 
victor. The presence of Louis XVIII on the throne was an 
assurance that this policy was genuine and not merely the 
manceuver of a Machiavellian diplomat. 

When the plan of the four Powers was explained to Talley- 
rand on September 30 at a conference, he objected to their 
designation of themselves as " Allies," as if the war had not 
ceased, and declared that, as the Congress was summoned by 
eight Powers, four could not undertake its management unless 
the Congress in general session delegated to them such a rep- Thermal 
resentative capacity. Spain, and finally Portugal and Sweden, ^'^^ 
came to his assistance, and, after three stormy conferences, the 
control of the proceedings passed into the hands of a committee 
representing the eight Powers. Talleyrand was content, how- 
ever, if only five of the eight, the original four and France, made 
the important decisions. No full session of the Congress was 
held, and the work was done by committees, was approved by 
the eight Powers, and was incorporated, on June 9, 181 5, in a 
Final Act, in which all concerned were invited to concur. This 
method of transacting business did not prevent Vienna from 
being the scene of brilliant assemblages. All had hastened 
thither who hoped to gain or who feared to lose. It is said that 
the entertainment of the guests cost the impoverished Austrian 
treasury thirty million florins. 

The important questions concerning Saxony and Poland could 
not be settled without taking account of the agreements of 1813 
at Kalisch, Reichenbach, and Teplitz.- None of these had 
stated specifically what should be done with the grand duchy of 
Warsaw, beyond the agreement that it should cease to exist as saxony 
such. Prussia was willing to give up nearly all she had pos- poiand 
sessed by virtue of the second and third partitions of Poland, if 
she might receive Saxony as compensation. According to the 
understanding which both Russia and Prussia had reached in 
1813, the King of Saxony, who was a prisoner in Berlin, had 
forfeited his rights. Both England and Austria feared the con- 
sequences of such wholesale aggrandizement of Russia as the 
plan implied, and Austria did not wish to see Prussian territory 
in central Germany enlarged, especially on the Bohemian fron- 
tier. In order to develop the possibilities of discord by means 
of this question, Talleyrand proposed the reconstitution of the 

2 See pp. 430, 435, 439- 



.54 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

55^^' kingdom of Poland, and Lord Castlereagh, the English repre- 

sentative at the Congress, supported the proposal. Even Prus- 

1814-15 gjj^ Yv^as reluctant to satisfy the Czar's extreme desires, and could 
be counted upon to oppose them, if the other Powers would yield 
on the question of Saxony. Against this, however, Talleyrand 
invoked the ancient rights of the minor princes and succeeded 
in uniting all their representatives in a formal protest. Finally 
both Metternich and Castlereagh were ready to oppose a veto 
to the Prussian and Russian solution of the problem, if they 
were assured of French military support. Talleyrand was au- 
thorized to pledge it, and the result was a secret triple alliance, 
negotiated in January, 1815. For a few days a renewal of the 
war, with the roles changed, seemed imminent, but every one 
realized that it would be an act of folly and would bring Na- 
poleon on the scene at once. Moreover, the suggestion had been 
made to the King of Prussia and the Czar, that, if the King of 
Saxony were restored, he might be required to cede a portion 
of his territories to Prussia, and that Russia might add enough 
of the grand duchy of Warsaw to connect Silesia and Prussia 
proper. Alexander's scheme of transforming the grand duchy 
into a kingdom, separate from Russia, and enlarged, perhaps, 
at Russia's expense, was also unpalatable to native Russians. 
The consequence was that the controversy did not come to an 
open breach and that by February it was considered settled on 
the basis of the annexation by Prussia of Posen, with the for- 
tress of Thorn, and of Austria's recovery of eastern Galicia, 
ceded in 1809. The remainder of the grand duchy was trans- 
formed into a kingdom of which Alexander should be king. 

This settlement impHed that Prussia was to find further com- 
pensation elsewhere, and the restored King of Saxony was re- 
gains of quired to cede two-fifths of his kingdom, including Torgau and 
Wittenberg. By a complicated plan of exchanges Swedish Pom- 
erania and the island of Riigen also came into Prussia's hands. 
Danzig was restored. The Westphalian lands were also re- 
stored, increased by other Westphalian territory, together with 
Berg. West of the Rhine she gained, besides other lands, nearly 
all those which had belonged to the electorates of Cologne and 
Treves before the French conquest. On the whole, her gains 
were not so valuable in extent of territory as in the exchange of 
former Polish subjects, who were difficult to assimilate, for Ger- 
mans of the center and west. Her acquisitions on the Rhine 
made her the natural defender of Germany against French ag- 
gression, a place Austria had long occupied. The scattered sit- 
uation of Prussia's territories seemed a disadvantage, but it 



THE RESTORATION IN FRANCE AND IN EUROPE 455 

served to stimulate the energies of her administrators and to SSyx; 
quicken the appetite of her rulers for annexations. 

Before the Congress of Vienna met it was agreed that Ger- 1814-15 
many should become a confederation of independent States. Germany 
Leaders like Stein hoped to use the national movement to unite 
all Germans in a strong empire, but Metternich saw that such 
a plan would foster the ambitions of the Hohenzollerns, rather 
than restore the lost authority of the Hapsburgs, and he defeated 
it by championing the rights of the minor princes. Among the 
States which Napoleon had destroyed and which were now re- 
constituted were Hesse-Cassel and Hanover, — Hanover as a 
kingdom, with George III of Great Britain as titular monarch. 
A committee representing the principal German States worked 
many months on a scheme of federation and agreed only on a 
makeshift constitution, which gave predominant power to no 
State and to Austria merely an honorary presidency. The Con- 
federation included thirty-eight States, among them three king- 
doms of Napoleonic " promotion " — Wiirttemberg, Bavaria, and 
Saxony. Hanover owed its royal standing to the fact of these 
promotions. The kingdom of the Netherlands, which included 
both Dutch and Austrian Netherlands, was the successor of the 
kingdom of Holland, another Napoleonic creation. 

The House of Hapsburg did not attempt to recover its former 
possessions in southern Germany, but on its immediate western 
frontier it regained a large part of Salzburg, Tyrol, and Vorarl- Austria 
berg. Its greatest gains were in Italy, and were both direct and 
indirect, including Lombardy and Venetia, which were officially 
proclaimed the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom — a concession to 
the idea of nationality. Members of the Hapsburg House ruled 
in the grand duchy of Tuscany and the duchy of Modena, while 
the Emperor's daughter, Marie Louise, ex-Empress of the 
French, received the duchy of Parma. The return of the Pope 
to his territories was also favorable to the influence of Austria. 

Italy now looked geographically much as it did before Na- 
poleon's first great campaign, except that Venice and Genoa had Italy 
disappeared. All that was left of his work was the rule of 
King Joachim Murat and Queen Caroline Bonaparte in Naples, 
but that was doomed. A glance at boundary lines, therefore, 
might seem to justify the conclusion that French influence had 
been like a tidal wave, which seems to sweep away old land- 
marks, but which when it recedes leaves the countryside quite 
as before save for the scattered ruins. The history of the later 
decades of the nineteenth century proves this to be more an ap- 
pearance than a reality. 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 



CHAP. 
XXVII 



The greatest changes in northern Europe, aside from the crea- 
tion of a new kingdom of Poland and a kingdom of the Nether- 
lands, were in the position of Sweden and Denmark, Sweden 
had lost Finland as a result of the Tilsit agreements, and now 
received as compensation Norway, which was taken from Den- 
mark, a State which had remained friendly to Napoleon too long. 
Sweden offered Swedish Pomerania as partial compensation, but 
Prussia finally received it, and Denmark was given the duchy 
of Lauenburg and an indemnity in money. In this way Swe- 
den's connection with the affairs of Germany, begun by the great 
Gustavus, came to an end. 

Great Britain's gains were all in the colonies. One reason 
why the English desired to compensate the Dutch by a cession 
of Belgian lands was to reconcile them to the loss of the Cape, 
Ceylon, Demerara, and Essequibo, which, with the acquisitions 
from France and the island of Malta, strengthened the British 
colonial empire. The immense progress which the English had 
made toward a control of the world's carrying trade was not bar- 
gained for in any treaty nor laid down on any map, and yet it 
was more important than any territorial cession. 

Before the Congress was dissolved the Powers took steps 
towards the abolition of the African slave trade, one of the deep- 
est blots on Christian civilization. Great Britain and the United 
States had already prohibited it, and now the representatives of 
Great Britain urged action by the Congress. The Powers, with 
the exception of Spain and Portugal, were willing, and on Feb- 
ruary 8 the declaration was issued, but without setting a definite 
time at which any Power should make the prohibition effective. 
As long as the war had continued England had been mistress of 
the seas and could check the trade almost wholly; but with the 
return of peace wider action was necessary. 

The work of the Congress was still unfinished when news 
reached Vienna that Napoleon had escaped from Elba and had 
landed on the southern coast of France. A declaration was is- 
sued at once in the name of the eight Powers that he was an 
enemy to the peace of Europe and as such should be delivered 
over to public justice. The phrase appears to mean that he 
was " abandoned to public vengeance," as if he were in the most 
literal sense an outlaw, whom any one might slay with impunity. 
The representatives of the four great Powers did not content 
themselves with phrases, but signed a treaty pledging each to 
place in the field at once an army of 150,000 men, and Great 
Britain in addition promised a subsidy of five million pounds 
towards the expenses of mobilization. 




East 15 of Grocriwch 



THE RESTORATION IN FRANCE AND IN EUROPE 457 

Napoleon had been influenced by several considerations in chap. 

forming his desperate resolve. He had been informed that the 

Allies were on the verge of war over the Saxony-Poland ques- I8i4-i5 
tion, and he also knew of widespread dissatisfaction in France 
with the Bourbon regime. Rumors had also reached him of a 
plan, urged upon the Powers, of removing him to the Azores. 
Later still, hearing that a plot, formed by Fouche for the over- 
throw of the Bourbons, was ripe, he felt he must act at once, if 
he was to be the beneficiary of the discontent. Petty reasons 
also influenced Napoleon's action. The small stock of money 
which he had brought with him for the support of his estab- 
lishment and of his httle garrison of a thousand men was be- 
coming depleted. The Bourbons had not paid a franc of the 
annual allowance agreed upon at Fontainebleau. If he were to 
retain his guards or to possess the money necessary to make one 
more stake in the great game, he could not afford to wait. In 
one respect he miscalculated. He heard that by the last of Feb- 
ruary the Congress would be ended and that the Princes would 
have set out for their capitals, so that he might count upon delay 
and uncertain or divided counsels. But his act found them still 
at Vienna. 

Napoleon embarked his followers, of whom 400 were mem- 
bers of his famous Imperial Guard, on February 26, and four 
days later reached the Golfe de Jouan. He knew that the peas- 
ants of Dauphine hated the Bourbon regime, fearing that the Retnm 
lands which they had purchased would be restored to the emi- *° ^^"^ 
grants and the Church. Anxious, therefore, to reach Grenoble, 
but afraid to pass through Provence, where the year before he 
had barely escaped assassination, he hurried his little army across 
difficult Alpine paths. Only once was he in serious danger. A 
battalion was sent out from Grenoble to dispute the approach to 
the town, and, as the soldiers had given no sign of mutiny, the 
leaders hoped that they would obey an order to fire. But the 
sight of Napoleon was too much for such formal loyalty, and 
with a cry of " Long live the Emperor " they rushed forward, 
prostrated themselves before him, and touched his clothing, as 
if to assure themselves that it was in reality he and not a phan- 
tom. From Grenoble the imperial eagles " flew to Paris." Gen- 
erals who were unwiUing to share in the adventure had to ride 
away to save their lives. Ney had promised Louis XVIII that 
he would bring Napoleon back in an iron cage, but he saw his 
regiments deserting him, his own Hfe in danger, and, remember- 
ing the bitterness of his grievances against the Bourbon Court, 
went over to Napoleon. 



CHAP. 
XXVII 



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

At the first news of Napoleon's landing the King and his ad- 
visers did not think the monarchy in serious danger, but as mes- 
sage after message brought tidings of his astonishing progress 
Louis XVIII saw that a second exile was inevitable. The peas- 
ants and the soldiers were almost everywhere enthusiastic Bona- 
partists. The middle classes did not share this feeling, because 
they feared that the return of Napoleon meant a renewal of the 
war, but they were indifferent to the Bourbon cause, and, more- 
over, possessed no means of resisting had they been inclined to do 
so. On the twentieth of March Napoleon was at Fontainebleau 
without having fired a shot or shed a drop of blood. The even- 
ing before towards midnight the royal carriages had drawn up 
in the courtyard of the Tuileries and Louis XVIII was driven 
north towards Lille. Some of his advisers urged him to hold that 
town or Dunkirk, but he was convinced that he was safer across 
the frontier at Ghent, under the protection of the troops of the 
Allies. 

The transition from the royal to the new imperial government 
was made without serious difficulty. After a few hours at Fon- 
tainebleau Napoleon rode on to Paris. On the night of his arrival 
several of his former ministers appeared at the Tuileries and re- 
sumed their portfolios. Carnot was induced to become Minis- 
ter of the Interior on the ground that it was a question of de- 
fending the country against the foreigner, a service which under 
altered circumstances he had rendered in 1793 and 1794. Davout 
became Minister of War and Caulaincourt again assumed the 
role of negotiator of impossible treaties of peace. About a 
fourth of the prefects were retained. So far as internal adminis- 
tration was concerned the chief trouble was with the mayors, 
a large number of whom were staunch loyalists. Armed resist- 
ance was brief. In the south it centered at Bordeaux, Toulouse, 
and Nimes. By April 8, with the capitulation of the Duke 
d'Angouleme at La Palud, it was over. In May civil war flamed 
up again in La Vendee, but the death of La Rochejaquelein early 
in June discouraged resistance. 

In one respect Napoleon found the situation completely 
changed. His appeals to liberal and revolutionary sentiment, 
in the proclamations issued on the way to Paris, had been taken 
seriously by those who had welcomed his return. They expected 
the end of arbitrary government and the introduction of a regime 
more liberal than that under the Bourbon Restoration. Forced 
by this sentiment, he caused a constitution to be drawn up, which 
was the Charter liberalized, and which he published in the Moni- 
teur of April 22 under the designation of Acte Additionnel, or 



THE RESTORATION IN FRANCE AND IN EUROPE 459 

supplement to the constitutions of the Empire. In reality only ^yii 

23 articles of minor importance reproduced any provisions of 

former imperial constitutions. The Additional Act was to be I814-15 
submitted to the people for approval ; but, before they had more 
than begun voting, public opinion compelled Napoleon to order 
an election of deputies to the " Chamber of Representatives." 
When the votes were counted, it was found that only a million 
and a half thought it worth while to record their votes. The 
acceptance of the Constitution was proclaimed at a great assem- 
bly, called the Champ de Mai, held June i, and immediately 
afterwards the Chamber of Peers and the Chamber of Repre- 
sentatives were organized. It turned out that only eighty depu- 
ties were thorough-going Bonapartists, while 500 were liberals. 
Instead of complimenting Napoleon by choosing his brother 
Lucien for president, the chamber chose the former Girondin 
Lanjuinais, an uncompromising constitutional liberal. Napoleon 
was deeply annoyed by the turn of affairs. The discouragements 
of the situation are said to have had the more fatal effect of de- 
stroying his confidence and his power of initiative. After all, 
the issues of the day would be settled not in debate but on the 
battlefield, and on June 12 Napoleon set out for the Belgian 
frontier. 

Napoleon had counted upon the help of Murat, with whom he 
had been negotiating before he left Elba. Murat believed that 
northern Italy was already seething with discontent over the Murat 
reactionary measures which princes under Austrian control had 
introduced, and he thought the occasion ripe for an attempt to 
unite all Italy under his scepter. In the middle of March he 
left Naples and moved rapidly northward as far as the Po. His 
suspicious conduct had led the Austrians to mobilize their army 
in January, so that they were not taken by surprise. After 
one or two slight successes he was decisively defeated, and hur- 
ried back to Naples. In a few days he realized the hopelessness 
of his position and fled to France in disguise, once more offer- 
ing his services to Napoleon. They were refused on the ground 
that he had spoiled the plan of pacifying the Allies. A few 
months later he made an attempt to recover his kingdom, but 
was captured and shot. 

If the task of preparing for the campaign of 1814 was per- 
plexing, the military problem of 1815 might seem insoluble. In 
one particular the conditions had changed for the better. Peace The Army 
had brought back to France the prisoners of the recent wars and ^^ ^^^^ 
the garrisons beleaguered in German fortresses. The number 
of these soldiers, upon a conservative estimate, was 120,000. 



^6o THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

CHAP. But many of them were weary of war and did not rejoin the 

colors, so that by June i only about 52,000 had reported for 

1814-15 duty. The Army of the Restoration on a peace footing num- 
bered 200,000, and this was increased by the time the campaign 
opened to 284,000. More than half the number were, however, 
needed to guard the frontier and to watch royalist districts. The 
quality of the troops was superior to that of any army Napoleon 
had commanded since Friedland. Wholly composed of French- 
men, it possessed a spirit and unity which the armies in the days 
of the Grand Empire had lacked. The men burned to avenge 
the recent defeats and the officers were spurred on by rage 
against the supporters of the Bourbon regime. This was not 
true of the general officers, who realized that they were in a 
serious predicament, since they had broken their oaths to the 
King. 

The army lacked lieutenants to cooperate with their great 
captain. Of the famous marshals only Soult, Ney, and Davout 
were available. To Soult was assigned Berthier's position of 
chief of staff, an office he had never filled, although he had dis- 
tinguished himself as commander of an army in the Spanish 
campaign, Davout was left in command of Paris, while Ney 
was summoned for service only at the last moment. With him 
was associated Marshal Grouchy, a brilliant cavalry general, but 
without experience in independent command, a lack which was 
to have a disastrous influence on the outcome of the campaign. 

War was inevitable, although Napoleon endeavored to gain 
time by sending messages to the Allied Powers explaining that 
he accepted the settlement made by the Treaty of Paris. His 
agents were turned back at the frontiers and France was cut 
off from the outer world as if she were in quarantine. It was 
simply a question of time when the armies of the four Allies 
would pass the frontiers and crush resistance under the weight 
of numbers. Already a Prussian army of 117,000 under 
Bliicher and a British army of 85,000 under Wellington were 
assembling on the Belgian frontier. Of the two Wellington's 
force was less formidable, for it was partly made up of Dutch, 
Belgians, and Germans who till recently had been subjects of 
Napoleon. If these armies could be attacked before their con- 
centration was completed, they might be driven back on diverg- 
ing lines of communication, the Prussians toward the Rhine and 
the British toward the Channel. Napoleon might then face the 
larger masses of the Russian and Austrian armies, which were 
expected on the frontier by the end of June. 

The first movements of the campaign promised Napoleon one 



THE RESTORATION IN FRANCE AND IN EUROPE 461 

of his most brilliant successes. Early on the morning of June ^vii 

15 he was ready to advance toward the roads which united the 

Prussian and British armies before they had an inkling of his ^^^^-^^ 
absence from Paris. By night he had crossed the Belgian fron- Opening 
tier, had driven back the outlying Prussian troops, and for the campaign 
time being at least had rendered impossible any effective coopera- 
tion between the two armies. Indeed, it was not until the night 
was more than half gone that Wellington, at his headquarters in 
Brussels, received any clear information upon what was going 
on at the frontier, thirty miles away. 

Napoleon had now gained an opportunity to fight a separate 
battle with the Prussians and he did not believe that the British 
could assemble a formidable force on his left at Quatre Bras. 
He directed Ney, therefore, to occupy Quatre Bras on the i6th, 
and then to sweep around the right of the Prussian army, while 
he attacked it in front. In this case the victory would be crush- 
ing and only the British would remain to be dealt with. He did 
defeat the Prussians at Ligny, but Ney did not succeed in mak- 
ing the expected flank movement, for by great exertions Welling- 
ton hurried up division after division to Quatre Bras until he 
had troops enough to drive Ney from the field. 

The courageous decision of the defeated Prussians to retreat 
northward, toward Wavre, so that they might keep in touch 
with Wellington, deprived Napoleon of the fruits of his victory 
at Ligny. On the morning of June 17 he let slip a chance to 
crush the British, whose news gatherers did not report the de- 
feat of Bliicher until after ten o'clock, and who were waiting 
at Quatre Bras, within striking distance of Napoleon's main 
army. A still more serious blunder was his order for the pur- 
suit of the Prussians which was based on the supposition that 
they had fled eastward. This order was given to Grouchy, who 
was not a Desaix. The consequence was that by the next day, 
when the Prussians were already on the march from Wavre to 
unite with WelHngton, Grouchy with 30,000 men was hopelessly 
distant from the battlefield. 

On the evening of June 17 Napoleon had pursued Wellington 
as far as a ridge two or three miles south of the village of Water- Waterloo 
loo. Here the British showed signs of fight, and as Napoleon's 
army was in no condition for a decisive attack he remained on 
a parallel ridge less than a mile away. It had been raining hard 
all the afternoon and the rain continued far into the night, ren- 
dering an early morning attack difficult on account of the char- 
acter of the ground. Napoleon's chief anxiety was lest the 
British should steal off again; but there was no danger of this, 



462 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

^^^j for Bliicher had promised Wellington the support of two corps, 

and of the rest of the Prussian army as soon as possible. 

1814-15 jj^ ^j^g battle of Waterloo, which took place on the following 
day, June i8, Napoleon had the advantage of numbers, but Wel- 
lington the advantage of position. Wellington's position was 
strengthened by two groups of farm buildings, which he had 
hastily fortified, Hougomont in front of his right, and La Haye 
Sainte in front of the center. He could also move troops behind 
the ridge from one part of his line to another without exposing 
them to French artillery fire. Napoleon opened the battle a few 
minutes before noon by a sharp but futile attack on Hougomont, 
planning to make his principal effort an hour or two later against 
the British left. About one o'clock a strange body of soldiers 
was descried on the hillsides toward the northeast. Although 
he soon learned that these soldiers were Prussians, Napoleon 
did not lose his sense of security and set in motion his heavy 
assaulting columns. The first line of Wellington's troops was 
made up of Dutch and Belgians, who had already suffered from, 
the fire of the French batteries. They fled as the French col- 
umns approached. The " thin red line " of the British regi- 
ments behind seemed too light to offer a stubborn resistance. 
Suddenly across the ridge rode two brigades of British cavalry. 
They plunged deep into the French columns, scattering them in 
utter confusion. Napoleon's attention was soon demanded by 
the advance of the Prussians against his right and Ney took 
charge of the struggle with Wellington. Ney ordered 5,000 
French horsemen to break through the British lines along the 
ridge west of La Haye Sainte. At one time the horsemen en- 
gaged in the attack numbered 10,000, but the British infantry, 
formed in squares, checker-board fashion, held firm, though torn 
by artillery fire. The conflict went on until six o'clock, when 
the cavalry was completely exhausted. By this time the French 
had captured La Haye Sainte, and their infantry and artillery 
enfiladed a part of the British line, so that Wellington had diffi- 
culty in filling the gaps. The situation of the British would have 
been precarious had Napoleon not been obliged to use so many 
troops in checking the Prussians who seriously threatened the 
rear of his army. About seven o'clock he resolved to make a last 
effort to break the British line. He formed nine battalions of 
the Imperial Guard into a column and sent it against the right 
center. Unfortunately for him it moved too far toward the 
British right and came into conflict with troops relatively 
fresh. Decimated by volleys in front and on the flank and 
charged with the bayonet, part of the battalions broke and others 



THE RESTORATION IN FRANCE AND IN EUROPE 463 

began sullenly to retire. Just then another Prussian corps fell S^vii 

on the French right, while the first was fighting its way steadily 

nearer Napoleon's only possible line of retreat. The pressure I814-15 
upon his exhausted troops became unendurable and the army 
was thrown into a panic. WeUington now ordered a general ad- 
vance and the French soldiers soon became a mass of terror- 
stricken fugitives hurrying down the road or through the fields 
toward Quatre Bras and the French frontier. 

For Napoleon the consequences of Waterloo were somber. 
In order to forestall attempts to depose him, he hurried back 
to Paris, reaching the city the third morning after the battle. Napo- 
His only chance of remaining in power was to seize the dictator- second 
ship ; but he hesitated. A few hours passed, and the opportunity Abdica- 
was gone. The deputies and the peers declared themselves in 
permanent session and voted to punish any attempt to interfere 
with them as treason. On the next day, bowing to the inevitable, 
Napoleon abdicated in favor of his son. He lingered in Paris 
and at Malmaison until June 29, when the provisional govern- 
ment informed him that they could no longer assure his safety. 
The Prussians were rapidly advancing and Bliicher had ordered 
that he be taken dead or aUve. To escape this danger he rode 
toward the coast, hoping to find passage to America. On July 
10 as it was impossible to elude the British fleet which was watch- 
ing the coast he applied for refuge to the captain of the Beller- 
ophon, one of the British ships. A few weeks later the Allied 
Powers decided to regard him as a prisoner and assigned to the 
British the ungrateful task of acting as his jailers. In October 
he was landed at St. Helena, and that distant and lonely island 
remained his dwelling place until his death, on May 5, 182 1. 

The companions of his adventure also suffered. In the South 
the hatred of the royaUsts for them found a vent in the White 
Terror, with wild mobs and wholesale murders, in the course conse- 
of which Brune, one of the most distinguished generals of the oJ^X^^ 
Revolution and a marshal of the Empire, was assassinated. Nor Hundred 
was the punishment of the men who had cast in their lot with *^^ 
Napoleon left wholly to mobs. The most distinguished victim 
was Marshal Ney, who was tried for treason before the Cham- 
ber of Peers, condemned, and shot. The opportunity was also 
taken to single out for vengeance the ex-members of the Con- 
vention who had voted for the death of Louis XVI and who had 
adhered to Napoleon in 181 5. These men were sent into an 
exile from which many did not live to return. 

For France the consequences were not as serious as might 
have been feared. Although the Prussians were eager to dis- 



464 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 

£^^^- member the country, urging the seizure of Alsace and other ter- 

ritory on the frontier, Great Britain and Russia were opposed 

1814-15 |.Q ^^y except minor changes in the arrangements of the pre- 
ceding year. The provisional government at Paris saw in the 
immediate presence of Louis XVIII a guarantee against dis- 
memberment, and Wellington advised him to reenter the country 
at once. The leaders of the government recognized his author- 
ity at the same time that they arranged the capitulation of Paris. 
On July 8 the King was in the Tuileries again. As it turned 
out, all that France lost was a few fortresses and some square 
miles of territory. She was also required to pay an indemnity 
of 700,000,000 francs within five years. Meanwhile the north- 
eastern departments should be occupied by 150,000 allied troops 
at French expense. The ambassadors of Great Britain, Russia, 
Prussia, and Austria received the right to tender their joint ad- 
vice to the government even upon matters of internal politics. 
These provisions were embodied in the second Treaty of Paris, 
of November 20, 1815. The four Powers on the same day 
agreed to meet from time to time to concert measures for the 
preservation of the peace of Europe. The experiences of the 
last two decades made the idea of new revolutions no mere spec- 
ter of reactionary minds. 

The French government of the second Restoration was moved 
by the same spirit that directed the leaders of the first. Louis 
Meaning XVIII was not inclined to listen to the doctrine of vengeance 
Second and tried to profit by the lessons of the Hundred Days. Welling- 
Eestora- ^q^ ^gg^j ^^^^ great authority which the victory of Waterloo gave 
him to counsel moderation. In consequence the first ministry 
was led by Talleyrand and included Fouche. The elections for 
the choice of new deputies, however, resulted in a decided vic- 
tory for the ultras and the chamber was " more royalist than 
the King." Talleyrand's successor was the Duke de Richelieu, 
a returned emigrant, who nevertheless persisted in the policy 
of moderation. In this fashion France after many vicissitudes 
seemed on the road towards orderly representative government, 
although with an electorate which numbered scarcely 100,000. 
After the coup d'etat of 1799 Napoleon had declared, " The 
Revolution is finished." He meant that its agitations were over 
and that it was time to enjoy its benefits in peace. The states- 
men of the victorious Allies of 181 5 thought that they had ended 
the Revolutionary movement, but in another sense. They were 
mistaken. They had simply rendered it a service in dissociat- 
ing it from the ambitions of one man. In the long era of peace 
which they secured men had time to forget that foreign domina- 



THE RESTORATION IN FRANCE AND IN EUR OPE 465 

tion and military despotism had been the counterpart of reform, g^^- 

The ideal of civil equality and social justice, which the deputies 

of 1789 had cherished, could now make its appeal with renewed is^^-i^ 
force. The proof of its vitality is recorded in hundreds of great 
acts of legislation in the later years of the nineteenth century. 



NOTES ON BOOKS 



NOTES ON BOOKS ^ 

It is proposed to give here some indications of the nature of the 
printed material available for the study of the subjects treated in 
the preceding chapters. No attempt will be made to offer a sys- 
tematic bibliography of the period. How great such a task would 
be may be inferred from the statement of F. M. Kircheisen in 1908 
that in preparing his Bibliographie du Temps de Napoleon he had 
already collected 70,000 titles of books and articles upon the period 
from 1795 to 1815 alone. 

There is as yet no satisfactory bibliography of the French Revo- 
lution. P. Caron in his Manuel pratique de la Revolution franqaise 
(1912) gives lists of the collections undertaken by government com- 
missions, historical societies, and individuals. Indications for this, 
as well as for later periods of modern French history may be found 
in Caron's Bibliographie des Travaux publies de 1866 a i8py sur 
I'Histoire de la France depuis lySg and in its continuation by Briere 
and Caron, Repertoire methodique de I'Histoire moderne' et contem- 
poraine de la France^ for the years 1898 following, complete to 1903; 
additions for 1910 f. printed as supplements of the Revue d'histoire 
moderne et contemporaine. The Kircheisen Bibliographie of the 
Napoleonic period was planned to include several volumes, but only 
two have appeared. Useful, but not annotated, lists are given in 
volumes VII (1909), VIII (1904), IX (1906) of the Cambrige Mod- 
ern History and in the corresponding volumes of Lavisse et Ram- 
baud, Histoire Generale, VII (1896), VIII (1896), IX (1897). For 
many of the topics belonging to the period from 1763 to 1789 the 
best suggestions will be found in volumes VIII (2) and IX (i) of 
Lavisse, Histoire de France (1909, 1910). The biographies of 
Napoleon, especially the German and English editions of Fournier, 
contain extensive notes upon the bibliography of his career. The 
material upon certain phases of the period have been discussed in 
critical articles, of which the following are notable examples: 
Letaconnoux, La question des Subsistances et du Commerce des grains 
en France au XVIIP siecle {Revue d'Histoire Moderne, VIII, 409- 
445) ; Levy, Histoire interieure du Premier Empire {Revue des 
Etudes Napoleoniennes, I, 1 16-148) ; Driault, Histoire exterieure du 
Premier Empire {Ibid., II, 429-453) ; Dunan, Le Systeme continental, 
Bulletin de I'Histoire economique {Ibid., Ill, 1 1 5-146) ; and Lingel- 
bach. Historical Investigation and the Commercial History of the 

1 It is impossible to refer to the many valuable articles in historical re- 
views, etc. 

469 



470 NOTES ON BOOKS 

Napoleonic Era (American Historical Review, XIX, 257-81). More 
complete information should be sought in bibliographies of the sev- 
eral countries in question ; for example, for Germany in Dahlmann- 
Waitz, Quellenkunde zur Deutsche Geschichte. For lists of bib- 
liographies, see Langlois, Manuel de Bibliographie historique (1901). 
Current bibliographical information is given in the numerous re- 
views for the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period or in the general 
historical reviews. Of the former may be mentioned: La Revolu- 
tion franqaise, Annales revolutionnaires, and Revue des Etudes 
Napoleoniennes. 

A few books may be mentioned which cover the period as a whole, 
or the larger part of it. A brief treatment, mainly political, is given 
by Wahl, Geschichte des Europdischen Staatcnsystems im Zeitalter 
der Fransosischen Revolution und der Freiheitskriege (1912). Be- 
sides the well known Oncken, Zeitalter der Revolution, des Kaiser- 
reichs und der Befreiungskriege, 2 vols. (1884, 1889) ; the volumes 
of the Cambridge Modern History and of the Histoire Generale of 
Lavisse et Rambaud, there is Lindner, Weltgeschichte, VII (1910). 
A work of capital importance, especially for diplomatic history, is 
Sorel, L'Europe et la Revolution frangaise, 8 vols. (1885-1904). 
An older but still useful work is H. von Sybel, Geschichte der Revo- 
lutionszeit von i/Sp-iSoo (4th ed. 1882, vols. I-III translated). 

On the several countries, see, for England: Lecky, History of 
England in the Eighteenth Century, 8 vols., 1878; Political History 
of England, 1760-1801, by William Hunt (1905); Political History 
of England, i8oi-i8j/, by G. E. Brodrick and J. K. Fotheringham ; 
H. D. Traill, Social England, vol. V ( 1904) : for Germany : 
Lamprecht, Deutsche Geschichte, vols. VIII, IX (1906, 1907); 
Haiisser, Deutsche Geschichte vom Tode Friedrichs des Grossen bis 
zur Grilndung des Deutschen Bundes, 4 vols. (4th ed. 1869) ; more 
briefly in Atkinson, Germany from 1/15 to 1815 (1908) or Hender- 
son, Short History of the German People, vol. II (1906): for the 
Netherlands, Blok, History of the People of the Netherlands, vol. V 
(1912) : for Russia, Bain's Slavonic Europe (Cambridge Historical 
Series, 1912), or Rambaud, History of Russia, vol. II (1878): for 
Spain, Hume, Spain, 1479-1788, dind Modern Spain, 1788-1898 (1906), 
or at length, Baumgarten, Geschichte Spaniens zur Zeit der fran- 
zosischen Revolution (1861) : for Italy, Orsi, L' Italia Moderna 
(1901). 

Chapter I. On the conditions in France prior to the Revolution, 
Taine's Ancient Regime (1875) ^"^ Tocqueville's Old Regime and 
the Revolution (1856) may still be read with advantage. For a 
criticism of Taine's historical method, see Aulard's Taine (1907). 
The manner in which Taine subjects a great social structure to 
analysis is suggestive. Lowell's Eve of the French Revolution 
(1892) presents in a clear and interesting way the various features 
of the old regime in France. Another excellent, though brief, ac- 
count will be found in Perkins, Louis XV, vol. II. 



NOTES ON BOOKS 471 

In French the best account is presented in volume VIII (2) and 
IX (i) of Lavisse, Histoire de France. Another notable account is 
given in Stryienski, Le XVIII^ siecle (1909). A. Wahl, Vorge- 
schichte der Franzdsischen Revolution, 2 vols. (1905) is a fresh and 
critical treatment of the subject. Much has recently been written 
on the condition of the peasants in France. The most authoritative 
statement upon peasant ownership of land is in Loutchisky's L'etat 
des classes agricolcs en France a la veille de la Revolution (1911). 
See also his earlier work, La propriete paysanne en France a la 
veille de la Revolution, first translated from Russian in 1912. An- 
other, somewhat antagonistic view is given by Kovalewsky in his 
La France economique et sociale a la veille de la Revolution, 2 vols. 
(1909 f.). Several of the works which deal with the sale of 
ecclesiastical lands during the Revolution also discuss peasant owner- 
ship in the preceding period; see especially Marion, Ventes des 
Biens nationaux pendant la Revolution (1908). See further, Bloch, 
U Assistance and I'J^tat en France a la veille de la Revolution (1908). 

Among the many instructive books on the condition of the peas- 
antry may also be mentioned: Kareiev, Les paysans et la question 
paysanne en France dans le dernier quart du XVIII^ siecle; Marion, 
Etat des classes rurales dans la generalite de Bordeaux (1902) ; See, 
Les classes rurales en Bretagnc du XV I^ siecle a la Revolution 
(1906) ; Babeau, La vie rurale dans Vancienne France (1882). For 
other references, see Lavisse, IX (i), 246-7 n. Several of the col- 
lections of sources for the study of the economic history of the Revo- 
lution contain documents bearing directly upon conditions during the 
last half of the eighteenth century, notably Sagnac et Caron, Les 
Comites des droits feodaux et la legislation et I'abolition du regime 
seigneurial (1907); Bourgin, La partage des biens communaux 
(1908) ; Gerbaux et Schmidt, Proces-verbaux des Comites d'agricul- 
ture et de commerce (1906-1910). The reprints of the cahiers pre- 
sented in 1789, included in the same collection, are similarly valuable. 
For a summary of such material, see Champion, La France d'apres 
les cahiers de i/8p (1897). Arthur Young's Travels in France re- 
mains the most valuable contribution of a contemporary. Dr. Rigby's 
Letters from France should be read as an antidote to the traditionally 
gloomy statements about the peasants. Among the books on the 
nobles may be mentioned: De Vaissiere, Gentilshommes campag- 
nards de Vancienne France (1903); the first three volumes of 
Lomenie, Les Mimft^aw (1878 f.), or ¥\\ng,Mirabeau, vol. I (1908); 
Dreyfus, Un Philanthrope d'autrefois, La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt 

(1903)- 
On the condition of the peasants in Prussia and Austria, besides 

passages in Lamprecht, Deutsche Geschichte, vol. VIII, Knapp, 
Bauernbefreiung in den dlteren Theilen Preussens, 2 vols. (1887); 
Griinberg, Bauernbefreiung und die AuHosung der gutsherrlich- 
bauerlichen Verhdltnisses in Bohmen. Mdhren, und Schlesien, 2 vols. 
(1894); Cavaignac, La Prusse contemporaine, vol. I (1891); Goltz, 



472 NOTES ON BOOKS 

Geschichte der deutschen Landwirtschaft, 2 vols. (1902-3). For the 
peasants in Savoy, see Bruchet, L' Abolition des droits seigneuriax en 
Savoie, iy6i-ijg^ (1908), which belongs to the collection upon the 
economic history of the Revolution. 

On direct taxation in France the texts with an historical intro- 
duction may be found in Marion, Les Impots directs sous Vancien 
regime (1910). See also Stourm, Les Finances de I'ancien regime 
et de la Revolution (1885) ; Clement, La Corvees des chemins en 
France (1899). For Prussia: Philippson, Geschichte des Preus- 
sischen Staatswesens vom Tode Friedrichs des Grossen bis su den 
Freiheitskriegen, 2 vols. (1880-2). Upon England the facts are 
given in Bastable, Public Finance (1892). 

The literature upon industry and commerce is growing rapidly. 
The following may be noted: the standard work of Levasseur, His- 
toire des classes ouvrieres avant 178Q, vol. II (ed. of 1901) ; Cun- 
ningham, Growth of English Industry and Commerce^ vol. II (re- 
vised ed. 1907); Gibbins, British Industry (1903); Sombart, Die 
deutsche Volkswirtschaft im ip. Jahrhundert (1903); Steinhausen, 
Geschichte der deutschen Kultur, vol. 2, 2nd ed. (1913) ; Martin, La 
grande Industrie en France sous le regne de Louis XV (1900) ; Bon- 
nassieux, Les Grandes Compagnies de Commerce (1892) ; Afanassiev, 
Le Commerce des cereales en France au XVI 11^ siecle ( 1894) ; 
D'Avenel, Histoire economique de la propriete, des salaires, des 
denrees, etc., 4 vols. (1894-1898) ; Dutil, L'Etat ecdnomique du Lan- 
guedoc a la fin de I'ancien regime (1911) ; Renard et Dulac, Evolution 
industrielle et agricole depuis cent cinquante ans (1912). 

Chapter II. For the laws, see volumes XXII-XXIX of Jourdan, 
Isambert and Decrusy, Recueil des anciennes lois franqaises. See 
also Flammermont et Tourneux, Remonstrances du Parlement de 
Paris au XVIII^ siecle, 3 vols. (188&-1898). Illustrations of the 
operation of the governmental systems will be found in the books 
already mentioned, especially Lavisse and Tocqueville for France, 
and Philippson for Prussia. A good general survey is given by 
Gasquet, Precis des institutiones politiques de I'ancienne France 
vol. I (1885). Useful information will be found in Boiteau, L'Etat 
dg la France en 178Q (2nd ed. 1889), and for local administration in 
Babeau, La Province sous I'Ancien Regime, 2 vols. (1894), La Ville 
sous I'Ancien Regime (1884) ; and in Ardascheff, Les intendants de 
province sous Louis XVI, 3 vols. (1909). On the parlements, see 
note in Lavisse, IX (i), 186-7. For the central administration, see 
Viollet, Le Roi et ses ministres pendant les trois derniers siecles de la 
Monarchic (1911). Upon Prussia illustrative matter will be found 
in the Life of Stein, vol. I, by J. R. Seeley, and in Freiherr vom Stein, 
vol. I (1902), by Max Lehmann. The governmental system of Eng- 
land is adequately explained in all of the standard constitutional 
histories. For Austria and Hungary a serviceable volume is Wolf 
and Zwiedinek-Siidenhorst, Oesterreich unter Maria Theresia, Joseph 
II, und Leopold II (1882-1884). 



J NOTES ON BOOKS 473 

Chapter III. The sources for this subject are the works which 
are mentioned, and they are to be found not only in the original 
editions, but many of them in critical editions. Convenient bib- 
liographical lists are given for chapters 23 and 24 of volume VI of 
the Cambridge Modern History, and for chapter i of volume VII. 
Abundant suggestions are made in Lavisse for France. Special at- 
tention may be called to the following books: Faguet, Le XVIII^ 
siecle (1890) ; Rocquain, L' esprit revolutionnaire avant la Revolution 
(1878); Lichtenberger, Le Socialisme au XVIIP siecle (1895); 
Espinas, La philosophie sociale au XVIII^ siecle et la Revolution; 
Roustan, Les Philosophes et la Societe frangaise au XVIII^ siecle 
( 1906) ; Leslie Stephen, English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, 
2 vols. (1896) ; Francke, History of German Literature (new ed. 
19 13). On the Physiocrats and Economists, see Higgs, The Physi- 
ocrats (1897) ; Gide et Rist, Histoire des doctrines economiques 
depuis les physiocrates jusqu'd nos jours (1909) ; the biography of 
the elder Mirabeau, Rae's Life of Adam Smith; Schelle, Vincent de 
Gournay (1897) and Dupont de Nemours et I'ecole physio cratique 
(1888). For the French leaders the biographies in the Collection 
des Grands Ecrivains frangais are useful: Sorel, Montesquieu; 
Lanson, Voltaire, Chuquet, Rousseau, and Say, Turgot. Morley, 
Rousseau, 2 vols., and Diderot and the Encyclopcedists, 2 vols. Col- 
lins, Voltaire in England (1905), and See, Les idees politiques de 
Voltaire, Revue Historique for 1908, are of special interest. For 
the clergy in France, see Sicard, L'ancien clerge de France, 2 vols. 
(1893-4). For education, see Compayre, Histoire critique des doc- 
trines de V education en France, vol. II, 2nd ed. (1881); for Ger- 
many, Paulsen, Geschichte des gelehrten Unterrichts (1885). 

Chapter IV. The leading work on Frederick II is Koser, Konig 
Friedrich der Grosse, 2 vols. (3rd ed. 1904-5). An excellent brief 
treatment will be found in Wiegand, Friedrich der Grosse (1902). 
See also Reddaway, Frederick the Great and the Rise of Prussia 
(Heroes of the Nations, 1904). Tuttle, History of Prussia, vols. 
Ill and IV, contains much information in regard to the earlier part 
of Frederick's reign. Besides Philippson and Cavaignac, already 
mentioned, see Reimann, Neuere Geschichte des preussischen Staates, 
vol. II (1888). For the towns, see Preuss, Entwicklung des 
Deutschen Stddtewesens (1906). For the peasants: Knapp, already 
cited. 

Among the biographies of Joseph II may be mentioned Fournier, 
Josef der Zweite (1885) and Bright, Joseph U (1897 brief). 
B right's little volume on Maria Theresa should be consulted in con- 
nection. Much of the Emperor Joseph's correspondence has been 
published; for example, Joseph II und Leopold von Toskana. Ihr 
Briefwechsel von 1781-17QO, edited by A. von Arneth, and Joseph II 
und Katharina von Russland. Ihr Briefwechsel, by the same editor. 
On the work for the peasants, see Griinberg, already mentioned. See 
also, Marczali, Hungary in the Eighteenth Century (1910). Besides 



474 NOTES ON BOOKS 

Wolf und Zwiedinek-Siidenhorst, see Mayer, Geschichte Osterreichs, 
vol. II (3rd ed. 1909). 

For Charles III of Spain, see Rousseau, Charles III, 2 vols. (1907). 
The work of Charles Emmanuel III in Savoy is set forth in the docu- 
ments, with their historical introduction, Bruchet, already cited. On 
the colonial system in England, France and Spain, see especially, 
Egerton, Short History of British Colonial Policy (1897); Beer, 
British Colonial Policy (1907), and The Old Colonial System, 2 
vols. (1912) ; Deschamps, Histoire de la Question coloniale en France 
(1891); Leroy-Beaulieu, Histoire de la colonisation, vol. I (ed. of 
1902). For Russia, in addition to the books cited, see Walizewski, ^ 
Le Roman d'une Imperatrice (1893) and Autoiir d'un Trone: Cath- / 
erine U, ses collaborateurs, ses amis, ses favoris (1894). For Italy, ( 
briefly in Vernon, Italy 1494-17QO (1909). 

Chapter V. Several of the books noted for chapters i, 2, and 3 are 
serviceable for this chapter also. Volume IX of Lavisse, Histoire 
de France should be mentioned, especially Bk. VI, which is an 
illuminating statement by Lavisse of the " imperfections de I'oeuvre 
monarchique " and a review of the crisis which was the consequence. 
An older excellent account is that of Cherest, La Chute de lAncien 
Regime (1884-7), 3 vols. The story of this period pleasantly writ- 
ten will be found in MacLehose, Last Days of the French Monarchy 
(1901). For the financial side, see, besides Stourm, Gomel, Les 
causes Unancieres de la Revolution frangaise, 2 vols. (1892-3). 
Necker's own writings are full of interest for this subject. 

For the last struggle with the courts see especially Carre, La fin 
des parlements (1912). 

The memoir literature and the correspondence are abundant; see 
especially the memoirs of MoUien, Talleyrand, Mme. de Stael, Fer- 
rieres. Mallet du Pan, Malouet, Frenilly, Hardy; Rocheterie et 
Beaucourt, Lettres de Marie Antoinette (1895), vol. I; Correspond- 
ence secrete entre Marie-Therese et the comte Mercy- Argenteau, 
edited by D'Arneth and Geffroy, 3 vols. (1874); Correspondance 
secrete du comte de M ercy- Argenteau avec I'empereur Joseph II 
et le prince de Kaunitz, edited by D'Arneth and Flammermont. 

Among the useful biographies, it is well to note volumes III and 
IV of Lomenie, Les Mirabeau; Say, Turgot; Lanzac de Laborie, 
Jean-Joseph Mounier. 

Chapter VI. Reference should again be made to Cunningham, 
Growth of English Industry and Commerce and to Gibbins, British 
Industry; Historical Outlines (3rd ed. 1903). The most detailed and 
instructive work is, Mantoux, La Revolution industrielle au XVIII° 
siecle: Essai sur les commencements de la grande industrie moderne 
en Angleterre (1906). Much interesting information upon the south 
of France is to be found in Dutil, op. cit. See also Levasseur and 
Bonnassieux, op. cit. 

On the Treaty of 1786, see Dumas, Etude sur le traite de com- 
merce de 1/86 entre la France et V Angleterre (1904), and Rose, 



I 



NOTES ON BOOKS 475 

William Pitt, vol. I, chapter 14; see also Journals and Correspond- 
ance of Lord Auckland, vol. I. 

Detailed bibliographies may be found in Mantoux and in Martin, 
Histoire de I'industrie en France avant lySp. For bibliographical 
notes for Germany, see Dahlmann-Waitz Quellenkunde, or the lists 
in Handbuch der Wirtschaftskunde Deutschlands, III. 

Chapters VII, VIII, IX, and X. For the study of the subjects 
touched upon in these chapters important additions have been made 
to the older collections of printed material ; that is, the Proces-verbaux 
of the assemblies, the Archives parlementaires, an official collection 
begun by Mavidal and Laurent, and Buchez et Roux, Histoire parle- 
mentaire de la Revolution frangaise. For a list of the collection 
upon the economic aspects of the Revolution, bearing especially on 
the early period, see Caron, Manuel pratique, pp. 9-13. Among other 
valuable series may be noted Actes de la Commune de Paris pendant 
la Revolution, edited by Lacroix, 15 vols.; Recueil de documents 
relatifs a la convocation des ^tats Generaux de i/8p, edited by Brette, 
3 vols. ; La Societe des Jacobins, edited by Aulard, 6 vols. The text 
of laws is to be found in Duvergier, Collection des Lois, which in- 
cludes all the laws passed since 1789. 

The Reimpression de I'ancien Moniteur furnishes material enough 
for the study of most discussions in the Revolutionary assemblies. 

There are several selections from the original material made for 
the use of students. For legislation the most useful is Cahen et 
Guyot, L'CEuvre legislative de la Revolution (1913). A collection 
of practical utility for college classes is Anderson, Constitutions and 
other Select Documents of France, the early part of which is devoted 
to the Revolution and to the Napoleonic period. It contains little 
upon the economic history of the Revolution. Another by Legg, 
Select Documents: the Constituent Assembly, is a history of the first 
two years, presented in untranslated clippings from contemporary 
newspapers, decrees, etc. On a different plan is Fling, Source Prob- 
lems of the French Revolution (1913), in which the selections offer 
material upon a few incidents, in order that students through its 
critical use may be trained in the historical method. Stephens, 
Orators of the French Revolution, 2 vols., contains typical speeches. 

The memoirs and correspondence of the period are rich. The fol- 
lowing should be noted: Young, Travels; Rigby, Letters; Duques- 
noy, Journal; Morris, Diary and Letters, 2 vols. ; Vaissiere, Lettres 
d' " Aristocrates" ; the memoirs of Bailly, Ferrieres, Lafayette, Tal- 
leyrand (Tr.), Malouet, Pasquier (Tr.), Mme. Campan (Tr.), Thie- 
bault (Tr.), Bouille, FreniUy (Tr.), Romilly (English). The Recol- 
lections of Dumont, especially of Mirabeau, appeared in an English 
translation in 1832. A new English edition was issued in 1904 under 
the inappropriate title, The Great Frenchman and the Little Genevese. 
Various volumes of diplomatic correspondence have also been pub- 
lished, including Dorset, Despatches, 2 vols.; Gower, Despatches; 
Bailli de Virieu, Correspondance; Stael-Holstein, Correspondance 



476 NOTES ON BOOKS 

diplomatique; Kovalevsky, / dispacci degli ambasciatori Veneti alia 
corte di Francia durante la Rivoluzione. 

For the general history of the Revolution, in addition to books 
previously noted, — Cherest, Sorel (indispensable for the international 
relations of France), Sybel (valuable for the same reason) — special 
attention should be called to Aulard, Political History of the French 
Revolution (Miall Tr.), 4 vols. (1910), embodying the results of Pro- 
fessor Aulard's long and fruitful researches. Jaures, Histoire So- 
cialiste, 2 vols., on the period of the Constituent and Legislative 
Assembly is suggestive (1901, 1902). The eighth volume of Lavisse 
et Rambaud, Histoire gencrale, represents the best French scholar- 
ship on the subject at the time of its publication in 1896. The Cam- 
bridge Modern History, VIII, is on a similar plan, although it does 
not deal with as many phases of the movement. The most brilliant 
brief treatment is in Madelin, La Revolution (1913). The two 
volumes of Stephens, French Revolution (1886, 1891), carry the 
subject as far as the fall of 1793. There are several brief manuals 
by Gardiner, Mathews, Johnston, Morris, Belloc. See also Acton, 
Lectures on the French Revolution, published in 1910 after the au- 
thor's death. Taine's three volumes are valuable for the discussion 
of institutions and the criticism of tendencies, but his method is open 
to serious objection. MacLehose, From Monarchy to the Republic 
in France (1904) is a clear and interesting presentation of the period 
from 1789 to 1792. Readers of Carlyle should use the critical edi- 
tions of Fletcher or Rose. The English translation of Thiers ap- 
peared in a fresh dress in 1894, 5 vols. 

On the legislative work of the Revolution, see Sagnac, La legisla- 
tion civile de la Revolution frangaise (1898). The introduction to 
Sagnac et Caron, Les Comites dcs droits feodaux, etc., is very im- 
portant for the study of the abolition of feudalism. On the finances 
of the Revolution, besides Stourm, the chief work is Gomel, Histoire 
Unanciere de I'Assemblee Constituante, 2 vols. (1896-7). Akin to the 
subject of taxation is Karmin, Question du sel pendant la Revolution 
(1912). Levasseur, Histoire des classes ouvrieres depuis i/8p, vol. 
I, has an important review of the assignats. See also Bloch, Le 
Papier-monnaie et la Monnaie: Instruction, recueil de textes et notes 
(1911). For the religious question the following books are of special 
interest: Debidour, Histoire des rapports de I'^glisc et de I'Etat en 
France de lySp a 1870 (1898) ; La Gorce, Histoire religieuse de la 
Revolution frangaise, vol. I (1909) ; Mathiez, Rome et le Clerge fran- 
gaise sous la Constituante (1911); Pisani, L'Eglise de Paris et la 
Revolution, 4 vols. (1908-1911). Other aspects of the early Revolu- 
tion are treated in Forneron, Histoire generale des Emigres, 2 vols. 
(1884) ; Daudet, Histoire de I'Emigration pendant la Revolution fran- 
gaise, 3 vols. (1904-7); Goncourt, Histoire de la Societe frangaise 
pendant la Revolution (1889) ; Carre, already cited. A critical study 
of the July 14 will be found in Flammermont, La Journee du 14 Juillet, 
lySg (1892). Aulard, Grands Orateurs de la Revolution (1914), 



NOTES ON BOOKS 477 

includes much of the matter contained in his earlier Orateurs de 
I'Assemhlee Constituante (1882). 

Among the biographies useful for the period are Lomenie or Stern, 
Mirabeau; more popular treatments by Willert and Barthou (Tr.) ; 
Mallet, Mallet du Pan, and Charavay, La Fayette, Clapham (English) 
or Neton, Abbe Sieyes. In regard to Mirabeau's policy the best 
source is his Correspondance avec le Comte de la March, 3 vols. 
(1851), edited by Bacourt. 

Chapters XI, XII, XIII, and XIV. It is unnecessary to repeat 
here the names of the general histories of the Revolution, except to 
emphasize once more the value of Aulard's analyses of political 
tendencies and descriptions of governmental changes. Jaures, His- 
toire Socialiste: la Convention, 2 vols. (1903); Jaures and Deville, 
Histoire Socialiste, vol. V (1904), contain much interesting matter. 

Upon the influence of the Revolution beyond the borders of France, 
see: Hazen, American Opinion of the French Revolution (1897); 
Dowden, French Revolution and English Literature (1897) ; Legouis, 
Early Life of Wordsworth (1897); Morley, Burke (1867); Smith, 
English Jacobins (1881); Lecky, French Revolution (chapters from 
his History of England) ; Lecky, History of Ireland in the Eighteenth 
Century, 5 vols. (1892) ; Francke, History of German Literature; 
Rambaud, Les Frangais sur le Rhin (1873). 

For foreign affairs the most important contribution is that of 
Sorel. See also, Heidrich, Preussen im Kampfe gegen die fran- 
zosische Revolution bis zur zweiten Teilung Polens (1908); Has- 
hagen. Das Rheinland und die franzosische Herrschaft (1908); 
Wittichen, Preussen und die Revolutionen in Belgien und LUttich, 
iy8p-i/po (1905) ; Delhaize, Domination frangaise en Belgique, 6 
vols. (1908-1912); Rose, William Pitt and the National Revival, 
2 vols. (1911) ; Clapham, Causes of the War of 1792 (1899). 

The texts of treaties will be found in Martens, Recueil des princi- 
paux traites d'alliance, de paix, etc., v^ith its supplements, and in De 
Clerq, Recueil des traites de la France. Parts of them appear trans- 
lated in Anderson. The most important collection for the study o£ 
French foreign, as well as internal, policy is Aulard, Recueil des 
actes du Comite de Salut Public, in 25 vols., nearly completed. Val- 
uable correspondence will be found in the Auckland, Fortescue, 
Castlereagh, Malmesbury, journals, letters, and papers. 

For the changes in the French government after August 10, 1792, 
the texts are in Mautouchet, Gouvernement Revolutionnaire : textes 
(1912). For reports upon public opinion, see Schmidt, Tableaux de 
Paris pendant la Revolution frangaise (1867). Of similar inter- 
est is the series Paris pendant la Terreur: Rapports des agents 
secrets du ministre de I'interieur, edited by Caron, of which two vol- 
umes have been published. For the period after the overthrow of 
Napoleon, see Aulard, Paris pendant la Reaction thermidorienne et 
sous le directoire, 5 vols. (1898-1902). 



478 NOTES ON BOOKS 

Upon notable features of the period the following books should 
be mentioned: Aulard, Orateurs de I'AssembUe Legislative et de 
la Convention, 2 vols. (1885, 1886); Sagnac, La Chute de Royaute 
(1909) ; Braesch, La Commune du Dix Aout (1911) ; and the older 
works written from a point of view hostile to the radical revolution, 
Mortimer-Ternaux, Histoire de la Terreur, 8 vols. (1862 f.), with ap- 
pendices containing valuable documents of which some of the orig- 
inals were destroyed in the burning of the municipal archives in 
1871, and Wallon, Revolution du 31 mai et le Federalisme, 2 vols. 
(1886). Lenotre, Massacres de Septembre (1907) reprints several 
original narratives. 

Upon the Revolutionary Tribunal, in addition to the monumental 
work of Wallon, Histoire du Tribunal Revolutionnaire , 6 vols. (1880- 
82), may be mentioned Campardon, Le Tribunal Revolutionnaire de 
Paris, 2 vols. (2nd ed. 1866) and Lenotre, Tribunal Revolutionnaire 
(1908). Two books of deep interest are Dunoyer's Deux Jures du 
Tribunal Revolutionnaire (1909) and Fouquier-Tinville (1913). 

The economic history of the period is well treated by Levasseur. 
A more recent work is Gomel, Histoire Unanciere de I'Assemblee 
Legislative et de la Convention, 2 vols. (1902, 1905). Marion, Vente 
des biens nationaux, deals with sales of emigrant, as well as ecclesi- 
astical, lands. 

Upon education, see Proces-verbaux du Comite d'instruction pub- 
lique de la Convention nationale, edited by Guillaume, 6 vols. (1890- 
1907). 

On the military side, see the list of the publications of the Section 
historique de I'Etat-major de I'Armee in Caron, Manuel, pp. 14-17. 
The principal descriptive work is Chuquet, Les guerres de la Revolu- 
tion, II vols. (1886-1893). Mahan, Sea Power and the French Revo- 
lution and Empire, 2 vols. (1897), deals at length with naval opera- 
tions. 

The memoir and biographical literature of the period is rich. 
Among the memoirs should be especially noted those of Brissot 
(Perroud edition), Carnot, Thibaudeau, Durand de Maillane, Lameth, 
in addition to those previously mentioned. The following additional 
biographies are important: ^Madelin, D ant on (others by Beesly, Bel- 
loc, etc.) ; Madelin, Fouche, 2 vols.'; Cahen, Condorcet; Chuquet, 
Dumouriez; Levy, Jeanbon Saint-Andre; Montier, Lindet; Lewes or 
Belloc, Robespierre; Bax, Babeuf. 

Chapters XVI and XVIL On the diplomacy of the period from 
1796 to 1802, besides Sorel and Sybel, see Guyot, Le Direct oire et la 
paix de VEurope (1911); Du Teil, Rome, Naples et le Directoire 
(1902) ; Gaffarel, Bonaparte et les Republiques italiennes, ifgd-i'/QQ 
(1895); Driault, Napoleon et VEurope, 1800-1803 (1909); Bowman, 
Preliminary Stages of the Peace of Amiens (1900); with Rose's 
William Pitt. 

On the relations of France with dependent states other than Italy: 
see, for the Belgian lands, Delhaize, already cited and Lanzac de 



NOTES ON BOOKS 479 

Laborie, Domination franqaise en Belgique, 2 vols. (1895) ; for Hol- 
land, Blok, vol. V, and Colenbrander, De Bataafsche Republiek 
(1908) ; for the Rhine country, Rambaud, Les frangais sur le Rhin; 
for Switzerland, Oechsli, Geschichte der Schweiz im 19. Jahrhundert, 
vol. I (1903). 

There are various collections of diplomatic correspondence and 
documents, for example: Bailleu, Preussen und Frankreich von 
1795-1^07, 2 vols. (1881, 1887) ; Luckwaldt, Der Friede von Campo 
Formio (1907); Montarlot et Pingaud, Le Congres de Rastatt, 3 
vols. (1912-1913); Dunant, Relations diplomatique s de la France et 
de la Republique helvetique (1902). 

The internal history of the Directory is sufficiently described by 
Aulard and Sorel. Aside from the affair of the i8th Fructidor and 
the bankruptcy of 1797 its most important features are associated 
with the history of General Bonaparte. 

The two most serviceable biographies of Napoleon are Rose,^ 
Napoleon I, 2 vols. (1902) and Fournier, Napoleon I (last German 
edition in 3 volumes, 1904, 1906). The earlier edition of Fournier 
appears in an English version (E. G. Bourne editor) in one volume, 
the later, translated by A. E. Adams, in 2 volumes. This translation 
is not an exact version of the original, important notes being reduced 
or omitted. There is a more detailed study of Napoleon, Sloane, 
4 vols, (revised edition, 1910). The briefer treatments are by Ropes, 
valuable on military questions, Seeley, Johnston, and Fisher. Rose, 
Napoleonic Studies (3rd ed. 1914), should also be noted. 

Upon special phases of Napoleon's career the following should be 
consulted: Masson's volumes upon Napoleon et sa famille (1897 if.) ; 
Chuquet, La Jeunesse de Napoleon, 3 vols. (1897 ff.) ; Vandal, 
L'Avenement de Bonaparte, 2 vols. (1902, 1907). 

The Correspondance de Napoleon I was originally published in 32 
vols, in 1858-1870. Supplementary collections have appeared from 
time to time, edited by Du Casse (1887), Lecestre, 2 vols. (1897), 
Brotonne (1898, 1903). 

Of the memoirs of the period the following are important: Barras, 
Larevelliere-Lepaux, Carnot, Gohier, Talleyrand, Thibaudeau, Miot 
de Melito, Lucien Bonaparte, Joseph Bonaparte. 

Chapter XVII. In addition to works already mentioned which 
treat various phases of the Consulat — Aulard, Debidour, Vandal, 
Levasseur, Clapham or Neton — the following should be noted: 

Upon the Provisional Consulate: Aulard, Registre des delibera- 
tions du Consulat provisoire (1894) ; and his L'Etat de la France en 
Van VIII et Van IX (1897). Upon public opinion during the Con- 
sulat, Aulard, Paris sous le Consulat (1903 ff.). See the descriptive 
work of Lanzac de Laborie, Paris sous Napoleon, 8 vols. (1905-1913). 

The documents for the Concordat will be found in the collection 
by Boulay de la Meurthe, Documents sur la negotiation de Concordat, 
6 vols. (J891-1905). On the subject see, besides Aulard, Hausson- 
ville, LEglise Romaine et le Premier Empire, 5 vols. (1868-1869). 



48o NOTES ON BOOKS 

For the code, see list of works given in the bibliography of chapter 6, 
Cambridge Modern History, IX. On education : Liard, L'Enseigne- 
ment superieur en France, 2 vols. (1888-1894). On the press: Le 
Poittevin, La liberie de la presse depuis la Revolution (1901). On 
the finances: Stourm, Les finances du Consulat (1902). On the 
administrative system much valuable information is given by Dejean, 
Un Prefet du Consulat (1907). Thiers, The Consulate and the Em- 
pire, should also be consulted upon such matters. See also volume 
VI of the Histoire Socialiste (1905) by Brousse and Thurot. The 
colonial policy of Napoleon is fully discussed in Henry Adams, His- 
tory of the United States. See also Roloff, Die Kolonialpolitik 
Napoleons I (1899); Gaffarel, La politique coloniale en France de 
i/8p a 1830 (1908). 

Besides the memoirs mentioned for the last two chapters, the fol- 
lowing should be noted: Chaptal, Gaudin, Mollien, Beugnot, Pas- 
quier, Mme. de Remusat, Bourrienne, Roederer, Chateaubriand. 

Chapter XVIII. On the character of the literary movement in 
Germany, see especially Francke, History of German Literature. 
The movement for reform in Prussia may best be studied in connec- 
tion with the lives of the leading Prussian statesmen and adminis- 
trators, particularly of Stein; see biographies by Seeley and Leh- 
mann. The peasant reforms are described in Knapp, Bauernbefreiung 
im Preussen, and the general history of Prussia in Philippson. For 
Bavaria, another typical state, see Doeberl, Entwickelungsgeschichte 
Bayerns, vol. II (1912), with full bibliographical information. On 
Germany as a whole and the revolutionary changes of 1802-3, see, be- 
sides Hausser, Heigel, Deutsche Geschichte vom Tode Friedrichs des 
Grossen bis zur Aufiosung des alten Reichs (1899) ; Miiller, Der letzte 
Kampf der Reichsritterschaft urn ihre Selbstdndigkiet (1910). Upon 
the work of France Sorel should be consulted. See also Servieres, 
L'Allemagne frangaise sons Napoleon I ( 1904) ; Fisher, Napoleonic 
Statesmanship in Germany (1903) ; Rambaud, L'Allemagne frangaise 
sous Napoleon I (1874). 

Chapters XIX, XX. The events which led to the creation of the 
Empire are clearly described by Aulard, and in their larger European 
relations by Sorel. For the conspiracies, see Madelin, Fouche; 
Daudet, La police et les Chouans sous le Consulat et V Empire (1895) ; 
Boulay de la Meurthe, Les dernieres annees du due d'Enghien (1886) ; 
Welschinger, Le due d'Enghien ( ). For the coronation: 
Masson, The Coronation of Napoleon. 

For the outbreak of war with England, see Rose, Napoleon, and 
Rose, Pitt; Temperley, Canning; also England and Napoleon in 1803, 
being Despatches of Lord Whitworth, edited by Browning. Upon 
Hanover: Ford, Hanover and Prussia, 1795-1803 (1903); also 
Thimme, Die inneren Zustdnde des Kurfiirstentums Hannover, 1806- 
18 1 3, 2 vols. (1893 f.). 

For the policy of France toward dependent states, see books men- 
tioned for chapters 15, 16. 



NOTES ON BOOKS 481 

The campaign of Trafalgar is described fully by Mahan both in 
his Sea Power and the French Revolution and Empire and in his 
Life of Nelson, 2 vols. (1897). See also Desbriere, La campagne 
maritime de 1805 (1907). 

For the struggle with the Third Coalition, see besides Sorel, Rose, 
and Fournier, Driault, Napoleon et I'Europe, vol. II (Austerlitz: La 
fin du Saint-Empire, 1911); Zwiedinek-Siidenhorst, Deutsche 
Geschichte von der Auiidsung des alt en bis zur Errichtung des neuen 
Kaiserreichs, vol. I (1897) ; Petre, Conquest of Prussia (1907), and 
Petre, Campaign in Poland (3rd ed. 1907), both exclusively given to 
the military operations. For further references on military opera- 
tions, Kircheisen should be consulted. Two recent books by officers 
of the French army are of special value in the study of Napoleon's 
methods as a soldier: Picard, Preceptes et jugements de Napoleon 
(1912) and Vachee, Napoleon en dampagne (1913). 

For the Rhenish Confederation, see works already mentioned, and 
Bitterauf, Geschichte des Rheinbundes (1905). For Poland: Han- 
delsman. Napoleon et la Pologne (1909), and Bonnefons, Un allie de 
Napoleon: Frederic-Auguste, premier roi de Saxe, etc. (1902) ; 
Pfister, Konig Friedrich von Wiirttemberg und seine Zeit (1888). 

Chapter XXI. The student of the Continental System should con- 
sult the critical discussions by Lingelbach and Dunan. Rose has con- 
tributed a special chapter to the subject, Cambridge Modern History, 
IX, chapter 13, and Fisher has explained in Napoleonic Statesman- 
ship in Germany the effects upon the different German states. See 
also Rose, Napoleonic Studies, VII. A few works of special im- 
portance may be noted: Kiesselbach, Die Kontinentalsperre (1850) ; 
Ame, Etude economique sur les tariffs de douanes, 2 vols. ( 1876) ; 
especially Darmstadter, Studien zur Napoleonischen Wirtschaftspo- 
litik, in Vierteljahrsschrift ftir Social und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 
1904, pp. 559-615, and 1905, pp. 112-141. For effects upon single 
states, see Hitzigrat, Hamburg und die Kontinentalsperre (1900), 
and Schmidt, Le Grand-Duche de Berg (1905); Darmstadter, Das 
Grossherzogthum Frankfurt, 1800-1813 (1901). On the American 
phase of the struggle: Henry Adams, History of the United States; 
Channing, Jeffersonian System; and Mahan, Sea Power, chapters 17- 
18 on the Warfare against Commerce. 

Upon the political and military affairs, in addition to books already 
mentioned, note Oman, History of the Peninsular War, 4 vols. 
(1902 ff.) ; Correspondance du comte de la Forest, 3 vols. (1905 ff.) ; 
Memoirs of Metternich ; Strobl von Ravelsberg, Metternich und seine 
Zeit, 2 vols. (1907); Welschinger, Le Pape et I'Empereur (1905); 
Vandal, Napoleon et Alexandre I, 3 vols. (1891-1896). 

Chapter XXII. A brief and suggestive treatment will be found in 
Meinecke, Das Zeitalter der deutschen Erhebung, 17^5-1815 (1906). 
As the principal impulse came from Stein, his biographies are of 
special importance. The biography by Lehmann, vol. Ill, enters fully 
in the details of the reforms and the difficulties which they encoun- 



482 NOTES ON BOOKS 

tered. On the question of the peasants, see Knapp, already cited. 
Cavaignac, Prusse contemporaine, discusses the scope of the reforms 
from a French point of view. Among other works are : Stern, 
Abhandlungen und Aktenstucke der preusssischen Reformseit (1885) ; 
Meier, Die Reform der V erwalttingsorganisation unter Stein und 
Hardenherg (1881) ; Lehmann, Scharnhorst, 2 vols. (1886-87); Del- 
briick, Gneisenau, 2 vols. (1908); Paulsen, Geschichte des gelehrten 
Unterrichts. 

Chapter XXIII. For the study of the scope of reform in Europe 
it is necessary to consult works on the several states. Many of these 
have been mentioned in other connections. All that can be done 
here is to refer to them once more, and to add a few other titles. 
Austria: Beer, Zehn Jahre Osterreichischer Politik (1877); Mey- 
nert, Kaiser Franz I — zur Geschichte seiner Regierung und seiner 
Zeit (1872). For Russia: Rambaud, History of Russia and chap- 
ter 21 in Histoire Generate, vol. IX. Sweden: briefly in Bain, Po- 
litical History of Denmark, Norivay, and Sweden from 1513 to ipoo 
(1903); Pingaud, Bernadotte, Napoleon, et les Bourbons (1901). 
For Great Britain during the period, see the bibliographical list in 
Cambridge Modern History, IX, ch. 22. Italy: in addition to books 
cited, Driault, Napoleon en Italic, 1800-1810 (1906) ; Johnston, Napo- 
leonic Empire in Southern Italy, 2 vols. ( 1904) ; Memoires et Cor- 
respondance de Prince Eugene, 10 vols. ; Lettres et documents pour 
servir a I'histoire de Joachim Murat (in course of publication). For 
Dalmatia : Memoires of Marmont ; Pisani, La Dalmatie de lypy a 181 5 
(1893). For Germany as a whole, see Fisher, Napoleonic States- 
manship, already cited, with bibliographical suggestions. Among the 
books which may be mentioned are, for Westphalia, in addition to 
Thimme, Goecke, Das Konigreich Westfalen (1888); Kleinschmidt, 
Geschichte des Konigreichs Westfalen (1893). For Berg and Frank- 
fort, see Schmidt and Darmstadter, already mentioned. For the 
South German States: Doeberl, cited; Bitterauf, Bayern als Konig- 
reich (1906); Schneider, Wiirtt ember gische Geschichte (1890); 
Weech, Badische Geschichte (1896). In regard to the work of 
Monteglas: Laubmann und Doeberl, Denkwiirdigkeiten des grafen 
Maximilian Joseph von Montgelas ilber die innere Staatsverwaltung 
Bayerns nebst einer Einleitung uber die Entstehung des modernen 
Staates in Bayern von M. Doeberl (1908). 

Chapter XXIV. For an analysis of the character of Napoleonic 
institutions, see Taine, Modern Regime, 2 vols., a work not completed 
at the time of the author's death. An excellent review of the prin- 
cipal characteristics of the imperial period is contributed by Professor 
Pariset to the Cambridge Modern History, IX, chapter 5. To books 
already mentioned may be added: Campardon, Liste des membres 
de la noblesse imperiale (1889); Courtois, Histoire des banques en 
France (1881); Gautier, Mme. de Stael et Napoleon (1902); Mem- 
oires de Baron Fain (1908). It is from Baron Fain's memoirs that 
the clearest account can be gained of Napoleon's methods of work. 



NOTES ON BOOKS 483 

Other memoirs valuable for the period may be mentioned again: 
Talleyrand, Pasquier, Segur, Meneval, Chaptal, Mollien. Much in- 
teresting light is thrown on the situation by the volumes of Lanzac 
de Laborie on Paris sous Napoleon, already mentioned. To the 
books dealing W\ih the relations of Napoleon and the Pope may be 
added Madelin, La Rome de Napoleon (1906). 

Chapters XXV, XXVI, and XXVII. An early and long popular 
narrative of the Russian campaign is by Segur, Histoire de Napoleon 
et de la Grande Armee pendant I'annee 1812, first published in 1824 
and republished many times. English translation in 1825. For an 
English treatment, see George, Napoleon's Invasion of Russia (1899). 
See also Osten-Sacken, Der Feldcug von 1812 (1901). Among the 
many memoirs recounting the experiences of the retreat that of Ser- 
geant Bourgogne, Memoirs (Tr., 1899) is especially vivid. 

Upon the literary movement v^^hich preceded the uprising of Ger- 
many, see Francke or Meinecke. Sorel discusses in great detail the 
diplomatic campaign, but his judgments of Metternich's policy are 
open to question. See Fournier's explanations as well as those of 
Rose. Petre's Napoleon's Last Campaign in Germany (1912) gives 
a clear account of the military incidents. A sequel is his Napoleon 
at Bay (1913). The best account of Napoleon's overthrow in 1814 
is Houssaye, 1814 (1888), Of the extensive literature of the sub- 
ject the following may be mentioned: Oncken, Osterreich und 
Preussen im Befreiungskriege, 2 vols. (1876, 1879); Metternich- 
Klinckowstrom, Osterreichs Teilnahme an den Befreiungskriegen 
(1887); Browning, Fall of Napoleon (1907); Henderson, BlUcher 
(1912). 

For the Congress of Vienna the principal authority is Sorel, vol. 
VIII (1904). See also Debidour, Histoire diplomatique de I' Europe, 
vol. I (1891), and Ward's description in chapters 19 and 21 of the 
Cambridge Modern History, vol. IX. The published correspondence 
of diplomats present is considerable, of which an interesting example 
is Correspondance inedite du prince de Talleyrand et du roi Louis 
XV HI pendant le congres de Vienne, edited by Pallain (1881). 

For the Hundred Days and Waterloo the best work is Houssaye, 
1815, 3 vols. (1893, 1898, 1905). See also Lettow-Vorbeck and Voss, 
Napoleon's Untergang, 2 vols. (1904-6). Ropes, Waterloo (1892), 
contains an extensive bibliography of the campaign and careful dis- 
cussions of disputed problems. It is accompanied by a special atlas. 

Of the literature of the Saint Helena episode it is enough to cite 
Rosebery, The Last Phase (1900), and Seaton, Sir Hudson Lowe and 
Napoleon (1898). Fisher in chapter 24 of the Cambridge Modern 
History gives an excellent summary of the events and explains the 
writings which started the controversy. Fournier, Rose, and other 
biographers of Napoleon have also treated this phase of Napoleon's 
career. 



INDEX 



INDEX 



Aberdeen, Lord, 434, 438. 

Aboukir, battle of, 255- 

Aboukir Bay, naval battle of, 253. 

Acre, siege of, 254. 

Acte additionel, 458-9. 

Addington, Henry, ministry of, 265. 

Agriculture, French, 10, 222, 406. 

Alembert, D', 40. 

Alexander I, Czar of Russia, succeeds his 
father, 265; and German reorgani- 
zation, 295, 296, 305; strained re- 
lations with Bonaparte, 306, 309, 
315. 317-8; enters Third Coalition, 
318; war with France, 323, 324, 
32s, 330, 331. 336; Peace of Til- 
sit, 337-8; interview at Erfurt, 
354-5 ; subsequent relations with 
Napoleon, 359, 367, 368; as a ruler, 
384-5; in war of 1812, 414 f.; 
agreements with Prussia, 426, 430, 
431; with Austria, 434, 435; cam- 
paign in France, 441 ; at Paris, 
442-4; Congress of Vienna, 453-4- 

Alsace, 20, 155. 

Amiens, Peace of, 265-6. 

Ancona, French seizure of, 243, 328. 

Angoulerae, Duchess of, 451. 
Duke of, 458. 

Annates, payment of, 102, 132. 

Ansbach, neutrality of, 323. 

Arkwright, Richard, 77, 80, 85. 

Armed neutrality, the, 68, 264-5, 343' 

Army, French, reorganized, 117; in 1792, 
169; universal service introduced, 
204, 215; new methods of fighting, 
237-8, 321; deterioration of, 358; 
at the Restoration, 448. 
Prussian, 332-4; reform of, 377-8. 

Arndt, Ernst Moritz, 331, 431. 

Artois, Count of, 70, 137, 147, 446. 

Aspern-Essling, battle of, 358. 

Assignats, 129 f., 178, 204, 206, 221, 227, 
245- 

Auerstadt, battle of, 334. 

Augereau, General, 245, 259, 305. 

Augsburg, 14, 79, 296. 

August 4, decrees of, loi. 

Augustus III, of Poland, 59. 

Austerlitz, battle of, 3-24-5- 

Austria, peasantry of, 11; under Maria 
Theresa and Joseph II, 51-55; re- 
lations with Revolutionary France, 
152-3; with Prussia, 157; origin 
of French war, 161 £., 167; con- 
duct of the war, 179, 187-8, 203- 
4, 215, 232; Third Partition of 
Poland, 234; campaign of 1796-7, 
236 f.; Treaty of Campo Formio, 



246; Second Coalition, 255-7; cam- 
paign of 1800, 261-3; Peace of 
Luneville, 263; policy in reorgani 



zation of Germany, 292 f. ; Empire 
proclaimed, 315; Third Coalition, 
317 f.; Peace of Pressburg, 326; 
war of 1809, 354, 357 f-; condition 
of, 383-4; alliance with France in 
1812, 415, 417; becomes neutral. 



487 



427-8, 429; prepares to join allies, 
431 f.; war with Napoleon, 436 f.; 
policy at Congress of Vienna, 

. . 452 f. 

Avignon, annexation of, 162, 163, 243. 

Babeuf, 227-8. 

Bacciocchi, Pascal, 389. 

Baden, 155, 236, 295, 296, 297, 299, 396. 

Bailly, 98, 99, 143, 146, 208. 

Bamberg, bishopric of, 293, 296. 

Bank of Discount, 74, 88, 126, 128, 129, 

130, 131- 
Bank of England, 31. 
Bank of France, 275, 405-6, 407. 
Bank, land, in Prussia, 51, 369. 
Bankruptcy in France, 73, 245. 
Bar, Confederation of, 60. 
Barclay de Tolly, 421. 
Barere, no, 219, 220, 224. 
Barnave, io8, 208. 
Barras, 218, 226, 259, 260. 
Bartenstein, Treaty of, 336. 
Barthelemy, 244. 
Basel, Peace of, 234. 
Bastille, fall of, 98. 
Batavian Republic, 250, 263, 304-5; see 

United Netherlands, Kingdom of 

Holland. 
Bautzen, battle of, 432. 
Bavaria, 61, 170, 236, 291, 293, 294, 295, 

296, 326 3p7-8, 424, 438, 455- 
Baylen, Capitulation of, 353. 
Bayonne, 351. 
Beaumont, 63. 
Beccaria, 46-47. 

Belgians, 188-9, 196, 391; see Nether- 
lands, Austrian. 
Benevolent Despots, 48 f.; in France, 

62 f. 
Bentham, 385. 
Beresina, crossing of, 422. 
Berg, 328, 364, 39S- 
Berlin, 4; Napoleon in, 334-5; Decree, 

335. 340. 346; University founded, 

379-80. 
Bemadotte, 258, 328; becomes Prince 

Royal of Sweden, 385, 417-8, 432. 
Berne, 251. 
Berthier, intendant, 98. 

General, 138, 250, 262, 328, 419. 
Berthollet, 83, 231, 254, 280. 
Beugnot, 392, 446, 448. 
Billaud-Varenne, 180, 182, 209, 213, 216, 

220, 224. 
" Black " Cardinals, 412. 
Bliicher, 437, 438, 442, 460-463. 
Bologna, 241. 
Bonaparte, Elise, 327-8, 389. 

Jerome, 328, 335, 337, 391, 395-6, 

439-40. 
Joseph, 302, 314, 318; King of 

Naples, 327, 391, 393; King of 

Spain, 351 f., 393, 394. 418, 435-*. 
Louis, 314, 328, 348, 360. 
Lucien, 260, 328. 
Napoleon, see Napoleon. 



INDEX 



Pauline, 389. 
Bohemia, 294. 

Boisgelin, Archbishop, 133, 140, 141. 
Bordeaux, 202, 203. 
Borghese, Prince, 388-9. 
Borodino, battle of, 421. 
Bouille, Marquis de, 138, 140, 143, 144, 

146. 
Boulogne, Camp, 308, 319-20. 
Boulton, Matthew, 83. 
Bourbons, restoration of, 442 f., 446 f., 

464; see under Louis XVI, etc. 
Brandenburg, 294. 
Bremen, 296, 309. 
Brest, 175, 319. 320. 
Breteuil, Baron de, 140, 144, 163. 
Brethren of the Christian Schools, 409. 
Brienne, Lomenie de, 72, 74, 88, 92, 141. 

battle at, 441. 
Brissot, 102, 149, 165, 166, 183. 
Brumaire, coup d'etat of, 259-261. 
Brune, General, 169, 257, 463. 
Brunswick, Duke of, 173, 179-80, 184-5, 
i32, 334. 335; the younger, 359. 

Manifesto of, 173. 
Brussels, 158. 
Bubna, Count, 427. 
Bufion, 40. 

Burke, Edmund, 91, 107, 151. 
Busaco, battle of, 357. 
Buzot, 183. 



Cadoudal, Georges, 31 1-2. 

iCagliostro. 71. 

Cahiers, the, 91, 92. 

Calas, Jean, 35. 

Calendar, Republican, 210-11, 275-6, 315. 

Calonne, 70, 71. 93- 

Cambaceres, 284, 314. 

Camperdown, battle of, 247. 

Campo Formio, Treaty of, 246. 

Canals, in England, 84. 

Canning, George, 336. 

iCape, The, 234, 336. 456. 

Capri, 393. 

Carnot, Lazare, 209, 220, 224, 236, 237, 
244, 313. 451, 458. 

Carrier, 209, 219. 

Carron iron works, 82. 

Cartwright, Edmund, 81. 

Castlereagh, 454. _ . ^ ^ 

Catherine II, of Russia, 57, 59, 60, 61, 
170, 192-3. 239. 

Caulaincourt, 439, 444, 445. 458. 

Cens, 6. 

Ceylon, 234, 266, 456. 

Chamber of Peers, 447. 

Chamber of Deputies, 447. 

Champ de Mars, Massacre of, 146. 

Championnet, 256. 

Chaptal, 231, 269, 280, 281. 

Charles III, of Spain, 48, 55. S6; IV, 
309. 349. 350, 351- 

Charles, Archduke, 236, 239, 251, 256, 
318, 321, 323. 358, 359- 

Chateaubriand, 278, 413. 

Chateaux, war on the, 100, 121. 

Chatillon, Congress of, 442. 

Chaumette, 180, 184, 200. 

Chenier, M. J., 180. 

Cherasco, armistice of, 238, 239. 
Church of England, 36. 
Church, French, 33-S. 38. 39, 40; dur- 
ing the Revolution, loi, 102, 127- 
8, 132-6, 139-43, 165-6, 178-9. 
210-12, 229-30; the Concordat, 
275-8; during the Empire, 315, 
409-12; at the Restoration, 447. 
German CathoUc, 35-6. 53-4; effect 



of the secularizations of 1803 upon, 
297-8. 
Cintra, Convention of, 353, 354. 
Cisalpine Republic, 242, 246, 249, 256, 

410. 
Cispadane Republic, 242, 246. 
iCities, reorganization of, French, iio-ii; 

Prussian, 374-5. 
Civil Code, French, 281-3; adopted else 

where, 391. 
Civil Constitution of the Clergy, 133, 135, 

139, 165- 
Claviere, 70, 167, 171. 
Coalbrookdale, 82. 

Coalition, Second, 256 f. ; Third, 315 f- 
Cobbett, 385. 
Coblentz, 148. 
Codes, 281-3, 391, 403. 
Colbert, 15, 25, 43. 
Collot d'Herbois, 209, 212, 216, 218, 220, 

224. 
Cologne, electorate of, 297, 454. 
Colonial policy, English, 28; French, 117, 

271-273- 
Commerce, treaty of, between England 
and France, 85; under the Empire, 
406-7; see Continental System. 
Committee of General Defense, 199. 
Committee of General Security, 208, 215, 

223. 
Committee of Public Safety, 199, 202, 
203, 207, 209-10, 211, 213, 215, 219, 
223, 341- 
Commune of Paris, no; Revolutionary, 

175 f., 201-2, 207, 210, 216, 220. 
Company of the Indies, 63. 
Compte Rendu, of Necker, 69, 70. 
Comtat Venaissin, 135, 162. 
Concordat, of 15 16, 134; of 1802, 276-7. 
Conde, Prince of, 137, 147, 148, 163. 
Condillac, Abbe de, 33, 40. 
Condorcet, 177, 183, 230-1. 
Confederation of the Rhine, 329-30, 337, 

396, 439- 
Conscription, origin, 204. 
Constituent Assembly, 95 f.; see also Na- 
tional Assembly. 
Constitutions, French, 103 f., not., 148; 
of 1793, 202; of 1795, 224-5; of 
the yeat VIII, 267 f. ; of the year 
X, 283-5; imperial, 313-4, 404. 
Continental System, 340 f., 397, 399, 407, 

408, 415, 418, 449. 
Contract, the Social. Rousseau's, 41. 
Convention, National, 183 f. 
Conventionals, ex-, 244, 269. 
Corday, Charlotte, 207. 
Cordeliers Club, 139, 146, 212. 
Corsica, 209. 

Corvee, royal, 10, 65, 66, 68, 73. 
Cort, Henry, 82. 
Corunna, battle at, 356. 
Council of Elders, 226. 
Council of Five Hundred, 226. 
Council of State, 268, 269-70, 277, 280, 

284. 
Courrier de Provence, no. 
Courts, see Parlements; reorganization in 

France, 116. 
Couthon, 209, 216. 
Crimea, annexed to Russia, 61. 
Crompton, Samuel, 80, 84. 
Custine, 93, 185-6. 
Cuvier, 413. 
Czartoryski, 60. 

Dalberg, Elector of Mainz, 329, 331. 
Dalmatia, 241, 246, 330. 
Danton, 146, 175. 181, 183, 184, 189, 198, 
199, 203, 212, 213. 



INDEX 



489 



Danzig, 192, 433, 436. 

Darby, Abraham, 81, 82. 

Dauphin, the, 176, 223. 

David, 403. 

Davout, Marshal, 169, 334, 419, 436, 458. 

Dec res, 269. 

Declaration of Rights, loi, 102, 105, 115, 
134- 

De Grasse, 66. 

Delaunay, 98. 

Delessart, minister of foreign affairs, 164, 
166, 170. 

Delessart, Benjamin, 366. 

Departments, French, iii, 210, 225, 271. 

Demerara, 456. 

Denmark, 264, 338, 346, 432, 456. 

Desaix, General, 169, 262-3. 

Desmoulins, 97, 158, 212. 

Diamond Necklace Affair, 71. 

Diderot, 40, 57. 

Directory, creation of the, 225-227; pol- 
icy of, 240-1, 248 f.; overthrow, 
257-60. 

Domain, Prussian, 31, 369. 

Domestic System of manufacture, 80. 

Dresden, 435, 437. 

Droits reunis, 405, 449 

Duces, Roger, 259, 260, 261. 

Dumouriez, General, 167, 171, 172, 180, 
187, 189, 197-8. 

Duplay, 208. 

Dupont, General, 353. 

Dupont de Nemours, 43, 44, 70, 93. 

Duport, Adrien, 108, 109. 

Dutch, see United Provinces, United 
Netherlands, Holland. 



East India Company, 58. 

Ecole, Normale, 231. 

Economists, the, 43. 

Eden, William, Lord Auckland, 85, 86. 

Edinburgh Review, 385. 

Education, 230-1, 278-9, 379-80, 408-g. 

Eglantine, Fabre d', 180, 213. 

Egypt, Expedition to, 251-5, 265, 266, 
306. 

Elba, 44, 456-7. 

Elector, the Great, 50. 

Emigrants, from France and their treat- 
ment, 138, 147, 164, 178, 200, 223, 
279, 448, 449-50- 

Emile, by Rousseau, 42, 46. 

Encyclopedia, the, 40. 

Enghien, Duke d', 312-3. 

England, peasantry in, 13-4; traders of, 
18; government of, 27-9; financial 
system, 31-2; Industrial Revolu- 
tion in, 74 f. ; attitude of towards 
French Revolution, 151; Nootka 
Sound Affair, 153-4; and the Dec- 
laration of Pillnitz, 162; war with 
France, 190-1, 192, 203; later con- 
dition of, 235-6, 247; conflict with 
the Armed Neutrality, 264; Peace 
of Amiens, 265-6, 305 f . ; menaced 
with invasion, 310, 319-20; rela- 
tions with Third Coalition, 318, 
327. 337 f-; Continental System, 
340 f.; intervention in Spain and 
Portugal, 353 f-; progress in, 385- 
6; and Coalition of 1813, 433-4; 
in Congress of Vienna, 453 f. ; 
Waterloo campaign, 460 f. 

Erfurt, The Interview at, 354. 

Etruria, kingdom of, 263, 303, 350. 

Eugene de Beauharnais, 318, 393, 395. 
419. 

Expilly, Abbe, 140. 

Eylau, battle of, 336. 



Factory Acts, 386. 

Farmers-General, 30. 

Febronius, 35. 

Federation of July 14, 1790, 137. 

Ferdinand VII, of Spain, 350, 351, 433, 
434- 

Ferrara, 241. 

Fersen, Count de, 144. 

Fesch, Cardinal, 314, 329. 

Feudalism, in France, 4 f . ; in Germany, 
II f.; abolished in Savoy, 56; 
abolition of in France, 101-2; 
II 8-2 1, 178, 206-7; in Alsace, 155- 
6; in Austrian Netherlands, 190; 
in Prussia, ch. 22; in Napoleonic 
Europe, ch. 23. 

Feuillants, the, 147, 163. 

Fichte, 235, 379, 430. 

Finances, of the old regime, 29-31; of 
Revolutionary France, 125 f., 178, 
204-S; of the Directory, 245; of 
the Consulate, 273-4; of the Em- 
pire, 404-5; of the Restoration, 
449; of England, 247, 265. 

Finlan4 337, 338-9, 355- 

Flesselles, 97, 98. 

Floreal, 22nd, 257. 

Forster, Georg, 186. 

Fouche, 209, 258, 279, 313, 402, 457. 

Foulon, 98. 

Fouquier-Tinville, 200, 214, 219. 

France^ see under specific titles, Feudal- 
ism, Peasantry, etc. 

Franche Comte, 20. 

Francis, II, of the Holy Roman Em- 
pire, I, of Austria, accession, 167, 
169, 173; see Austria, for rela- 
tions with France; German policy 
of, 292 f . ; becomes Emperor of 
Austria, 315; renounces title as 
Emperor of the Holy Roman Em- 
pire, 330; marriage alliance with 
Napoleon, 360; as a ruler, 383-4. 

Frankfort, 14. i73, 296, 363. 438. 

Frederick the Great, 14, 26, 27, 39, 48, 
49, 60. 

Frederick William I, 12, 26. 

Frederick William II, 157, 158, 161, 162, 



163, 167, 185, 192-3. 

II, 289-291, 315, 
323. 327, 332, 333, 334, 336, 367 f.. 



lUj, lU/, 

Frederick Willi 



III, 



376, 416, 417, 424 f. ; see also 

der Prussia. 
Freron, 218. 
Frey, 374. 

Friedland, battle of, 337. 
Friends of the Constitution, 109, 147; 

see Jacobin Club. 
Fructidor, i8th, 245. 
Fulton, Robert, 280-1. 

Galicia, 60, 415, 420. 

Galileans, the, 133. 

Gaudin, 269, 274, 406. 

Genet, 196. 

Geneva, 251. 

Genoa, 242, 303, 321. 

Gensonne, 149. 

Gentz, 152, 331. 

George III, of England, 28, 58, 235, 261, 
315. 318. 

Germany, population of, 4; peasantry 
of, 11; social structure of, 14; 
guilds in, 16; religious controversy 
in, ^5-6; intellectual life of, 44- 
6; industrial revolution in, 85; 
effect of the French Revolution 
upon, 152, 154-7. 163-5. 167; cor- 
onation of the Emperor Francis 
II, 173; French invasion of, 185- 



490 



INDEX 



7, 1 88, 189; the Empire declares 
war, 192; French attempts at an- 
nexation, 197, 232; effects of the 
Peace of Basel, 234; dangers from 
Peace of Campo Formio, 246; 
Congress of Rastadt, 248-9; con- 
sequences of Peace of Luneville, 
263, 292-300; conditions in before 
1803, 286-92; results of the Peace 
of Pressburg, 326; the Confedera- 
tion of the Rhine, 329-30; conse- 
quences of Treaty of Tilsit, 337- 
8; effect of the Continental Sys- 
tem upon, 348-9, 360, 363, 364, 
365; Napoleonic influence in, 
387 f.; War of Liberation, 429 f. ; 
changes in, made at the Congress 
of Vienna, 453f. • ^e^ also under 
Austria, Bavaria, Prussia. 

Girondins, the, 149, 165, 166, 167, 174, 
176, 177, 182, 183, 184, 189, 192, 
196, 200, 201-2, 207-8, 221. 

Gneisenau, 377. 

Gobel, Bishop, 141, 142, 211. 

Godoy, 309, 349, 350, 351. 

Goethe, 14, 23s, 287, 355. 

Gournay, Marquis de, 16, 43, 63. 

Grain trade, 62, 63, 65, 71, 73. 

Grand Empire, The, 325 f. 

Great Britain, see under England. 

" Great Fear," The, 100. 

Gregoire, Bishop, 141, 142, 147, 211, 229, 
230. 

Gross-Gorschen, battle of, 432. 

Grouchy, Marshal, 460-1. 

Guadet, 149. 

Guilds, IS, 16, 66, 68, 121, 281. 

Guillotine, the, 116. 

Gustavus III, of Sweden, 159; IV, 385. 



Hamburg, 14, 79, 296, 308, 349, 436. 

Hanau, battle at, 438. 

Hanover, Electorate of, 308, 330, 338. 

455- 
Hapsburgs, see Austria. 
Hardenberg, 298, 335, 368, 370, 371, 376, 

378-82 416, 424, 425, 426, 439. 
Hargreaves, James, 80, 85. 
Haugwitz, 323, 324, 425-6, 332, 333. 335 
Hebert, 180, 184, 201, 207, 212, 213. 
Heligoland, 348-9. 
Helvetic Republic, 251, 263; see Switzer 

land. 
Herder, 45, 46, 287, 288. 
Heriot, 11. 

Hertzberg, 153, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161 
Hesse-Cassel, 294, 297, 331, 338, 455. 
Hesse-Darmstadt, 155. 
Hoche, General, 223, 245, 247. 
Hofer, Andreas, 359. 
Holbach, Baron d', 40. 
Holland, 318, 360, 389, 433, 434, 439, 

452, 455- 
Holy Roman Empire, 19, 59, 291 f., 329, 

330. 
Hontheim (Febronius), 35. 
House of Commons, 27-8. 
Huguenots, the, 35, 73, 139. 
Humboldt, 379. 
Hungary, 4, 53, 54, 158, 159. 
Huntsman, Samuel, 83. 

Illyrian Provinces, 359, 394, 423, 433, 

434. 436. 
Impressment question, 345. 
Indies, Council of the, 56. 
Indulgents, the, 213. 
Industrial Revolution, the, 76 f. 
Industry, history of, 15-17, 66, 76 f., 



122, 205-6, 222, 280-1, 380, 398, 
406-7. 

Infernal Machine plot, 311. 

Inquisition, the, 56, 356. 

Institute, 230, 231, 279. 

Intendants, the, 25, 271. 

Invalides, Hotel des, 97. 

Inventions, 76 f. 

Ionian Islands, 246, 251. 

Iron industry, 81 f., 281. 

Isnard, 164, 165, 221. 

Istria, 241, 246. 

Italy, 46-7, 56; Bonaparte in, 2371.; 
consequences of Peace of Campo 
Formio, 246; French rule in, 249- 
50, 255-6; campaign of :8oo in, 
261-4; under the Consulate, 301- 
3, 309; kingdom of, 318, 320, 321; 
changes after Austerlitz, 326, 327- 
8; industry of, 364; Napoleonic 
mfluence upon, 387 f. ; collapse of 
Napoleonic rule in, 440, 441, 459; 
conclusions upon at Congress of 
Vienna, 452, 455. 

Jacobin Club, 109, 145, 147, 150, 167, 
168, 171, 172, 174, 202, 207, 208, 
212, 217, 219-20. 

Jactjuart, 280. 
ales. Camp of, 148. 
Jansenist controversy, 34. 
Jassy, Peace of, 159. 
Jefferson, Thomas, 273, 345, 347. 
Jena campaign, 333-4. 
Jesuits, 34, 49, 56, 58. 
Joseph II, of Austria, 20, 48, 51 f., 60, 

61, 153, 159. 
Josephine, the Empress, 315, 359, 360. 
Joubert, 256. 

Jourdan, General, 169, 236, 259, 435. 
Judicial reform in France, 115. 
Junot, General, 350, 353, 
Jury system, 116, 403. 

Kainarji, Peace of, 60. 

Kalisch, Treaty of, 430, 453. 

Kalckreuth, Marshal, 367. 

Kant, 46, 152, 286, 374. 

Kay, John, 79. 

Kellerman, General, 180, 184, 185. 

Klopstock, 45, 152, 179. 

Knights, Imperial, the, 299-300. 

Korner, Theodor, 431. 

Kosciusko, 179, 195, 217. 

Kraus, Professor, 289. 

Kriimper system, 378. 

Kurakin, 416. 

Kutusoff, 421. 

Lafayette, Marquis de, 67, 93, 98, 99, 
loi, 102, 104, 105, 113, IIS, 120, 
143, 146, 164, 166, 175, 177-8, 
284. 

Lameth, Charles and Alexander de, 93, 
109. 

Lands, Public, in France, 128-132, 178, 
200, 277, 279, 449-50. 

Landsturm, 431. 

Landwehr, 429. 

Lanjuinais, 221, 227, 459. 

Lannes, General, 169. 

Laplace, 231, 413. 

La Kochejaquelein, 198, 458. 

La Rothiere, 442. 

Lavoisier, 231. 

Law, see Code. 

Le Bas, 216. 

Lebrun, 314. 

Legion of Honor, 279-80. 

Legislative Assembly, 148 f., 176 f. 



INDEX 



491 



xv!] 



Legislative Corps, 268, 277, 280, 440. 

Leipzig, 363; battle of, 438. 

Leopold, of Austria, 53, 56, 140, 156, 

159, 161, 163, 165, 166, 167. 
Lessing, 45, 46. 
Lettres de cachet, 90, 282. 
Libel plot, 311. 
Liege, 156-7, 159. 
Ligny, battle of, 461. 
Ligurian Republic, 242, 303, 321. 
Lindet, Robert, 209, 215, 228. 
Lit de justice, 64. 
Liverpool, 79. 
Local government in France, 24, 271; in 

Prussia, 27, 374-5- 
Lodi, battle of, 238. 
Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, 455. 
Lorient, 63. 
Lorraine, 20. 
Louis XIV, of France, 4, 20, 24, 43, 45, 

67. 155. 163. 

XV, 24, 34, 39, 43, 61, 62, 63, 64. 

XVI, 34, 43, 61, 62, 67, 72, 88, 114, 
143, 144-145, 161, 163, 167, 171 f., 
191-2. 

[I, 176, 223. 
XVIII, 144, 197. 223, 277, 443, 444, 
446 f., 457-8, 464. 
Louis, Baron, 360, 447. 
Louise, Queen of Prussia, 333, 338, 380. 
Louisiana, 265, 272-3. 
Louverture, Toussaint, 272. 
Louvet, 221. 
Liibeck, 296, 407. 
Luneville, Peace of, 263, 286, 292. 
Liitzen, battle of, 432. 
Luxemburg, 158, 232. 
Lycees, 231, 409. 
Lyons, 202, 209, 408. 

Mably, Abbe, 33. 

Macadam, 84. 

Macdonald, Marshal, 424, 436, 444, 450. 

Machinery, introduction of, 76 f., 280, 
365- 

Mack, General, 321-2. 

Mackintosh, Sir James, 151. 

Madison, President, 361. 

Madrid, 55, 351, 353, 354, 356, 435. 

Mainz, 186, 197, 204, 232, 248. 

Malesherbes, 37. 

Malisset, 63. 

Mallet du Pan, 107, 171. 

Malouet, 112, 448. 

Malta, 251, 256, 264, 265, 266, 305-6, 
, 307, 318, 456. 

Mandat, commander of the Paris Na- 
tional Guard, 175, 176. 

Mandats, 227. 

Mantua, 239. 

Marat, no, 181, 184, 200, 201, 207. 

Marck, Count de la, 113, 163. 

Marengo, battle of, 262-3. 

Maria Theresa, of Austria, 46, 51, 59. 

Marie Antoinette, Queen of France, 71, 
143, 144, 148, i66, 171, 172, 208. 

Marie Louise, Empress, 360, 443, 444, 
455- 

Marmont, Marshal, 394, 444. 

Marseillaise, the, 174. 

Marseilles, 174, 202, 203. 

Massena, General, 257, 262, 356, 357. 

Maupeou, Chancellor, 64. 

Maurepas, Count de, 64, 67, 69. 

Maury, Abbe, 109. 

Maximum legislation, 200-1, 205-6, 221. 

Melzi, Count, 302, 303. 

Merlin, of Douai, 93. 

Metternich, Count, 417, 427 f., 431 f., 
438 f., 454 f. 



Milan, 240, 241. 262; Decree, 347. 

Miollis, General, 352, 410. 

Mirabeau, Count de, 92, 95, 108, 113, 

114, 120, 125, 126, 128, 154, 162. 
Modena, 240, 241, 246, 295, 455. 
Molasses Act, 18. 
Mollien, 406. 

Monastic Orders, 54, 129, 133, 291. 
Monge, 254, 280. 
Moniteur, the, no. 
Montagnards, the, 183, 224. 
Montesquieu, 37, 62. 
Montesquiou, Abbe de, 443, 448. 

General, 93, 187. 
Montgelas, 291, 397-8. 

Montmorin, 85, 114, 132, 144, 154, 171. 
Moore, Sir John, 356. 
Moreau, General, 169, 236, 239, 259, 260, 

262, 263, 312, 313, 436. 
Morris, Gouverneur, 92, 93. 
Moscow, 420 f. 
Mounier, 93, 105, 109. 
Municipal reform, in, 374-5. 
Miinster, bishopric of, 293-4, 295, 296, 

297, 298. 
Murat, Joachim, 226, 301, 302, 314, 323; 

grand duke of Berg, 328, 336; 

king of Naples, 352, 393, 395, 419, 

422, 424, 440, 455, 459. 



Nantes, 209. 

Naples, kingdom of, 255-6, 264, 327, 389- 
90, 410, 440, 455, 459. 

Napoleon Bonaparte, spectator at assault 
of the Tuileries, 176; defends the 
Convention, 226; closes the Club 
of the Pantheon, 228; first cam- 
paign in Italy, 237-9; exacts war 
contributions, 240; his Italian pol- 
icy, 240-4, 246; expedition to 
Egypt, 251-5; overthrows the Di- 
rectory, 259-60; one of the pro- 
visional consuls, 261 ; First Consul, 
261; campaign of Marengo, 261-3; 
makes peace with England, 265; 
as First Consul, 267 f.; Consul for 
Life, 283-4; policy in Germany, 
2p3 f. ; his foreign policy as First 
Consul, 301 f. ; plots against, 310- 
3; proclaimed Emperor, 313; cor- 
onation, 314-5; VVar of the Third 
Coalition, 317 f.; at Vienna and 
Austerlitz, 323-5; makes his brother 
King of Naples, 327; claims to 
be successor of Charlemagne, 328- 
9; organizes the Confederation of 
the Rhine, 329; crushes Prussia, 
333-4; negotiates Treaty of Tilsit 
with Alexander I, 337-8; his Con- 
tinental System, 340, 342 f. ; seiz- 
ure of Spain, 349 f. ; interviews 
Alexander at Erfurt, 354-5; de- 
feats Austria, 358-9; marries the 
Archduchess Marie Louise, 360; 
his influence upon dependent states, 
387 f. ; his methods as a ruler, 
400-403; imperial policy in France, 
403 f.; his quarrel with Pius VII, 
410-2; break with Alexander, 416; 
victor at Borodino, 421; retreat 
from Moscow, 421 f . ; efforts to or- 
ganize a new army, 423-4, 432; 
campaign of 1813-14, 432 f. ; abdi- 
cation, 445; return from Elba, 
4^56-8; the Hundred Days, 458-63; 
St. Helena, 463. 

Narbonne, Count de, 163, 166, 431. 

Nassau-Usingen, Duke of, 299. 

National Assembly, organized, 94, 95; 



492 



INDEX 



achievements, 107; called the Con- 
stituent Assembly, 118. 

National Guard, organized, 99; federation 
of, 137- 

National Library, 231. 

" Natural Limits," doctrine of the, 
i88-9- 

Necker, first ministry, 68-9; second min- 
istry, 88, 90, 94, 96, no, 123, 125, 
126, 129, 138. 

Neerwinden, battle of, 197. 

Nelson, 247, 252, 253, 25s, 256, 264, 319- 
20, 322-Z. 

Netherlands, the Austrian, 55, 158, 187- 
90, 196-8, 232, 455. 

Ney, Marshal, 334, 419, 444, 457, 460, 
461, 462, 463. 

Nice, 195, 452. 

Niebuhr, 380, 430. 

Nile, battle of the, 253. 

Nimes, 139, 202. 

Nobility, m France, 4-6; in Prussia, 12; 
imperial, 402. 

Non-jurors, the, 165, 178-9, 229. 

Nootka Sound affair, 153. 

Norway, 417, 418, 456. 

Nuremberg, 296. 

Oldenburg, duchy of, 366, 414, 415. 
Orange, Prince of, 233. 
Orders in Council, 346, 418. 
Organic Articles, zyj, 315. 
Orleans, Duke of, 208. 

Pacca, Cardinal, 411. 

Pache, 189. 

Facte de Famine, 63. 

Paine, Thomas, 151, 191. 

Palm, 331. 

Panic of 181 o, 407-8. 

Pantheon, Club of the, 228. 

Paris, government of. 25; elects depu- 
ties to the States General, 91; re- 
volt in, 95-8; improvises a gov- 
ernment, 98-100; insurrection of 
October 5, 104-5; new municipal 
law, in; see also Revolutionary 
Commune; organized during the 
Consulate, 271. 
Treaty of, 452; Second Treaty of, 
464. 

Parma, duchy of, 240, 387. 

Parthenopean Republic, 256, 264. 

Parties, in France, during the Revolu- 
tion, 109. 

Patterson, Elizabeth, first wife of Jerome 
Bonaparte, 328. 

Paul, Czar of Russia, 239, 253, 303. 

Peace of Amiens, 265-6, 305-307. 342- 

Peasantry, under the old regime, 4, 6 f., 
II, 13, 50-1, 52-3,. 55 ; abolition of 
feudal dues of, in Savoy, 56-7; 
work of the Revolution for, in 
France, 101-2, 1 18-21, 178, 206- 
7; in Alsace, 155-6; in Austrian 
Netherlands, 190; in Prussia, 290- 
1, 369-373, 381-2; in the Napo- 
leonic states, ch. 23. 

Physiocrats, the, 10, 43, 53, 123. 

Pichegru, 312, 313. 

Piedmont, annexed, 303; reforms m, 
388-9; disposition of in 1814, 452. 

Pillnitz, Declaration of, 162, 163, 166. 

Pitt, William, 85, 86, 153, 191, 235, 265, 
327- 

Pius VI, 135, 250. 

VIL 264, 276, 314-5, 328-9, 352, 
409-12, 441. 

Penal code, 47, 55, 116, 385, 403. 

Petion, 147, 174, 180. 



Poland, first Partition of, 59; revolution 
in, 160; Second Partition, 193, 
204; Third Partition, 217, 234; 
Grand Duchy of Warsaw, 337, 391, 
398-9, 414, 415, 419-20; final dis- 
position of, 453-4. 

Poniatowski, Stanislas, 60. 

Portalis, 282. 

Portugal, 309, 338, 350, 354, 356-7, 423. 
456. 

Prague Congress, 436. 

Prefects, 271- 

Preliminaries of Leoben, 241, 242, 246. 

Preliminaries of London, 265, 342. 

Press, liberty of, 36, 283, 413. 

Pressburg, 1 reaty of, 326. 

Price, Richard, 151. 

Prina, 302, 303, 392. 

Privy Council, 284-5. 

Provence, Count of, 70, 144, 148, 162, 
163; see Louis XVIII. 

Provincial assemblies, 20, 69-70, 72-3. 

Prussia, under Frederick IL 11-13, 26-7, 
48-51; policy at the opening of the 
Revolution, 152-3, 157-8; and the 
Polish Revolution, 160-1; unites 
in Declaration of Pillnitz, 162; at 
war with France, 167, 179-80, 
184-5, 203-4; Treaty of Basel, 
234; share in Poland, 192-3, 217, 
234; reference to, in Treaty of 
Campo Formio, 246; joins the 
Armed Neutrality, 264; share in 
the reorganization of Germany, 
292 f.; attempts at reform, 289-91; 
intervention in 1805, 323, 325-6; 
crushed by Napoleon, 330 f. ; re- 
organization of, ch. 22; in 1812, 
416-7; policy after Napoleon's de- 
feat, 424 f. ; declares war upon 
France, 430; campaign of 1813-4, 
430 f. ; share in the work of Con- 
gress of Vienna, 453 f. ; gains, 
454; in the Waterloo campaign, 
460 f. 

Pyramids, battle of, 252. 

Quatre Bras, battle of, 461. 
Quebec Act, 58. 
Quesnay, 43. 
Quiberon affair, 223. 
Quimper, bishopric of, 140. 

Raynal, Abbe, 33, 62. 

Rastadt Congress, 248, 292. 

Rapinat, 251. 

Reason, Worship of, 211-12. 

Reflections on the Revolution in France, 

Burke, 151, 152. 
Regicides, 192, 226, 463. 
Regency, announced by the Count of 

Provence, 148. 
Reggio, 241- 
Reichenbach, conference at, 159; Treaty 

of, 453- 
Reichsdeputation, 294. 
Reign of Terror, 207, 218. 
Religion, see Church. 
Representatives on mission, 199. 
Republicanism in France, 145-146, 177, 

184. 
Reubell, 226, 233. 
Revolutionary Army, 207, 209, 213. 
Revolutionary Tribunal, 199. 200, 201, 

208, 214, 219. 
Revolutions de Paris, newspaper, no. 
Rhenish Confederation, 329-30, 337, 396, 



INDEX 



493 



Richardson, 44, 45. 

Rights oj Man, Paine, 151, 

Kivoli, battle of, 243. 

Rodney, 6tS. 

Roebuck, 82, 83. 

Roederer^ 392. 

Rohan, Cardinal de, 71. 

Roland, 1&7, 171, 177, 208. 

Romantic movement, 41, 288. 

Rome, 240, 250-1, 412: see also Pius VI 
and VII. 

Romilly, Samuel, 99, 107, 308, 385. 

Robespierre, Augustin, 216. 

Maximilien, 109, 114, 122, 134, 147, 
180, 182, 184, 201, 202, 203, 208, 
209, 211, 212, 213-7, 218. 

Rosetta Stone, 254. 

Rousseau, 3, 37, 41, 44, 46. 

Rumbold, Sir O'eorge, 315. 

Russia, under Catherine II, 57-8; share 
in Partition of Poland, 59-60; an- 
nexes the Crimea, 60-1 ; war with 
the Turks, 157, 159; Second Par- 
tition of Poland, 161, 170, 192-3; 
Third Partition of Poland, 217, 
234; a member of the Second Coal- 
ition, 255-7, 261-2; joins the 
Armed Neutrality, 264-5; interven- 
tion in Gerrnan affairs, 295; re- 
newed hostility to France, 306, 
317-8; in the Third Coalition, 
32: f. ; war in Poland and Prussia, 
336-7; Tilsit, 337-8; annexes Fin- 
land, 338-g ; condition during Alex- 
ander's reign, 384-5; invasion of 
18 1 2, 420 f.; conflict at the Con- 
gress of Vienna, 453 f. 



Saint-Andre, 209. 

Saint-Etienne, Rabaut, 89. 

Saint-Just, 216. 

St. Helena, Island of, 463. 

St. Ouen, Declaration of, 446, 450. 

St. Vincent, Cape, battle of, 247. 

Salamanca, battle of, 423. 

Saliceti, 240. 

Salonica, 349. 

Salt tax, 9, 22, 122-3, 405- 

Salzburg, 61, 246, 296, 297, 455. 

Santo Domingo, 117, 118, 205, 265, 271—2. 

Sardinia, kingdom of, 56, 195, 237, 249, 

256, 303. 452- 
Savary, General, 351. 
Savoy, 56-7, 187, 188-9, 452- 
Saxony, 161, 294, 331, 333, 337, 365, 438, 

453-4, 455- 
Scharnhorst, 289, 377-9, 416, 417. 
Schill, Colonel, 359, 382. 
Schiller, 235, 287. 
Schleiermacher, 235, 288, 331. 
Schlozer, 152. 
Schon, 289, 370, 373. 
Scbonbrunn, Treaty of, 359. 
Schools, see Education. 
Schwarzenberg, 436, 437, 438. 
Sebastiani, Colonel, 306. 
Senate, French, 269, 284, 440, 443, 444, 

446. 
September Massacres, 181-3. 
Serfdom, see Peasantry. 
Servan, 171. 
Shuttle, the Flying, 79. 
Sieyes, Abbe, 89, 95, loi, 113, 220, 226, 

233, 257-66, 267, 269. 
Simeon, 391. 
Simplon Road, 303, 393- 
Sistova, Treaty of, i59- 
Slave Trade, 36, 79, 385, 456. 
Smeaton, 82. 



Smith, Adam, 44, 289. 

Smolensk, 421, 422. 

Smuggling, 18, 348-9. 

Soult, Marshal, 169, 448, 456, 460. 

Spain, under Charles III, 55-6; Nootka 
Sound affair, 153-4; war with 
France, 192, 235; war with Eng- 
land, 236, 247; relations with Na- 
poleon, 309, 322; Napoleon's seiz- 
ure of, 349 f . ; colonies open to 
English trade, 360-1 ; French pol- 
icy in, 394; French defeats in, 418, 
433. 434; tinal settlement, 456. 

Stadion, 383-4. 

Stadtholder, of the United Provinces, 74. 

Stael, Mme. de, 223, 413. 

States General, organization of, 89; 
opened, 92. 

Steffens, 430. 

Stein, Baron vom, 11, 289, 298, 332-3, 

^ , 335. 368 f., 425-6, 429, 431, 455. 

Stock, government, in France, 245, 274-5, 
406, 441, 449. 

Suvorof, 256. 

Sweden, 75, 264, 338, 385, 417-8, 432, 
456. 

Swiss Guard, 175, 176, 180. 

Switzerland, 251, 303-304, 364, 391. 



Taille, the, 66. 

Taine, 6, 9, 40. 

Talleyrand, 70, 93, 113, 125, 128, 137, 
141, 142, 251, 252, 269, 272, 402, 
412, 443. 444. 447. 448, 452 f. 

Talhen, 180, 218-9. 

Target, 89. 

Targovitz, Confederation of, 170. 

Tariff, barriers, 22; in 1786, 86; of 1791, 
124; during the Continental Sys- 
tem, 341 f., 362; at the Restora- 
tion, 449. 

Tauroggen, Convention of, 426. 

Taxation, under the old regime, 8-10, 
13, 21, 22, 31, 32, 53, 58; French 
attempts to reform, 62, 66, 71-2; 
changes made by the Revolution, 
102, 122-4; failure to collect, 204; 
reforms under the Consulate, 273- 
4; during the Empire, 404-5; Eng- 
lish, 386. 

Tennis Court affair, 94. 

Teplitz, treaties at, 439, 453. 

Textile machinery, 79 f., 280, 365. 

Tithe, the, 7, 102, 127. 

Thomson, 44, 45. 

Thorn, 192, 454. 

Thouret, 93. 

Tilsit, Peace of, 337-8, 346, 367, 385. 

Tippoo, the Sultan of Mysore, 254. 

Tolentino, Treaty of, 243, 250. 

Torres Vedras, Lines of, 356. 

Toulon, 202, 203. 

Trafalgar, battle of, 322-3. 

Treilhard, 93. 

Trent, bishopric of, 295. 

Treves, Electorate of, 186, 297, 454. 

Tribunal of August 17, 180; see also 
Revolutionary Tribunal. 

Tribunate, the, 268, 280, 284, 404. 

Tronchet, 93, 282. 

Trudaine, 44. 

Tuileries, Louis XVI at, 105; mob in, 
172; attack upon, 176. 

Turgot, 43, 44, 62, 64-7, 70, 71, 93, 121. 

Turks, the, 60, 61, 159, 337, 354, 415, 
418. 

Tuscany, 56, 263, 295, 303, 350, 387, 
455- 

Tyrol, 359. 455- 



494 



INDEX 



Ulm, capture of, ^21-2. 

United Irishmen, Society of the, 151 

United Netherlands, United Provinces, 
74. 192, 233, 250; see Batavian Re- 
public, Holland. 

United States, and France, 67-8, 195-6; 
the Louisiana question, 272-3; con- 
sequences of the warfare upon neu- 
tral commerce, 343 {., 361, 362; 
growth of manufactures, 365: War 
of 1812, 418-9. 

Valais, 303. 

Valtelline, 242. 

Varennes, Flight to, 144. 

Vendean troubles, 198, 223, 458. 

Vendemiaire, 13th, 225-6. 

Venice, 241, 242, 243, 246, 326. 393. 

Verdun, 181, 185. 

Vergennes, 85. 

Vergniaud, 149, 165, 166, 176, 183. 

Versailles, Treaty of, 85. 

Vienna, Treaty of, 359; Congress of. 

452-6.^ 
Vieux Cordelier, 212. 
Villeneuve, Admiral, 319-20. 
Vittoria, battle of, 435. 
Voltaire, 37, 38, 49, 57. 

Walpole, Sir Robert, 32. 

War of Liberation, 429 f. 

Warsaw, 217; Grand Duchy, 337, 359, 

w 1,-^''.°' 398-9, 433, 434, 436, 453-4- 

Washington, George, 179, 196. 



Waterloo, battle of, 461-2. 

Watt, James, 77, 83. 

fVealth of Nations, Smith, 44, 289. 

Weimar, 287. 

W^i!«ley, Governor General, 254. 

Welles ey. Sir Arthur, 353, 356; as 

Wellington, 356, 418, 423, 438. 440, 

460-3. 
Wesley, John, 36, 44. 
Westphalia, kingdom of, 338, 390, 392, 

395-6, 440. 
White Terror, 463. 
Whitefield, George, 36. 
Whitworth, Lord, 306. 
Wieland, 45 287, 355- 
Wilkinson, John, 82. 
Winckelmann, 45. 
Wittenberg, 41:4. 
Wolf, F. A., 288, 380. 
Wordsworth, 107, 307-8. 
Workmen, 16, 121-2, 281. 
Worms, 148, 185, 197. 
Worship of Reason, 141. 
Wiirmser, Marshal, 239. 
Wiirzburg, 296. 
Wiirttemberg, duchy of, 155, 236, 294, 

296, 297, 299; kingdom, 326, 396- 

7, 424. 455- 

Yorck, General, 424, 426, 429. 
Young, Arthur, 5, 7, 10, 21, 95, 107, 108. 
170. 

Zurich, battle of, 257. 



THE RENAISSANCE 
THE PROTESTANT REVOLUTION 

AND 

THE CATHOLIC REFORMATION 

IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE 

BY 

EDWARD MASLIN HULME 

PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF IDAHO 

Royal 8vo. 598 pages. $2.50 postpaid 

Professor Hulme has written a work which reveals wide 
knowledge of a period particularly difficult to master. In liter- 
ary style, in comprehensiveness, in balance of accent it is 
delightful. It covers a field which will always be of interest and 
importance to both the student and the general reader. 

Judiciously condensed, presenting the essence of all that 
recent study has proved and disproved, placed in new lights, or 
reduced to its proper proportions in the history of what still 
remains the most significant and fruitful episode in the progress 
of humanity toward self-realization, the book has the further 
merit of being readable. It will serve to dispel in large degree 
the impression, sent abroad by earlier historians and still gener- 
ally held, that the Renaissance and the Reformation were but 
slightly interrelated; that, indeed, in its broad outline, the 
"pagan " new life in the South was the antithesis of the awaken- 
ing of the North. The author lays emphasis throughout upon 
the multiple aspects of the Reformation, social, economic, 
political, which are in the general mind still obscured if not 
hidden by its religious phase; and he is uncommonly felicitous 
in his summings up of the results of influences and movements 
and of the significance and the personality of leaders. 

He constantly suggests in his treatment of the social and 
economic phases of the period a parallel with the unrests and 
new aspirations of our own day. This gives the narrative a 
living quality without impairing its historical correctness. 



THE CENTURY CO. 

UNION SQUARE NEW YORK 






SB 



1 81 



Vincent of Beauvais, 119 & n. 3, 
162, 223, 239; Speculum His- 
toriale, 223 

Viterbo, 212, 261 

Volo, Gulf of, 112 

Wadi Sabu, 411 n. 3 

Wahegins, igo 

Waldemar IV, K. of Danes, 332 n. i 

Waleran de Warvin, 204 n. i 

Wales, 5, 44 

Wallachia, 195, 206, 218, 435, 440, 

444 &n. 2,447,451,455 
Walsingham, 333 
Walter de Maundy, 333 n. 6 
Walter de Ruppes, Flemish knight, 

441 
Warwick, Earl of, 339 
Wenzel, Duke of Pomerania, 184 
Wey. Vide William 
Widdin, 389 n. 2, 390, 393 n. i, 

435. 443*444 n. r 
Wilhelm von Boldensele, 160— I, 

162, 168; Hodoeporicon ad T.S., 

161, 169 
William Fotheringay, 408 n. 3, 421 

n. I 
William Occam, 9 
William de la Pole, Lord of Castle 

Ashby, 339 & n. 3 



INDEX 603 

William of Tripoli, 247 n. i 
William Wey, 212, 2 1 5- 1 9; royal 

brief to — , 216 n. 2; Itineraries 

of — , 215-16 nn. 
Wiltshire, 216 
Wurtemburg, 220 
Wyclif, 9, 188, 189 

Yalbogha al-Khassiki, 329 n. 5, 352, 
371 n., 372 & nn., 375 & n. i 

Ya'qub, Jewish envoy to Pierre de 
Lusignan at Alexandria, 368-9, 
369 n. 2 

Ya'qub, Turkish general, 464 

Yerakites, 329 

Yon de Cholet, 421 n. i 

York, Duke of, 143, 152 

Ypres, 462 

'Ysini', 170 

Zaccharia. Fide Benito and Mar- 

tino 
Zaitun, 251 n. 7, 254 
Zanta, 461 
Zara, 198, 212 
Zealand, 147 
Zeno. Fide Pietro 
Zuchio (Morea), 387 
Zwailah Gate (Cairo), 476 
Zwornik, 464 



ADDENDUM TO APPENDIX I 

(pp. 487-9) 

Compare I. Longpre — Deux opuscules inedits du B. Raymond Lu//e, 
in France franciscaine, 18 (1935), 145-54. This includes the 
Petitio pro Conversione Infidelium. M. Longpre's text is derived from 
the B.N. MS. Lat. 15450, and mine from the Munich MS. Lat. 
10565. Evidently both texts were in preparation at the same time, 
and the decision to leave my text as it stands is due to the fact that 
Longpre's work has been made known to me only at the final stage 
in the publication of my book. The Munich text, moreover, may 
prove useful for purposes of comparison and further collation with 
the Paris MS., and this may be sufficient justification for the space 
here given to it. 



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